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Introduction 
_________________________________________ 
 
“We were quite a big clique of Europeans in the MFA back then (...) 
who had distinct opinions about where Norway was supposed to go when it came to integration.”1 
Eivinn Berg on the Europeans, 1960-1972. 
 
September 25, 1972, marked the end of the most bitterly fought political struggle of 
Norwegian postwar history. With a slight majority (53,5 per cent), those opposed to 
membership in the European Community (EC) prevailed in a popular referendum, which was 
the crescendo of an unprecedented mobilisation of voters on both sides of the issue. With the 
Norwegian ‘no’, the date also marked the first non-enlargement of the EC, assigning Norway 
a peripheral role in the process of European integration. 
On three different occasions the Norwegian government encountered the Community. 
The first time (1960-63) the hegemonic Labour government was forced to follow as Britain, 
Denmark and Ireland applied for membership negotiations with the young European 
Economic Community (EEC) in the summer of 1961. Both the fear of losing out on export 
markets and traditional foreign policy ties to Britain (and the US) pulled them in this 
direction. The Community had ambitious plans for cooperation both in the economic and 
political field, but was unprepared for the daunting task of negotiating an enlargement. The 
Norwegian government spent most of the first round coming to terms with the fundamental 
reorientation an application entailed, hesitantly applying ten months after the applications 
were made by Britain, Denmark and Ireland. Norway did not enter real negotiations until 
French President Charles De Gaulle gave his first veto to the British, and consequently the 
Irish, Danes and Norwegians.  
The second time (1967), a divided Centre-Right coalition headed by Prime Minister Per 
Borten from the Eurosceptic Centre Party (agrarian) reluctantly applied for membership a full 
month after the other three countries. At the time, the EEC was recovering from several 
internal crises and had lost much of its supranational momentum. Still, the young coalition – 
which had broken 20 years of Labour rule – made domestic compromises that would have 
been difficult to uphold in real negotiations (such as permanent exemptions from the 
Community’s Common Agricultural Policy, CAP). There was great relief, therefore, when de 
Gaulle came to the rescue with a second veto. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012. 
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 The same coalition would not survive when the issue of membership returned in 1969-
1970. The closer the coalition came to real negotiations with the EC, the more internal 
divisions came to the fore, and in March 1971, it fell apart on account of a minor indiscretion 
regarding the EC-case from the Prime Minister. The newly appointed Labour Party 
government, headed by the staunchly pro-European Trygve Bratteli, was clearly in favour of 
membership. The Labour Movement, however, was torn, and the EC-sceptics were well 
organised in an extra-parliamentary ad hoc organisation which transcended political divisions. 
Moreover, the Community’s push for deepening, widening and completion, accelerated the 
integration project and diluted the frail domestic compromises the negotiations rested upon. 
The Labour government signed the accession treaty in January 22, 1972, after tough and 
prolonged negotiations with the EC and other applicants on fisheries, and failed to take 
Norway into the Community after a referendum eight months later. Fear of loss of sovereignty 
– deeply rooted in historical traditions, rural population, language and symbols, and 
effectively exploited by the ‘no’-side – was cited as the number one reason for voting ‘no’ 
among the electorate. This is a short recap of the traditional narrative of Norwegian-
Community relations in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
This thesis, on the other hand, investigates the diplomats at the centre of those twelve 
years of encounters, who worked continuously with the EC-case, and who developed a strong 
pro-European sentiment: the Europeans. The term European is both a category that this thesis 
uses to capture this group of diplomats analytically, and a name they used to describe 
themselves in interviews and contemporary sources.2 The present thesis asks two fundamental 
questions: 
1) Who were the Europeans? And, 
2) How did the Europeans work with the EC-case? 
As we shall see, being a European denotes the development of an emotional and professional 
conviction that membership in the EC is a good thing in itself. But it also carried a certain 
displacement: the Norwegian Europeans would never follow the careers of their colleagues in 
the other applicant countries into the European machinery, and in the Norwegian context 
they would be discursively marginalised. Who the Europeans were and how they worked with 
the EC-case was determined by their in-betweenness – being a European meant being caught in 
the middle.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is also an adaptation of historian Robin Allers’ term ‘Europa-experten’. Robin Allers: Besondere Beziehungen – 
Deutschland, Norwegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt (1966-1974), Bonn: Dietz Verlag 2009. Other diplomats also used 
the terms ‘a good European’ or ‘a committed European’ in the 1960s and 1970s. See for example: FCO 30/1026 – 8 
July 1971, Oslo (British Embassy) - G. A. Crossley – Dear Norman. 
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As will be argued, the Europeans profoundly shaped Norwegian European policy between 
1960 and 1972, helping to redirect the Norwegian postwar foreign policy in a fundamental 
way. They produced an entirely new political rationale, which tied Norway’s traditional 
Atlantic outlook to the new European policy, and which connected continued prosperity and 
security to the necessity of membership. Through their work, moreover, the Europeans altered 
and challenged established diplomatic norms and practices, common in most of postwar 
Western Europe, in untraditional ways. Due to their personal commitment to membership, 
they used informal, transnational and non-governmental arenas – particularly the European 
Movement in Norway – and administrative power and expertise, to defend a particular 
membership line, which they had been crucial in developing themselves.  
Furthermore, they were at the heart of the government and pro-Europeans’ information 
campaigns leading up to the referendum, and were discredited for their involvement 
afterwards. The most hard-hitting critique – attacking the core of civil servant norms and 
diplomatic self-perceptions – was that they were ‘unfaithful servants’, working out of personal 
conviction, rather in service to the government or the good of the country.3 Neither the 
validity of these accusations, which were posed by contemporary EC-sceptic social scientists,   
nor how the Europeans ended up in a position were they could be accused of this from scholars 
(albeit in a deeply politicised way), has been properly investigated. As this thesis shows, these 
issues can only be understood by investigating, first, the deep changes diplomatic practices 
underwent in the 1950s, 60s and 70s (particularly multilateral-economic); second, the distinct 
historical and social role of the ‘diplomat’ in the Norwegian context; and third, the profound 
normative commitment of the Europeans. Last, the Europeans also changed the Community 
itself. In the negotiations of the 1970s, the most contested item on Norway’s agenda was 
fisheries. The Europeans created a communitarian negotiation strategy that would, through a 
string of multilateral adaptations; end up altering the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy.  
The Europeans were forged into a community and received their political potency (and 
weakness) from their in-betweenness: between being professionally and personally invested in 
the membership issue; their actions lay between traditional diplomacy and politics; their ideas, 
practices and spaces were constituted between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’ in multiple ways, and 
their ultimate task remained to bridge the division between the two entities. In brief, this thesis 
tells the story of a handful of Norwegian diplomats who became passionately pro-European in 
the 1960s, and who worked to get Norway on the inside of the EC – a failed elite, shaped in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Øivind Østerud and Jon Elster (Eds.) De Utro Tjenere – Embetsverket i EF-kampen, Oslo: PAX 
forlag (1974). 
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the middle, which nonetheless made a lasting, yet untold, mark on Norway, Europe and the 
diplomatic trade.4 
 
Locating the Diplomat 
The Europeans, then, are at the centre of this thesis. In order to “bring the diplomat back in” as 
historian Karen Gram-Skjoldager puts it5, this thesis focuses on two elements. In dialogue 
with other disciplines, it seeks to understand diplomacy, and the diplomat, in their own right,. 
This means distinguishing diplomacy from, for example, politics, as we traditionally 
understand it. Since historical studies placing the diplomat at the centre are few and far 
between, it means that we are also in the business of creating an epistemology of diplomacy 
and a broad conceptual framework with which to analyse it. Second, “bringing the diplomat 
back in” means to centre on diplomatic practices; what diplomats do, how they do it and 
where they do it. The thesis is answering the call of political scientist and social anthropologist 
Iver B. Neumann: “[diplomacy] should be studied concretely, as a specific practice which is 
carried out by human beings acting inside a web of historically emergent norms and 
organizations.”6 The two elements mentioned above are clearly connected and, in some ways, 
inseparable.  
Diplomatic history, and later International History (IH), are marked by a tenacious 
traditionalism, focussing predominantly on formal functions and powers, interstate bargaining 
and policy outcomes.7 In this tradition, academics have long taken for granted the classic 
Weberian distinction between the professional, knowledge-based, rational-legal bureaucracy 
and the charismatic politician, guided by the electoral process, as an unquestionable and 
unarticulated division when writing about diplomacy and/or foreign policy.8 Weber argued 
that a bureaucrat who disagrees with a political decision should nonetheless “carry it out as if 
it corresponded to his innermost conviction.”9 British interwar diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 They are, for example, not mentioned in Rune Slagstad’s massive De nasjonale strateger, Oslo: Pax Forlag (2001), 
otherwise a veritable ‘who’s who’ of administrative elites shaping Norwegian society and politics the past 200 years. 
5 Karen Gram-Skjoldager “Bringing the Diplomat back in. Elements of a new historical Research Agenda” EUI 
Working Paper, RSCAS 13 (2011). 
6 Iver B. Neumann, The English School on Diplomacy, The Hague: Clingendael Institute (2002), p. 0. 
7 Karen Gram-Skjoldager “Never Talk to Strangers? On Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of Diplomacy 
in the European Community/European Union” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 22:4, (2011), pp. 696-714, p. 699; Ann 
Christina L.-Knudsen and Karen Gram-Skjoldager “An Introduction” in Knudsen and Gram-Skjoldager (Eds.) 
Living Political Biography. Narrating 20th Century European Lives, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press (2012), pp. 13-30, p. 16. 
8 Sir Ernest Satow Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice, ed. Lord Gore-Booth (5th Ed.), London: Longman ([1917] 
1979); Sir Harold Nicolson Diplomacy A Basic Guide to the Conduct of Contemporary Foreign Affairs, London: Thorton 
Butterworth (1939). 
9 Max Weber, ”Politics as vocation” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
London: Routledge (1948 [1919]), pp. 77-128; Quote from Iver B. Neumann At home with the Diplomats – Inside a 
European Foreign Ministry, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (2012), p. 86. 
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in his oft-quoted book, noted that the diplomat’s “duty is to place [his] experience at the 
disposal of the Government in power” and to “execute his instructions without further 
question.”10 Weber tried to capture the ideal bureaucrat while Nicolson offered a guide to the 
traits of diplomacy, yet neither of them studied the concrete unfolding of diplomacy at any 
given time in history. 
In IH, taking this distinction for granted has often led to the peculiar outcome that while 
one may encounter diplomats negotiating on every page, they remain faceless conveyers of 
national interests.11 The diplomat is the politicians’ mute henchman, leaving him “an actor 
without any independent political quality,” ready to negotiate “everything from the price of 
butter to security and policy issues.”12 Thus, while many historians implicitly operate with a 
very clear distinction between the diplomat and the politician – the Weberian distinction – 
and thereby deface the diplomat, they also portray the two as one and the same – the 
diplomat being the silent extension of the politician’s reach.13  
In diplomat-turned-historian Stephen Wall’s The Official History of Britain and the European 
Community, volume II, for instance, the intended subject matter is high politics, but most of the 
book is in fact filled with meticulous studies of diplomatic practice. Take, for example, this 
reflection on the famous May 1971 Heath-Pompidou summit, a bilateral meeting between the 
British Prime Minister and the French President, which in many ways secured a successful 
outcome to the British negotiations for membership in the EC:  
 
“The meeting which in due course did take place between Heath and Pompidou has rightly been 
seen since as a turning point in the negotiations for British entry. But it is interesting to note, not 
just the realization of the need for preparation, so that a success could be anticipated, but also the 
degree of contrived theatricality which was envisaged from the outset.”14  
 
What Wall notes, but then leaves without further reflection, is a specific diplomatic ‘way of 
doing things.’ Distinguishing it from politics, he describes how diplomats prepare sites for 
successful negotiations to take place. Diplomats, in fact, spend much of their time preparing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Nicolson Diplomacy (1939), p. 42. 
11 As Neumann notes, some diplomatic practitioners turned scholars, such as Adam Watson (1984) ”understand the 
work of a state’s diplomats taken together as no less than a state’s ’national interests’” Iver B. Neumann: At home with 
the Diplomats – Inside a European Foreign Ministry, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (2012), p. 3. In international history, 
however, this has led to the diplomat being ‘swallowed’ by the nation state. 
12 Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Ann-Chr. L. Knudsen “Hvor gik statens representanter hen, da de gik ud? Nye 
rolleforståelser hos diplomater og parlamentarikere efter 1945”, TEMP, 1 (2010), pp. 82-113, p. 84. 
13 In Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster (1994), Henry Kissinger makes no real distinction between foreign 
policy, diplomacy or statesmen and diplomats. Diplomats proper are, however, left to carry out the statesman’s 
orders. 
14 Stephen Wall From Rejection to Referendum, 1963-1975, The Official History of Britain and the European 
Community, Vol. 2. Oxon: Routledge (2013), p. 386. 
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sites: from ‘informal’ dinners, meticulously planning everything from the menu to seating 
arrangements, to multilateral summits.15 Wall, in fact, touches upon how to ‘emotionally 
prepare’ a site through ‘contrived theatricality.’ Preparing sites, such as meals or meetings, are 
among the oldest diplomatic practices.16 
Another insight one could extract from the book is that the diplomats who prepared the 
Heath-Pompidou summit by no means acted as ‘mute henchmen’ – they shaped policy. 
French and British diplomats exchanged notes on themes to be discussed and those that 
should be left out, decided how many people should be present at the meeting, the order of 
business, prepared arguments for their respective sides, and shared viewpoints prior to the 
meeting to assure smooth talks and avoid unpleasant surprises.17 They did this in close 
coordination with diplomats from the other five EC countries while remaining in touch with 
the Americans and others of interest.18 In this light, diplomacy is a “key institution of global 
politics.”19  
This is precisely what the thesis aims at: by shifting the analytical focus away from the 
state(sman) to the diplomat, it gives agency back to the diplomat. But, if diplomatic practices 
are of such importance, and diplomacy is a key institution of global politics, why then is it so 
often neglected? One answer is found in the traditional (self-)perception of diplomacy: the 
diplomat erases himself. He talks on behalf of the state, thinks along the lines of national 
interests, suggests solutions carried out by others, facilitates sites where others meet – he is to 
be a medium, placed between entities to ensure frictionless interactions.20 Heroic feats, big 
words, emotional moments and epic conflicts –all the exciting things when taken at face value 
– are left to the statesman.21 After spending months preparing the Heath-Pompidou summit, 
for instance, diplomats naturally left the dramatic climax (the meeting itself) and the “wildly 
exciting” and “historic” joint press conference following the summit, to the statesmen.22  
Thus, the fact that much of “everyday policy formation (...) is in the hands of diplomats” 
– as illustrated by the Heath-Pompidou summit – is easily lost in traditional international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 On the importance of organising space and furniture appropriately in multilateral talks, for example, see Andrew 
Seidel ”The Use of the Physical Environment in Peace Negotiations’ in Journal of Architectural Education, vol. 32, no. 2 
(1978), p. 19-23. Reference lifted from John W. Young Twentieth-Century Diplomacy. A Case Study of British Practice, 
1963-1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2012). 
16 Iver B. Neumann Diplomatic Sites – A Critical Enquiry, London: Hurst & Company (2013). 
17 Wall From Rejection to Referendum (2013), p. 386. 
18 In fact, Wall spends 21(!) pages on the preparations of the Heath-Pompidou summit without analysing the 
diplomacy of it. Wall From Rejection to Referendum (2013), p. 386-407. 
19 Neumann, At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 3. 
20 Those looking into the diplomacy of the 21st Century still highlight the role of diplomats as frictionless mediators. 
Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan and Paul Sharp Futures of Diplomacy – Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st 
Century, Clingendael Report No1, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (2012). 
21 Again Kissinger’s Diplomacy (1994) is a splendid example of this. 
22 Edward Heath The Course of My Life, London: Hodder and Stoughton (1988), p. 372. 
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history.23 The seemingly dry diplomatic landscape of callous memos, notes, dispatches and 
telegrams is mistaken for the simple, mechanical execution of decisions taken elsewhere. 
However, while contemporary IH has mostly described states’ or statesmen’s rational political 
choices, it has done so by ploughing through an almost endless amount of the detailed 
remains of diplomatic practice – the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs.), the 
archives of international and regional organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
business organisations, trade unions and many others. All are filled to the brim with 
diplomatic conduct. A rich variety of archival material is at our disposal, then, but in order to 
escape the ‘soft variant of realism’ that has underpinned the work of most IH historians (and 
perhaps also the logic of the diplomats themselves), this thesis draws inspiration and borrows 
heuristic tools from bordering academic disciplines and other historical fields.24  
Three sources of inspiration should be mentioned. First, the ‘durosellienne’ history of 
international relations, in the tradition of l’École des Annales, which focuses on both the ‘forces 
profondes’ shaping international relations (demography, economic systems, collective 
mentalities etc.) and the events and individuals. As Gram-Skjoldager has noted, historian 
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle in L’homme d’état25 “dealt with the decision-making individuals, their 
social background, their ideas and resources, and with how they were influenced by structural 
forces and with how they were, in turn, capable of modifying and bending these forces.”26 To 
understand who the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case, we need to map 
out and situate their social, educational and prosopographical traits. A second important 
source of inspiration is the so-called ‘English School’ of international relations. Starting out in 
the 1960s, they were among the first to formulate general reflections on the nature and 
development of diplomacy, and they placed diplomacy, as an institution, at the centre of 
international politics. By the 1980s, a third generation of English School scholars had turned 
increasingly to the social practice and historical forms of diplomacy.27 Following the end of 
the Cold War, which had been dominated by the realist school, more studies started to 
appreciate the significance of diplomacy in shaping politics and the international arena.28 
Last, there is a broad range of newer studies from the social sciences, and increasingly also 
history, that combine elements of what has been labelled the transnational or global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Neumann, At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 6. 
24 Gram-Skjoldager “Never Talk to Strangers?” (2011), p. 699. 
25 See Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationales, Paris (1954). 
26 Gram-Skjoldager “Never Talk to Strangers?” (2011), p. 700.  
27 Gram-Skjoldager “Never Talk to Strangers?” (2011), p. 700-701; Neuman The English School (2002). 
28 For a recent example exploring the constitution of world politics through diplomatic practice, see: Ole Jacob 
Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Neumann (eds.) Diplomacy: The Making of World Politics, Cambridge: CUP (forthcoming). 
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governance turn with a socio-cultural focus on the make-up and changes in diplomatic norms, 
identities, loyalties and practices.29 The sociological ‘turn’ centres “the making and shaping of 
the ideas and norms that inform the ‘rules of the game’” and how beliefs about national 
identity, ideology, professional roles and much more shape the exercise of power.30 This 
perspective therefore removes the strict divisions between formal and informal politics often 
found in traditional international history, a distinction – as we shall see – that makes very little 
sense when investigating the Europeans, whose professional and personal convictions and 
networks are increasingly conflated. The sociological ‘turn’ has also greatly influenced 
research on institutions. Sociological institutionalism understands institutions as “a web of 
interrelated norms – formal and informal – governing social relationships”.31 
Following recent developments in the field of International History, and what has been 
labelled New Diplomatic History32, this thesis studies the social and professional practices of 
the Europeans as part of an institutional web of norms (particularly the MFA and diplomacy as 
a profession) shaped by social, educational and prosopographical traits.  
What remains is to have a clear epistemological framework to understand the way in 
which the Europeans produced knowledge. The 1960s and early 1970s were times of profound 
and rapid change: the collapse of the ‘Bretton Woods’-order, the challenge against established 
hierarchies following ‘1968’, détente and globalisation gave the latter part of the period a 
sense of increased fluidity (and for some, uncertainty). However, the 1960s and 1970s were 
also the years in which the postwar welfare state, and the Keynesian order, peaked. Equally, 
the 1970s saw a marked shift from government to governance, though as has been noted, this 
was not as sudden as described by social scientists. Many of these developments had been a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Some examples from the field of history: Gram-Skjoldager and Knudsen “Hvor gik statens representanter hen” 
(2010); Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Ann-Christina L. Knudsen “Elite transformations and diffusion in foreign 
policy: a socio-historical approach to the emergence of European power elites” in Niilo Kauppi and Mikael Rask 
Madsen (Eds.) Transnational Power Elites. The New Professionals of Governance, Law and Security, New York: Routledge 
(2013), pp. 81-100; Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen “A European Political System in the Making 
1958-1970: The Relevance of Emerging Committee Structures” in Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 14, 
No. 1, Nomos: Baden Baden (2008), pp. 51-67; N. Piers Ludlow “Mieux que six ambassadeurs. L’emergence du 
COREPER durant les premières années de la CEE”, in Laurence Badel, Stanislas Jeannesson, N. Piers Ludlow 
(Eds.) Les administrations nationales et la construction européenne. Un approche historique (1919-1975), Brussels: Peter Lang 
(2005), pp. 337-356; Thomas Raineau Whitehall and Europe: British senior officials and the unification of Europe, 1949-1979 
Unpublished PhD Paris: University of Paris-Sorbonne (forthcoming). 
30 Knudsen and Gram-Skjoldager “An Introduction” (2012), p. 17, Patrick Finney “Introduction: what is 
international history?” in Patrick Finney (Ed.) Palgrave Advances in International History Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan 
(2005), p. 18; Frank A. Ninkovich “No Post-Mortems for Postmodernism, Please’, Diplomatic History, 22 (3) (1998), 
pp. 451-466. 
31 Victor Nee and Paul Ingram “Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure” in Mary 
C. Brinton & Victor Nee (Eds.) The New Institutionalism in Sociology, New York: Russell Sage Foundation (1998), pp. 
19-45, p. 19. 
32 For an introduction, see: Dino Knudsen and Haakon A. Ikonomou (Eds.) New Diplomatic History – An introduction, 
Copenhagen: PubliCom, University of Copenhagen (2015). 
	  	   27	  
long time coming.33 For diplomats, the postwar years saw increasing multilateralisation, 
economification and specialisation, within a growing number of diverse international, regional 
and non-governmental organisations - developments that challenged former distinctions 
between domestic and foreign spheres. On the other hand, “the state and its representatives 
constitute[d] a crucial and persistent element of the postwar era’s international organizational 
reality”.34 In the professional field of the Europeans, both these developments were present, and 
to grasp this we need to properly situate their knowledge production in this field. 
Diplomacy has been described as having a Janus-faced character: one side rooted in the 
national and the other based in the international. On the one hand, the diplomat represents 
the state, defending national interests and acting on behalf of the government; on the other 
hand, he is part of a transnational, cosmopolitan corps of diplomats, with a common set of 
rules and a deeply ritualised set of norms and practices. As Jozef Bátora contends, the tension 
between the two faces of diplomacy has been “accommodated through the emergence of 
diplomats as a specialized group of professionals recruited and socialized precisely into the 
dual role that the enterprise of diplomacy requires them to fulfil”.35  
Neumann suggests that the diplomat ‘abroad’ and the diplomat ‘at home’ are engaged 
in different forms of knowledge production. At the core of knowledge production abroad is the 
gathering and dissemination of information, the dispatch being the end product. Hedley Bull 
described the diplomat abroad as someone who was “uniquely skilled in gathering a particular 
kind of information that is essential to the conduct of international relations.”36 Neumann 
builds on this and contends that “[i]nformation gathering is a key category of practices 
anchored by permanent diplomacy. What Bull describes is nothing less than the diplomatic mode 
of knowledge production.” 37  
At home, the diplomat is concerned with producing policy documents. Through memos 
he structures an endless stream of information coming into the MFA – a continuous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Governance: “The term denotes a shift from centralized ‘Government’ by cohesive state institutions exercising 
their clearly defined powers in hierarchical forms of decision-making towards decentralized informal forms of 
political communication and decision-making by sets of state and non-state actors in less hierarchically structured or 
even non-hierarchical relationships.” Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler “Transnational Networks 
in European Integration Governance: Historical Perspectives on an Elusive Phenomenon” Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte 
Leucht and Michael Gehler (Eds.) Transnational networks in regional integration: Governing Europe, 1945-83, Palgrave 
Macmillan: Basingstoke (2010), pp. 1-17, p. 1-2. For a political scientist claiming that Governance ‘started’ in the 
1970s, see: Paul Hirst “Democracy and Governance” in Jon Pierre (Ed.) Debating Governance, Oxford: OUP (2000). 
34 Gram-Skjoldager and Knudsen “Hvor gik statens representanter hen, da de gik ud?” (2010), p. 87. 
35 Jozef Bátora “Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?”, Working Paper ARENA No.3 
2003, Oslo (2003), p. 1-2. 
36 Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, London: MacMillan (1977), p. 181. 
37 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 33. My Italics. 
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production of text, shaping a response to any given situation. Neumann stresses that this 
bureaucratic mode of knowledge production socially integrates the diplomats: 
 
“As a result, the writing up of a diplomatic text is not primarily a question of communicating a 
certain point of view to the outside world, or producing a tight analysis. It is rather an exercise 
in consensus building. One effect of this mode of knowledge production is that texts emanating 
from a foreign ministry are all, at least ideally, in the same voice.”38 
 
Since this is simply ‘an exercise in consensus building’, he claims that the diplomat at home 
“when not interfered with by politicians, (...) produce nothing new”. 39 This is fiction, for when 
is a diplomat at home not in contact with politicians or diplomats abroad? Seeing the two 
modes of knowledge production as interlinked, this thesis concludes the opposite:  diplomats 
always produced something new.40 Diplomacy could be described as a ceaseless ‘real-time 
interpretation’ between the international and the national. It was through such connected 
practices that the Europeans produced policy and constituted their worldview. Thus, the very 
core of their diplomatic practice – the knowledge productions combined – broke down the 
inside-outside barriers. 
How are we then to understand the concept of national interests? In the field of 
diplomacy, Rebecca Adler-Nissen suggests to “move away from seeing the state as a unitary 
actor (...) and look to those who act in the name of the state.” Instead of dealing with “the 
peculiarities of some national character”, she looks at “the particularities and patterns of 
different strategies in concrete negotiations.”41 In her study of how national diplomats deal 
with the Danish and British opt-outs in the Council of Ministers, she shows how notions of 
‘national interests’ or ‘sovereignty’, and processes of inclusion and exclusion, “are 
continuously constructed and reconstructed in diplomatic practice”.42 This move towards 
empirical studies of practice among political scientists is important, because it is able to grasp 
the transnational and national sides of diplomacy simultaneously.43  
On the one hand, therefore, we might place the Europeans within the boundaries of 
different political entities. Rather than understanding the boundary as a final, thick line, with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p.7. Neumann thus refutes both realist and institutionalist claims. 
39 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p.170. 
40 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 176; Karen Gram-Skjoldager review of At Home with the Diplomats: 
Inside a European Foreign Ministry, by Iver B. Neumann, New Global Studies 7(1): 54-56 (2013). 
41Rebecca Adler-Nissen Opting out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European integration, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2014), p. 12; See also: Iver B. Neumann “Beware of Organicism: The Narrative Self of 
the State, Review of International Studies 30(02), Cambridge: Cambridge Journals, pp, 259-267. 
42 Adler-Nissen Opting out of the European Union (2014), p. 18; Niilo Kauppi “Bourdieu’s Political Sociology and the 
Politics of European Integration”, Theory and Society, 32 (5/6) (2003), pp. 775-789. 
43 Neumann, The English School (2002). 
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a definitive outside and inside, political scientist Brian Hocking suggests conceptualising it as a 
hotly contested area of continuous mediation.44 On the other hand, as many scholars have 
made clear, diplomats do in fact act in the name of the state. In fact, very often they are the 
state, as when an Ambassador says, “Norway believes”. Bátora points to the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815 as a defining moment when such practices were codified and formalised as 
“routines for future relations between states”. 45  A consequence of this ‘institutionalised 
interaction’ – where states categorised their policy as domestic and foreign – is that diplomats 
(like academics) presuppose this division. And as Neumann convincingly argues, “all people 
who presuppose this dichotomy, and make it the basis of their actions in the social world, by 
that very presupposition are reproducing the division between inside and outside”. 46 
Following this line of argument, national interests could be studied as historical and spatial 
discourses that are reproduced and altered through diplomatic practice. 47  This is also 
significant for the field of enlargement history. 
Recent trends in the interdisciplinary field of diplomacy studies enable us to construct 
an epistemological framework: engaging with the mountains of written material produced by 
the Europeans related to the EC-case, this thesis – apart from incorporating the 
prosopographical and institutional aspects – understands their practice as structured by two 
important elements. On the one hand, a diplomatic practice that ipso facto breaks down the 
barriers between insides and outsides. On the other hand, a worldview and notion of a 
professional self that upholds a clear distinction between the two. Analytically, therefore, 
diplomats could be seen as institutionalised and inbetweeners, placed within the contested borders 
of different political entities. Only by reading the sources through such a lens may we locate 
the diplomat as an historical actor. 
 
Enlargement – entangled and embedded 
To understand what this thesis has to offer to integration history, one has to deal with two 
struggles within the field: that of its ‘end point’, and if there should be such a thing, and that of 
the role of the nation state. Unsurprisingly, the two are inseparable. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Brian Hocking “Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the 
European Union” in Brian Hocking and David Spence (Eds.) Foreign Ministries in the European Union. Integrating 
Diplomats. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2002), pp. 1-18. 
45 Neumann (2002) from Bátora, p. 5. 
46 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 41, 42. 
47 It is important to remember that ‘interests’ are historical and spatial constructions informed by norms, identities, 
and values. If interests are constructed, then it follows that what is deemed to be rational is also historically 
contingent. Ben Rosamond “History, Political Science, and the Study of European Integration” in Fernando Guirao 
Frances M. B. Lynch, and Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change. pp. 389-404 
New York: Routledge (2012), p. 403. 
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Early integration history had a normative underpinning that historians of European 
integration have had to reconcile with ever since. Walter Lipgens – first holder of the Chair in 
European Integration History at the EUI (1976-79) – headed this historiographical tradition. 
He was an active member in the European Movement, a strong supporter of Konrad 
Adenauer’s Westpolitik, and a committed federalist. Integration – as federalists generally hoped 
– was a way to supersede the discredited nation-state. Accordingly, Lipgens  found the roots of 
the European idea within the resistance movements and various pro-European movements of 
the war years. 48  As historian Wolfram Kaiser notes tongue-in-cheek, Lipgens describes 
European integration as the “linear ascendancy of federalist idealism over the nation-states”.49  
British economic historian Alan S. Milward (who took over the chair at the EUI), 
however, wanted to kill the myth of the “fundamental antithesis between the nation-state and 
the Community (…) set in circulation by academic discourse.”50 Surrendering sovereignty 
only when gaining support and stability at the domestic level, nation-states drove integration. 
Postwar Europe’s path was not one of ever-deeper integration, but marked by nation-states 
“embarking on unprecedented programmes of intervention in economic and social life with 
the express purpose of shaping and controlling their national destinies”.51 After a period 
marked by collapse (1929-1945), the nation-states re-emerged with a conscious policy of 
binding the electorate to the state once again.52  Integration preserved the nation-state, 
harnessed interdependence, and allowed it to support social and economic policies aimed at 
securing economic growth, full employment and welfare for its citizens. In setting up the 
supranational institutions, nation-states defined and limited their loss of sovereignty and aimed 
to preserve maximum national influence for themselves.53 
Both Milward and Kaiser criticise Lipgens for not establishing any causal links between 
the ideas of Europe within resistance movements and European movements and the actual 
setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).54 While Kaiser, after a rather 
reductionist reading, scorns Milward for making nation-states the “only relevant and 
apparently cohesive actors (...) with material interests as the only motivating forces that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration, vol. I: 1945-1947, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1982); Wolfram 
Kaiser Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, Cambridge: CUP (2007), p. 5; Antonio Varsori ”From 
Normative Impetus to Professionalization: Origins and Operation of Research Networks” in Wolfram Kaiser and 
Antonio Varsori (Eds.) European Union History. Themes and Debates, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan(2010), pp. 11-13. 
49 Kaiser Christian Democracy (2007), p. 5. 
50 Alan S. Milward The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London: Routledge (1992), p. 5. 
51 Alan Milward et. al. The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992. London: Routledge (1993), p. 4. 
52 John R. Gillingham “A Theoretical Vacuum: European Integration and Historical Research Today” in Journal of 
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ever mattered in the integration process”.55 In Kaiser’s opinion, Milward came close to 
writing transnational actors and ideas out of the history of integration altogether.  
Kaiser does indeed bring ideas and transnational networks back in (as seen in his study 
on Christian democracy and the origins of the European Union (EU)). Much of Kaiser’s work, 
however, as Walter Lipgens’ before him, is trapped in the trajectory of its analysis. Both 
Kaiser and Lipgens have clear ‘end points’. Kaiser’s is the transnational political networks that 
shape political processes of the present-day EU. Looking through the lens of todays’ multi-
level governance European Union, Kaiser, and others like him, trace the existence and 
influence of political networks, informal politics and non-governmental actors in the formative 
years of European integration.56 This is a valuable contribution to the field, and an important 
correction of earlier state-centred studies. But its inherent teleology is reminiscent of some 
histories of globalisation: it offers another chronology of events, but buys into the same 
progressive logic.57 
The ‘transnational turn’ has been one of the most widely debated historiographical 
directions in the past decade.58 However, as Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Ann-Christina L. 
Knudsen have argued, there is a tendency of essentialising the transnational paradigm, much 
in the same way the nation-state paradigm was cultivated before.59 Just as Milward, from the 
vantage point of postwar reconstruction and the rise of the welfare state, puts  the nation-state 
at centre-stage and perhaps marginalises transnational and ideational forces, Kaiser, from the 
vantage point of today’s multi-level governance, runs the risk of essentialising the 
transnational networks and pushing the powerful postwar states out of history.60  
Curiously, the ‘transnational turn’ has not influenced the sub-field of enlargement 
history in any significant way. Until the 2000s, the predominant approach was to analyse an 
applicant country’s official policy towards the Community, weighing economic and political 	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pros and cons, balancing domestic demands and intergovernmental bargaining, on the road 
towards membership. Whether there was a Milwardian or diplomatic history tendency, the 
state remained firmly at the centre.61 The European Community Liaison Committee of Historians is 
perhaps the most obvious exponent of such an approach, particularly in mapping the two 
failed enlargement rounds (1961-63 and 1967).62 The only comprehensive anthology on 
enlargement, as such, also ends up comparing different member states’ ‘road to 
membership’. 63  This holds true for most of the literature on Norway’s road to ‘non-
membership’ in the 1960s and early 1970s. Inspired by Alan Milward, historian Hans Otto 
Frøland analyses the socioeconomic reasons for the ambivalent Norwegian policy towards the 
EEC.64 Knut Einar Eriksen, Helge Pharo and Rolf Tamnes, describe the domestic political 
considerations regarding the Community in response to shifting geopolitical pressures65, while 
historians Dag Axel Kristoffersen and Geir Almlid dissect the strategies and considerations of 
the Centre-Right coalition and Bratteli’s Labour Government towards the EC.66 Building 
almost exclusively on governmental sources, they all focus on Norway’s official policy towards 
the EC. Such meticulous studies of national policies – with parties, personalities, press, public 
and the past – are valuable as they give detailed insight into both material and non-material 
consideration of the applicant countries and their day-to-day political struggles. However, 
they do not, as this thesis does, explore the crucial learning processes between the different 	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applicants (Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway), or how non-governmental networks 
influenced governmental policies (for example, the European Movement in Norway (EMN)), 
or how the Europeans and other civil servants learned and adapted to the communitarian 
language of the Six through pro-longed interactions and shaped Norwegian foreign policy 
accordingly.67 
Historian Piers Ludlow pioneered a shift away from state policies towards the 
Community, focussing instead on the intra-Community negotiations of the Six during the 
first, failed, enlargement.68 Moreover, Michael J. Geary recently offered the first monograph 
on the Commission and the enlargement process of the 1960s.69 Others, like Emma De 
Angelis and Daniele Pasquinucci, have offered some of the first enquires into the political and 
ideational discourses around enlargement within the European Parliament in a longue durée 
perspective.70 Both the multiarchival and the institutional analyses give important insights to 
the goals and priorities of the Six and the Community.71 Still, transnational studies of 
enlargement are few and far between. One of the few explicitly transnational studies of 
enlargement focus on Socialist party networks in northern Europe working towards the EEC 
application in 1967.72 	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In the Norwegian context, historian Robin M. Allers has produced the most 
comprehensive multi-national, multi-archival and transnational study of the enlargement talks 
of the 1960s and 1970s. His monograph on the unusually close German-Norwegian ties while 
Willy Brandt was Foreign Minister and Chancellor, and the implications it had on the 
enlargement negotiations, brings to the fore the informal transnational network of Social 
Democrats and personal ties between leading politicians and civil servants in the two countries 
and beyond. Coining the phrase Europa-experten, Allers also offers the, until now, only 
proper conceptualisation of the administrative key-role the diplomats played in enlargement 
negotiations.73 
This thesis draws on these less essentialising multi-archival and transnational studies, 
going beyond networks and personal ties to conceptualise foreign policy formation itself as a 
transnational endeavour. It places the diplomats and Norway at the centre, but understands 
its boundaries and recognises the lines between foreign and domestic affairs as blurred.74 
Rather than deconstructing or surpassing the nation-state completely, it interprets it as 
changeable, interwoven with its surroundings, and part of a continuous circulation of ideas, 
people, goods and institutions.75 Rather than discarding the concept of national interest 
altogether, it views such interests as products of a continuous interaction between a variety of 
political entities, both within and beyond the nation-state. 
Transnational circulations – renegotiating the boundaries of the state as well as the 
diplomatic profession – accelerated in the 1960s. However, that same decade also marked the 
zenith of the postwar state. Crucially, diplomats stood at the intersection of these 
developments, and were among their most important interpreters. National interests – a 
predominant concept in the mode of thinking within the administration – were partly 
transnational constructs. Rather than being fixed and purely material, they were steeped in 
the ideas and discourses of their time and place.76 Only through such an approach are we able 
to understand, for example, how the Europeans – following Britain’s first application (1961) – 
slowly re-interpreted membership of the EC (and its goals and ambitions) as a continuation of 
Norwegian postwar aims. 
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The challenge is to capture this analytically. To overcome the dominant IH approach, 
and its “‘realist’ assumptions about the autonomy of foreign policy-making elites in defining 
and negotiating ‘national interests’”, Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, Morten Rasmussen and others, 
have used social science concepts and theories as ‘heuristic tools’. This has been important, as 
a way “to clarify and discuss the often too implicit epistemological assumptions underlying (…) 
more empirically-driven research”.77 Or, put differently, to capture and make more explicit 
the dynamics of political action. ‘Soft realism’ is not enough to master the complex 
entanglements between local, national, European and international levels – and between the 
governmental and non-governmental – that were in play in the enlargement negotiations of 
the 1960s and early 1970s.78 Did the Europeans keep a strict division between foreign and 
domestic policy or continuously renegotiate the boundaries between the two traditional policy 
realms? How did the Europeans interact with the plethora of actors involved in the decision-
making processes? What kind of traits did the Europeans possess as a group and what does this 
tell us about them? In what way did the MFA, as an institution, and diplomacy, as a 
profession, shape, constrain and enable their actions? By using social science concepts as ideal 
types, such important questions can be addressed with a certain conceptual clarity.  
Now, to return to the first ‘struggle’ within the field of integration history: in different 
ways, both Lipgens and Kaiser – as has been noted – operate with an explicit or implicit 
teleology. But they are not alone. At the threshold of the economic crisis, and in the aftermath 
of the Constitutional defeat in the mid-2000s, Mark Gilbert pioneered an important rethink. 
Scholarship on the EC/EU was steeped in a teleological language, Gilbert argued, with a 
historical thrust toward more integration (non-integration being hurdles on that path), 
blinding us to alternative narratives of European integration.79 It was as if he thought the 
enduring crises since the mid-2000s ought to jolt historians and social scientists out of a long 
stretch of couched ‘Euphoria’.80 	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One way for historians to overcome such progressive interpretations is to embed and 
connect integration historiography with other bordering historiographies. Giuliano Garavini, 
Wolfram Kaiser, Morten Rasmussen, Lorenzo Mechi and Antonio Varsori have all argued 
that European integration should be “understood in the context of the political, socio-
economic and cultural history of contemporary Europe more generally”.81 Though this might 
seem obvious, and in some ways represents a continuation of Milward’s approach, it has 
invigorated the field of integration history.82 Varsori, for example, is among the first to embed 
the post-de Gaulle Community into the wider perspective of the 1970s as a research field, and 
to connect the first enlargement and The Hague Summit in 1969 with the social and cultural 
turmoil of ‘1968’.83 Along the same lines, Piers Ludlow has pointed to the unfortunate 
tendency of separating Cold War and European integration history, and seeks to reconnect 
the two in an edited volume on the emerging détente of the late 1960s and 1970s.84  
The Cold War plays a prominent part in the much of the literature on Norway and 
Western European integration. Typically, however, the literature explores Norway’s policy 
towards the EEC in a Cold War context. Specifically, Norway’s reluctance to engage with the 
continental integration project in the postwar period has been understood in the context of its 
traditional Atlantic security ties. 85  ‘1968’ also plays a major role in the Norwegian 
enlargement historiography, but mostly as a domestic phenomenon (with global roots) that 
shaped the referendum. There is little reflection on how the changes connected with ‘1968’ 
influenced foreign policy formation, let alone diplomatic work with the EC-case.86 It is 
perhaps overstating the point, but realism, geopolitics and statesmen prevail in the foreign 
policy realm, while all the ‘softer’ factors are left for the domestic sphere. The two need to be 
integrated: the Europeans’ practices – and thus Norwegian-Community exchanges – were 
embedded in broader discourses in contemporary Europe. By educing essential elements of the 	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social, ideological, cultural, political and economic landscape of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
the experiences of the Europeans can be interpreted into this broader context. It is, for example, 
impossible to understand both the limited popular reach of the Europeans’ dense public 
diplomacy and the public sanctions they received from EC-sceptics round the referendum, 
without an idea of the paradigmatic capabilities of ‘1968’. 
A second important contribution to this debate came with Kiran Klaus Patel’s call for 
“a less EU-centric form of writing European integration history”. Drawing on postcolonial 
theory, Patel wants to ‘widen the canvas’ and ‘provincialise’ the EC (EU). By stressing the 
exchange between ‘centre’ and other alternative sites as an entangled two-way process – one is 
able to critically assess and properly place the EC/EU in connection with its surroundings. As 
Patel argues, this two-way process is important in order for historians to escape the language 
of success that surrounds the European project.87  In this spirit, Giuliano Garavini has 
challenged the myopic narrative of the EC of the 1960s and 1970s by telling the parallel and 
entangled history of the “births and initial interaction (or lack thereof) between the Global 
South and the European Economic Community (...)”. By decentring the EC, Garavini is able 
to explore the “profound impact” the rise of the Global South had “on the nature of western 
European integration itself”.88 Such decentred approaches enrich our understanding of the 
Community.89 
Again, these changes in perspective have had little impact on enlargement as a field of 
research as reflected in the ‘road to membership’- literature predominant in its historiography. 
The two fundamental questions remain: why did [insert country] apply? And why did it 
fail/succeed? These questions can be seen as a natural response to enlargement itself: if 
successful, it entails the EC getting bigger. Also, the structured steps and negotiation chapters 
that bring the applicants towards membership – towards the EC – characterise the 
negotiations of enlargements. Where does this leave Norway?  
In a strange twilight zone it seems. On the one hand, Norway is marginalised: in the 
broader literature on enlargement – even when focussing solely on the first enlargement – 
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borrowed from postcolonial studies: Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, Princeton: PUP (2000); Patel “Provincializing the European Communities” (2013), p. 652. 
88 Giuliano Garavini After Empires. European Integration, Decolonization, & the Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986, 
Oxford: OUP (2009), p. 3. 
89 Johnny Laursen “The Enlargement of the European Community, 1950-95” in Wilfried Loth (Ed.) Experiencing 
Europe – 50 Years of European Construction 1957-2007 Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag (2009), pp. 269-305, p. 270. 
Laursen argues that research on the Anglo-Scandinavian enlargement has added nuances to the historiography 
through a more ‘oppositional’ approach to the history of European integration. 
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Norway is peripheral, or is ascribed a ‘failure’ narrative.90 Progressive narratives of integration 
easily become one of progress or stagnation; integration or non-integration; success or failure; 
membership or non-membership.91 Applicants that did not join – such as Norway (or Turkey 
for that matter) – hardly fit into such a “Christmas story of European integration”.92  
On the other hand, Norway’s non-membership spurred a rich Sonderweg-literature 
devoted to the question of why Norway didn’t join. Some focus on material explanations, for 
example, arguing that Norway’s corporative system, which gave a great deal of political 
influence to primary economic sectors such as fishery and agriculture, explains the eventual 
negative referendum.93 Spearheaded by political scientist Stein Rokkan, others found answers 
to the Norwegian ‘no’ by analysing electoral behaviour, geography and history.94 A range of 
scholars dove into the organisation, resources and connections of the successful ‘no’-
campaign.95 And several critical and contemporary social scientists dissected the government, 
civil service and the yes-campaign.96 To this is added a whole body of work assessing the role 
of the divided Norwegian Labour Party in the failed campaign and negative referendum.97 
Finally, there are several historical-ideational and constructivist studies. Neumann, in his 
seminal study Norge - en kritikk, for example, convincingly argues that the ‘no’-side won the 
referendum by successfully defining it as a struggle between the people and parliament for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In Gilbert’s general history of European integration Norway is only mentioned in a parenthesis, when discussing 
the EC’s first enlargement; and in Elvert and Kaiser’s edited volume on the comparative history of European Union 
enlargement (the first of its kind) Norway is conspicuously missing. Mark Gilbert Surpassing Realism: The Politics of 
European Integration Since 1945. Lanham, Md: R&L Publishers (2003), p. 126; Gilbert European Integration (2012), p. 70, 
95; Kaiser and Elvert (Eds.) European Union Enlargement (2005). For a couple of Milwardian failure narratives, see: 
Frøland “Choosing the Periphery” (2001); Frøland “The Second Norwegian EEC-Application, 1967” (2001). 
91 Gilbert “Narrating the Process” (2008). 
92 Dülffer “The History of European Integration” (2009), p. 22, 29. Think for example of the terms ’awkward 
partner’ and ’reluctant Europeans’. They are, in many ways, accurate descriptions, but still leaves out the possibility 
of the awkward and reluctant countries shaping the EC/EU as something less than non-members. Stephen George 
An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, Oxford: OUP (1990); Sieglinde Gstöhl Reluctant Europeans – 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the process of integration, London: Boulder (2002). 
93 Christine Ingebritsen The Nordic States and European Unity. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press (1998), p. 
125; Christine Ingebritsen ”New Perspectives on European Integration” in Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 38 (2), s. 159-
161, Oslo: Sage Publications (2003). Ingebritsen is inspired by liberal intergovernmentalism: Andrew Moravcsik The 
Choice for Europe – Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht, New York: Cornell University Press (1998). 
94 Stein Rokkan”Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics” in Seymor M. 
Lipset and Stein Rokkan (Eds.) Party Systems and voter alignments, New York: The Free Press (1967); Anders Todal 
Jenssen og Henry Valen Brussel midt imot: Folkeavstemningen om EU. Oslo: Gyldendal (1995). 
95 Two classics, investigating the no-campaign and the farmer’s organisations and the Centre Party, respectively, are: 
Tor Bjørklund Mot strømmen. Kampen mot EF 1961-1972, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1982); Jostein Trøite and Jan Erik 
Vold Bønder i EF-strid – Senterpartiet og bondeorganisasjonane 1961-72, Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget (1977).  
96 Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik Kampen om EF, Oslo: PAX forlag (1977); Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster 
(Eds.) De Utro Tjenere (1974). 
97 Contributions were written by contemporary politicians and officials: Ronald Bye Sersjanten. Makt og miljø på 
Youngstoget, Oslo: Gyldendal (1987); Haakon Lie ...Slik jeg ser det, Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag (1975); Haakon Lie ”Hva 
var det egentlig som skjedde?” Internasjonal Politikk, 30(4b): 783–794; Or by political scientists: Nils Ørvik (Ed.) Fears 
and Expectations. Norwegian attitudes toward European Integration, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1972); Nils  Ørvik(Ed.) 
Norway’s No to Europe. Pittsburgh (PE): International Studies Association (1975). 
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continued sovereignty, and the state and bureaucracy in favour of union.98 The predominant focus in 
the broader and Norwegian literature makes it difficult to see how those on the outside shaped 
the EC, to understand and narrate the history of the range of ‘memberships’ that have 
developed since the 1970s, or address matters of non-integration in the context of 
enlargement. The main interest of this thesis is not ‘why Norway failed to join’, but rather 
how the diplomats, on behalf of the Norwegian government, worked with the EC-case. There 
is no implicit ‘end point’ to the question. 
This thesis, therefore, contributes to the enlargement historiography in three ways. First, 
it offers a decentred and non-teleological analysis of a failed enlargement. It is not a ‘road to 
(non-) membership’ analysis, but deals instead with encounters, learning and interaction. 
Second, it transcends – or rather does not acknowledge – the apparent division between state-
centric and transnational approaches within the field of integration history. To grasp the 
significance, contribution and working environment of the Europeans, one needs to understand 
their construction and representation of national interests in a non-state-centric and 
transnational way. Last, it embeds the Europeans and their work in broader discourses that 
formed important elements of their worldview: notions of Europe and Norway as historical, 
cultural and political units, postwar concepts of prosperity and security, and the changing 
political culture in the 1960s, impinged on and shaped the Europeans’ professional calculations 
and choices. The third contribution is therefore to bring ideas back in to the enlargement 
process, not as something abstract or outside of the bargaining process of diplomats and 
politicians, but as a crucial component of it. 
 
Approach, Sources and Structure 
As the previous discussion reveals, the challenge of this thesis is to answer the two overarching 
research questions of who the Europeans were, and how they worked with the EC-case in a way 
that captures the institution(s) and in-betweenness of diplomacy and the entangled and 
embedded nature of enlargements. To attempt this through a mono-casual approach is – in 
the words of George Benson – like “trying to write a love song with just a single note”.99 
Nonetheless, a singular view of humans and human interaction underpins the entire 
thesis, which in fact addresses both the practice of diplomacy and the entangled processes of 
enlargement. This view is best captured by Norbert Elias’ attempt at analytically reconnecting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Iver B. Neumann Norge – en kritikk. Begrepsmakt i Europa-debatten, Oslo: Pax Forlag (2001). 
99 George Benson “No one emotion” [track 1] in 20/20, Warner Bros. (1985). 
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the artificial division between ‘individual’ and ‘society’ through the notion of the dancer and 
the dance:  
 
“One can certainly speak of a dance in general, but no one will imagine a dance as a structure 
outside the individual or as a mere abstraction. The same dance figurations can certainly be 
danced by different people; but without a plurality of reciprocally oriented and dependent 
individuals, there is no dance.”100  
 
Elias understands the dancers and the dance as “networks of interdependent human beings, 
with shifting asymmetrical power balances”.101 This is his way of transcending the “image of 
man which tacitly underlies many historical studies (...) an image of single human beings each 
of whom is ultimately absolutely independent of all others – an individual-in-himself, a homo 
clausus.”102 There is no homo clausus in this thesis, the Europeans are studied as interconnected, 
their individuality collectively shaped and embedded in institutions and discourses, and as 
shaping and becoming shaped by diplomatic practices. With these two insights in mind, the 
current thesis answers the research questions through a three-level analysis:  
1) The anthropo-institutional investigation 
2) The discursive framework, and  
3) The study of the Europeans’ diplomatic practice regarding the EC-case.  
The aim is that the reader gets to know the Europeans and their material, institutional and 
discursive environment, with each layer acting as a filter through which the next layer can be 
understood. There are no ‘linear’ links between the three levels, but rather a criss-cross of 
references and connections that swirl the layers together. 
 
To address the approach and answer the research questions, multi-archival, multi-sited and 
eclectic sets of sources have been chosen. Unsurprisingly, the most important source to the 
Europeans’ practice has been the Norwegian MFA’s series (UD) on Norwegian-EC relations. 
This has been complemented with governmental sources from Norway’s two most important 
co-applicants, Britain and Denmark. The United Kingdom’s Foreign (and Commonwealth) 
Office’s (F(C)O), the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) and the Danish MFA’s archives (UM) 
give us the opportunity to trace ideas, concepts, reactions and shared practices across borders. 
Moreover, it is true what they say: the FCO’s reports and dispatches are rich, insightful and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Norbert Elias “Homo clausus and the civilizing process” in Paul du Gay, Jessica Evans and Peter Redman (Eds.) 
Identity: A Reader, London: Sage Publications (2000), pp. 284-297, p. 295. 
101 Norbert Elias Foundation “Figuration Studies: Some Concepts, Principles and Major Research Areas”, 
http://www.norberteliasfoundation.nl/network/concepts.php (last visited 16.05.2014). 
102 Norbert Elias The Court Society, Oxford: Blackwell (1983), p. 143. 
	  	   41	  
full of good gossip. To trace the impact of the Europeans, their administrative powers and 
internal disputes, the thesis draws upon the archives of the Norwegian Prime Minister’s Office 
and the transcripts of the Government (Cabinet) Conference’s (RA/S-1005) together with the 
Minutes from the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs (SA).  
To understand the Europeans’ informal practices and the MFA’s institutional 
connections, and to map the corporative spaces and the complexities of the information 
campaigns, the Norwegian Shipping Association’s (NSA) well-kept archives have been of the 
utmost importance. The European Movement in Norway’s (RA/PA-0092), Federation of 
Norwegian Industries’ (RA/PA-0636), YES to the EC (RA/PA-0673) and the Conservative’s 
Political archives (RA/PA-0965), have been chosen for similar reasons. The private archives 
of Trygve Bratteli (AA/A/044), Per Kleppe (AA/A/079), Haakon Lie (AA/A/053), Per 
Borten (RA/ PA-1451, John Lyng (RA/ PA-0672), Arne Skaug (AA), Rakel Seweriin (AA), 
Terje Wold (RA/PA-1493) and, especially, Halvard Lange (S-6173) were chosen to tie 
together official politics, informal networks, personal considerations and the role played by the 
Europeans. These archives have been particularly valuable in the exploration of a vast 
transnational, social democratic network. Both the negotiations and the organisational 
connections of the Europeans have been explored in the Historical Archives of the European 
Union (HAEU). The archives of the Commission’s DG1 Relations extérieures (BAC) proved 
somewhat disappointing. However, the European Movement’s archives (ME), Franco Maria 
Malfatti’s private archives (FMM), the European League For Economic Co-operation’s 
archives (LECE) gave glimpses into the Community, and put the Europeans’ non-governmental 
activities in a broader framework. 
Capturing the roles, norms and practices of the Europeans in an institutional framework, 
the anthropo-institutional investigation draws extensively on laws, reports, state calendars and 
organisational maps. Moreover, simple statistics – based on memoirs, state calendars, 
obituaries and Internet sources – provide an aggregate knowledge of the Europeans’ 
educational backgrounds, career paths and generational traits. For an in-depth understanding 
of the discourse engaged in by the Europeans regarding the EC-case, newspaper articles, 
dispatches and memos, speeches, contemporary scholarly writings, literary fiction and poems, 
and biographies and memoirs, have been carefully selected with an eye towards the foreign 
policy elite in Norway. The discourses have also been structured ‘backwards’, if you will, as 
the study of the Europeans’ diplomatic practices (Part III) revealed which concepts they ‘spoke 
into’, which in turn informed the shape and content of the discourses. 
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Last, throughout the thesis, and particularly in the epilogue, oral sources in the form of 
interviews conducted by the author are cited. Five of the fifteen Europeans have been 
interviewed. The former diplomats were between the ages of 77 and 92 at the time of the 
interviews, all of which were semi-structured, open-ended and conducted at the diplomats’ 
homes.103 Interviews with many Europeans made it possible to map biographies, practices, 
work-environments, friendships and quarrels, self-perceptions, personal reflections and 
personalities, and not least how memories themselves were shaped. The methodological 
challenge is to analytically capture the Europeans’ memories and anecdotes while connecting 
them with the historical relevance of the EC-case, in a way that gives a greater understanding 
of both. As famous poet and novelist Emanuel Litvinoff noted, memory is a literary exercise 
that “shapes our yesterdays into narrative form, an inevitably fictionalizing process”.104 In an 
interview situation, therefore, the historian must be aware that memory is not “a passive 
depository of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings”.105 This ‘fictionalizing 
process’ is continuous: as one moves forward, the past is continuously altered to fit one’s new 
‘location’ and this creation of meaning happens throughout one’s life. Moreover, emotionally 
charged memories, though temporally disconnected, might be blurred together and given “a 
shared significance”.106  
Through a critical comparison of various sources, we are able to untangle what shaped 
a particular diplomat’s worldview and self-understanding at a certain time in history, and how 
these are interpreted in the present. It is here that the combination of oral history and archive-
based history is of value: narratives evident in the interviews – that link events to a specific 
‘location’ – tease out important aspects of thoughts and ideas that are nearly impossible to 
extract from the archival material of the 1960s. In contrast, archival material helps us trace 
how narratives, ideas, and chronologies are constructed and change over time, how they are 
riddled with ‘inconsistencies’, and shape present interpretations and worldviews.107 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Europeans interviewed: Eivinn Berg, Arild Holland, Tancred Ibsen Jr., Terje Johannessen and Arne Langeland. 
Furthermore, the author has interviewed: Conservative politician and Minister of Commerce and Shipping (1965-
1970) Kåre Willoch; Daughter of European Asbjørn Skarstein, herself an Ambassador, Tove Skarstein; daughter of 
Labour Party Secretary (1945-1969) and EMN member Haakon Lie, Gro Dragland (worked at the European 
Movement in Norway in the early 1970s); and then diplomats Håkon W. Freihow, Thorvald Stoltenberg (also state 
secretary) and Sverre Jervell.  
104 Emanuel Litvinoff: Journey through a small planet, London: Joseph 1972. 
105 Alessandro Portelli: “What Makes Oral History Different”, in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (Eds.): The Oral 
History Reader, London: Routledge 2006, p. 77. 
106 Alistair Thomson: “Memory and remembering in oral history”, in Donald A. Richie (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of 
Oral History, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 83-85; See also: Daniel Schacter: The Seven Sins of Memory: 
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The anthropo-institutional investigation (Part I) comprehensively describes the Europeans by 
mapping their biographical, social and educational background, their institutional spaces and 
roles, and their connections and practices. 108  Who the Europeans were, studied as an 
interconnected whole, rests on the presumption that people change institutions (and 
discourses) and vice versa. This, in turn, rests on another presumption: individuals and groups 
of individuals are shaped through practice—one is what one does. 
The anthropo-institutional investigation is not void of time, but it studies the formation 
and composition of the Europeans as a process – in a certain time and space – beyond neat 
chronology. Processes and connections are at the centre, but not exactly when they occurred. It 
is a qualitative exploration, which will end up defining the Europeans as a community. The 
research is based on a set of criteria or key questions109:  
1) What were the social, educational and generational traits of the most centrally placed 
diplomats working with the EC-case? 
2) How did the MFA and Foreign Service organise in relation to multilateral economic 
issues in general, and the EC-case in particular, and who were the most centrally placed 
diplomats working with the EC-case ? 
3) How did those diplomats communicate and interact with each other and their 
surroundings in relation to the EC-case? 
In this sense, Part I is a prosopography: by establishing a ‘universe’ to be studied and asking a 
set of uniform questions, it examines the common background characteristics of a group, and 
is concerned with connections between individuals in a group, As the individual is constantly 
considered with reference to his links to the whole, this approach dovetails with the notion of 
the ‘dancers and the dance’.110 Moreover, by investigating who the Europeans were as a 
collective, we are able to make sense of their political action and social reality111, and how 
“they operated within and upon the social, economic and other institutions of their time”.112 
This explicitly links the question of who the Europeans were to the question of how they worked 
with the EC-case.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Anthropo in this context means human (as the Greek word), and institutional means both the institution of the 
Norwegian Foreign Service and that of diplomacy as such. 
109 K. S. B. Keats-Rohan “Biography, Identity and Names: Understanding the Pursuit of the Individual in 
Prosopography” in K. S. B. Keats-Rohan Prosopography approaches and applications, a handbook, Oxford: OUP (2007), pp. 
139-181, p. 144. 
110 Lawrence Stone “Prosopography” in Daedalus, Vol. 100: 1, MIT Press Journals (1971), pp. 46-79, p. 46; Keats-
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111 Claude Nicolet “Prosopographie et histoire sociale: Rome et l’Italie à l’époque républicaine”, Annales, Économies, 
Sociétés, Civilisations 25 (1970), pp. 1209-1228; Stone “Prosopography” (2007), p. 47. 
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To analytically capture the Europeans as interconnected in the broadest sense, the 
anthropo-institutional investigation – informed by the inter-disciplinarity of both NDH and 
integration history – uses a set of concepts from the social sciences as heuristic tools: 
- Chapter 1 maps the Europeans’ social, generational and educational background, uses 
two sociological ideal type diplomats as distinguished by social anthropologist Iver B. 
Neumann to categorise the Europeans.113 Also, it combines the concept of ‘generation’, as 
negotiated and fluid, with a discussion of their professional careers, to distinguish the 
coming of a certain type of multilateral economic diplomats.114 
- Chapter 2 explores the Europeans’ place in the changing institutional framework and 
diplomatic spaces of the postwar era, and how these created new diplomatic norms. It 
rests on the view from the field of sociological institutionalism, that “an institution is a 
web of interrelated norms – formal and informal – governing social relationships.”115 
Moreover, to describe the ‘new’ diplomat that emerged in the 1960s, it draws upon 
British political scientist Brian Hocking’s concept of ‘boundary-spanners’.116 
- Chapter 3 shows how the Europeans communicated with each other and their 
surroundings by both mapping institutional connections and looking into the mundane 
practices of the Europeans in order to “uncover the systems of feelings” that bound them 
together.117 
- Last, the Conclusion uses three ideal types of communities - epistemic communities, 
communities of practice and emotional communities118 – as a way to explore the fringes of the 
European community and, through this, distinguish some of its core characteristics and 
values. 
 
Part II (Chapter 4) constructs a discursive framework through which we can understand the 
statements and diplomatic practices of the Europeans. The actions of the Europeans were not 
only shaped by their social background, professional outlook and institutional surroundings. 
They were also embedded in the shifting social, ideological, cultural, political and economic 	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114 Ulrike Jureit Generationenforschung, Göttingen: UTB (2006). 
115 Nee and Ingram “Embeddedness and Beyond” (1998), pp. 19-45, p. 19; Knut Kjeldstadli “Struktur, norm og 
interesse – om historikerens behov for handlingsteori” in Historisk Tidsskrift, 1/1991, Trondheim: 
Universitetsforlaget (1991) p. 53-55, 59. 
116 Brian Hocking “Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners”, pp. 10-11. 
117 Barbara H. Rosenwein, ”Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions”, Passions in Context, vol. 1, no. 1, 
(2010), p. 11. Thanks to Kasper Grotle Rasmussen (University of Southern Denmark) for the reference. 
118 Peter M. Haas “Introduction: Epistemic Communities And International Policy Coordination” in International 
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landscape of the 1960s and early 1970s, shaped by the historical developments leading up to 
it, and the symbolic language drawn from these developments. Part II seeks to “cut into the 
discursive webs” to provide meaning to concepts such as postwar Norway, continental 
Europe, foreign policy and national interests, and the EC-struggle as seen from the MFA and 
foreign policy elites.119  
Discourses could, in all simplicity, be understood as groups of statements that form 
certain ways of speaking about the world, and – since language is constitutive – certain ways 
of understanding the world.120 For analytical purposes the framework is divided into three 
parts:  
1) Europe as the Other 
2) Prosperity and Security and, 
3) ‘1972’ – a Norwegian ‘1968’.  
Such a framework gives an outline of the ‘legitimate’ normative space for actions – of what 
was recognised as true or meaningful in a given political arena121 – and gives the thesis a way of 
relating the everyday ‘doings’ of the Europeans to broad and important historically and spatially 
constructed norms, identities, values and ideas.122 The approach therefore addresses and gives 
content to the epistemological solution of engaging with diplomatic practices and national 
interests. Moreover, it embeds the EC-struggle in broader narratives of national identity, the 
postwar state and the countercultures of the 1960s. In this sense, then, the thesis also 
transcends the homo clausus. For while part II outlines the structure of discourses, part III turns 
to the agency of the Europeans within these discourses. In their diplomatic practice, the 
Europeans shaped and were shaped by the meanings of the three concepts listed above.123  
 
Part III: The Europeans and the EC-case (Chapters 5-12 and epilogue), makes up the main 
part of the thesis and is a detailed study of the Europeans’ diplomatic practices as rooted in the 
epistemological structure discussed above. It answers the question of how they worked with the 
EC-case between 1960 and 1972. And, in turn, how these twelve years shaped and constituted 	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”Discourse as Capability: Non-State Actors’ Capital in Global Governance” in Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 33(3) (2005), pp. 723-746. 
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them as Europeans. Though Part III has a chronological set-up (1960-1963; 1962-1971; 1969-
1972) following the three encounters with the E(E)C, it is also structured thematically. The 
first section (Ch. 5-7) explores how the Europeans were forged into a community by their own 
creation and defence of a new European strategy. The second section (Ch.8-9) analyses how 
the Europeans became embedded in non-governmental, pro-European networks, and 
increasingly politicised – operating as boundary-spanners for the European cause. The third 
part (Ch. 10-12) traces three diplomatic practices that were rather unique in the Europeans’ 
work with the EC-case, and that broke with traditional diplomatic norms: an elaborate public 
diplomacy strategy; a communitarian negotiation strategy in the fishery sector; and a massive 
information campaign, which they took part in personally. The three sections can also be read 
as (1) How diplomatic practice constituted the Europeans, (2) How diplomatic practice ventured 
into new arenas and created new patterns of conflict and cooperation (3) How diplomatic 
practice changed and challenged the institution of diplomacy itself.  
Equally, however, Part III is about how the Europeans shaped the enlargement process. 
With a multiarchival approach combining governmental and non-governmental sources from 
several countries and institutions, it explores transfers of ideas, strategies, values and norms 
across political borders through the knowledge production of the Europeans. With this 
approach we see that not only Norwegian European policy, but also British, Danish and Irish 
negotiation strategies and the Community’s own common policies, were transnationally 
shaped through the in-betweenness of the Europeans’ practice and all foreign policy formation. 
Just as there is no homo clausus, there are no definitely bordered political entities.  
Last, the epilogue – based on the Paul Ricoeur’s concept of emplotment124  and 
Neumann’s three ingrained diplomatic stories of what it means to be a good diplomat125 –
investigates how the Europeans created a meaningful narrative from the professional and 
personal failure of the negative referendum. Drawing heavily on the Europeans’ memories of 
the past as articulated in the interviews, and tying it in with their anthropo-institutional make-
up, discursive surroundings, and diplomatic work in the 1960s and early 1970s, the epilogue is 
a meta-reflection on who the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case. It shows 
how the Europeans reinvented their diplomatic story to fit the defeat narrative, and discerns a 
fourth discourse about Europe, born out the Europeans and their pro-European surroundings, 
which never resonated with the Norwegian public, but which to this day holds the community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Paul Ricoeur: ”Narrative and time”, Critical Inquiry 7(1), 1980, pp. 169-190; Paul Ricoeur: Time and Narrative (Temps 
et Récit), Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago: University Press of Chicago 1984 [1983], 
pp. 54-77. 
125 Neumann: At home with the Diplomats (2012). 
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of Europeans together. 
 
The study of the Europeans and how they worked with the EC-case offers important 
contributions to several fields. First, it is the first archive-based historical monograph on 
Norwegian-Community relations that covers the entire first enlargement, with all three 
rounds of negotiations (1960-1972). It is also the first in-depth study entirely devoted to the 
highly contested and influential Europeans. Second, it will be among the first monographs that 
draw upon important, inter-disciplinary insights from New Diplomatic History to critically 
engage with integration history and enlargements. It demonstrates that studying foreign policy 
formation from the diplomat’s point of view enables us to trace transnational learning and 
transfers of ideas and concepts between diplomacies and polities. Opposite, it will be a 
detailed study of how enlargement as a political process shaped not only foreign policy, but 
also the MFA as an institution and diplomatic practices as such. This duality in approach and 
aim is unique. Third, the methodology of this thesis offers a possible model through which one 
can study enlargements beyond the traditional ‘road to (non-) membership’ narratives; foreign 
policy beyond the traditional distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’; and human action 
beyond the clinical distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘society’. Last, the thesis will combine 
the ‘soft’ elements of biographies, norms, values, discourses, memories and identities, with the 
‘hard’ elements of economic and national interests, high politics, negotiations and foreign 
policy in a way that is fruitful for both: through the detailed study of the Europeans’ diplomatic 
practice we see that identity and belief were important elements of policy formation, and that 
geopolitics and economic and institutional ties shape values and norms. 
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PART I 
The Dancers and the Dance 
_________________________________________ 
 
There were many diplomats working with Norwegian European policy between 1960 and 
1972. If we include every high-ranking diplomat specifically assigned to the EC-case, 
including those appointed to the two negotiation delegations (1962-63 and 1970-72), the 
Market Committee (1966-70) and the Negotiation Secretariat (1970-72), diplomats stationed 
in Brussels, Paris, Bonn, The Hague, Rome, London and Copenhagen, and those 
representing Norway in the most relevant multilateral organisations126, we arrive at 94 
diplomats. They can all be characterised as experts on European policy, and many of them as 
experts on European integration.127 But not all of them were Europeans. 
The following three chapters define and investigate who the Europeans were as individuals 
and as a group. Three questions will be investigated:  
 
1) What were the social, educational and generational traits of the most centrally placed 
diplomats working with the EC-case? 
2) How did the MFA and Foreign Service organise in relation to multilateral economic issues 
in general, and the EC-case in particular, and who were the most centrally placed 
diplomats working with the EC-case? 
3) How did these diplomats communicate and interact with each other and their 
surroundings in relation to the EC-case? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
Euratom, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Council of Europe (CoE). 
127 The numbers are based on Harald Gram (Ed.) 1958-1960/Knut J. Hougen (Ed.) 1961-1973 Norges Statskalender, 
Oslo: Aschehoug (1958-1973). 
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Chapter 1 
Europeans – elite and expert 
 
“They are very much alike. They look alike too (...) because they think the same way, and they had the 
same wavy hair – handsome men, when they were young.  
They were the product of the same political generation, and the same political tradition.”128 
 
Terje Johannessen on similarities between Arne Langeland and Per Martin Ølberg  
 
This chapter explores the social, educational and generational background of the most 
centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case. It studies who the Europeans were by 
investigating where they came from – and argues that they were understood and understood 
themselves as elites based on their social, educational and institutional position. Elites could be 
defined as individuals holding disproportionate amounts of resources within a field129, or as 
having a high position within hierarchical power structures and possessing the potential to 
shape decisions of major importance. But it can also be seen as a social practice where those 
belonging recognised and interacted with each other.130 The Europeans belonged to one of two 
co-existing, and oft-overlapping, elites: the old civil servant families and the new Labour-era 
top. Moreover, they were recruited to an exclusive and prestigious education – the diplomatic 
academy, and formed part of a highly specialised group of diplomats: Multilateral Economic 
Diplomats (MEDs). To their understanding, this was the cutting-edge of the diplomatic field, 
and MEDs were experts. This layered elitism was important for their self-perception, and 
crucial for the role the Europeans got in the Norwegian EC-discourse.   
Last, the chapter shows that the Europeans were part of a ‘young war’ generation 
populating the MFA (1960-1972). This generation of Norwegian diplomats demarcated itself 
from the previous in many ways. For one, they were much more specialised, and received a 
far more structured and diverse diplomatic training. But there were other differences too: the 
‘young war’ generation was not as emotionally tied to Britain as the previous generation (the 
so-called London generation). And their view on Norway’s place in Europe was different. On 
the other hand, the two generations dominating the MFA in the 1960s shared the memories 
of war, which – as we shall see – deeply shaped their ideas of international co-operation. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
129 Shamus Rahman Khan “The Sociology of Elites” in Annual Review of Sociology, 8:1 (2012), pp. 361–77. 
130 C. Wright Mills The Power Elite, London: OUP (1973 [1956]). 
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Well established and well connected 
Iver B. Neumann distinguishes two sociological types of Norwegian diplomats still prevalent in 
the 1960s and early 1970s based on their social background. The first ideal type was the 
diplomat hailing from the old civil servant families. The second ideal type emerged with the 
rise of the Labour Party hegemony.131  
The first ideal type finds its historical roots in the old civil servant families dating back to 
the Danish-Norwegian union. De facto dominated by Denmark from the thirteen hundreds, 
Norway officially came under the Danish crown in 1536, and became a real union, 
composing a whole state ruled by an absolutist monarch from Copenhagen in the 1660s. 
Denmark-Norway endured until ending up on the losing side in the Napoleonic War, and the 
Norwegian territory was given to Sweden through the Treaty of Kiel in January 1814. In the 
absolutist era, the governance of the Norwegian territory was done through a group of civil 
servant families, who increasingly developed a distinct, and later ’national’ understanding of 
politics. From the 1600s onwards a self-aware, self-recruiting class with both the will and 
ability to administer the state grew out of a heterogeneous group of immigrant families.132 
These families constituted the state, societal and economic elite of the 1600-1800s. Making up 
about one per cent of the population living on Norwegian territory, they were the undisputed 
‘ruling elite’ of Denmark-Norway. Typically, they were lawyers, priests, officers or successful 
merchants. As they made up both the state elite and the bourgeoisie, the all-encompassing elite 
was simply referred to as øvrigheten (the upper stratum; in German: Obrigkeit).133 
With Norway in a personal union under the Swedish crown (1814-1905), in the words of 
the famous Norwegian historian Jens Arup Seip, ”the potential for unity and firmness among 
a people that was scattered and without tradition lay with one singular societal class, the civil 
servants of the country (...) spread like a thin film across the land”.134 Seip maintained that this 
tiny and decreasing part of the total population, remained culturally and economically 
isolated, self-recruiting, and largely of Danish ancestry. The civil servant class dominated the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012). 
132 Neumann Norge – en kritikk (2001), p. 44. 
133 Øystein Rian ”Hva og hvem var staten i Norge?” in Erling Ladewig Petersen (Ed.) Magtstaten i Norden i 1600-tallet 
og dens sociale konsekvenser, Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag (1984), pp. 73-98; Neumann Norge – en kritikk, p. 43; 
Øystein Rian ”Politisk historie i dansketiden” in Øystein Rian et al. (Eds.) Revolusjon og resonnement. Festskrift til Kåre 
Tønnesson på 70-årsdagen den 1. Januar 1996, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press (1995), pp. 196-208; Øystein Rian 
”Politisk historie i dansketiden” in Øystein Rian et al. (Eds.) Revolusjon og resonnement. Festskrift til Kåre Tønnesson på 70-
årsdagen den 1. Januar 1996, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press (1995), pp. 196-208, p. 204. Vilhelm Aubert Continuity 
and Development in Law and Society, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press (1989), p. 168; Neumann Norge – en kritikk 
(2001), p. 58, 189. Norway in union with Sweden had neither a landowning aristocracy nor a moneyed bourgeoisie 
playing a leading role in the process of governance. [alte geld, nouveau riche]. 
134 Jens Arup Seip “Historisk prolog” in Nils Petter Gleditsch, Øyvind Østerud and Jon Elster (Eds.) De Utro Tjenere 
– Embetsverket i EF-kampen, Oslo: PAX forlag (1974), pp. 10-22, p. 12. My translation. 
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government—placed in Sweden—the parliament (Storting), its committees, presidency and 
commissions, and the administration, uniting bureaucratic implementation and political 
innovation.135 Until the mid-19th century this elite was hegemonic, and historians simply refer 
to the period between 1814 and 1884 as the era of the civil servant state.136 
From the 1840s onward the monopoly of the civil servant families was gradually 
challenged and opened up by nationalistic, democratic and later socialist political currents. 
1884 was a turning point, in this respect, as parliamentary rule was introduced in Norway: 
with this change in constitutional practice an accelerated move away from the Juristenmonopol 
commenced.137 Following Norway’s independence from Sweden in 1905 and the completion 
of a national administration, the civil servant elite adapted to the professionalisation of the 
interwar years, and reluctantly absorbed the principle of neutrality and the apolitical role of 
the ‘new’ bureaucrat.138 By the 20th century this segment of society was not a confined 
stratum, but arguably still a distinct class inhabiting many of the top posts in Norwegian 
society. It is not surprising, therefore, that many, perhaps most convincingly sociologist and 
intellectual historian Rune Slagstad, have pointed to the strong continuity between the civil 
servant state (1814-1884) and the Labour Party state (1945-1981) as embodied by the 
politically charged civil servant.139 
Looking to the diplomats working the closest with the EC-case, many of them fit this 
ideal type. Søren Christian Sommerfelt (born 1916), for example, was of a civil servant family 
dating back to the early 1700s.140 He was the cousin of Johan Georg Alexius Ræder – 
Secretary General until 1965 and then ambassador to Rome – Ræder being from another old 
civil servant family of German descent dating back to the late 1600s. Following the war he 
was one of the leading figures of the Economic Department. Between 1960 and 1972 he was 
first Director General for the Economic Department (1960) and Ambassador to the EFTA 
delegation in Geneva (1960-68) and Ambassador to Bonn (1968-75). In 1970 Sommerfelt was 
selected as head of negotiations at deputy level between Norway and the European 
Community.141 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Seip “Historisk prolog” (1974), p. 12-20. 
136 The term ”civil servant state” (embetsmannsstaten) was coined by Jens Arup Seip Fra embedsmannsstat til ettpartistat og 
andre essays, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1963). 
137 Trond Bergh, ”Norway: The Powerful Servants”, History of Political Economy, 13, 3 (1981), pp. 471-512, p. 475. 
138 Neumann and Leira describe the increasing standardisation, professionalisation and control within the MFA in 
the interwar period as going from ‘old’ diplomacy to ‘new’ diplomacy. Iver B. Neumann and Halvard Leira Aktiv og 
avventende – Utenrikstjenestens liv 1905 2005, Oslo: Pax Forlag (2005), p. 92-130. 
139 Slagstad De nasjonale strateger (2001). 
140 Per Sundig ”Søren Christian Sommerfelt 1”, Store norske leksikon (SNL), 
http://nbl.snl.no/S%C3%B8ren_Christian_Sommerfelt_-_1 (08.05.2014). 
141 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012; Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014; Interview – Eivinn Berg – 
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A more curious example was Tancred Ibsen Jr. (born 1921). He was the son of a famous 
movie director, and former officer, Tancred Ibsen142; grandson of Sigurd Ibsen, one of the 
founding fathers of the Norwegian MFA in 1905143; and great grandson of world famous 
playwright and author Henrik Ibsen. Ibsen Jr. came into the service immediately after the 
war, as his mother sat next to MFA Secretary General Rolf Andvord at a costume carnival, 
and recommended Andvord take on her unemployed son. Later, at the after-party, Andvord 
called Ibsen Jr. over and simply remarked that he “belonged with us. He is of the family that 
founded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. The following Monday Tancred Ibsen Jr. was 
enrolled as a trainee.144 Ibsen Jr. first finished a degree in economy (1943) and then a degree 
in law (1946) and entered the service in 1947. In 1961-62 he was the Head of the 4th/5th 
Economic Office and temporary counsellor to Brussels (1962-63), permanent delegate to 
EFTA (1963-65) and Assistant Director General for the Economic Department (1966-67). In 
1968 he stopped his career as a multilateral economic diplomat and became Ambassador to 
Budapest. Ibsen Jr. was a specialist in treaty revisions and worked closely with the FTA 
negotiations in the late 1950s and the Stockholm Convention (EFTA treaty) in 1959/60.145  
Tim Greve (born 1926) is a third example. The Greve family had emigrated from the 
Netherlands to Bergen in the late middle ages or early modern period. His father, Arent 
Wittendorph Greve, was a third generation Consul. Greve came into the MFA in 1951, and 
soon became one the ‘young and bright’ people foreign minister Halvard Lange worked with 
closely. Between 1960 and 1972, he was first Press Counsellor to Bonn (1961-62), then 
became the secretary of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, and returned to the 
MFA as Head of the Press Office (1966) and Director General for the Press Department 
(1967-73). He had a vast network of contacts and friends in many circles and was one of the 
most active diplomats in the information campaign leading up to the referendum.146 With 
their background and education, Sommerfelt, Ibsen Jr. and Greve capture the roots of ‘old’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18.12.2012; Søren Chr. Sommerfelt Sendemann: Utenrikspolitisk seilas- minner og betraktninger, Oslo: Schibsted (1997). 
Reginald Nordby. ”Søren Christian Sommerfelt – utdyping II”. SNL, 
http://www.snl.no/.nbl_biografi/S%C3%B8ren_Christian_Sommerfelt/utdypning_%E 2%80%93_2 (27.01.2013). 
142 Aftenposten – 06.07.1981 – ”Tancred Ibsen 60 år”. 
143 Neumann and Leira Aktiv og Avventende (2005), p. 30. 
144 Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013. 
145 Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013; Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010; 01.05.2012; 
Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014; Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012. He understood himself as a true 
European and strongly supported a Norwegian membership in the EC, but was never politically engaged in the issue. 
After some personal differences, he was increasingly referred to the outskirts of the group. Ibsen Jr. was a humorous, 
colourful, and inquiring diplomat, often with creative, if sometimes unrealistic, solutions to problems. 
146 Arne Bonde “ Tim Greve”, SNL, http://nbl.snl.no/Tim_Greve (25.05.2014); Interview – Arild Holland – 
27.04.2012; Redaksjonen ”Greve – norsk slekt” http://snl.no/Greve/norsk_slekt  (08.05.2014); 
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diplomacy and the structure of ‘new’ diplomacy that was still present in the Foreign Service of 
the 1960s and early 1970s.147 
The second ideal type emerged with the rise of the Labour Party hegemony (1935-
1981). Following the Second World War, and the merger of the parts of the MFA that had 
fled to London with the government-in-exile with the small remains of the MFA in Oslo, there 
was an acute need for qualified personnel for the MFA. The Labour Party, returning to power 
in 1945, was ideologically inclined to ‘democratise’ the Foreign Service. It ran counter to the 
socialist rationale not to open up the service. Moreover, further professionalisation of the 
service resonated with their highly technocratic social democratic ideology, building a bridge 
of continuity between the reforms of the interwar and postwar years. The MFA had 
administered a Trainee Program since 1922, but it had not functioned as intended. It had 
been poorly funded, and as a result trainees had to finance their own education until after the 
Second World War. This obviously favoured those who were well off, and perpetuated the 
recruitment from the old elite.148  
After the war, a new Diplomatic Academy (DA) was introduced, heavily influenced by 
earlier British and US reforms.149 The selected trainees were now given a year of paid training 
and practical work. As of the immediate postwar period, therefore, “men from rural or 
working-class backgrounds were accepted by the Diplomatic Academy.”150 Thus, in general, 
more people from the middle and working class, and a greater geographical diffusion marked 
the Foreign Service of the 1950s and 1960s.151 Besides the egalitarian aims of the Labour 
Party, there were also political considerations. ‘Opening’ and ‘democratising’ the Foreign 
Service was indeed a way of challenging the hegemony of the conservative civil servant elite 
mentioned above. Many of the new diplomats already had, or developed, ties to the Labour 
Party. And not a few of them jumped between administrative and political positions. This 
constituted a well connected, if not necessarily well-heeled, diplomatic type: The Labour-era 
diplomat. 
Per Martin Ølberg (born 1933) was a typical Labour-era diplomat. Ølberg was the son 
of a Labour Party leader from Lier, and soon formed the Labour Youth Section of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 16.05.2013; Lars Roede “Fritz Holland”. SNL, There were many other 
diplomats central to the EC-case with similar backgrounds. Håkon W. Freihow, for example, came from “a typical 
civil servant family, where the majority belonged to the clergy”. Arild Holland too descended from Germany, his 
family coming to Norway during the house-building boom of the 1870s. His father was a famous architect and 
curator of many local museums in Oslo. http://snl.no/.nbl_biografi/Fritz_Holland/utdypning (05.05.2013); 
Interview – Arild Holland – 16 February 2013. 
148 Neumann and Leira Aktiv og Avventende (2005), p. 340 
149 UK: Proposal for the Reform of the Foreign Service (1943); US: Reorganization of the Foreign Service (1946). 
150 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012) p. 151-154. 
151 Neumann and Leira Aktiv og Avventende (2005), p. 345. 
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hometown. He later became state secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping for 
two Labour Governments, between 1976-1981.152 During the 1960s, Ølberg was considered 
one of Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie’s ‘boys’ – that is subordinates that Lie trusted and 
called upon to do all sorts of political work.153 Ølberg finished his degree in political science in 
1957 and went straight into the service in 1958. He was attaché (1961) and 2nd Embassy 
Secretary (1962-63) to Copenhagen; Press attaché to Bonn (1965-66); Junior Executive Officer 
(1967) and Executive Officer (1968-70) and Head of the 1st Economic Office (1971-73). 
Ølberg was secretary of the Market Committee and member of the negotiation secretariat.154 
Similarly, Knut Frydenlund (born 1927), from a middle-class background, was both 
politically active and pursuing a diplomatic career. He started in the Foreign Service in 1952, 
and was posted both to Brussels and Bonn. His early experiences with political work were as 
political secretary to Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, and as permanent representative to the 
Council of Europe (1963-1965). From the mid-1960s he became more of a politician than a 
diplomat. He came to hold central positions within the Labour Party, crucially as member 
(1967-69) and later chairman (1969-73) of the International Committee. In 1969 he was 
elected to parliament and also became a delegate to the NATO parliamentary assembly 
(1969). By 1970, Frydenlund was one of the Labour Party’s most respected foreign policy 
experts, and was, among other things, vice chairman in the ECFA. He later became foreign 
minister in all Labour Governments between 1973 and 1987, holding the position for a total 
of 11 years. In many ways, Knut Frydenlund acted as a diplomat and a politician 
simultaneously, belonging to a new kind of polito-administrative elite.155  
Many of the diplomats working closely with the EC-case, then, matched one of two 
ideal type elites. Some belonged to both. Thorvald Stoltenberg (born 1931) was one of the 
many diplomats who became Labour Party politicians, inhabiting a polito-administrative role. 
Stoltenberg’s family was of German origin and came to Bergen during the times of the 
Hanseatic League (13th-17th Century), and later moved to Tønsberg, Drøbak and finally Oslo. 	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154 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012; Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012; Redaksjonen “Per Martin 
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It was an old civil servant family, whose members were mostly merchants, clergy and/or 
politicians (one of which was present at Eidsvoll in 1814 when the Norwegian Constitution 
was negotiated and signed). His father, Theodor Emil Stoltenberg, was an officer of the 
army.156 Stoltenberg came into the diplomatic service in 1958. He was part of Foreign 
Minister Halvard Lange and John Lyng’s political secretariats (1965-1970) before working as 
international secretary for The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU) until 
1971. Stoltenberg then held the crucial position as state secretary in the MFA under the 
Bratteli government between 1971 and 1972 up until the referendum. Though he did not 
work specifically with the EC-case while being a diplomat, Thorvald Stoltenberg was heavily 
involved with the issue as MFA state secretary.157 
Looking beyond the diplomats, the quintessential character inhabiting both ideal types 
was Foreign Minister Halvard M. Lange (1945-1965). Lange – foreign minister for nearly 
twenty years (1946-1965) – was a highly educated academic and a typical ’social democrat’, 
well to the right within the Labour Party. Lange’s father – Christian L. Lange – was a famous 
internationalist politician, intellectual and parliamentarian in the interwar period, and a 
member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. Christian L. Lange, in fact, 
received the Nobel Peace Price in 1921 for his work in keeping the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
together during the First World War.158 At the helm of the MFA for most of the postwar 
years, therefore, was a man that captured the peculiar mixture of elites populating his 
ministry. Put simply, the leading diplomats working with the EC-case were either well 
established, well connected, or both. The two ideal types embodied two kinds of ruling elites 
that co-existed within the diplomatic service of the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Crème de la crème 
An important part of the postwar-MFA was its recruitment and education system – the 
Diplomatic Academy (DA). The academy was the standardised way of getting in to the MFA: 
an applicant would be accepted to the program after a set of written and oral exams, and then 
given a year of education and practical experience with pay. The education consisted of 
courses in diplomacy, economy, international law, modern history, French and English, and 
was concluded with a final exam. Following the final exam the Foreign Service Trainees 
would be placed one or two years abroad as ‘juniors’. The best of each cohort were given the 
chance to choose where to be posted. At the end of the placement, if considered fit, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 http://snl.no/Riksforsamlingen_p%C3%A5_Eidsvoll_1814%2Frepresentanter (15.05.2014). 
157 SalvesenThorvalds Verden (1994); Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014.  
158 Redaksjonen “Christian L Lange” http://nbl.snl.no/Christian_L_Lange (09.05.2014). 
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would be hired.159 This educational system was one of the elements that set the MFA apart 
from other government institutions, and diplomats apart from other civil servants. Through 
the course of the education, a group of individuals would first be forged together by the shared 
experience of courses and exams, and then introduced to ‘life as a diplomat’ by being 
scattered across the globe as ‘juniors’ as “a kind of expenditure for the future that the system 
was prepared to take.”160  
Being chosen to the academy, set them apart from others, it marked the initial step 
towards the development of an esprit de corps.161 It was, and still is, portrayed and conceived as 
one of the most prestigious educations in Norway.162 Arild Holland recalled when he was 
admitted to the academy: “well, I applied for the MFA program, and was admitted. It was a 
feather in the cap, because there were perhaps 150 applicants and only six were admitted. So 
you felt like someone proclaimed you a genius right off the bat.”163 Thorvald Stoltenberg 
sardonically remarked that there was a certain arrogance on the part of the MFA  because it 
had ‘the divine advantage’ of being the only department with entrance exams. With several 
hundred applicants, and perhaps only six or eight being accepted to the Academy, Stoltenberg 
went on, “you’re bound to become a bit haughty”.164  Daughter of Asbjørn Skarstein, 
Ambassador Tove Skarstein, recalled how her father told her that there was “a queue almost 
out into the streets” of applicants, and how he got in because he had “excellent results from 
his exams”. 165  This was not uniquely Norwegian. In most postwar Western European 
countries, being accepted to the Foreign Service was reserved for the best and the brightest. 
Describing British diplomat John Robinson’s way into the FCO, Hugo Young asserts, “in 
1949, he sat the Foreign Office exam, and was one of eight applicants, out of 400, selected for 
entry: those were the days when the brightest and the best still saw public service as a career-
option of unrivalled fascination.”166 
As Iver B. Neumann notes, the cohort and the academy year (class of 1953 etc.) was 
“the yardstick of how one’s career progresses”.167 This process started already with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 343-246. 
160 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
161 On the creation of an Esprit de Corps within the ECSC High Authority and the Commission: Seidel The process of 
politics in Europe (2010). 
162 NRK – Kveldsnytt – 12.04.2014 https://tv.nrk.no/serie/dagsrevyen/NNFA19041214/12-04-2014#t=14m29s 
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they have to be the best and brightest to be chosen. 
163 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. 
164 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014. Stoltenberg is comparing the MFA with the MoCS. 
165 Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014. 
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ranking of trainees at the end of the DA. Based on how they did, the trainees were allowed to 
choose their first postings. Many of the Europeans did very well and could thus choose where 
they wanted to be stationed as ‘juniors’. Terje Johannessen (class of 1961, born 1936) recalled 
being “number one in my year, so I asked if I could be stationed in Brussels, because that was 
the big issue at the time, and I got the posting of course, because I was number one.”168 
Johannessen, a political scientist by training, was junior attaché (1962-1964) and 2nd Embassy 
Secretary (1965-66) to Brussels, then served two years as Executive Officer to the 1st Economic 
Office (1967-69) before he became a member of the Norwegian Export Council (1970-73). 
Johannessen was a member of the Market Committee (1966-70).169  
Seen from the outside and experienced from the inside, the DA set the diplomats apart 
from the rest of the administration and established an internal hierarchy among them. 
However, even if they were not number one in their cohort, as many of them were the only 
economists of their cohort, the Europeans were needed as ‘juniors’ where the workload was the 
heaviest and were drawn to the stations where multilateral economic policy was central. Their 
career paths became increasingly specialised.  
 
Experts: Multilateral Economic Diplomats 
In the interwar and immediate post-war period, the vast majority of diplomats in the 
Norwegian Foreign Service held degrees in law, came from the best parts of Oslo or the areas 
around, and belonged to the upper classes of society.170 By the late 1940s and 1950s the 
recruitment patterns had changed to fit both the shifting international environment, and the 
egalitarian norms of the Labour Party. One of the consequences was a greater variety in 
education. 171  Together with the political scientists, the economists gradually broke the 
hegemony of the lawyers. In the 1930s, professor of economics Ragnar Frisch set up a five-
year ‘social economist’ education at the University of Oslo specifically intended to meet the 
state’s need for civil servants trained in economics.172 In 1947, a new magister degree in 
political science was introduced at the University of Oslo. Professor Dr. Frede Castberg’s 
reason for creating the degree was to qualify people “for the Foreign Service and the press 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
169 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012; UM GS 108 B2/-17 – 02.03.1966, Brussels – Memo. Norwegian-
Danish contacts. Johannessen was very interested in history and came to see the question of membership in broad 
geopolitical terms as an important way to anchor Norway firmly to the Western camp. Early on he was recognised as 
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(and nothing else)”.173 Already in 1944, Head of Office Aage Bryn, recommended increased 
diversity in recruitment and more specialisation during the DA and afterwards.174 The road 
was open for a more diversified educational background.175 As a rule-based multilateral 
system of trade took shape in the postwar era, the need of the MFA to recruit ‘the best and the 
brightest’ economists grew.176 Eivinn Berg, for example, felt he “very much enjoyed the 
benefits” of his economic education when he joined the MFA because, “at the time, trade 
policy was very central”.177 His career, working with the EEC, GATT and EFTA for ten 
years straight in Brussels and Geneva (1962-1973) was emblematic for this new generation of 
diplomats.  
Take, for example, Gunnar Rogstad (born 1916). Rogstad was an economist and served 
as Assistant Director General (1960-65) and Director General (1965-67) for the Economic 
Department, ambassador to Haag (1968-1971) and director for the Norwegian Export 
Council (1971-2), between 1960 and 1972. As one of the older multilateral economic 
diplomats – together with Skarstein and Halvorsen – the younger diplomats looked up to him, 
and he was known to be an expert on the technical aspects of trade politics.178 For twelve 
years, Rogstad dealt almost exclusively with multi- and bilateral European economic issues. 
Again, such career paths and specialisations were a general trend among Western 
European MFAs. Economic multilateralisation and later globalisation turned multilateral 
economic diplomacy into an increasingly significant factor in foreign policy.179 Diplomat in 
the British FCO John Robinson, for example, was part of a new generation of diplomats, and 
was “allowed to become a real European expert” by working uninterruptedly with 
Community affairs for fifteen years in Paris, Brussels and London.180 Likewise in Denmark, a 
new generation of multilateral economic diplomats with similar educational backgrounds was 
allowed to pursue long careers working solely with European economic matters.181 The 	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Danish so-called cand.polit generation (a degree similar to the master in political economy 
many of the Europeans held), historian Johnny Laursen points out, shared values and concepts 
and were among the core decision makers regarding Danish European policy. As in Norway, 
the new generation of diplomats came to break the dominance of lawyers and was an 
expression of how the multilateral economic diplomacy gained significance both in foreign 
policy and domestic economic-political issues. 182  In the British and Danish case, these 
diplomats would end up with splendid careers in the EC – the Norwegian Europeans would 
not.183 As we shall see below, this new specialisation, answering the major shifts occurring on 
the international scene, also challenged established diplomatic norms. 
For obvious reasons the economists became dominant within the Economic Department 
of the Norwegian MFA and were stationed at the newly created multilateral economic 
organisations. There is a clear trend if we turn to the education of the 94 diplomats that could 
be considered experts on European policy. Throughout the period (1960-1972), some 30 
percent of the diplomats were educated economists. The percentage of lawyers decreased 
distinctly from about 40 percent during the early 1960s to ca. 30 percent in the early 1970s. 
Political scientists made up ca. 10 percent of the experts during the first two rounds of 
enlargement talks (1960-1967), and they grew to 17,5 percent in the last period (1969-
1972).184 These trends are softened a bit with the inclusion of those posted abroad. Within the 
Economic Department of the MFA, the percentage of lawyers decreased to some 17 percent, 
and the economists increased to about 40 percent by 1967.185 By comparison, the percentage 
of lawyers in the whole MFA was around 40 percent for the period 1960 to 1964. And 
economists made up some 16 percent.186 The diplomats working the closest with the EC-case 
were a much more homogenous group: counting the fifteen that we will label Europeans, half of 
them (7) were economists. Five of the fifteen core diplomats were lawyers – three were 
political scientists.187 
“[P]artly because they played such key roles, partly because they represented a powerful 
area of expertise that wielded great authority among politicians and the general public”, 	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economic historian Einar Lie argues, the economists of the civil service were seen as ‘the 
powerful servants’. Lie continues, “in the early 1970s these economists were probably also at 
the zenith of their influence and understanding.”188 Only those who graduated from the 
University of Oslo and the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in 
Bergen were generally accepted as ‘economists’. Thus, the number of Norwegian economists 
was relatively small, and economy was perceived as an elite education.189 Though the number 
of economists working in ministries increased from around 20 in 1938, and about 100 in 
1950, to 257 in 1972, economists were still few and far between in Norway during the postwar 
years.190 The first fifteen postwar years were marked by an enormous surplus demand for 
professionals (of all sorts) – which heightened the prestige of economists. The mid-1950s and 
1960s, moreover, were marked by a slump in graduated economists. Thus, those who did 
graduate were even more sought after by the government. Put simply, economists were highly 
valued and in demand.191 
Eivinn Berg and Arild Holland, for example, were the only economists of each of their 
cohort of six trainees. Holland’s 1953 cohort consisted of four lawyers, one philologist and 
himself; Berg’s 1956 cohort consisted of two lawyers, two political scientists, one philologist 
and himself. Eivinn Berg recalled that there were simply too many lawyers and political 
scientists, and that the MFA hungered for economists: “and that was all well, because there 
were people from the business sector on the [Diplomatic Academy] board, and they thought 
‘luckily we now get a man that knows a bit about the business community and economy’.”192 
Equally, Arild Holland and Asbjørn Skarstein both felt to be sought-after, “and especially 
[for] these giant trade negotiations and such, economists were needed, they needed people 
that could do the math”.193 The notion that they were better equipped than lawyers and 
political scientists to handle and understand multilateral economic negotiations, seems to have 
been quite common. Eivinn Berg reflects:  
 
“It isn’t easy for a political scientist to conduct negotiations regarding customs unions (...) Quite 
complex issues. Not that I had any particular qualifications for those particular matters, but I 
had, we [economists] had a lot of international economy and trade policy at the Norwegian 	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School of Economics, seminars and such, so I was geared towards following a career within 
trade policy.”194 
 
Captured in Berg’s statement is a duality: he was at once a specialist and a generalist. In fact, 
80 percent of the experts on European policy were educated as generalists and 100 percent of 
the most centrally placed diplomats working with the EC-case were educated generalists. 
Political scientist Nils Ørvik surveyed several ministries in the late 1960s and found that half of 
the civil servants in two of the expert ministries, Defence and Commerce & Shipping, 
regarded themselves as generalists. The diplomats of the Economic Department of the MFA 
“notoriously the most generalised of them all – categorized themselves as experts!”195 Ørvik, it 
could be argued, got the answers he asked for. The question was: “Would you regard yourself 
as a ‘specialist (expert) on the tasks assigned to your office?” And this they did, because they 
were specialised within certain fields of diplomacy, and often certain sectors within a field of 
diplomacy.  
The diplomats considered themselves as experts on multilateral economic diplomacy, 
and experts on negotiations.196 This was how, for example, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange 
often referred to them; this was how they referred to themselves.197 On the other hand, Eivinn 
Berg would remember how – during the negotiations in 1970-1072 – they had “loads of 
experts on tariffs and customs coming down to Brussels” to help them out with the technical 
deliberations.198 The linguistic distinction was clear: technical experts (tekniske eksperter) came 
from the expert ministries (fagdepartementer) and if they were sent to Brussels, it was to have 
technical deliberations (tekniske drøftinger).199 
There was a well-cemented perception among the Europeans that they were working with 
the most important and complex issue of the 1960s, the EC-issue, and that they enjoyed a 
privileged position within the Foreign Service. This might be another reason why they 
considered themselves experts: they considered themselves more expert than the Political 
Department of the MFA. Arild Holland reveals this when he says: 
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“There was the Economic Department and the Political Department. They kept on writing 
memos on what was going on down in Eastern Europe, and what not. But the Economic 
Department was the substantial part of the MFA, you know. And as an economist, the only one, 
I was placed there.”200 
 
Holland connected the superiority of the Economic Department with the exclusivity of being 
an economist, distancing the Economic Department from the rest of the MFA. As will be seen 
below, this was reflected in their communication patterns as well: the Economic Department 
was secluded – horizontally and vertically – from the rest of the MFA.201  
Holland went on to argue that the Political Department lacked the expertise to 
understand that the EC-case was more than economic policy. As many of the interviewed 
diplomats recalled it, the Political Department was uninterested, and more concerned with 
security issues, Eastern Europe, and the United Nations (in what they used to call the 
“Hallelujah-office”). One can sense the notion of MEDs conducting the ‘substantial’ 
diplomacy, and a distinct ‘trivialising’ of purely political diplomacy. Terje Johannessen 
contended the Political Department saw the EC-issue as ‘purely commercial policy’, and “did 
not recognise that economy, commercial policy, foreign exchange issues, was really security 
policy.”202 Arne Langeland added that diplomats from the Political Department, “couldn’t get 
involved with the negotiations” as they were too complex and technical. There were only “a 
handful of people who dealt with these matters”.203 Again exclusivity and superiority marks 
the language. In this sense too they perceived themselves as part of an elite. To their mind 
they were experts dealing with cutting-edge diplomacy, and the most complex issue of the 
1960s: the EC-case. The Europeans, then, were almost exclusively part of this wave of 
specialisation within the field of diplomacy, belonging to the first generation of MEDs. 
 
The ‘young war’ generation 
Most Europeans belonged to a generation that entered the Foreign Service following the 
Second World War and understood and articulated itself in relation to other generations 
(notably the foregoing). One of the most significant markers was the aforementioned 
specialised education and work with multilateral economic organisations. The ‘young war’ 
generation of multilateral economic diplomats expressed its conscious ‘we’ in a definite 
junction with their understanding of the preceding generation of diplomats, the so-called 	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London generation. However, the distinction made between the two generations was not clear 
cut: as will be explored below, education, expertise and the understanding of the new 
diplomatic issues at hand blurred the line between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ generation.204  
As the Second World War came to an end, the MFA administration that had operated 
in exile in London was reunited with the small remains of the MFA in Oslo. The London 
MFA was sizeable, and in fact comparable to the entire MFA before the war. As it were, those 
taking part of the Norwegian-London government would play a crucial role in shaping 
postwar Norway. Neumann and Leira note that “[t]he young men that landed political and 
bureaucratic positions during the war, could surf the ‘war-capital’-wave for the rest of their 
lives.” This holds true for the first generation of diplomats in the Foreign Service after the 
war. It is striking, for example, that all three Secretary Generals between 1945 and 1971 had 
spent their war-years in London. Even Lange, when he took over as Foreign Minister in 1946, 
considered it a weakness that he had not been in London during the war.205  
The London generation occupied much space between 1945 and 1972. Still, with the 
multilateral and economic foreign policy developing in the postwar era, and the 
decolonisation process gathering speed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, new career paths 
and positions were created.206 What Tancred Ibsen Jr. complained about as being a “definite 
distortion in the age distribution” leading to a slow rate of advancement in the early 1960s 
was largely normalised by the creation of international organisations and the disintegration of 
colonial empires by the late 1960s.207 As the first 15 years after the war showed an increase of 
22 employees in the MFA, the next ten showed an increase of 56 employees.208 The 1960s 
was thus a decade of an emerging new generation of diplomats in an expanding service. 
The 94 experts on European policy were largely young adults during the Second World 
War. Most of them were too young to have been in London with the government. Over 40 
percent of them were between 17 and 26-years-old during the war. During the first EC-round 
(1960-63) some 30 percent were aged between 27 and 36 during the war; this had fallen to just 
shy of 13 percent in the third round (1969-72). The share of people that were 16 or younger 
during the war rose from roughly 14 to 33 percent from the first to the third round. By the last 
EC-round, thus, roughly 76 percent of the experts on European policy were between 7 and 26 	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during the Second World War. For the 15 core MEDs, the numbers were similar, but more 
focused. For the entire period (1960-72) 73 percent were aged between 7 and 26 during the 
Second World War. Nine out 15 (60%) were aged between 16 and 27 during the war.209 The 
Europeans were part of a ‘young war’ generation populating the Foreign Service in the 
1960s.210 
The ‘young war’ generation shaped its identity in relation to the London generation. 
Arild Holland, for example, described the London generation as being too attached to Britain: 
  
“If you look at the Economic Department and the Political Department after the war – they had 
all been to London. Ræder, Thore Boye, all of them, well almost all of them. Skylstad, Secretary 
General for 13 years, he was there for way too long. They were all influenced by the British [and] 
thought the British had the answers. And that’s why we didn’t wake up.”211 
 
Holland highlights the Norwegian government’s loyalty towards, and willingness to follow, the 
British. This was an enduring aspect of Norwegian foreign policy that was challenged 
precisely in the 1960s.212 Holland recalled such generational reflections were discussed and 
shared in the mid-1960s together with, especially, Asbjørn Skarstein and Per Martin 
Ølberg.213 Much in the same way, Thorvald Stoltenberg reflected on the shift from following 
Britain on foreign policy issues, to – increasingly – looking to Germany: 
 
“To them [the London-generation] Britain was the great power in Europe, and for many of those 
who still live, Britain is still the one they look to. But the British chose (...) to focus on the 
Commonwealth. Fair enough, but this compelled the small and medium-sized countries in 
Europe – in need of a great power to associate with – to increasingly relate to Germany, who, in 
fact, conducted a small-state [friendly] policy.”214 
 
Stoltenberg’s reflections reveal how generational outlooks were shaped by political realities. In 
this case, there is little doubt that his ‘replacement’ of Britain with Germany as the European 
great power was influenced to a large extent by the strong links between Willy Brandt’s 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Norwegian Labour Party in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.215 This coincided with the climax of the EC-struggle in Norway, and 	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Stoltenberg’s rise to the position of State Secretary of the MFA (1971-72) within Bratteli’s first 
Labour Government (1971-72).216 
The Europeans’ distancing from the London generation’s emphasis on the British was 
also informed by an increasingly strained relationship between the UK and Norway within 
EFTA and, especially, in the EC-negotiations of the early 1970s regarding fisheries. In 1964, 
following the EFTA surcharge crisis, British ambassador to Norway, Sir Patrick F. Hancock 
reported on “a crisis of confidence” between the two countries, and that the Norwegian public 
reactions against the British had been stronger “than at any time since the war”.217 Equally, 
the bitter and intense negotiations on fishing rights and fisheries during the fall of 1971 left a 
big impression on them: “Our biggest problem: Britain. They absolutely ruined the whole 
thing for us (...). They demanded that every concession given to Norway in the fishery sector, 
should be given to the UK as well - the EC-countries wouldn’t have it. They said: ‘no way’, 
and we were left high and dry.”218 The MEDs dealing with the EC-case’s relationship with 
Britain was different than that of the London-generation due to specific political incidents, 
and broader geopolitical shifts. But they came to understand and articulate it as a generational 
shift, and thus ascribed it importance in shaping their own generational identity. Keenly 
aware of the former generations’ trust in Britain, Holland concluded: “there’s nothing wrong 
with it, and I would’ve probably been one of them, had I been in London during the war. 
Can’t run from your past anyhow.”219 
The generational understanding was related to the war experience, but also to the 
specific education of the young generation of MEDs. There was no clear line, and people 
could be included or excluded from the ‘generation’ based on criteria that had little to do with 
age. The complexity of the generational understanding of the ‘young war’ generation is 
exemplified by diplomats Sommerfelt and Skaug, the eldest of the 15 core MEDs and the only 
ones who had worked for the London government. Søren Christian Sommerfelt, a lawyer by 
training, had been an attaché in London in 1941 and personal secretary to Foreign Minister 
Trygve Lie the following two years.220 Sommerfelt’s admiration for the British stuck with him 
throughout his career. In his memoirs he recalled their “stoic calm, their incredible resistance 	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to letting anything caused by the enemy commove them. What truly made me admire them – 
as it did for many Norwegians – was the civil courage of the British.”221 Holland, who worked 
very closely with Sommerfelt, recalled him as “the most British Norwegian I have ever 
met”.222  
The second, Arne Skaug (born 1906), had led the Governmental Welfare Office in New 
York from 1942 and been Economic Counsellor to Washington from 1943. Skaug was one of 
three Norwegian representatives at the Bretton Woods conference. In 1944 he came to 
London to work for the Ministry of Supply. Skaug was one of the most promising economic 
academics in Norway, but after the Second World War he became increasingly involved in 
politics (Labour) and in the emerging multilateral economic diplomacy of OEEC. Skaug was 
Minister of Commerce and Shipping for three consecutive Labour governments (1955-62); 
and Ambassador to London (1962-68) and to Copenhagen (1968-74). He was also a member 
of the first negotiation delegation (1962-63).223 Both, in a way, approached the task of 
Norwegian membership in the EC slightly differently than their younger colleagues.  
Sommerfelt was chief negotiator, at the deputy level, setting up EFTA. He was one of 
the strongest proponents of EFTA as a permanent solution, and afterwards a common EFTA 
approach towards the Community in the early 1960s. It was not until later that he abandoned 
this view. But he was also perceived differently. Some of the younger diplomats viewed him as 
an ‘old school’ diplomat. By this, it seems, they meant two things: that he was a ‘lord-like’ 
character who wanted to play a leading role in the negotiations and fix things through heroic 
feats of diplomacy. This did not square with the nitty-gritty of multilateral economic 
diplomacy, which left little room for heroism. But they also meant that he was not an expert 
on multilateral economic issues. This opinion, shared by many of the younger MEDs, 
consisted of subtle generational considerations: Sommerfelt was a lawyer by training, not an 
economist. He could thus easily be interpreted as being part of the older, lawyer-dominated, 
generation – not sufficiently equipped for the challenges of GATT, EEC and EFTA.224 
During interviews, both Berg and Holland juxtaposed Sommerfelt and Halvorsen/Skarstein. 	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Berg described Sommerfelt as a “driving” negotiator, but Halvorsen as the real expert, the 
one who “knew the EC”.225 Equally, Holland described Sommerfelt as a “tough” and 
“difficult” negotiator, but went on to opine, “he didn’t know anything about the EC”.226 
Sommerfelt had, so Holland claims, to lean on Skarstein and himself for the real expertise.227 
This could, however, just as easily be interpreted as an educational distinction: since Skarstein, 
Halvorsen, Berg and Holland were economists, Sommerfelt – as a lawyer – was not deemed a 
‘real expert’ on multilateral economic negotiations. A third aspect could be that Sommerfelt, 
as opposed to those from the ‘young war’ generation, had not gone through the new DA. As 
seen above, the academy programme was essential in creating an esprit de corps among the new 
generation of diplomats. This set them apart, not only from other ministries, but also from 
earlier generations of diplomats within the MFA. Most likely, these views on Sommerfelt 
reflect generational, educational and personal divisions, and show how they were all 
intertwined.228  
Arne Skaug, too, approached the EC-question slightly differently than his younger 
colleagues. Skaug, together with Erik Brofoss, was the most predominant politician and civil 
servant shaping Norway’s external economic policy between 1947 and 1962.229 He was 
initially an academic, one of the brightest and best students of economy under famous 
Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch at the University of Oslo in the interwar years.230 
Following the Second World War he became the director of the influential Statistics Norway 
(SN), one of the main hubs of economic knowledge production for the new social democratic 
order. Skaug saw the new generation of economists as the state’s ‘social entrepreneurs’, 
uniting science and society in a higher order – the modern mixed-economy welfare state. As 
director of Statistics Norway, he increasingly represented the government at international 
economic conferences. Skaug took part in the Geneva conference in 1947, negotiating the 
establishment of an international trade organisation and the following tariff talks; the Havana 
conference of 1947-48; and all meetings and negotiations concerning the Marshall plan 
during the first Paris conference in July 1947. He was subsequently appointed as state 
secretary to the MFA and in May 1948 he was made minister, and later Ambassador, to 
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Norway’s permanent representation to the OEEC (1949) and the North Atlantic Council 
(1952) in Paris.231  
In 1955, Skaug was summoned to take over for Erik Brofoss as Minister of Commerce 
and Shipping. Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen 
both thought Skaug would strengthen the newly elected third Gerhardsen government. Skaug 
was initially unwilling to take the job, but eventually gave in after persistent courtship and 
pressure by party secretary Lie. Gerhardsen wanted Skaug for the post due to his excellent 
track record as an economist and social entrepreneur; Lie required Skaug because of his 
undying support of Western cooperation in general, and NATO in particular.232 This made 
him prone, as much of the Labour Party leadership, to prefer Atlantic solutions to 
international economic problems. He was a strong supporter of OEEC, and later OECD, as a 
framework for future economic cooperation. Similarly, as chief negotiator at the ministerial 
level, he became Norway’s strongest proponent of the eventually failed Free Trade Area 
(FTA, 1956-1958).233 Even after the first British application for membership (1961), Skaug still 
considered a joint OECD solution to the market schism in Europe the best answer. As a 
result, the younger Europeans also perceived Skaug slightly differently. In short, he was seen as 
being above them and a part of them. Tancred Ibsen Jr., during his OEEC-years in Paris, 
remembered Skaug as “hovering in the background”. Skaug was, to his mind, the minister 
“coming down every now and again”.234 Similarly, Arne Langeland, during his OEEC-years, 
described Arne Skaug simply as “the big boss”.235 As a leading Labour Party politician and 
member of another generation, Skaug was viewed as a superior rather than a co-worker, at 
least in the 1950s. On the other hand, both Eivinn Berg and Arne Langeland consistently 
described Skaug as a professional (diplomat) – he was one of them.236 Even in his days as 
Minister of Commerce and Shipping, he was seen as an expert on multilateral economic 
diplomacy. In contrast, Langeland described O. C. Gundersen, who took over the Ministry 
after Skaug, as a ‘typical Labour Party politician’.237  
Berg and Langeland considered Skaug similar to them because he was a politician that 
also filled the role of diplomat and expert. But it was also due to his particular education and 
his postings – he too was an expert in multilateral economic diplomacy in a way the ‘previous’ 	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generation could not match. Such interpretations reveal the fluent, discursively negotiated and 
renegotiated, borders between the two generations, and that education was a crucial 
component. However, we should not exaggerate the divisions between the two generations: 
both had first-hand experiences and memories of the Second World War, both were 
instrumental in the postwar reconstruction of Norwegian society, and both would have much 
more trouble in understanding the next generation that would rebel in the late 1960s. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The social, educational and generational background of those working the closest with the 
EC-case criss-crossed to create a layered pattern of elitism. Many had ties back to the old civil 
servant or newer Labour Party elite. Such ties denoted status and echoed their high 
institutional position within the MFA and administration in general – status often facilitated 
position. Beyond the prestige of belonging to the few chosen for the diplomatic trait, the 
Europeans were part of a certain segment of diplomats: the MEDs. They defined themselves as 
apart from and above other diplomats through educational, career and generational markers. 
Without being too categorical, it seems a background in economics and/or belonging to the 
younger generation that had gone through the DA was particularly important. To this was 
added the long, almost exclusive, careers within multilateral economic diplomacy rendering 
them experts (as well as generalists). Their self-perception as ‘something new’ was often 
articulated in a generational language that perhaps concealed a much more complex set of 
ruptures and continuities. That they had a different view on Britain than the previous 
generation, for example, had more to do with their concrete experience of the EC-case and 
the decline of Britain, than anything inherent in the new generation of diplomats. Still, the 
Europeans did mostly belong to a new generation of diplomats who perceived themselves and 
were perceived by others as both elite and expert in a distinct way – a notion that would play 
a very important part in the emotional EC-struggle.  
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Chapter 2 
Europeans – in a changing diplomacy 
 
“You know they talk of politicians being in charge, they come marching in, and they talk as if the 
administration doesn’t exist – 80 per cent of all decisions made, at least, come from us.”238 
 
Arne Langeland’s slightly exaggerated claim to decision-making power  
 
One of the trademarks of the postwar era – between 1945 and 1973 – was the development of 
a rule-based multilateral system of trade, built on a network of arrangements, such as GATT, 
OEEC (OECD), EC and EFTA.239 Norway became deeply embedded in this system, starting 
with the Labour Party’s reluctant acceptance of the Marshall Aid. 240  As these new 
international and regional organisations came into existence, following the Second World 
War, the responsibilities of the MFA and Foreign Service grew. As Western European 
postwar MFAs responded to the changing patterns of economic, technical and political co-
operation, the boundaries of foreign policy, and with them, the role of diplomacy, were 
glacially shifting.241 
The Norwegian MFA and Foreign Service responded to these structural changes by 
mapping its institutional adaptation, also in relation to the EC-case, which created new spaces 
of interaction, roles and patterns of co-operation within the Norwegian administration. As 
exemplified by leading multilateral economic diplomats (MEDs) who worked with the EC-
case, these structural changes and organisational adaptations challenged the traditional role of 
the diplomat. The Norwegian MFA’s adaptation to the growing multilateralisation and 
economification of foreign policy blurred the borders between foreign and domestic politics, 
bureaucracy and politics, and between governmental and non-governmental actors and 
arenas. In tracking down who the Europeans were, we see that they were among the centrally 
placed MEDs whose role changed from a traditional Weberian gate keeper to that of a 
boundary spanner with a significantly altered potential to create foreign policy. Without 
recognising this new diplomatic role, it is difficult to understand how the Europeans worked 
with the EC-case, and how this in turn put them on a collision course with a critical press and 
those opposed to membership in parliament and public. 
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Institutional Adaptation 
While the Foreign Service changed, its relatively strict functional division remained, which 
helps us understand how only a handful of MEDs actually ended up working with the EC-
case. Shortly after the Second World War, the Foreign Service in its entirety underwent a 
thorough revision by the so-called Reform Committee of 1946. The newly appointed Foreign 
Minister Lange believed that the experiences of the war had revealed the necessity for an 
“alert and vigorous Foreign Service”.242 An updated version of this law was adopted in 1958, 
but the organisational and administrative framework remained largely the same.243  
 
As seen in the organisational map of the MFA between 1960 and 1972244, the core of the 
institution remained relatively stable. At the same time, the MFA adapted according to an 
east-west axis, focusing on security and defence policy, a western and increasingly global 
development of economic multilateralism, and from the mid-1960s onwards along a north-
south axis focussing on economic assistance and aid. Moreover, the combination of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Kolsrud Rekonstruksjon og reform (2008), p. 171. The restructuring of its system of recruitment, organisation and 
aims was finalised with the new law for the Foreign Service of 13th December 1948. 
243 Iver B. Neumann ”Norway. The Foreign Ministry: Bracketing Interdependence.” in Brian Hocking (Ed.) Foreign 
Ministries – Change and Adaptation, Basingstoke (1999), pp. 152-169, p. 157. In 1969 Foreign Minister John Lyng 
(Conservative) instructed the so-called Dons Committee with the task of revisiting its structure, this work was 
completed in 1970, but the organisational changes did not occur until 1973. 
244 This organisational map combines that of 1967, Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets (1968), p.45-48, 68, and that of 
1972-73 Kolsrud Rekonstruksjon og reform (2008), p. 180. 
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flourishing cultural diplomacy and a growing interest from the press in foreign policy meant 
that a distinct press service took shape. What marked the Norwegian MFA and Foreign 
Service of the postwar era, as so many other Western European MFAs, was a combination of 
institutional consistency and flexibility, but first and foremost growth.245  
The MFA at home was divided into departments with a particular area of responsibility 
(Fig. 1), and it was the Economic Department that had the overall responsibility of the EC 
negotiations.246 Between 1960 and 1972 four men held the position of Director General, 
heading the Economic Department: Søren Christian Sommerfelt (1956-1960) 247 , Jahn 
Halvorsen (1960-1965)248, Gunnar Rogstad (1965-1967)249, and Asbjørn Skarstein (1967-
1973). Together with Halvorsen, Skarstein would be the most influential Director General 
working with the EC-case.  
Asbjørn Skarstein (born 1922), an economist with a background in banking who joined 
the MFA in 1948, was a highly respected specialist on multilateral economic diplomacy, and a 
skilled and popular mentor for many of the younger MEDs. Between 1960 and 1972 he was 
Counsellor to the EFTA delegation in Geneva (1960-61) and Brussels (1962-65); Assistant 
Director General (1965-67) and Director General (1967-73) for the Economic Department 
and member of the Market Committee and both negotiation delegations (1962-63 and 1970-
72). Skarstein was among the earliest to realise that Norway needed to apply for membership, 
and became one of the most enthusiastic pro-Europeans in the service.250 
A closer look reveals several important institutional adaptations in response to the EC-
case. The Economic Department, established in 1934, was divided into six offices between 
1960 and 1972, each led by a Head of Office who reported directly to the Director 
General.251 Each office’s responsibility was based on a mixture of geographical and field 
criteria. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Kolsrud Rekonstruksjon og reform (2008), p. 32, 180. More than doubling of people employed between 1946 and 
1975 (155 to 322) and a growth in departments, offices, permanent representations, embassies and interdepartmental 
committees and councils. See for example Zara Steiner’s edited volume comparing the history and development of a 
wide range of Foreign Ministries: Zara Steiner (Ed.) The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, London: Times 
Books (1982), pp. 541-574, p. 26-27. 
246 The Secretary General was the highest-ranking permanent administrative leader at home. 
247 After being the chief negotiator at the deputy level in the EFTA negotiations, he was moved to Geneva as 
ambassador to its permanent delegation. 
248 From 1965 to 1973 he was ambassador to Brussels, with the dual responsibility for Belgium and the European 
Communities.  
249 From 1967 he landed the position as Ambassador in The Hague. 
250 Aftenposten – 28.10.1999, Asbjørn Skarstein; FCO 30/698 – 31.10.1970, Oslo – G. A. Crossley – Dear Brind; FCO 
33/1661 – Biographical Note – Skarstein, Asbjørn; Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012; Interview – Tove 
Skarstein – 08.04.2014; Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. Skarstein has been described as a modest, attentive, 
but firm man. Not too fond of small talk with people he did not know, but warm and kind to his friends. 
251 From 1957 onwards, it became increasingly common to have an Assistant Director General placed ‘between’ the 
Deputy General and the Head of Office. Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 314. 
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Fig. 2252 – depicting the various offices responsible for EC-matters between 1960-1972 – 
captures both the rigidity and flexibility of the MFA. Until March 1962 – one month before 
the Storting voted in favour of an application for membership in the EEC – the 4th Economic 
Office had a wide range of responsibilities. The EEC was listed together with EFTA, OEEC, 
economic matters within NATO, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which reflects 
the government’s aim of finding a broad Atlantic solution to the market challenges (or its lack 
of direction). The 5th Economic Office, responsible for EC-matters from March 1962 until 
1966, was more focused, with a narrower field of responsibility. It also incorporated the on-
going GATT-negotiations (the Kennedy round). Lastly, the 1st Economic Office was narrower 
still in its focus. Significantly, the bit “including Nordic” was added in the 1969 description. 
This was due to the on-going Nordek-negotiations (1968-1970) for a Nordic customs union. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 The organisational map shows the various offices that had the responsibility for EC-matters between 1960 and 
1972. Harald Gram (Ed.) 1958-1960/Knut J. Hougen (Ed.) 1961-1973 Norges Statskalender, Oslo: Aschehoug (1958-
1973). 
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Also, by 1968, EFTA was delinked from EC-matters and placed in a separate office – a late, 
though revealing, recognition of EFTA’s dwindling importance.  
Each office, then, had clearly specified assignments.253 The dossier in the MFA archives 
following the EC-case throughout the 1960s and early 1970s reveals how rigidly this division 
of labour was followed: it was almost exclusively the 4th, 5th and 1st Economic Office, 
respectively, that dealt with EC matters. The Administrative, and especially the Press and 
Legal Department would be involved, but only on an ad hoc basis concerning their highly 
specific area of expertise. 254 Six Heads of Office were in charge of the office dealing with EC-
matters between 1960 and 1972.255 Of these, four were significant contributors to the shaping 
of Norwegian European policy: Tancred Ibsen Jr. (1961-62); Arne Langeland (1962-65); Arild 
Holland (1967-70); Per Martin Ølberg (1971-73). And, of these four, two could be described 
as fundamental drivers and designers of Norwegian European Policy in the 1960s and early 
1970s, namely Arne Langeland and Arild Holland. 
Arne Langeland (born 1928), a trained lawyer entering the service in 1954, was initially 
the only official specifically placed to follow EC-matters, as an Executive Officer and later 
Higher Executive Officer in early 1961, and arguably the first diplomat who reported that 
Britain contemplated membership negotiations with the EEC. He was then Head of Office in 
the crucial years from 1962 to 1965, becoming a leading member of the first negotiation 
delegation, organising much of the apparatus, as well as developing large parts of its tactics 
(1962-63). Between 1965 and 1970 he was Counsellor at the permanent delegation to EFTA 
in Geneva (1965-70).256 Langeland was strongly in favour of membership from the minute 
Britain applied, and was one of the few diplomats that wrote about, and actively engaged 
with, the public during the first round of membership debates.257  
Arild Holland (born 1926) was an economist, and entered the service in 1953. Between 
1960 and 1972, he was first embassy secretary at the permanent delegation to EFTA in 
Geneva (1961-63); Executive Officer (1964-65); Head of 5th Economic Office (GATT and 
EFTA, 1966) and Head of 1st Economic Office (EC, 1967-70); and then Assistant Director 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets (1968), p. 85. This was a way of assigning accountability. 
254 UD 44.36/6.84 – Norway. Relationship with the EEC. 
255 Under the position of Head of Office followed, respectively, the Higher Executive Officers, Executive Officers, 
Junior Executive Officers and Secretaries (I and II). The Higher Executive Officers and Executive Officers usually 
had a speciality or area of expertise, and followed specific issues or cases. The Norwegian word for these positions 
was ‘førstekonsultent’ and ‘konsulent’, i.e. first consultant and consultant. 
256 Haakon A. Ikonomou Den indre kjerne. Europaekspertene i Utenriksdepartementet I perioden 1960-1963, Unpublished MA 
thesis, Oslo: University of Oslo (2010). 
257 Gram (Ed.) 1958-1960/ Hougen (Ed.) 1961-1973 Norges Statskalender (1958-1973); Interview – Terje Johannessen 
– 24.04.2012; Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014; Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012; Interview – Arne 
Langeland – 22.01.2010; 01.05.2012; Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013. Langeland was ambitious, very 
effective, hard headed, and full of initiative. 
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General of the Economic Department (1971-73). As member of the Market Committee (1966-
1972) and the negotiation secretariat (1970-72), Holland was ‘at home’ for an unusually long 
period of time and became one of the leading experts and organisers of the EC negotiations 
from Oslo.  Unafraid of confrontation, he was also one of the strongest supporters of 
diplomats actively informing the public prior to the referendum.258 
There was, one could say, a striking degree of consistency in the MFA’s organisational 
structure: offices might be given new instructions, or would sometimes be opened or closed 
down, but the elementary parts would remain unaltered. As will be seen below, the trend 
towards increased specialisation, and different recruitment patterns, was a response to 
multilateralisation, economification and decolonisation—a gradual adaptation to changing 
circumstances. 259  However, the MFA as an institution also changed dramatically. This 
happened in the ‘outer’ parts of the MFA apparatus: the elements connecting it with the 
international environment (embassies, permanent delegations, consulates etc. i.e. the Foreign 
Service Missions) and with the domestic environment (committees, councils, boards etc.). 
Most Western European ministries responded similarly. All four applicants for membership in 
the EEC (the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway), for example, managed what 
amounted to a lasting blurring of domestic and foreign policy by bringing domestic actors 
onto the international scene and by inviting themselves into the domestic arenas.260 
As a response to the explosive growth in international and regional organisations, 
Missions traditionally assigned the responsibility of one or more countries would be given the 
additional task of managing relations with an organisation.261 The Ambassador to Brussels, 
Nils Anton Jørgensen (1959-1965), for instance, was appointed as Norway’s permanent 
representative to EURATOM and EEC (1960), and the ECSC (1962).262  
Brussels, of course, developed into the most important hub of communication regarding 
the EC-case. Britain’s first application (summer 1961), however, caught the government off 
guard. Until the UK application, the MFA had placed its most trusted MEDs in either Paris 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Arild Holland "Utenrikstjenestens historie" Unpublished memoires Oslo (1997); Interview – Arild Holland – 
27.04.2012; Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010. He was known as competitive, energetic, somewhat impatient, 
candid and enthusiastically engaged in the EC-case. 
259 Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 353. 
260 Klaus Kjølsen “Denmark – The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs” in Zara Steiner (Ed.) The Times Survey 
of Foreign Ministries of the World, London: Times Books (1982), pp. 163-183; Dermot Keogh “Ireland – The 
Department of Foreign Affairs” in Zara Steiner (Ed.) The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, London: Times 
Books (1982), pp. 275-297; Erik-Wilhelm Norman “Norway – The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs” in 
Zara Steiner (Ed.) The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, London: Times Books (1982), pp. 391-408; Valerie 
Cromwell “United Kingdom – The Foreign and Commonwealth Office” in Zara Steiner (Ed.) The Times Survey of 
Foreign Ministries of the World, London: Times Books (1982), pp. 541-574. 
261 For a brief description of the explosive growth of IOs, see: Guiseppe Schiavone International Organizations – A 
Dictionary and Directory (3rd Ed.), London: Macmillan Press ([1983] 1992), pp. 1-22. 
262 UD 44.36/6.84 B.-1 – 04.06.1963, Oslo – Dear Andreas, Halvard Lange. 
	  	   79	  
(OEEC) or Geneva (EFTA). Ambassador Jørgensen, though a respected diplomat with a long 
career behind him, was close to retirement and dispassionate towards multilateral economic 
policy. Accordingly, not long after Britain applied, Asbjørn Skarstein was transferred from 
Geneva to Brussels, and soon became chargé d’affaires of all EEC matters.263  
Jahn Halvorsen (born 1916), after serving as Director General of the Economic 
Department for five years, followed Jørgensen as ambassador to Brussels (1965-1973). In 
Brussels he soon became well connected, close with the corps of permanent representatives, 
and an important asset for the government in the membership negotiations.264  Together with 
Skarstein and Langeland, he was one of the first diplomats to become convinced of the 
necessity of a Norwegian membership in the Community, and later became an ardent pro-
European “burning almost religiously for the cause”.265 Halvorsen, and economist by training, 
was seen as one of the leading MEDs, and his opinion was respected throughout the 
ministry.266 
Increasingly, though, international and regional organisations were not covered by 
embassies but represented through permanent delegations. With the creation of EFTA, for 
instance, Norway placed a permanent delegation consisting of three to five diplomats at its 
headquarters in Geneva (1960-1972).267 Between 1960 and 1968, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt was 
ambassador to Geneva and permanent representative not only to EFTA, but also the United 
Nations European Office and other international organisations. On the domestic front, a host 
of corporative and cross-departmental committees were created, as foreign policy and 
domestic policy intertwined. For instance, The Committee for matters concerning the Free 
Trade Association and Nordic Economic Cooperation (The Free Trade Committee, FTC), set 
up by the Gerhardsen Government in 1960, was a direct response to the creation of EFTA, 
but came to serve as a general advisory body on foreign economic issues.268 Through the 
committee, officials from several ministries were linked to foreign policy issues, and MFA 
officials became involved in domestic policies. A decision made in the Free Trade Committee, 
therefore, signified a broad, and cross-departmental, agreement within the administration. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014. 
264 Aftenposten – 19.05.1976, Jahn Halvorsen, by Knut Frydenlund; Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. 
265 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
266 Aftenposten – 15.05.1976, Jahn Halvorsen, by Helge Seip. Helge Seip (Liberal), who studied economy together with 
Halvorsen, wrote of him in his obituary: “He had the entire register, from thorough knowledge of the most serious 
problems of professional and personal character, and a great ability to assess independently in different situations, to 
the jester’s joy of celebration in good company.” 
267 Harald Gram (Ed.) 1958-1960/Knut J. Hougen (Ed.) 1961-1973 Norges Statskalender (1958-1973). 
268 The Free-Trade Committee was cross-departmental and corporative: Director Generals from the Ministries of 
Commerce and Shipping (MoCS), Agriculture (MoA), Industry (MoI), Finance (MoF) and Foreign Affairs, and 
representatives from the business sector, met to discuss and decide on international economic matters. The MFA 
was represented by whoever was the Director General of the Economic Department. 
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With such an agreement, further work with the issue was backed by a united milieu of 
experts.269 The FTC was crucial during the first application and negotiation round with the 
EC (1961-63), but afterwards its significance faded. 
Another important cross-departmental committee was the Council for International 
Economic Cooperation (CIEC), headed by the Minister of Commerce and Shipping.270 As 
with the FTC, the Director General of the Economic Department represented the MFA 
together with the Head of Office from the office concerned. Its significance fluctuated greatly, 
depending on the Minister in charge. Arne Skaug (Labour, 1955-62) was very fond of using 
CIEC as an arena to discuss EC-matters; O. C. Gundersen (Labour, 1962-63), who replaced 
Arne Skaug, however, did not make much use of it271, and it was a ‘sleeping’ body until Kåre 
Willoch (Conservative, 1965-70) took over and revived it in 1965.272  
A third, cross-departmental committee of importance was the so-called Market 
Committee, established in March 1966.273 Foreign Minister John Lyng (Conservative, 1965-
70) proposed the creation of the Committee with the task of preparing material on the 
developments of the Community and updated analyses of Norway’s relationship with the 
EC.274 Unlike similar committees, the Prime Minister Office headed it, through state secretary 
Emil Vindsetmo.275 Among its most central MFA-members were Asbjørn Skarstein, Arild 
Holland, Per Martin Ølberg and Terje Johannessen. Holland and Ølberg stayed throughout 
the period, while Johannessen was moved to the Norwegian Export Council from 1970.276 
The Market Committee would be central in the second and third rounds of negotiations, and 
the Nordek negotiations, acting as a hub where much of the early planning took place, and 
from which negotiations and secretariats sprang out. 
As seen above, the inner parts of the MFA consisted of clearly defined Departments and 
Offices, some of which worked with multilateral economic issues related to the European 
Communities. To this was added a growing number of permanent representations abroad and 
committees and councils at home. A handful of diplomats populated top positions within the 
relevant embassies, representations, departments, offices and committees. Unsurprisingly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010 
270 CIEC consisted of civil servants from the MoCS, the MFA, the MoF, and the MoA. Additionally, many of the 
major business and labour organisations were represented – making it yet another corporative organ. 
271 9 meetings in 1960, 8 in 1961, 4 in 1962; 0 in 1963. UD 44.5/85–16 – 12.09.1963 – M. Huslid – CIEC. 
272 UD 44.5/85–16 – 1.1.63-21.4.67 - CIEC; UD 44.36/6.84 N. – 24.08.1962 – E. Berg – Minutes from the 
Negotiation Delegation 22.08.1962; Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets handelspolitiske (1968), p. II.5.  
273 The Committee was active until august 1972. 
274 RA, SMK, Government protocols, Meeting 08.02.1966; John Lyng Mellom øst og vest – Erindringer 1965-1968, Oslo: 
Cappelen (1976), p. 210. 
275 Kolsrud Rekonstruksjon og reform (2008), p. 60-71; Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 166. Until the Centre-Right Coalition 
Government left office in March 1971. 
276 UD 44.36/6.84 E-1-7 – 1.2.1966-31.10.1972. 
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therefore, the delegations in charge of the enlargement negotiations came to be largely 
composed of these specialised MEDs: Jahn Halvorsen, Asbjørn Skarstein, Arne Skaug and 
Arne Langeland, who were part of the first negotiation delegation (1962-63). Tancred Ibsen 
Jr. and Knut Frydenlund (press attaché) were sent to strengthen the embassy in Brussels 
during the negotiations, and William G. Solberg (embassy in Brussels) was placed as observer 
with the EEC.277 In the negotiations of the early 1970s, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt headed, and 
Asbjørn Skarstein and Jahn Halvorsen joined, the negotiation delegation. While Holland and 
Ølberg were placed in the secretariat in Oslo, Eivinn Berg served as Industrial Counsellor to 
Brussels and Søren Chr. Sommerfelt’s right hand.278 
 
New spaces of diplomacy 
The structural changes that occurred with the growing number of multilateral organisations 
dealing with international or regional economic and political issues in the postwar era created 
new spaces of diplomacy that interlinked domestic and foreign policy, and blurred the lines 
between politics and bureaucracy. A common response to multilateralisation and 
economification among Western European state administrations was to set up 
interdepartmental committees that integrated expertise from a variety of organisations at 
home and put representatives from organisations and officials from other ministries onto the 
international scene.279 The diplomatic field became more crowded, which both challenged 
and created opportunities for the MEDs. 
The EC negotiations included almost the entire Norwegian state administration. The 
most heavily involved ministries were Commerce and Shipping, Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Industries, Finance, and the MFA. These were drawn into the preparations and negotiations 
through various committees, councils and advisory boards. During the first round of 
negotiations, for instance, officials from the implicated ministries were represented in the 
FTC, which gave advice to the CIEC, which in turn advised the government. CIEC was 
composed of representatives from the same ministries, and often the very same members, as 
the FTC. Similarly, during the third round of negotiations, a preparatory committee charged 
with the task of preparing the negotiations and giving advice on the composition of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 UD 44.36/6.84 – 07.06.1962 – H. K. Engen and A. Skarstein – Appointment of the Norwegian Negotiation 
Delegation to the EEC. Speech to the Council of State. Order in Council, 08.06.1962; Bjørn Dynna Fiskerisektoren i de 
norske utvidelsesforhandlingene med EF (1970-72), Unp.. Master thesis, Oslo: Inst. for Statsvitenskap (1973), p. 86. 
The secretariat was staffed by officials from the Six and the applicant countries, and was informally attached to the 
Council of Ministers. 
278 Underdal ”Forhandlingene om Norsk medlemskap (1972). 
279 Gram-Skjoldager and Knudsen “Hvor gik statens representanter hen, da de gik ud?” (2010), pp. 82-113; John W. 
Young Twentieth-Century Diplomacy. A Case Study of British Practice, 1963-1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(2012), p. 145. 
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negotiation delegation consisted of “pretty much the same people (...) as the CIEC”.280 The 
Negotiation Secretariat (NS) and Negotiation Delegation (NG), proposed by this preparatory 
committee, was also composed largely by members of CIEC. What took shape in the 
Norwegian administration in relation with the EC-case, was a network of committees and 
councils - each body a node of cross-departmental and (often) corporative expertise - 
populated by the same handful of officials.281 
Moreover, interest organisations were increasingly drawn into political decision-making 
processes. For one they were part of the corporative organs and committees related to foreign 
economic issues. Similar adaptations to internationalisation occurred across Western Europe – 
though some developments were more similar than others.282 For instance, the Danish and 
Norwegian Market Secretariat, bore the same name, had very similar work descriptions, and 
were established the same year (1966).283 Still, the Norwegian state administration was 
comparatively small, and the MFA relatively young, and therefore it drew extensively on the 
expertise of interest organisations.284 Several social scientists and historians have described the 
Norwegian corporative system, either highlighting the state’s influence over the 
organisations285 or the other way around286. But few dispute the historically unmatched and 
comparatively uniquely close ties developed in Norway during the postwar era – also in the 
field of foreign policy.287  
It was recognised, for example, that organisations such as the Federation of Norwegian 
Industries (FNI) and the Norwegian Shipping Association (NSA) had extensive experience 
working within international organisations, and possessed expert knowledge that the 
administration needed. Through their participation in a multitude of committees within the 
OEEC from the 1950s onwards, such governmental/non-governmental co-operation within 
international organisations was institutionalised. 288  Since the 1950s, it also became 
commonplace to strengthen embassies with sectoral attachés. Brussels, for example, was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Interview - Arild Holland – 14.12.2014. 
281 UD 44.36/6.84 E - 17.12.1969 – A. Holland Memo. EEC. Changes in the composition of the Market Committee.  
282 Young Twentieth-Century Diplomacy (2012), p. 144. 
283 Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen “Den fleksible og robuste forvaltning”, in Martin Marcussen and Karsten Ronit 
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strengthened with agricultural and fisheries attachés from 1962 onwards, reflecting what the 
Norwegian government saw as two of the most important and problematic areas of 
negotiation with the Community.289 These attachés were often from the private sector: the 
fisheries attaché in the 1960s and early 1970s, Otto Hansen, was recruited from Frionor, a 
Norwegian sales conglomerate for processed fish.290  
On the other hand, the FNI and Norwegian Export Council opened its own 
‘representation’ in Brussels to promote Norwegian export interests in the European 
Community. The Norwegian Export Council was a corporative consulting organ established 
in 1945 giving advice to the MFA on export-related matters. Following postings at the EFTA 
delegation in Geneva and the Embassy in Brussels, Martin Huslid (born 1931) was given leave 
from the MFA to work for the new ‘representation’ in Brussels (1966-1969), and returned to 
the MFA to work with the membership negotiations in 1970.291 As a testimony to the duality 
of his role, he interchangeably reported back to the FNI and MFA while on leave. From 1970 
onwards this ‘representation’ was placed under the Brussels Embassy, where Eivinn Berg 
became industrial counsellor.292 
Epitomising the intermeshing of domestic and foreign politics, and how new expertise 
was tied in, ambassador Otto Kildal (Ambassador to The Hague), the FNI, the NSA, and the 
Ministry of Salary and Price, set up an educational programme in international economic co-
operation. In a letter to Director General Rogstad in 1967, young Martin Huslid estimated 
that Norway would need 100 people, one third from the administration and two thirds from 
the business organisations, to fill different positions and represent Norwegian interests in 
Brussels after a membership.293 The aim of the programme was to educate domestic civil 
servants and representatives from business organisations who were expected to partly work in 
Brussels. The course included a series of lectures in international political economy by several 
prominent experts, among them several of the leading MEDs, and 50 hours of French – a 
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crash course version of the Diplomatic Academy.294 
Clearly, the multilateralisation and economification of foreign policy in general, as 
exemplified through the membership issue, blurred the lines between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’, 
‘politics’ and ‘bureaucracy’, and ‘governmental’ and ‘non-governmental’ in many ways. On 
the one hand, the diplomats were accompanied, helped and sometimes challenged by a 
variety of actors in the field of foreign policy – a field where they had traditionally held a 
monopoly. On the other hand, the young MEDs entered the domestic political arena through 
the backdoor of a network of policy creating committees.  
 
A new diplomat emerges 
With the emergence of new diplomatic spaces followed new diplomatic practices, which 
slowly altered the role of the diplomat. Until the 1960s, and in many ways to this day, classic 
Weberian ideals governed the Norwegian postwar civil service: structural traits such as a 
hierarchical organisation, specified lines of instruction and responsibility, division of labour, 
advancement based on merits, and the rule of written procedure, governed the MFA. 
Furthermore, diplomats, as all civil servants, were hired for life and not elected.295 The 
sociologist Max Weber saw professional independence and political neutrality as core 
elements of a functional bureaucracy. The ideal civil servant, in his opinion, would obey the 
impersonal and formal rules, and not necessarily the person in charge of the Ministry. This 
was the ideal.296 Weber’s argument that a bureaucrat who disagrees with a political decision 
should nonetheless “carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction”297, is echoed 
in famous British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson’s classic, Diplomacy: A Basic Guide to the Conduct 
of Contemporary Foreign Affairs, a publication widely read by diplomats to this day: 
 
“The civil service, of which the diplomatic service is a branch, is supposed to possess to politics. 
Its duty is to place its experience at the disposal of the Government in power, to tender advice, 
and if need be to raise objections. Yet, if that advice be disregarded by the Minister, as 
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representative of the sovereign people, it is the duty and function of the civil service to execute his 
instructions without further question.”298  
 
Terje Johannessen’s reflections on the role of diplomats in the 1960s reveal the consistency of this 
definition of the civil servant: 
 
“[The] first task is to ensure that governments’ policies are implemented. And on this there is 
almost no exception, you must implement. (...) But, at the same time, it must be equally clear that 
if you perceive that what the government is doing is, shall we say, obviously contrary to the 
interests of the nation, then you must be allowed to speak up (...).”299 
 
Weber’s analysis from 1919, Nicolson’s guide from 1939, and Johannessen’s reflection from 
2012 reveal inherent tensions surrounding the role of civil servant and, more specifically, the 
diplomat. Since both professional independence and political neutrality was needed, and the 
balance between them depended on the circumstances, any clear rule would be unsatisfying. 
As political scientist Knut Dahl Jacobsen suggested, analysing the Norwegian civil service in 
the early 1960s, potentially contradictory norms could be balanced through explicitly vague 
role expectations. 300  Arne Langeland’s thoughts on the balance between professional 
independence and political neutrality, or between bureaucrats and politicians, echoes this: 
“[T]he first thing you need to do is to smell the air – how is this new guy? They are all 
different. We just have to – as civil servants, as the bureaucracy – accept, within limits. And 
where this limit is, I do not know.”301 In fact, Norwegian diplomats of the 1960s and 1970s 
had very few written rules limiting their actions.302 The only written rules delineating the 
outer perimeter of the norms governing the diplomat’s participation in public debates, for 
example, were § 62 of the Norwegian Constitution stating that civil servants should not be 
electable to the Storting, on the one hand, and § 100, which secured the general freedom of 
expression, on the other.303  
One reason for the lack of rules was the ambition for a flexible Foreign Service. Too 
many rules would hamper the institutional elasticity, rendering it unable to adapt to shifting 	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situations.304 As seen above, the structural changes of international politics and the Foreign 
Service and administration’s organisational adaptations created new diplomatic spaces that 
challenged the traditional Weberian role of the diplomat. Or, put differently, the MEDs’ 
changed responsibilities and tasks brought out inherent tensions in the role of the diplomat. 
Arne Langeland might have exaggerated when claiming that some 80 percent of the policy 
responses in relation to EFTA were hammered out within the Free Trade Committee – 
reducing CIEC, not to mention the Cabinet, to ceremonial bodies – but the statement reflects 
the changed understanding of role expectations among the young multilateral diplomats.305 In 
response to changed responsibilities, the young MEDs had a more ‘activist’ interpretation of 
the boundaries of a diplomat’s political engagement. Eivinn Berg thought it “depended on 
your position, your strength, compared to the pressure coming from the outside”. If a 
diplomat was in a position to do so and it felt right, he should shape policy; and if he was not 
in position he should do it anyway, but “with a little less force, and a bit more moderation.”306 
Norwegian political scientists were grappling with these changes in diplomacy in the late 
1960s. Jens A. Christophersen maintained that Norwegian diplomats operated along the lines 
of the ideal Weberian bureaucrat – they executed decisions made by others, and did not have 
a substantial role in the decision-making process. Abraham Hallenstvedt, on the other hand, 
made the exact opposite point: for him the administration (and especially the MFA) and 
business organisations combined were the drivers of foreign policy, introducing the term 
Corporacy. To his mind the government was simply modifying policy initiated by the 
Corporacy.307 This renewed academic interest in the role of bureaucracy was part of a broader 
trend, and dovetailed with a more systematic critique of the establishment by the critical press 
and the general public in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the critique of a bureaucrat lay 
the recognition of his political potential: “[p]ublic bureaucracies, staffed largely by permanent 
civil servants, are responsible for the vast majority of political initiatives taken by 
government”, wrote Robert D. Putnam in 1973.308 
At the highpoint of the EC-debacle, the critical press in Norway pinpointed the 
potential politicians hidden in the highflying multilateral economic diplomats. In an 	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interesting passage describing Søren Christian Sommerfelt, just as he had been appointed 
deputy head of the EC-negotiations in 1970, Dagbladet captured the tensions between the 
‘classical’ and ‘new’ diplomat: 
 
“He is a civil servant of the classical type, loyal to his minister and his government, but at the 
same time capable of making assessments independent of preconceived political perceptions. He 
makes an effort portraying himself as a civil servant, and not as a politician, but is surely aware 
that the borders are tremendously fluid, and that a ‘neutral’ civil servant most definitively can 
play a political part more significant than most politicians.”309 
 
The changes in the role of the MEDs had happened gradually, then, but it was the bitterly 
fought EC-struggle in the 1960s and early 1970s that brought it to public attention. Grasping 
this new role, therefore, is crucial to understanding how the Europeans worked with the EC-
case. 
Boundary-spanners 
As a way of conceptualising the role of diplomacy and diplomats in the late 20th and early 21st 
century, British political scientist Brian Hocking coined the term ‘boundary-spanners’310:  
 
“Rather than that of gatekeeper, an alternative image more suited to the contemporary 
environment might be termed that of the ‘boundary-spanner’, recognizing that boundaries 
between organizations and policy arenas, far from being irrelevant, are fluid and continually 
reconstituting themselves, thereby becoming sites of intense activity which demand a special role 
for those capable of acting as linkage points. In such an environment, diplomats can assume 
significant roles as mediators or brokers, facilitators and entrepreneurs.”311 
 
Studying Danish MEDs in the 1950-70s, Gram-Skjoldager and Knudsen have argued that the 
foreign economic policy field was one of the first in which the traditional boundaries and 
norms of diplomacy eroded. The distinction between bureaucracy and politics, and foreign 
and domestic policy – fundamental assumptions of the Danish and Norwegian interwar 
diplomacy – remained largely intact coming out of The Second World War, but gradually 
adapted to the changing international environment. The most significant new feature of the 
Danish MEDs was the close collaboration between them and the civil servants from other 
parts of the administration on the domestic and international scene. Drawing on Hocking’s 	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term, they argue that these diplomats “not only defined and communicated national interests, 
but also administrated and mediated between a growing number of bureaucratic actors and 
interest organisations in an increasingly complex and integrated political environment.”312 
This description is applicable to developments in Norway at the same time. Well into the 
1960s, diplomats, academics and the general public alike, understood the Norwegian diplomat 
as exceptionally ‘well behaved’, and close to the Weberian ideal type bureaucrat.313 In fact, it 
was the Europeans’ work with the EC-case, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which 
brought to the fore the changes in multilateral economic diplomacy that had taken place since 
the 1950s. Leading Norwegian MEDs mediated between the Cabinet, interest organisations, 
Brussels, EFTAns, the public, other ministries and bordering diplomacies through a multitude 
of new diplomatic spaces, surpassing any neat conception of foreign and domestic policy as 
separate spheres. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has explored who the Europeans were through a sociological institutional inquiry into how 
structural changes and institutional adaptations changed the role of multilateral economic diplomacy. 
The Europeans were among the MEDs who transcended the traditional Weberian ideal diplomat. As 
seen, leading multilateral economic diplomats who worked with the EC-case, such as Skarstein, 
Halvorsen, Langeland and Holland, served in a multitude of overlapping positions, which gave them 
the possibility to create foreign policy. As MEDs entered new diplomatic spaces, their responsibilities 
and tasks changed, which in turn created a more activist diplomat operating “outside and within the 
organisation [MFA], assuming a diversity of forms in both the governmental and non-governmental 
arenas”.314 These policy-shaping MEDs bore the traits of Hocking’s boundary-spanners. Analysing how 
these boundary-spanning capacities came into play in the EC-case is crucial to understanding how the 
Europeans’ worked with the EC-case.  
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Chapter 3 
Europeans – secluded, connected and likeminded 
 
”Well, I can only speak for myself, but I think that it’s true for all of us. 
When you’re already an MFA-man, and you’re stationed abroad, 
you get a knowledge and an understanding that makes it natural to be in favour of things 
- and not place yourself on the outside, but to join in where the big things are happening.”315 
 
Håkon W. Freihow on why he became a supporter of membership in the EC. 
 
This chapter is, in all simplicity, concerned with patterns of interaction and connections. It 
explores how the multilateral economic diplomats working with the EC-case interacted with 
their surroundings and with each other. First, we will turn to the interaction and connections 
between the MEDs and their administrative surroundings. The Economic Department and 
the different Economic Offices were secluded from the rest of the MFA. This, combined with 
the increasing workload of the MFA and the level of specialisation, meant that MEDs enjoyed 
a high degree of autonomy, potentially giving them much decision-making power, but also 
creating a secluded room for them to coalesce in different groups. At the same time, the 
Economic Department and the MEDs cooperated closely with the Ministry of Commerce and 
Shipping (MoCS), which was marked by brotherly competition, overlapping responsibilities 
and close contacts. The previously discussed boundary-spanning capacities of the MEDs and 
intermeshing of foreign and domestic policy in their areas of expertise brought them into 
contact with different parts of Norwegian society. The second aspect of this chapter is to 
explore the diplomats’ connections with, in particular, political and business circles. What 
becomes clear is that the MEDs were embedded in dense networks of membership-positive 
diplomatic, economic, political and administrative elites.  
Last, we will explore the emotional and professional ties between the MEDs.316 The 
importance of such ties should not be underestimated as they shaped careers and opened 
channels of influence. As will be seen, the Europeans formed a particular community among the 
MEDs, based on criteria such as likeability, admiration and shared beliefs. They were brought 
together through simple situated practices of inclusion and exclusion, such as 
mentoring/being mentored, recruiting/being recruited, travelling together, sharing lunch or 
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sharing diplomatic sites.317 What is revealed is a closely-knit group of multilateral economic 
diplomats, sharing a common set of values centred round the EC-issue. 
 
Departmental seclusion 
At home, the multilateral economic diplomats were remarkably secluded, both vertically and 
horizontally, from the rest of the MFA. With seclusion came autonomy. And with autonomy 
followed decision-making power. 
The vertical lines of interaction within the MFA during the 1960s and early 1970s were 
extremely hierarchical. The secretaries and different officers communicated directly to the 
Head of Office. He, in turn, communicated mostly with the Director General, who took 
matters up with the State Secretary or Secretary General, who would then bring things to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.318 The State Secretary was meant to be a sort of filter between the 
administrative and political arms of the MFA. From 1951 onwards, the State Secretary was 
given transcripts of all political reports, and the responsibility of deciding whether or not the 
reports should be shown to the Minister.319 Terje Johannessen made a telling comparison: “It 
was like being in the army, you know, if you’re a colonel you’re not mingling with the 
sergeants.”320 This general impression is backed by numbers: political scientist Abraham 
Hallenstvedt’s 1967 study of the Economic Department showed that over half of the total 
interactions took place within each office, with departmental leadership involved only around 
13 percent of the time. In turn, roughly 12 percent of this information was given to the 
political leadership.321  
General information and guidelines the administration had to follow within specific 
policy areas trickled down from the political leadership. “If the system is going to work”, 
prominent official Knut Getz Wold noted in a widely read article on civil servant norms from 
1968, “there has to be close, continuous contact between the minister and the civil servants”. 
To remedy the growth of the MFA’s workload, which tended to distance the leadership from 
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the administrative branch, the minister had to call regular meetings to give “general 
orientations on guiding principles on how to assess current policy problems”.322 
This was the way the MFA absorbed, sorted and structured the information that was 
gathered. Only the essentials concerned the Foreign Minister, and with an ‘explosive’ increase 
in the workload in the postwar era, fewer issues ever reached the Foreign Minister and, thus, 
more and more important decisions were made further down the chain of command.323 As 
Ibsen Jr. humorously reflected: 
 
“As I’ve claimed, the entire Norwegian state administration, is actually governed by the 
secretaries: The secretaries get the ideas; the Heads of Offices fine tune them a little; the Director 
General looks at it – inserts a comma perhaps; and then its at the Minister’s desk, who thanks the 
administration, trusts it, and accepts. I’ve seen it many times.”324 
 
With the new international organisations and growing multilateralisation, Neumann and 
Leira argue, diplomats did most of the concrete work and day-to-day decision-making at 
home and abroad.325  
The stations received general instructions on what to report on and, occasionally, 
detailed instructions to convey certain messages or impressions, but they generally enjoyed a 
great deal of autonomy. Terje Johannessen reflects: “in those days there was less control from 
‘home’ than today, we were pretty much left to ourselves to figure out what was important 
and what to spend our resources on.”326 As journalist and Stoltenberg-biographer Geir 
Salvesen noted, “Heads of Offices and secretaries [and embassy secretaries and attachés 
abroad] were given assignments that would’ve been handled on a much higher level today”.327 
This impression is strengthened when we look at the leadership style of the different 
Foreign Ministers. Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister between 1946 and 1965328, has been 
described as weak on economic policy and administration. 329  Lange was an esteemed 
international figure, but did not interfere with the day-to-day running of the MFA. Lange 
mostly travelled by train to Paris and other continental capitals, and by boat to the US, which 
gave him time for political reflection. When travelling to the US, he might be gone for weeks, 
leaving the daily administration of the MFA to the Secretary General. “[S]ince Foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Getz Wold “Administrasjon og politikk” (1974), p. 34. 
323 Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets (1968), p. 74, 86; Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 286. 
324 Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013. 
325 Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 315, p. 277. 
326 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24 April 2012. 
327 Salvesen Thorvalds Verden (1994), p. 39. 
328 With the exception of three weeks in 1963. 
329 Neumann and Leira Aktiv og avventende (2005), p. 256. 
	  	   92	  
Minister Halvard Lange was rather disinterested in economic politics”, Neumann and Leira 
contend,  the MEDs, in particular, were “left with much room for initiative”.330 
Lange’s successor, Lyng, was much more involved in the daily political life in the 
parliament. He was also more engaged in the organisational structure of the ministry. This led 
to slightly decreased freedom of action for the administration, though Lyng did not represent 
any kind of rupture in leadership style.331 However, like his predecessor, Lyng was not 
particularly interested in economic issues. In fact, as Terje Johannessen recalled it, none 
among the four Foreign Ministers between 1960 and 1972 – Halvard Lange (Labour Party, 
1946-63); Erling Wikborg (CPP, 1963); Halvard Lange (Labour 1963-65); John Lyng 
(Conservatives, 1965-70); Svenn Stray (Conservatives, 1970-71); Andreas Cappelen (Labour 
Party, 1971-72) – were “genuinely concerned with foreign trade policy as such”, but saw it as 
a tool to reach general foreign policy aims. According to Johannessen, “trade policy is often 
the sum of many small details, especially package deals: going from agriculture, fish, research, 
industry, transport, if you look at all these different element, you get a total package, and in 
that respect I thought Stray was very good, and Lyng too.”332  
Their horizontal interactions with the rest of the MFA were even more limited. 
Hallenstvedt’s study shows that the Economic Department’s written communication with the 
Political Department was less than two percent of its total written communications.333 The 
departments were like “watertight compartments”, as Johannessen expressed it.334 The MFA 
was, as discussed above, geared towards specialisation, and diplomats who became MEDs 
dealt almost exclusively with such matters. Ibsen Jr. remembered “a clear division between 
three groups [political, economic and legal department] and if you ended up in one of the 
departments and made an impression, you were likely to be tied in”.335 The Political 
Department was scarcely involved in the EC-case but it did, of course, stay in touch with the 
other departments. Langeland emphasised the distinction between informal talks and actual 
involvement in the case during the first round (1960-1963): 
 
“We’re in the same building, right across the hall. (...) We talked about these issues openly, but 
they couldn’t meddle in the negotiations. [And how about the preparations?] No, not those either, 
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though they were permitted to express themselves. They weren’t the ones who dealt with it – the 
system is straightforward that way. We were a handful of people who took care of it.”336   
 
Other than informal consultations, though, the patterns of interaction reveal that the 
Economic Department was highly secluded from the rest of the MFA. 
Diplomats looking back might exaggerate their autonomy and influence (clearly 
Norwegian foreign policy in its entirety was not governed by secretaries alone) but the patters 
of communication, developments within the field of multilateral economic diplomacy, and 
leadership styles of the different foreign ministers point in the same direction: the MEDs were 
vertically autonomous and horizontally secluded within the MFA. Opposite, the MFA was 
almost equally connected with the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping. 
 
Ministerial cooperation  
Throughout the postwar years the norm had been that the MoCS coordinated domestic 
efforts while the MFA conducted the negotiations and communicated with the international 
community with regards to multilateral economic issues.337 In reality the two ministries often 
had overlapping responsibilities, and cooperated and competed for influence. 338  The 
diplomats and civil servants from the MoCS often wrote memos, travelled and negotiated 
together in groups, and often accompanied the Minister of Commerce and Shipping on visits 
abroad.339 They were also part of the same interdepartmental committees, such as the Free 
Trade Committee and the Market Committee. These could be officially established by the 
MoCS and headed by the MFA, or the other way around.340 Hallenstvedt’s analysis clearly 
indicates the Economic Department’s close connection to the MoCS.341  
In fact, many working in the Economic Department saw both the Minister of 
Commerce and Shipping and the Foreign Minister as their political leaders. Søren Chr. 
Sommerfelt remembered, from his time as Director General of the Economic Department, 
that he seldom submitted cases to Lange: “and if I did, usually got the reply: ‘You should ask 
Skaug about this’. It made my job easier that Arne Skaug was acting foreign minister when 
Lange was abroad, which was often. Few hours passed after [Lange’s] departure before Skaug 
came over from his office in the MoCS, some buildings away, and sat in the Foreign Ministers 	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chair.”342 Sommerfelt was not alone. Langeland referred to Arne Skaug as “my minister in 
practice”. Equally, Holland reflected on how it was “a strange thing that the Economic 
Department, in reality, was headed by the Minister of Commerce and Shipping”.343 Most of 
the diplomats interviewed, distinguished Arne Skaug and Kåre Willoch as the two ministers 
with whom they cooperated the closest. This is confirmed in the archives.344 
Their relationship and interactions with the civil servants of the MoCS can be 
compared to that of two competitive brothers, the MoCS being the younger. Terje 
Johannessen remembered it being “a lot of ‘katzenjammer kids’” fighting with each other 
“about personal positions and such”. Such quarrels could intensify when the Minister of 
Commerce and Shipping had ambitions to take over matters of foreign policy and “the 
annoyance trickled down the MoCS system”.345 The rivalry would also increase when MEDs 
were given leadership roles within the many joint committees and working groups. One of the 
reasons why the coalition government chose Vindsetmo to lead the Market Committee, for 
instance, was to avoid competition between the MoCS and the MFA.346 
Indeed, the MoCS was the little brother: the MFA increased from 178 to 234 
employees, while the MoCS decreased from 275 to 149 employees, between 1960 and 1970 – 
a major loss of institutional significance.347 In the early 1970s, at one of the government 
conferences, Per Kleppe (Labour) complained that his ministry did not have enough to do, 
and wanted to transfer several tasks from the MFA to his MoCS. Prime Minister Trygve 
Bratteli was increasingly annoyed, and the third or fourth time Kleppe complained, Bratteli 
reputedly responded: “well, if the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping doesn’t have enough 
to do, we could just shut down the whole ministry.”348 This was in fact what happened – in 
1987 the whole ministry was incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.349 
Despite the overlapping areas of responsibility and the rivalry, all of the MEDs 
interviewed described their working relationship with the MoCS as ‘very close’ and ‘very 
good’. One of the reasons for this was that they leaned in the same direction regarding the 
EC-issue. Arild Holland, for example, explained his close working relationship with MoCS 
official Gudmund Saxrud, much as he did with Ølberg and Skarstein, by simply stating that 	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he was a pro-European.350  The employees of the MoCS, as those of the MFA, were 
overwhelmingly in favour of membership.351 
 
Networked diplomats 
As seen above, the multilateral economic diplomats were increasingly embedded in a dense 
network of political, economic, diplomatic and administrative connections – diplomats 
entered the domestic scene, just as domestic actors entered the international scene. This 
section explores with whom the MEDs working on the EC-case were connected. For 
analytical purposes, we will divide the connections into corporative and political. As will be 
argued, they were embedded in a wholly membership-positive network of elites. 
It is often claimed that MFAs cannot compete with other ministries because they lack 
the support of a specific domestic interest group. The MFAs, therefore, cannot harness the 
political power of so-called iron triangles between the ministry, the parliamentary committee 
and the interest group. This was not the case in Norway: during and immediately after The 
Second World War, the MFA formed a close and institutionalised cooperation with the 
Shipping sector. 
The shipping sector grew into a major industry from the mid-1800s onwards, and by 
1875 Norway was the third largest; since the late 1930s until the 1960s it was consistently the 
fourth biggest shipping nation in the world. Between 1945 and 1965, the shipping sector 
contributed to two-thirds of new jobs created in Norway, and by the late 1950s it shipped in 
roughly one-third of the Norwegian import. It was, as the Norwegian Shipping Association 
(NSA) claimed:  
 
“As a currency-creating industry that shipping occupies the most prominent position in the 
Norwegian economy. The value of Norwegian imports has, for well over a hundred years, 
normally been considerably higher than the export. This imbalance of trade has only been 
possible to maintain because the shipping sector, by sailing in currency, has raised the means to 
pay the for a big part of the import.”  
 
The merchant fleet was, with much justification, known as “Norway’s floating empire”.352 
Hence, the MFA enjoyed the support of “one the strongest economic interest groups in the 
country”.353 	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The issue of separate consular services was of major importance to the shipping sector 
and it led to the dissolution of the Union between Sweden and Norway. Shipping and trade 
was a major reason for the move towards neutrality, with silent security guarantees from 
Britain, following Norway’s independence in 1905. Historian Olav Riste goes as far as to 
claim that the Norwegian MFA of the early 20th century went a long way towards being “the 
handmaiden of trade and shipping”.354  Since the creation of a department of shipping under 
the MFA in 1913, after pressure from the Norwegian Shipping Association (NSA), ties 
between the two grew even closer. By the 1950s, the cooperation was institutionalised further. 
The most significant corporative organ of the MFA, where the NSA took part, was the board 
of the Diplomatic Academy. With the support of the MFA, the reform committee of 1946 
suggested creating a board consisting of five members: one from the MFA, the university, the 
NCTU, a joint representative from trade and industry, and one from the Norwegian Shipping 
Association. In the end, a representative from the fishery sector and another from the 
Norwegian Federation of Industries joined the five representatives. As Neumann and Leira 
point out, the MFA “gave away its right to control its own recruitment”, and of all the 
economic interest groups, the shipping sector had the closest ties to the MFA.355 
This obviously affected the recruitment patterns of the Foreign Service: Eivinn Berg, 
Arne Langeland and William G. Solberg – all central MEDs that worked with the EC-case – 
had close ties to the shipping industry. Eivinn Berg (born 1931), for example, who came from 
a shipowner-family and was raised in the traditional shipping city of Sandefjord, recalled how he 
was recruited to the service in 1956 after studying economics, in part, because the 
businessmen on the board approved of him. In 1962, on the request of Arne Langeland, Berg 
worked with the Economic Office handling the EC-issue. Between 1963 and 1965 he was 
placed in Geneva to work more closely with GATT and EFTA. Between 1967 and 1969, 
Berg was the office director of the EFTA secretariat. From 1970 to 1972 he served as 
Industrial Counsellor to Brussels and the special attaché to head of negotiations Søren Chr. 
Sommerfelt. Berg was passionately concerned with the membership issue. After the negative 
referendum in 1972, he immediately took a job as director in charge of international issues in 
the Norwegian Shipowners Association (1973-78). After five years on the job he returned to 
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the Economic Department of the MFA, and later became state secretary of the MFA for the 
Conservatives (1981-84).356  
The institutionalisation of ties between the MFA and NSA took place during the Labour 
Party rule (1945-1965). To understand the peculiarity of the MFA-NSA connection, we need 
to briefly revisit the ambivalent alliance between the shipping sector and the hegemonic 
Labour Party in the postwar era – an alliance that continued during the EC-case. Throughout 
the postwar era, the NSA fought the authorities on what they perceived as “rigid management 
of regulations and distinctly Norwegian rules”. Animosity peaked in the immediate postwar 
years: the shipping sector believed it was disproportionally penalised through import and 
contracting restrictions imposed by the government due to an acute currency shortage.357 
Entering into the 1960s, the NSA contended that it suffered from the “heaviest shipping-taxes 
in the world”, and called for “changes in the government’s policies” so that “restrictions could 
be kept to an absolute minimum”.358 It is perhaps not surprising that Norwegian shipowners 
were staunch supporters of private enterprise and opposed governmental interference, and 
less surprising still that every sitting government had to consider the demands of the NSA. 
Successive Labour governments, therefore, tried to balance their interventionist inclinations 
with measures to keep Norwegian shipping competitive. One way of securing the interests of 
the shipping sector was to press “continuously, in every intergovernmental forum available, 
for maximum freedom of international shipping.”359 The Norwegian Embassy to London, for 
example, contacted British diplomats in 1967 to seek an agreement in principle: “if and when 
we go into the EEC, shipping will be treated as liberally as possible and we shall not support 
the creation of a large shipping secretariat like those dealing with coal and steel.” 360 
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the NSA was fuelled by one overarching goal: a 
global and liberal shipping sector. After the first British application, the NSA saw membership 
in the Community as a way of weakening Norway’s statist economic policies. Specifically, it 
was seen as a way of pressuring the government to loosen its contracting restrictions on 
shipbuilding, and for the government to revise its ‘taxation-mentality’. 361  But an EC-	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membership was also understood in long-term, ideological conditions that marked “a very 
important step towards a return to liberal views and a liberal policy.”362 Membership was thus 
seen as a step towards breaking with the almighty interventionist postwar state.  
Moreover, the NSA feared that the Community would become too regional, namely 
that the Six would develop their own shipping policy under the umbrella of a Common 
Transport Policy. This would run counter to a more global outlook, and the NSA worried 
that a Community solution would, in one way or another, discriminate against those left on 
the outside and be driven by regional priorities.363 “As a full member of the EEC, Norway 
would”, the shipowners argued, “together with other shipping nations, be able to influence the 
Community’s view on shipping questions – the relationship between the member states and to 
the world at large.”364  
With the strong ties between the NSA and the MFA, the MEDs working with the EC-
case were keenly aware of the interests of the shipping sector. William G. Solberg, who was 
one of the contact points between Brussels and the NSA, recognised the dangers of a regional 
shipping policy early on. Solberg (born 1922) was a lawyer by training and was 1st embassy 
secretary to Brussels (1961-62). In October of 1962 he was made the Norwegian 
representative to the EEC’s negotiation secretariat.365 Together with Langeland, Halvorsen, 
Berg and Skarstein, Solberg was among the first proponents of a Norwegian membership in 
the EEC. As early as July of 1961, he told the NSA it was “dangerous for Norway to not 
participate as a full member of the EEC because we would be without the right to vote in 
similar situations in the future. If we become full members, we would de facto be able to veto 
this kind of [regional] shipping cooperation between the EEC-countries if we would want 
to”.366 This was written nearly a year before the government made its decision to apply for 
membership negotiations. 
For both the reasons mentioned above, the NSA and the entire shipping community’s 
view was that Norway “should apply for full membership, as soon as possible.”367 The MFA as 
an institution, and the MEDs in particular, had close ties and formalised corporative 
connections with the NSA and the shipping sector. Eivinn Berg pointedly summed up the 
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relationship between the MEDs and the shipping sector as, “there was nothing but applause 
from the NSA for what we did.”368  
Just as the MEDs involved with the EC-case had close ties to the highly pro-European 
business sector, they were closely affiliated with two predominantly pro-European political 
parties: the Labour Party and the Conservative Party.369 More noteworthy is the fact that 
many of the MEDs held political and administrative positions interchangeably, giving them an 
enormous potential for influence. Per Martin Ølberg, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Arne Skaug and 
Knut Frydenlund all ended up as ministers or state secretaries in Labour governments. 
Furthermore, Ølberg, Stoltenberg and Skaug returned to diplomacy after having held 
political positions. This tendency was less marked among the core-MEDs who were affiliated 
with the Conservatives. Of Søren Chr. Sommerfelt, Eivinn Berg, Arild Holland, Arne 
Langeland, only Berg crossed over from diplomacy to politics and back.370 
In matters of domestic politics, the Conservative and Labour Parties – the major parties 
of the right and the left wing, respectively – were adversaries. But a remarkable consensus 
prevailed between the two parties throughout the Cold War era in regard to foreign policy 
matters. Two reasons should be mentioned: first, the reality of the Cold War, and the 
perceived Communist threat, both domestically and internationally, facilitated an 
unparalleled discipline and conformity of foreign policy between 1950 and 1972.371 Second, 
as Thorvald Stoltenberg – who followed Frydenlund as Foreign Minister in 1987 – explained, 
the job of the MFA was to uphold domestic consensus. Paraphrasing Frydenlund, Stoltenberg 
contended that Norway, as a small country, did not have the privilege of having two or three 
foreign policy positions. Foreign Ministers, therefore, sought the middle of the parliament, 
often at the expense of the full backing of their own parties.372  
Consensus was reflected in personnel as well. Between 1945 and 1972, the only foreign 
minister not coming from the Labour or Conservative Parties was Erling Wikborg (Christian 
People’s Party), who sat for three weeks in 1963. Furthermore, Labour and Conservative 	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foreign ministers had no problem recruiting from each other’s parties. After the change from a 
Labour government to a centre-right coalition in 1965, for example, Foreign Minister Lyng 
(Conservative) kept Thorvald Stoltenberg as political secretary. “Lyng needed close contacts 
with the Labour Party regarding foreign policy”, Salvesen explains, “and Stoltenberg would 
be one of the links”.373 The same consensus was evident among multilateral economic 
diplomats. Consider this reflection by Arild Holland: 
 
“The MFA, and particularly the Economic Department, where I worked, was never 
characterised by party politics. So, my right hand in the EC-case, Per Martin Ølberg, was a 
Labour Party man, while I was Conservative. In fact, there was very little difference between us, 
and we sometimes wondered why one of us ended up in Labour while the other ended up with 
the Conservatives.”374 
 
Holland believed this was because party politics were completely irrelevant in foreign policy 
issues. But it was actually more a reflection of the nearly unanimous, highly party specific, 
agreement among the MEDs, and the MFA at large, on the policy of membership in the EC. 
The corporative and political networks, of which the diplomats were a part, pulled in the 
same direction: towards membership. This became particularly evident when they all 
conjoined within the European Movement in Norway (EMN). As we shall see, the EMN 
became the main hub for pro-European efforts, particularly in the early to mid-1960s, with a 
remarkably strong presence from the MFA, the NSA, the Labour Party and the 
Conservatives. 
 
The emotional connections between the Europeans 
Among some of the autonomous diplomats, centrally placed to work with the EC-case and 
embedded in wholly membership-positive networks, there evolved distinct emotional bonds. It 
was these emotional and professional ties that distinguished the Europeans from other MEDs. 
They came to form a community based on criteria such as likeability, admiration and shared 
beliefs. Most important was how the ‘members’ related to the EC-issue: it required being pro-
European in a certain way to gain acceptance into the group as a whole. A community was 
forged through the diplomats’ work with the EC-case, and it took its shape and size through a 
range of mundane practices surrounding exclusion and inclusion. 
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Mentor-apprentice relationships were one way diplomats became cemented as a group 
and across cohorts. Formalised versions of these relationships existed between trainees, when 
sent out on their first junior postings, and the mentors in charge of their on-site education. 
This was how many of the Europeans came to know each other. Many of the younger MEDs 
carried out their junior postings at one of three sites: Paris (OEEC/OECD), Geneva (EFTA 
and GATT) or Brussels (EC). In these multilateral economic settings, young diplomats were 
taught by older MEDs. Junior postings were formative experiences, and often forged long-
lasting friendships, feelings of admiration and, crucially, possibilities for later advancement. 
Tancred Ibsen Jr., Arne Langeland, Jahn Halvorsen, Asbjørn Skarstein and Arne Skaug 
were all stationed in Paris in the mid-1950s.375 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
investigate the environment of the OEEC-delegation of the mid-1950s, but it is safe to assume 
that the diplomats were socialised into the world of intergovernmental and multilateral 
economic diplomacy, and that many of the strong links between the Europeans can be traced to 
Paris.376 Arne Langeland, for example, reflecting on how his cooperation with Jahn Halvorsen 
began, recalled his junior posting: “I was very fortunate, because I was sent to the delegation 
in Paris, dealing with OEEC and NATO matters, and I worked a bit with both as a ‘junior’. 
Arne Skaug was my boss, the big boss, and the Counsellor, that was Jahn Halvorsen.”377 
Halvorsen trusted Langeland’s judgement and respected his skills and therefore handpicked 
him to be the Head of the 4th Economic Office.378 The Administrative Department had 
initially regarded Langeland as too young for the job. But Halvorsen, after appealing to 
Foreign Minister Lange and State Secretary Engen, forced it through.379  
The youngest multilateral economic diplomats had similar experiences as Langeland, 
through ‘junior’ postings at the new hub of economic integration – Brussels. Terje 
Johannessen remembered his first stint in Brussels like this: 
 
“I was fortunate enough to be placed in Brussels (...) and it was ‘number two’ [at the Embassy] 
who was the mentor, and that was Asbjørn Skarstein (...) As I would say to anyone, there’s not 	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a single person that I have learned so much from, about international trade policy, or 
international monetary policy, as Asbjørn.”380 
 
Several of the younger diplomats were mentored by Skarstein, who was seen as one of the 
leading experts of the service’s economic diplomacy. While working with EFTA in the early 
1960s, Skarstein was Holland’s senior at the 4th Economic Office. Holland recalled him as 
“amazingly articulate. When I had to ponder the issue before I saw a solution, he had it right 
away. He was absolutely superb, I was speechless sometimes, at how quickly he perceived 
situations”.381 Equally, Berg recalled the admiration he had for the older MEDs:  
 
“[Skarstein], he was a dynamo. I think he was the economic diplomat that I admired the most 
when I came into the system. I really looked up to him. And he had an excellent reputation. He 
and Langeland were good friends. (...) I was a younger man in all of this, and I had the same 
admiration for Skarstein as all the other younger economic diplomats.”382 
 
Jahn Halvorsen was another respected and admired senior among the younger diplomats. 
Håkon W. Freihow came to know Halvorsen as a young press attaché to Brussels. 
Ambassador Halvorsen and the young press attaché frequently travelled together and became 
friends, sharing long walks together. Freihow described Halvorsen as “unsurpassable” as 
Ambassador, and as “very knowledgeable, very hardworking”.383 
Such feelings of respect or admiration went the other way as well: older diplomats recruited 
and promoted young diplomats in whom they saw potential, liked personally, and felt 
embodied the same ethos and fundamental beliefs as their own. This was part of the informal 
norms of recruitment and advancement. Eivinn Berg, for example, went from being an 
attaché to Chicago – dealing with security policy issues – to becoming a secretary at the 
Economic Department in 1960. Berg recalled how this came about: 
 
“It is a strange process. I don’t know why, but I had a very good relationship with Langeland. I 
had read many reports from Brussels and Geneva and round about. I have myself picked people 
in this way, and it has something to do with you standing for the same things. You need to be a bit 
enthusiastic, and you need to have a good chemistry, and I always had a good chemistry with 
Arne Langeland (...) it was thanks to him picking me up, and making me one of his closest 
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associates in that period, that I could make an impression, and move up. So, that was a flying 
start.”384 
 
When Arne Langeland was looking for a skilled economist for his office, he likely enquired at 
the Administrative Department, and was informed that there was one who had just finished 
the academy. Langeland spoke to the young Eivinn Berg, immediately liked him, and asked if 
he wanted to start working for him. Berg was interested, but was not in a position to make the 
decision. Langeland then asked his superior, Director General of the Economic Department, 
Jahn Halvorsen. Halvorsen took the request to the Director General of the Administrative 
Department, but it turned out that Eivinn Berg was to be placed somewhere else. Langeland 
refused to accept this answer so Halvorsen asked again – more emphatically – and Berg was 
allowed to transfer to the 4th and later 5th Economic Office. 
As Berg recalled, “everyone wanted to pick associates that they had a good relationship 
with, and there is no doubt that there exists a dominant principle in the entire administration: 
if you want to have a career, you have to stick with someone you’re sure is going to move up 
the ladder.”385 Hopes of personal benefits went hand in hand with social considerations. 
Much to the same point, Langeland reflected on how advancements came about, and how 
offices and committees were put together: “it’s about cooperation, things should run smoothly. 
We’re supposed to thrive together.”386 Through such mechanisms people were included into 
communities and cliques. To this point, Eivinn Berg concluded: “so that’s how I became part 
of the gang led by Arne Langeland, and partly Holland. They were older, they were Heads of 
Offices, I came in as a secretary (...) but I was very engaged in the team.”387 
Among the Europeans, practices of social inclusion and exclusion contained a strong 
normative component, which was simultaneously a process of creating consensus.388 Such 
inclusion/exclusion and consensus building happened through mundane practices.389 In the 
case of the Europeans, it seems that those who did not share some core traits and, more 
importantly, a set of normative and principled beliefs, were blocked from strategic interaction 
and involvement, marginalised, pushed to the fringes of the group, or simply ignored. 
Tancred Ibsen Jr. experienced this. He took part in the formation of Norwegian European 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012. 
385 Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012.  
386 Interview – Arne Langeland – 1.05.2012.  
387 Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012. 
388 Etienne Wenger and William Snyder “Communities of practice: the organizational frontier” in Harvard Business 
Review, January-February (2000); Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012).  p. 16. This is also much in line with Iver 
B. Neumann, when he argues, for example, that text production within the MFA is “in the name of the social 
integration of the MFA itself”.  
389 de Certeau “General Introduction to the practice of everyday life” (2002), pp. 63-75 
	  	   104	  
policy – as Head of the EC-Office between 1960 and 1962, counsellor to Brussels in 1962, 
and permanent representative at the EFTA delegation in Geneva between 1963 and 1965. He 
was also one of the early MEDs at the OEEC delegation in the mid-1950s. Ibsen Jr. arguably 
bore many of the traits of a European, and also conceived of himself as one.390  
Still, the broader group did not perceive Ibsen Jr. as a ‘proper’ European. Eivinn Berg 
remembered Ibsen Jr. as “very knowledgeable, but he wasn’t predisposed for these practical 
foreign economic policy matters”. Moreover, he recalled that Ibsen Jr. saw “other aspects of 
this, he wasn’t too concerned with us getting in [to the Community]”.391 Another example is 
how Asbjørn Skarstein had disliked the way Ibsen Jr. had been accepted into the diplomatic 
service. Ibsen Jr., Skarstein thought, got in on his name and not his merits.392 As explained 
above, one of the ways the MEDs set themselves apart was by recruitment into the Diplomatic 
Academy. Because of the way he was recruited, Ibsen Jr. was elite in the wrong way. Berg and 
Skarstein, therefore, distinguished Ibsen Jr. from the rest of the group by highlighting three 
core self-perceptions of the Europeans: they were experts on multilateral economic diplomacy, 
they were elite due to their merits, and they believed in Norway’s membership in the 
Community.  
Two incidents serve to illuminate how practices of exclusion/inclusion worked. First, 
Ibsen Jr. and Langeland did not get along.393 As a practical joke with deeper implications, 
Langeland placed Ibsen Jr., whom Langeland believed didn’t like practical economic matters, 
on a special assignment. Ibsen Jr. was asked to prepare highly technical and detailed economic 
calculations for the agricultural sector during the first round of negotiations.394 Ibsen Jr. 
recalled how he came ‘home’ to the MFA in 1960 and became the Head of Office. But, as 
seen above, Jahn Halvorsen wanted the young, trusted and ambitious Arne Langeland as the 
Head of Office. “There was some intrigue surrounding the matter”, Ibsen Jr. remembered, 
“Langeland was supposed to become the Head of Office, and they needed to do something 
clever with me (...) Langeland took over the Office, [and] I was placed in the attic to study 
Norwegian agriculture.”395 Tancred Ibsen Jr. was marginalised, though he kept important 
positions until 1965. In 1968, he became Norway’s ambassador to Budapest: “and thus ended 
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my carrier in economic diplomacy”, he explains. “I was to a certain degree, one could say, 
voluntarily sent into exile”.396 
Equally revealing is this incident of inclusion: Eivinn Berg remembered how then 
assistant Director General of the Economic Department Ibsen Jr., in around 1967 or 1968, 
tried to make Berg Counsellor of the Embassy in Morocco. “That seemed to me, to be the 
worst thing I could imagine”, Berg explains, “I would have been stuck there for three or four 
years just as things were starting to happen back home, it would have been fatal!” It didn’t 
happen because the community the young secretary belonged to, intervened: “I fought it the 
best I could, and both Rogstad and Langeland got involved – and Skarstein too – and saved 
me from Tancred’s grasp.”397 
The academy, stations, departments, offices and committees were all sites of 
socialisation and forging of friendships. Håkon W. Freihow and Eivinn Berg became the best 
of friends as they went to the DA together. They kept in touch while they were posted in 
different places, and ended up working together between 1970 and 1972 at the Brussels 
Embassy when Freihow was press attaché and Berg was industrial counsellor. 398  Knut 
Frydenlund and Thorvald Stoltenberg’s long lasting friendship (and Stoltenberg’s habit of 
following in Frydenlund’s footsteps) began when the two shared an office together just after 
Stoltenberg arrived at the MFA.399 Similarly, locations abroad became sites of learning and 
consensus building. Consider for example how Håkon W. Freihow describes the Embassy in 
Brussels around 1970-72: 
 
“No, we were all supporters [of membership]. Remember, we were in this job to contribute to 
Norway securing the best possible basis for negotiations, which in turn would give us the 
opportunity to get inside the EC, or EEC as it was called back then. So, we were all ardent pro-
Europeans, no doubt about it. (...) The Embassy staff was led by Jahn Halvorsen, and we had 
morning meetings every day, you know, where we went through this. There was no need for him 
to interfere, and animate us to become pro-European, because we already were, it was 
natural.”400 
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Freihow explains how diplomats, already positive to membership, worked with a case that 
inclined them to take a positive stand, and how they confirmed this attitude through daily 
rituals. The Embassy in Brussels was a site of consensus building, where Freihow and the rest 
confirmed and reinforced their pro-Europeanness. 
Such sites of friendship and consensus building existed at home as well. Terje 
Johannessen was the youngest member of the secretariat of the Market Committee, working 
together with Arild Holland and Per Martin Ølberg. Johannessen recalled Ølberg as “very 
effective, very professional, knowledgeable as few, and very dynamic”, and had “great 
respect” for him. The two had studied political science together, with Ølberg three years 
ahead of Johannessen. While working together on the Market Committee, Johannessen was 
“inspired by  [Ølberg’s] work methods” and “tried to the best of [his] abilities to copy it”. 401 
Per Martin Ølberg, in turn, had an apprentice-like relationship with Arild Holland. 
Ølberg and Holland had offices right next to each other, and they “talked continuously about 
negotiation issues” throughout the second and third EC-round.402 As seen above, Holland 
considered Ølberg his “right hand”, and put him in charge of fishery policies during the third 
round.403 Arild Holland, as already mentioned, worked under Asbjørn Skarstein and admired 
him greatly. These mentor-apprentice relationships evolved into close friendships. The four, 
Skarstein, Holland, Ølberg and Johannessen, worked closely together on the EC-case for 
many years. They shared “the [traditional] Norwegian packed lunch” together “every day.”404 
Asbjørn Skarstein, Arild Holland, and their families, had been close since the diplomats’ days 
together in Geneva (1960-62), so close in fact that Skarstein’s wife was the godmother of 
Holland’s youngest daughter.405  
The emotional ties between the Europeans were partly forged through shared beliefs. 
Holland, for example, explained his close friendship with Jahn Halvorsen in the following 
matter: 
 
“Jahn Halvorsen [...] he was formidable, and we became damn good friends, he was also an 
economist. And we became very good friends. We had everything in common, and a shared 
view on this [the EC-issue]. And Jahn, he understood the meaning of the whole thing. We saw 
eye to eye on this matter.”406 
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The sheer complexity of the answers to why and how they became friends is illuminating. 
Holland greatly admired Halvorsen; the two had a common educational background, they 
were colleagues, and they shared a set of principled beliefs regarding the EC-issue. Holland 
described his close friend, Per Martin Ølberg, in a similar matter, and added that he was “one 
of the few who understood”. 407 Equally, Skarstein – perhaps Arild Holland’s closest friend – 
was described by Holland as “one of the first in Norway that understood the background for 
the EEC-cooperation”.408 
Similarly, Langeland and Halvorsen’s work relationship was the beginning of a close 
friendship, which was strengthened during the first round of negotiations by a common belief 
in Norwegian membership in the EC. Describing their friendship, Langeland recalls how 
Halvorsen became “the one who believed together with me”.409 Understanding the essence of 
what membership entailed, therefore, was a crucial component in the emotional cobweb that 
demarcated the inside and outside of the group of Europeans. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The interactions and connections among the leading multilateral, economic diplomats 
working with the EC-case reveal that this group of MEDs bore the traits of an emotional 
community in which agreement about the positive value of Norwegian membership in the EC 
was at the very centre. Believing strongly in a Norwegian membership was at the core of what 
it meant to be a European. The possibility to enforce and uphold such a community of belief 
was strengthened by the Europeans’ seclusion from the rest of the MFA, a dominant connection 
with the MoCS, and wholly pro-European corporative and political connections. There was 
little resistance. An array of other markers have been explored throughout the previous 
chapters, which played larger or smaller roles in defining the group as a whole depending on 
the person in question. Background, education, career, generation, connections and beliefs 
were all woven into the tapestry that made up the Europeans. 
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Conclusions: Europeans – a community of likeminded MEDs 
 
The overarching aim of the previous three chapters has been to answer the question: who 
were the Europeans? The conclusions will hold the group up against three ideal types of 
communities – epistemic communities, communities of practice and emotional communities – and explore 
the fringes of the group. What will become clear is that the Europeans were, what this thesis 
calls, a community of likeminded MEDs (see Fig. 3 at the end of the conclusions). 
One of the more basic criteria for belonging to the Europeans was that one had to be a 
diplomat. This could be exemplified through someone who was not: Einar Løchen (born 
1918) was one of the first in Norway to be genuinely concerned with European integration 
and supranationalism. In the 1950s he published several articles and books on the subject, and 
was rather alone in sympathising with the continental European integration project.410 He was 
a lawyer by training and employed by the MFA between 1949 and 1963. In the early phases 
of the EC-case, Løchen was the leader of the committee publishing the so-called Løchen-
report on the implications of the Treaties of Rome, and he was used as an expert on 
European integration until 1962. Løchen was also a long-standing board member of the 
Norwegian Council of the European Movement (NCEM).411 Though Løchen was a proto-
European of sorts, he  did not belong to the group. First, he was not a trained diplomat, though 
he was employed by the MFA for 14 years. He was first and foremost a legal expert with 
academic knowledge of the EEC.412 Second, Løchen was only involved with the EC-case in its 
first two years, and then went on to pursue a career as a lawyer, and later, Chief Justice. One 
reason Løchen left the MFA was a personal rivalry, where he was seen to step on the turf of 
the specialised diplomats handling the EC-case.413 
More specifically, the Europeans were among the centrally placed diplomats working 
closely with the EC-case. The MFA was organised in a way that opened up and connected the 
international and domestic political spheres. Through this institutional adaptation, which 
happened largely in the outer parts of the ministry, new diplomatic spaces for the emerging 
multilateral economic diplomats were created. Exploring these spaces in relation to the EC-
case, we find that a very limited group of diplomats inhabited overlapping positions 
domestically and internationally. The range of new tasks and positions the MEDs possessed – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Eriksen and Pharo Kald krig og internasjonalisering (1997), p. 139; Einar Løchen “Norges møte med Europa 1950-
1964”, IFS-info No.6, Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier (1993). 
411 RA – S-1275/Db/Box 277/Folder 2. 
412 Interview – Arne Langeland – 22.01.2010; 01.05.2012. 
413 Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013; Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012; Interview – Arne Langeland – 
22.01.2010; 01.05.2012. Ibsen Jr., Berg and Langeland all confirmed this. 
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and not least the continuous interaction between them – changed their roles. The MED broke 
away from the traditional Weberian norms and showed his political propensity. 
These boundary-spanning diplomats, populating the MFA from the 1950s onwards, 
came to understand themselves, and were understood as, experts within the multilateral 
economic field. This ‘expert’ role apexed a layered, elitist background accentuated by the 
prestige of their trade. The Europeans were, for the most part, specialised diplomats (many of 
them educated economists) – a fact that revealed itself in their patterns of communication and 
connections. A unique role was complemented by departmental seclusion, much room for 
manoeuvre, and a strong connection with other bodies engaged in international trade (the 
MoCS and the NSA). It was for these reasons, it seems, that the Europeans did not count 
Thorvald Stoltenberg as one of their own. Stoltenberg had many traits that overlapped with 
the Europeans, and shared their cause, but he was not an expert MED and had not worked on 
the EC-case specifically while serving as a diplomat. This was an important criterion: having 
multilateral economic career paths (stints in Paris, Brussels or Geneva) not only forged many 
personal links among the Europeans, but it also set them apart from other diplomats. Even the 
Ambassador to Brussels (1960-65), Nils Anton Jørgensen (born 1911), was excluded from the 
group.414 Jørgensen joined the service in 1939 after serving as unpaid consul to Havana since 
1937. An educated economist, he was very much involved in the early stages of the first round 
of the EC-case (1960-63), but became, in essence, superfluous after the posting of Asbjørn 
Skarstein to Brussels in 1962. Jørgensen was not considered part of the ‘young war’-generation 
of multilateral economic experts, and according to several of the Europeans, he was relatively 
uninterested in the EC.415 
On the contrary, people like Jahn Halvorsen or Arne Skaug, educated before or during 
the war (and without having gone through the new DA) were considered part of this 
‘generation’, revealing the plasticity of an imagined generation that absorbed a range of non-
age-related markers (such as career, like-mindedness, social background and education). 
Halvorsen and Skaug – both economists – were included because they were recognised 
experts in multilateral economic diplomacy. However, being experts on multilateral economic 
diplomacy did not necessarily mean that they had to be educated economists, and many 
Europeans were not. Sigurd Ekeland (born 1921), for example, was a lawyer by education and 
came from the position as Counsellor to Moscow to become Jahn Halvorsen’s second in 
command at the Embassy in Brussels between 1966 and 1971. In 1972, Ekeland became 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Following his posting as Ambassador to Brussels went on to serve in Bern (1965-70) and Teheran (1970-75). 
415 Hvem er Hvem “Nils Anton Jørgensen” http://runeberg.org/hvemerhvem/1973/0295.html (25.05.2014); 
Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014. 
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Minister to Brussels. After his passing away in 1973 the obituary read that “hardly any 
Norwegian” had a deeper knowledge of the legal aspects of the European Communities.416  
The recognised expertise of the Europeans, which became a sought after commodity with 
the first British application in 1961, gave them traits similar to that of an epistemic 
community, defined as a “professional network with authoritative and policy-relevant 
expertise”.417 Moreover, the Europeans, in line with the definition of an epistemic community, 
came to share the principled belief that Norwegian membership in the EC was for the good of 
all.418 This belief was in fact the most important criteria separating the Europeans from other 
MEDs (how it developed over time, will be discussed in the third part of this thesis). 
Tim Greve, for example, was not a multilateral economic diplomat, but could still be 
included among the Europeans (and was described by others as a European) due to his 
extraordinary commitment to the European cause. He was a long-standing board member of 
the European Movement, together with Halvorsen, Skarstein, Rogstad, Frydenlund and 
Løchen.419 By contrast, Håkon W. Freihow (born 1927), Press Counsellor to Brussels in 1971-
72 and a convinced pro-European, was not necessarily understood as a European. He had close 
ties with Berg and Halvorsen but became involved in the EC-case only at a late stage and was 
not an expert on multilateral economic diplomacy. As Freihow explained in an interview, 
Freihow also kept a low profile, and stayed out of the EMN, and therefore belonged more to 
the margins than Greve.420  
The exclusion from, and inclusion into, the group of Europeans happened through 
mundane, situated and recognised practices within the diplomatic domain. Such 
developments are difficult to grasp, but one gets the sense of a community being brought 
together through practices that constituted like-mindedness. These are developments similar 
to what Wenger, Adler, Pouliot and others see occurring within communities of practice: “a 
community of people that ‘creates the social fabric of learning’, and a shared practice that 
embodies ‘the knowledge the community develops, shares, and maintains’.”421 Its members 
continuously renegotiate the community of practice and through this a certain belief in how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Aftenposten, 13.09.1973, Sigurd Ekeland; Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 18.12.2012; Interview – Terje 
Johannessen – 24.04.2012. An enthusiastic pro-European, he was described as persistent, flamboyant and energetic. 
417 Mai’a K. Davis Cross “Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later” in Review of International Studies, 39 
(2013), pp. 137-160, p. 137. Used on diplomats in transnational settings: Mai’a K. Davis Cross The European 
Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht Basingstoke: Palgrave (2007). 
418 Haas “Introduction: Epistemic Communities (1992), p. 3; See also: John Gerard Ruggie ‘International Reponses 
to Technology: Concepts and Trends’, International Organisation, 29:3 (1975). 
419 RA – S-1275/Db/Box 277/Folder 2. 
420 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 18.12.2012. 
421 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot “International Practices” in International Theory, 3:1 (2011), pp. 1-36, p. 18-19, 
quotes Etienne Wenger, Richard McDermott and William C. Snyder A guide to Making Knowledge: Cultivating 
Communities of Practice, Boston: Harvard Business School Press (2002), pp. 28–29. 
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things are and should be done is upheld.422 As we shall see, it was the doing – the actual work 
with the EC-case – that bound the Europeans together. 
It is clear that the Europeans developed affective bonds with each other through their 
work, with a common outlook on the EC being an important component. Both the practice and 
the episteme (belief) of the Europeans forged them into something akin to what Barbara H. 
Rosenwein has called an emotional community.423 They shared a very specific assessment of 
what was valuable (membership) and what was harmful (staying on the outside of the 
Community), and it seems they encouraged and valued certain emotional bonds in relation to 
the EC-matter more than others. Tancred Ibsen Jr., for example, was marginalised because 
he had a different, though wholly pro-European, conception of Norway’s relationship with the 
EC. It was a matter of belonging to those ‘who understood’. 
As the discussion above makes clear, none of the markers that defined the Europeans were 
absolute. And to complicate matters more, the composition of the group changed over time, 
though its core-members remained largely the same between 1960 and 1972. By exploring the 
fringes of the group of Europeans, and holding them up against three different concepts of 
community, we are able to define them as a highly autonomous, emotionally tight-knit, and 
elite group of multilateral, economic diplomats with recognised expertise on European 
integration, and who defined themselves through their passion for, and belief in, a Norwegian 
EC-membership – a community of likeminded MEDs. 
Fig. 3 below serves as a representation of the Europeans and its fringes, including some 
of their main traits and their connections with each other (1960-1972). The level of 
involvement in the EC-case (going from pale yellow to red) is based on a source-based 
qualitative assessment of their practices in the twelve years this thesis investigates. The 
coloured lines around the name-box (green, turquoise and blue) indicate their education424, 
and the yellow square in its upper-right corner denotes they were board members of the 
European Movement in Norway. Last, the lines between the different names indicate the 
personal and professional connections between the different diplomats. This can never be a 
hundred percent accurate. Nonetheless, it is valuable to have a representative image of these 
connections, based on a careful reading of a wide range of sources, not least because they 
often were decisive in the policy formation regarding the EC-case. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 Wenger and Snyder “Communities of practice” (2000), p. 139, 142; http://www.ewenger.com/theory/.  
423 Rosenwein “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions” (2010). The concepts of epistemic communities 
and communities of practice can very well be combined. Morgan Meyer and Susan Molyneux-Hodgson 
“Introduction: The Dynamics of Epistemic Communities” (2010) http://www.socresonline.org.uk/15/2/14.html 
(13.04.2013). 
424 Attachment 1 – Statistics.	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PART II  
Norway and Europe in times of transition 
_________________________________________ 
Chapter 4 
Norway and Europe in times of transition 
 
This chapter explores and distinguishes discourses that shaped the Europeans’ world and the 
society around them in relation to the EC-case. The first section gives a broad historical 
grounding to the discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’ related to the nation-building process and 
foreign policy outlook of Norway in the 1800s and 1900s. It traces perspectives and ideas of 
this process that were still relevant in the 1960s. The next section goes more into detail, and 
reconstructs the discourses of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ as they developed in the postwar era 
until the 1960s. The last section deals with some of the fundamental forces that challenged the 
postwar order in the late 1960s as seen from the perspective of the state in general, and the 
Europeans in particular. 
Three things will become clear: first, the discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’ was deeply 
ingrained in Norwegian nation-building of the 19th century and the Norwegian foreign policy 
outlook after its independence. Norway’s postwar foreign policy orientation was greatly 
influenced by scepticism toward the continent. This discourse came into play in a variety of 
ways in the EC-case, not least as a rhetorical arsenal for the ‘no’-side. As we shall see in Part 
III, this was something the Europeans were submerged in, and tried to confront throughout the 
EC-case. Second, postwar concepts of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ played an important part in 
the Europeans handling of the EC-case. The importance of interpreting membership in the 
Community in terms of a continuation of what had essentially been the backbone of 
Norwegian postwar foreign policy was never lost upon the Europeans. In fact, these discourses 
were so deep-seated in the MFA that the Europeans were unable to understand how anyone 
could disagree with their reasoning. This lay at the heart of the failed information campaigns 
that took place prior to the negative referendum. Third, the referendum in 1972 was a 
distinctly Norwegian version of the rebellious spirit of ‘1968’. It was a revolt against elites, and 
a defence of Norway’s historically earned right to ‘self-determination’. This concept united 
national conservatives and left wing radicals in the struggle against membership. 
As this thesis argues, one way to understand how the Europeans worked with the EC-case 
is through the way they navigated in and engaged with these three discourses. 
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Europe as the Other 
Late spring 1972, a British diplomat thought it amusing to show a list of humorous 
characteristics that made continental Europeans and Norwegians different, taken from the 
funny pages of a Norwegian newspaper, to one of his Norwegian colleagues in Brussels425: 
 
“Arguments against EEC: They are Catholics; they are capitalists; they are swarthy; they are 
authoritarians and beat their children; they drive like madmen; they are all gigolos; they are 
megalomaniacs; they pollute the environment; they oppress the working masses; they are scared 
to death of Communists; the only thing they know about Norway is that the girls are blonde and 
serve coffee in bed the day after; they are one great slum; they are indulgent, sell contraceptives 
under the counter and persecute unmarried mothers; half of them are policemen; they talk 
funny; they are bureaucratic and do not permit divorce; they manufacture miserable goods; they 
have double standards; they are always on strike.” 
  
To counter these unbeatable Norwegian arguments against membership, the piece produced 
a corresponding number of good arguments for the EEC against Norwegians. This list started 
with, “they are protestant”, and ended, “they are not European.” After having read the piece, 
the Norwegian diplomat nodded thoughtfully and replied: “both lists seem to fit. As I see it, 
we ought to have every chance of getting along with each other.”426 
This was a joke, of course, but it is true that European identity is usually seen in relation 
to national identity. Bo Stråth argued that, Europe might appear, “as the Other from within, 
that is, from within what others consider to be Europe, as a kind of self-imposed exclusion. 
This is the case, for example, when Europe is referred to as ‘the Continent’ in Great Britain 
and parts of Scandinavia. It is this internal demarcation in particular that we mean by Europe 
as the Other.”427 In fundamental ways, the meaning and identity of ‘Norway’ was constructed 
and understood in opposition to ‘Europe’, and this discourse was the most fundamental hurdle 
the Europeans had to overcome in the EC-negotiations. It manifested itself in their strategies 
and communication; it was evident among the EC-sceptics in parliament; it was equally 
evident among those within the Community that doubted the Norwegian government’s 
Europeanness. Most importantly, the ‘no’-side – drawing a direct historical line from 1814, 
1905, 1940 to 1972428 – won the referendum by successfully defining it as a struggle between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten (08.05.1972, evening Ed.) had simply taken a satirical piece from the funny 
pages of the Swedish newspaper Veckans Affärer, and replaced ‘Sweden’ with ‘Norway’. 
426 FCO 30/1472 – Aftenposten, ev. Ed. 8 May.  
427 Bo Stråth “Introduction. Europe as a Discourse” in Bo Stråth (Ed.) Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, 
Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang (2000, 4th Ed. 2010), pp. 13-44, p. 15. 
428 The year the Constitution was adopted, and Norway broke free from Denmark (1814); the year Norway 
peacefully left the personal union with Sweden and elected to be a Monarchy (1905); the year Norway was invaded 
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the concepts of people, parliament and sovereignty, on the one hand, and state, bureaucracy and union, 
on the other. An effective and historically loaded definition of ‘Norway’ and accompanied 
othering of ‘Europe’ lay at the heart of the successful no-campaign.429 These binary oppositions 
were not simply constructions – they were powerful symbols that resonated with earlier 
interpretations and realities of Norwegian history. Much of the explanation, as Danish 
historian Uffe Østergård succinctly states, is to be found in “the kind of nation-building 
process Norway went through”.430  
In this respect, 1814 marked a starting point. In the turbulent times following the peace 
treaty of Kiel in 1814, the Danish Crown Prince Christian Fredrik (resident viceroy in 
Norway) and the governing elites in Norway – the civil servants – along with some 
distinguished farmers, convened a National Assembly at Eidsvoll and wrote the first 
Norwegian Constitution. The Constitution ensured that Norway, handed from Denmark to 
Sweden as part of the peace settlement, could negotiate with Sweden regarding its role within 
the new union on a proper legal basis. After some struggle, the Swedish king recognised an 
amended version of the Norwegian Constitution, and in November 1814 the Norwegian 
parliament (Storting) elected King Charles XIII of Sweden as King of Norway, creating a 
personal union between Sweden and Norway that lasted until 1905.431 
As Norwegian historian Jens Arup Seip argued, “the national movement was not a 
prerequisite for ‘1814’, but a product of what happened at that time”432 The nation did not 
‘awake’ one day and articulate itself through a national movement, but was created through a 
nationalistic ideology carried out by the intellectual and political elites.433 In short, the 
construction of a distinct Norwegian identity and political nation in the 19th century happened 
in cultural opposition to Denmark and political opposition to Sweden – both were defined as 
foreign and ‘European’. According to political scientist Øyvind Østerud, national distinction 
was partly found, rediscovered and reinterpreted in the popular culture, and partly postulated 
by the nation-building intellectuals.434 This process of redefining political and cultural identity 
and tying it in with the territorial boundaries of the nation - cultural nation building – 
manifested itself in many different arenas: language, geography, folklore, educational policies 
and, not least, historical research. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and occupied by Nazi Germany (1940); and last, of course, the referendum to stay out of the European Community 
(1972). All are stories of resisting foreign rule, and in particular ’unions’ of any kind. 
429 Neumann Norge – en kritikk. (2001). 
430 Uffe Østergård ”Norden – europæisk eller nordisk?” in Den Jyske Historiker, 69-70 (1994), pp. 7-37, p. 20. 
431 Neumann Norge – En kritikk (2001), p. 58. 
432 Jens Arup Seip Utsikt over Norges historie, Oslo: Gyldendal ([1974] 1997), p. 52. 
433 Østergård ”Norden – europæisk eller nordisk?” (1994), p. 20, 21. 
434 Øyvind Østerud  Det moderne statssystem og andre politisk-historiske studier, Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag (1987). 
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Two historians, Rudolf Keyser and P.A. Munch, for instance, distinguished a racially 
pure and distinct Norwegian genealogy, which was kept alive by the Norwegian free holding 
farmers, who unlike the Swedish and the Danish, were untainted by European feudalism. The 
19th century poet, patriot and ‘historian’ Henrik Wergeland claimed that Norwegian history 
was made up of two parts – the Viking Age and the time following 1814 – the intermediate 
400 years under Danish tutelage was a illegitimate soldering of these two half circles, that 
historians ought to remove. In the late 19th century, historian Ernst Sars wrote four volumes 
on Norwegian history (Udsigt over den norske historie) that were important building blocks in the 
nation building project. One of his lasting contributions was the interpretation of ‘1814’ as a 
result of the slumbering national spirit of the Norwegian people that was reawakened by the 
political events of the day. Common in all of the historical interpretations was the centrality of 
the Norwegian people. “The claim that there existed a separate and subordinate Norwegian 
subject, with a culture distinct from the Danish”, Neumann sums up by quoting historian Odd 
Arvid Storsveen: “maybe the most important result of Norwegian historical research in the 
1800s”. In this struggle against Danish cultural hegemony “‘Norway’ and its history [was] 
created in a conscious and direct opposition to ‘Europe’ and its history”.435 
There were, of course, many conflicting representations of ‘Europe’ and Norway’s place 
in it, but a popular and romantic nationalist movement – represented through the political 
alliance and party Venstre – increasingly united a cultural struggle, which was mainly directed 
against Denmark, with a political, democratic struggle waged from the parliament (Storting) 
and directed against Sweden. The internal enemies, in this struggle, were, among others, the 
civil servants that clenched to their administrative and political powers. Venstre successfully 
fought for increased democratisation and self-determination marked by two decisive political 
victories: the establishment of Parliamentarism in 1884 and the successful and peaceful 
dissolution of the Union with Sweden in 1905. In this, arguably, very European struggle to 
become a recognised European nation-state, Neumann claims, ”the European Other was not 
only, not even primarily, seen as an external, continental unit, that stood side by side with the 
Norwegian. On the contrary, it was deemed as something internal, ’Danish-Norwegian’ and 
with extensive control over Norway through the control of the state apparatus. The popular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Neumann Norge – En Kritikk (2001), p. 66-68; quote from Odd Arvid Storsveen ”Evig gammel. Henrik 
Wergeland, P.A Munch og historiens nasjonale funksjon” in Øystein Sørensen (Ed.) Jakten på det norske. Perspektiver på 
utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet på 1800-tallet, Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal (1998), pp. 229-247, p. 232; on the 
historians, Ottar Dahl Norsk historieforskning i det 19. og 20. århundre, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1990) and Jens Arup 
Seip “Friheten i gave” in Fra embedsmannsstat til ettpartistat og andre essays, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget ([1952] 1963), pp. 
43-50. See also: Iver B. Neumann “This little piggy stayed at home. Why Norway is not a member of the EU” in 
Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.) European Integration and National Identity. The challenge of the Nordic states, London: 
Routledge (2002), pp. 88-129. 
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nationalist’s essential slogan: ’Out of the unions!’ brought up political independence from 
Sweden and cultural independence from Denmark as equal aims”.436 
With the introduction of Parliamentarism in 1884, majority rule and political parties 
replaced the old civil servant state. Venstre (1884), which had first fought for an equality of 
nations within the Union, began pushing for Norwegian independence. The restrictions 
placed on Norway’s independence within the Union were first and foremost in the realm of 
foreign policy, where Sweden jealously defended its prerogative to have unbridled freedom to 
act. It was the issues of Norway’s independent right to enter into treaties of international 
arbitration, trade and shipping treaties – the kind of neutrality that Norway and Sweden 
should adhere to – and, most importantly, Norway’s right to an independent foreign and 
consular service that in the end broke up the Union in 1905.437  
In foreign policy terms Norway, an independent nation from 1905, formalised its 
distanced relationship with Continental Europe. As Norway’s first Foreign Minister Jørgen 
Løvland famously announced, Norway’s foreign policy was to have no foreign policy, and to 
“keep us from participating in combinations and alliances that can drag us into war-like 
adventures together with any of the European warrior states”. The aversion of European 
‘warrior states’ obviously lay in continuation of the experiences of 1814, in which the 
Norwegian province (as part of Denmark-Norway) had been drawn into the Napoleonic War, 
only to be given as a peace settlement to the Swedes. In 1905, however, an implicit British 
‘guarantee’ backed the new formal neutrality and strong isolationist streak. Strong Norwegian 
trade and shipping interests informed this British connection, and the second element of 
Løveland’s foreign policy was indeed “to secure to the utmost possible our international 
material relations”.438 Already here we see the contours of Norway’s postwar foreign policy. 
As Norwegian historian Olav Riste explains, this Atlantic outlook and contempt of the 
continent was subsequently strengthened: 
 
“(...) the public’s reaction to German submarine warfare against Norwegian merchant ships 
during the First World War had produced a wave of anti-German feelings, subsequently re-
awakened and magnified by the emergence of Nazi Germany. The image of Britain and the 
United States as the champions of democracy and national self-determination on the other hand, 
had been strengthened by their victory and by their lead in creating the League of Nations”.439  
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The interwar years saw Norway embarking on a ‘new internationalism’ side by side with its 
formal neutrality, stressing the rule of law and arbitration of conflicts, with the League of 
Nations as the main vehicle. Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the League’s failure to 
act as an instrument of collective peace, however, left the Norwegian government wondering 
whether its obligations under the sanctions paragraphs of the League Covenant did not pose a 
direct threat against Norwegian neutrality “as they risked involving Norway in a war between 
great powers.” With this, and the growing threat of Nazi Germany, Norway slowly returned 
to isolationism. This attitude, Riste concludes, strongly resembled George Washington’s 
rhetorical question to the people. ‘Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of 
Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, humor 
[sic], or caprice?” Europe was “foreign territory (...) sinking into barbarism”. 
The German onslaught of April 9, 1940, was a rude awakening for the government, 
which together with the king, managed to escape to Britain and continue its business in exile. 
With this, neutrality ended: the government now put its faith in the Grand Alliance it had 
joined, and its “foreign policy became to all intents identical with its alliance policy”.440 The 
experiences of the government in exile during the war shaped the strong Atlantic outlook that 
would mark the Labour Party in the postwar era. In a famous passage from The Times on 
November 14, 1941, Foreign Minister Trygve Lie gave this shift a geo-historical 
underpinning: “the sea does not divide but links us together [...] We are an Atlantic nation, 
and we do want, above all, a strong, organised collaboration between the two great Atlantic 
Powers”.441 
A “radical – not to say revolutionary – change of foreign policy direction”, then, lay the 
foundation for what historian Magne Skodvin has labelled Norway’s ‘functional western 
connection’ in terms of security, first with Britain, as a continuation of the cooperation during 
the war, and second with the US in an Atlantic Community that eventually culminated with 
NATO membership in 1949. To this development Rune Slagstad notes the industrial and 
ideological western connection that followed442: 
 
“America was ‘the free world’ after 1945; the international arrangement with the World Bank, 
the IMF, GATT OEEC etc. was based on American leadership. But the American hegemony 
was, with Geir Lundestad’s words, an ‘empire by invitation’. The reconstitution of the Marshall 
aid to the European Recovery Program took place after a strong initiative from the Europeans, 	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not least from the British. (...) What was peculiar was that the Norwegian Labour Party, one of 
the most Soviet-minded of all the social democratic parties in the interwar period, in the 1950s 
became perhaps the most American of all”.443 
 
A new ideology – Atlanticism – had become hegemonic. Combined with this were very close 
ties to Britain, an inherent and historically rooted reluctance to be involved with Continental 
Europe, and a strong desire to protect its national sovereignty and self-determination, making 
Norway a somewhat ‘reluctant European’.444  
In a speech with the telling title, “European union. False hopes and realities”, which was 
given to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in December 1949, Foreign Minister 
Halvard Lange pointed out the direction Norway would follow until the 1960s: 
 
”The Norwegian people, in so far as they take an active interest in the problem, are definitely 
sceptical towards integration plans, which once more place our economy at the mercy of 
continental cartels. (...) Much rather than envisaging such a development, most Norwegians 
would tend to favour the idea of expanding Scandinavian regionalism in the direction of a North 
Sea and a North Atlantic community, working in, that is, more closely with Great Britain and 
with the United States. (...) The problem of European union is our common problem. It is one 
problem among many that we are faced with within our North-Atlantic community. And I’m 
convinced it can only find its solution in the wider context of Atlantic cooperation.”445 
 
We will return to aspects of Norwegian postwar security and prosperity below. Here it suffices 
to observe that Lange’s guiding words were echoed in Norway’s dismissal of any participation 
in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Defence Community 
(EDC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Norway’s relationship with the 
Continent in the last half of the 1950s was increasingly shaped by a tension between the 
continents and especially Germany’s growing significance for Norway in the military, 
economic and political field on the one hand, and Norway’s Atlantic policy on the other.446 
But the ruling Labour government’s aloofness and scepticism towards purely continental 
endeavours also reflected another aspect of the postwar distance to ‘Europe’. “Distrust of 
more conservative regimes and policies on the continent was probably a main motive force 
when the Norwegian government took its position in response to US pressure and joined the 
British side of the dividing line between federalists and functionalists” in the Council of 	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Europe and within the OEEC”, as historian Helge Pharo concludes.447 A sense of opposing 
ideological orientations fed into the Labour Party’s initial reactions to European integration in 
the 1950s: participation was out of the question due to the continental economic and social 
policies. It is not entirely unreasonable to see the Norwegian thinking as an expression of self-
complacency, and an understanding of the Anglo-Scandinavian welfare model as superior 
and, to a certain extent, exceptional.448 Norway’s political elites, therefore, “saw no need to 
participate in an endeavour that involved a loss of sovereignty to supranational bodies 
dominated by countries adhering to doctrines ‘inferior’ to their own welfare model.”449  
Underpinning this social democratic aversion of ‘Europe’ was the ideational opposition 
between what historian Thorsten B. Olesen has labelled the Continental triple-C – Christian 
Democrats, Catholicism and Capitalism, on the one hand, and Nordic Social Democracy, 
Protestantism and mixed-economy, on the other.450 Nordic cooperation was also interpreted 
within this framework: as an ideological platform the Nordic countries could serve as the 
protectors of the social democratic welfare system. Large parts of the Norwegian Labour Party 
shared this ideological understanding of Norden.451  
At a European Movement convention in 1963, Halvard Lange – also a trained historian 
– reflected on what he perceived as the Norwegian detachment from the continent. Norway 
being a young sovereign nation had come out of the Second World War with its national 
pride intact and its national unity strengthened, he said, and continued: 
 
In reality it was the 1930s with the rise of Nazism and fascism in Europe that created a barrier 
between Norway and Europe’s mainland, and provoked the one-sided orientation towards the 
west, towards the Anglo-Saxon world, that became even more pronounced due to our 
encounters and experiences during the Second World War. 
 
Britain’s application for membership negotiations in 1961 ended this strict separation between 
the Anglo-Saxon world and the European mainland in Norway’s foreign policy outlook – “the 
foundation of our hitherto European policy is about to disappear, and we have to re-orientate 
ourselves”. Lange ended his speech with an honest reminder: “Norway is a part of Europe, a 	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part of Western Europe, of the free Europe. Whether we like it or not, this is where we 
geographically belong, and we have all our cultural roots in this part of the world”.452 
 The constructed meanings of ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’ changed significantly for each time 
the matter of membership in the EC was brought up in the 12 years between 1960 and 1972. 
But the debates – and the two concepts – were always loaded with historical interpretations 
and realities of Norway’s relationship with the continent. In fact, interpretations of Norway’s 
historically constructed identity in relation to Europe gave validity to claims and political 
arguments in an unprecedented manner in the emotionally charged EC-struggle. The 
Europeans were aware of this, and sought to navigate these waters carefully. 
 
Prosperity and Security 
The Europeans belonged to a generation that grew up with early memories of the interwar 
period and the Second World War, was educated in the early postwar years of reconstruction, 
and spent most of their careers until 1972 serving a Labour Party government, and, in fact, a 
single foreign minister. This generation dealt with foreign policy and foreign economic policy 
in multilateral settings and in the corporative and political system at home. The Europeans 
represented the political order - they embodied, applied and changed the Norwegian postwar 
state’s understanding of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’.453 It was these distinct postwar discourses 
that were challenged through the EC-case. 
The period between 1945 and 1973 has many names, one being ‘the age of Social 
Democracy’. On a Western European, and indeed Western scale, it was a time of mixed 
economies, social engineering and welfare regimes, under the protective umbrella of Bretton 
Woods (or more accurately a system of international economic interdependence) and 
NATO. 454  In the Norwegian domestic context, historian Berge Furre saw ‘the social 
democratic order’ (1952-77) as dominated by a strong state, economic redistribution, aims of 
economic growth and full employment with the emphasis put on the industrial sector, a 
‘corporative’ system of negotiations between the state and organised interest groups, a 
regulated and protected market in the primary sectors (agriculture and fisheries) and public 
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health care, education and cultural services.455 It was a period marked by unprecedented 
growth, remarkable domestic political stability, and sustained peace. 
From the outset, the Gerhardsen government’s postwar reconstruction efforts 
constituted a ‘scientific-industrial’ vision of the future where the state would “develop and 
exploit rationally and completely all of the country’s productive forces in accordance with the 
manufacturing techniques made possible by modern science”. The initial aim was “a socialist 
Norway”, through planned industrialism – a socialist industrialism that would be realised 
through the democratic institutions and benefit the entire populace.456 Prosperity, then, would 
come through state governed industrialisation. The aim was “to produce oneself into 
socialism”.457 However, social democracy was the result of convergence. The Labour Party 
reclaimed power in 1945 with elaborate plans of a socialist society, but ended up heading a 
capitalist welfare state. Tamed by the Cold War’s call for political stability and alignment with 
other western countries, and shaped in its dialogue with the bourgeois parties at the Storting, 
the Labour Party moderated or left behind its more radical plans. From the mid-1950s, the 
ruling Labour Party, and indeed the political system as such, had ‘found its shape’ and centred 
its attention on what became universally ‘good’ goals: prosperity for the many, security for the 
citizens, and labour for all.458 
In Norway, political stability manifested itself through an almost unrivalled political 
hegemony. The Labour Party was in power from 1935 to 1965, except for the five years of 
German occupation (1940-45) and three weeks of John Lyng’s (Conservative) centre-right 
government in 1963. In 1963, historian Jens Arup Seip polemically described the Norwegian 
postwar political order as ‘the one-party state’, just as the Labour Party’s dominating position 
was challenged both from the left and the right.459 The year 1961 saw the creation of the 
Socialist People’s Party (SPP, Sosialistisk Folkeparti) and the Labour Party’s loss of absolute 
majority in parliament; 1963 saw the first non-socialist coalition in power, albeit for just three 
weeks; and 1965 saw the definitive end of the long streak of Labour governments, as a centre-
right coalition headed by Prime Minister Per Borten took office. However, the Labour Party 
returned to power in March 1971 to see the era to its end. 
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The universality of the social democratic order was evident when the Centre-Right 
coalition (largely continuing the policies of the Labour government it dethroned) put the 
cherry on top of the welfare cake and introduced a universal social security system 
(Folketrygden) with unanimous support in the Storting. Both the Labour Party and the 
Conservatives (1949) recognised the need for a universal social security system: the welfare 
state put social equality at the centre of its operational rationale.460 Danish social scientist 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, in fact, has argued that social equality was the cornerstone of the 
Nordic welfare state. In addition to the universalist social security system, came a strong, 
redistributive state and public financing through taxation. According to Esping-Andersen, the 
Nordic welfare state – as opposed to other welfare regimes – sought to minimise the volatile 
forces of the market on the lives of regular people, and thus reflected distinctly social 
democratic values.461 This formed an important part of the feeling of Nordic exceptionalism 
discussed above. 
The 1960s and early 1970s, then, marked both the zenith of the social democratic order 
and a time of political transformation. A transformation symbolically and physically marked 
by the end of the last restriction on buying cars, and thus the definitive end of the austerities of 
reconstruction, in its beginning in 1959, to the oil findings of 1969 and 1970 at its end. 
However, this domestic perspective conceals the duality of ‘prosperity’ in the postwar era. For 
it was, in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, the “marriage between economic liberalism and social 
democracy”, that drove economic expansion.462 
The liberalisation of trade and the many international and regional organisations 
facilitating it463 tamed the Labour Party’s immediate postwar ideas of radical socialism in one 
state. Pressure came both from the inside, as industrialists and shipowners threatened to rebel, 
and the outside, as the US and the logic of the Cold War forced Norway to fall into line with 
the rest of the West.464 As argued by Milward, postwar reconstruction, the emergence of the 
welfare state and twenty years of uninterrupted growth throughout Western Europe – a 
“reassertion of the nation-state as the fundamental organizational unit of political, economic 
and social existence” 465  – rested on the construction of an elaborate system of an 
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institutionalised pattern of economic interdependence under American auspices. 466  This 
intricate system, able to balance the widely different domestic policies of the Western 
European countries with the strategies and aspirations of the United States, shaped the 
Norwegian postwar conception of prosperity.  
Although the Norwegian government would have preferred a global liberal economic 
solution, on par with the global scope of the United Nations, this soon seemed an impossible 
aspiration due to the development of the Cold War. The long-term goal of liberalising trade 
and the urgent need for hard currency left few options. With the acceptance of Marshall Aid 
in 1947, the Labour Party agreed to remove restrictions on trade, and entered the OEEC.467 
From 1949 onwards, the Norwegian regime of export and import regulations was gradually 
removed, and one of the cornerstones of the Gerhardsen government’s initial planned 
economy crumbled. Through participation in the OEEC, the Labour Party’s planned 
capitalism, stressing full employment and social policies, was confronted by continental 
solutions and US pressure. As Ambassador to the OEEC, Arne Skaug wrote of the 
Continental policies in 1950: 
 
“So-called financial stability, which seems to mean slight depression and reluctance against control 
and regulations, is what matters to them. They are largely against equalising incomes, and often 
against public investments. They see trade liberalisation as a goal in itself (...) and do not seem to 
worry too much about the commitment to full employment.”468 
 
Liberalisation was not a goal in itself, but a means to an end, as MoCS Erik Brofoss warned in 
1952. On this point, they butted heads with the Americans too, who had a different view of 
the balance between liberalisation and growth, on the one hand, and full employment, on the 
other.469 As a prerequisite for its generous treatment of Norway, the Economic Cooperation 
Administration (the US government’s agency set up to administer the Marshall Aid, ECA) 
expected Norway’s government to deregulate its economy.470 The ECA also pushed for 
increased productivity. America helped change European capitalism by launching an array of 
Productivity Councils. In 1950, the ECA wanted productivity centres in all OEEC-countries. 
“’Productivity’ was hymned as an ideological alternative (...), a means of boosting both wages 
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and company profits”, writes historian Mark Mazower.471 Soon the NCTU, the FNI and the 
Labour Party all had their own productivity centres. The OEEC monitored levels of 
productivity in the different member countries, and the term ’economic growth’ was first used 
in 1956. By the time the OEEC was transformed into the OECD, the aim of achieving the 
‘highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living’ had 
made its way into Art. 1 of its founding charter.472 Here the Americans pushed on an open 
door, and the notion of planning and engineering to increase productivity resonated with the 
social democratic ideology. “What is remarkable with the Norwegian development after 
1945”, Slagstad notes, “was that it was the Labour movement and its government that was the 
avant-garde of the productivity-ideology (...) an Atlantic modernisation of capitalism under 
social democratic direction”.473  
Still, the Norwegian blend remained a peculiar one. According to historian Hans Otto 
Frøland, Norway’s political economy had a ‘dual character’: 
 
“On the one hand, Norway aimed for export markets for industry and the merchant navy as well 
as the importation of capital from abroad. From this it followed that Norway was willing to 
collaborate in international markets. On the other hand, it sought to shield the primary sector 
from foreign competition, which implied that Norway would not participate in any preference 
area that included the primary sector.”474 
 
Export-led growth, then, would provide the income to finance a deep modernisation of the 
country – epitomised by the welfare state. The Labour government pursued this strategy of 
reconstruction from the outset: “the strategy was exploited within the context of the Marshall 
Plan. It nourished the failed talks on a Nordic preference area through the 1950s and led to 
Norway joining EFTA in 1960”.475  
Apart from the merchant fleet, growth would come through capital intensive ‘industrial 
modernism’ propped up by Norway’s comparative advantage of cheap hydroelectric power. 
Energy intensive industries, such as the wood and aluminium processing, grew exponentially 
in the 1950s and 1960s, hand in hand with the development of hydroelectric power.476 The 	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industrial outlet quadrupled between 1946 and the early 1970s. The problem with this 
strategy, Frøland argued, “was always lack of capital and the danger that international 
preference areas got in the way of export revenues”. This, among other things, made both the 
failed OEEC-wide industrial free trade area of 1957-58, and the membership in EFTA, 
attractive solutions. The same logic meant that Norway could not ignore the EEC.477 
This was the ‘open’ economy. The ‘closed’ economy was first and foremost the primary 
sector, and also a large ‘home industry’ protected from foreign competition and producing for 
domestic consumption. There was a strong social component to the ‘dual’ economy, which 
included modernising the fishery and agricultural sector (and the home industry) slowly, 
without causing social discontent and without depopulating large parts of Northern Norway. 
Prosperity was meant to benefit all. In the 1950s, for example, parliament decided that the 
income of farmers should follow the average wage of industrial workers. This gradual shift, 
Frøland explains, meant vast transfers from the ‘open’ economy to the ‘closed’ through “an 
ambitious credit and investment policy, and herein we find the explanation for the fear of 
liberalising the movement of capital.”478 The protection of the primary sectors, of course, also 
had a hint of Cold War to it, since a depopulated north meant easy access for the Soviets, 
should they invade. This delicate balance haunted Norwegian negotiators in every 
international and regional market negotiation in the postwar era. 
So what about ‘security’? In the negotiations with the Community and the domestic 
debates on membership in the EC in the 1960s and early 1970s, economic arguments were at 
the forefront. A rash reading of sources might lead to the conclusion that foreign and security 
policy played little part in the decision making process. This is wrong. As we shall see, issues of 
Norway’s position in the Cold War landscape shaped the Europeans’ economically-founded 
arguments supporting membership application. Prosperity and security, then, had become 
inseparable.479  
Norwegian foreign policy in the first postwar years was marked by an attempt at ‘bridge 
building’. In the words of Halvard Lange, Norway was to “cooperate with everyone” through 
the United Nations (UN) “without taking part in any blocs”. Allied cooperation from the war 	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had to be maintained, and Norway’s task would be to “do what we can to strengthen the trust 
between the countries”.480 Norway had good reasons to avoid alienating the Soviet Union, an 
overwhelmingly powerful neighbour “in a part of the world that might become an area of 
East-West confrontation (...)”.481 
A string of international events brought the bridge building to an end. In January, 1948, 
British Foreign Secretary Bevin proposed a Western Union. Then came the communist coup 
in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, which by many was regarded as a ‘bridge-builder’ 
between East and West. The coup deeply influenced a reorientation of Norwegian security 
policy towards alignment with the West. Last came the Soviet offering of a friendship and 
cooperation pact to Finland, and rumours that Norway was about to get a similar invitation. 
Both Minister of Defence Jens Chr. Hauge and Foreign Minister Lange enquired of the 
Americans how they could support if Norway should be attacked. Shortly thereafter, Riste 
explains, “Bevin made an urgent request to Washington for negotiations about trans-Atlantic 
security cooperation ‘before Norway goes under’. The case of Norway thus became one of the 
triggers for the process which began with the so-called Pentagon talks, continued with the 
Washington security talks, and ended up with the formation of the Atlantic Alliance.”482 
Foreign Minister Lange had first half-heartedly pursued a Scandinavian solution to the 
defence issue, an idea that enjoyed strong popular support, not least among Labour Party 
politicians.483 When these talks failed, Lange gave a basic explanation for the breakdown: “[i]t 
was the difference in foreign policy considerations regarding the West that was decisive”484. 
The Ministry of Defence argued, and Lange agreed, that a Scandinavian defence alliance 
would be an insufficient deterrent. In fact, as Pharo sums up, the German invasion of 1940, 
the closeness to the Soviets, and the hardening of Cold War hostilities “made it mandatory to 
seek protection within a Western framework”.485 The Swedes thought the US and UK would 
intervene if the neutral Scandinavian alliance was attacked by the Soviets. Minister of Defence 
Jens Chr. Hauge and Lange, however, doubted the Swedish assumption.486 	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Moreover, the Norwegian economy was weak, and in 1949 reconstruction was still the 
government’s number one priority. In a speech given to the national convention, Lange 
maintained that if Norway were to commit to rearmament without help from the US, the 
economic strains would be so great that “we risk creating the foundation for a Communist 
mass movement in Norway”.487 This notion, that a weak economy – soon marred by 
depression and mass unemployment – created fertile ground for totalitarian ideologies, was 
rooted in the experiences of the interwar period, and was a fundamental part of the MFA’s 
institutional outlook, from Lange and downward in the system. The rhetoric changed slightly 
with Foreign Minister John Lyng, but Foreign Minister Svenn Stray reasserted the principle 
with vigour. Equally, the Europeans would see the increased prosperity they argued would be 
secured within the Community in this light. 
There was also another ‘security-prosperity’ link. A main ingredient in the ‘security’ 
concept, especially in the early Cold War, was deterrence through the “enormous resources of 
the United States and its atomic bomb”. For all the European signatories, Riste concludes, 
“the North Atlantic Treaty had served its purpose by giving them the necessary confidence to 
go on re-building their economies and strengthening their political stability without fear of 
being undermined or overwhelmed by the threat of communism.”488 In the midst of the final 
discussions regarding the Scandinavian solution, another twist was added when the Soviet 
Ambassador to Oslo asked whether Norway intended to join the Atlantic alliance and if this 
would entail bases in Norway for foreign forces. The government replied by formulating the 
so-called ‘bases policy’ – a unilateral declaration that Norway “will not open bases for the 
armed forces of foreign countries unless attacked or threatened with aggression.”489 With the 
government’s proposal, Storting’s approval, and Halvard Lange’s signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty on April 4, 1949, most of the basic ingredients of the Norwegian postwar concept of 
‘security’ were in place. 
Supporters saw the Treaty as a continuation and affirmation of Norway’s wartime 
Atlantic policy, and ties to Britain, dating back to 1905. Those opposed, on the left, regarded 
it as giving up the global solution and peaceful bridge building by joining a war alliance that 
unnecessarily provoked the country’s Soviet neighbour. Until the late 1950s, it was the 
national-conservative centre-right opposition, and those Lange called the ‘farmers’ of his own 
party, that worried the foreign minister the most: “in their hearts they have never come to 	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terms either with the fact that we must pursue an active defence policy or that we have left 
isolationism behind.”490 The resistance against the Atlantic alliance among the communists 
and the left side of the Labour Party, however, proved more lasting. And from the late 1950s, 
especially after SPP was created on an anti-nuclear programme, it would be a recurring theme 
increasing in intensity through ‘1968’. Many of the forces opposed to NATO, both on the left 
and the national-conservative centre-right, were also opposed to the EEC. 
However, both the alliance and Norwegian policy developed. With the outbreak of the 
Korean War came “the impulse for transforming the political treaty into a mutual security 
organisation for collective defence, with a high degree of military integration as the ultimate 
purpose”.491 This development, among others, formalised the balanced Norwegian approach 
to Soviet ‘Deterrence’, obtained through membership in the Atlantic Alliance and softened by 
continued efforts of ‘reassurance’ that the membership was purely a defensive measure. With 
the alliance, as Rolf Tamnes has argued, the government accepted ‘integration’ into NATO’s 
defence system to secure allied assistance, balanced against careful ‘screening’, or self-imposed 
restraints, on Allied military activity in Norway during peacetime. “These measures – not very 
popular in NATO – were part of a broader Norwegian security calculus, which were aimed at 
reassuring the Soviet Union and reducing domestic opposition against NATO.”492 With this 
balance, the government hoped to maintain NATO’s northern flank as a low-tension area.493  
The most famous, and hotly contested, self-imposed restraint came towards the end of 
the 1950s. Following US President Eisenhower’s 1954 announcement of the doctrine of 
‘massive retaliation’, NATO brought nuclear weapons into its arsenal. With the development 
of medium- and short-range tactical nuclear weapons, fears of a nuclear war involving 
Norway were enhanced. In several European countries anti-nuclear weapons movements 
were demanding a stop to nuclear tests and an all-out ban on nuclear weapons. Fear of a 
nuclear arms race, or even war, made its way into the Labour Party’s national convention in 
1957. Here the so-called nuclear-paragraph was adopted. Together with the ‘bases policy’ of 
1949, this was “one of the mainstays of the Labour Party’s  - and also Norway’s – foreign 
policy”.494 Lange was embittered by the adoption of this “procedural monstrosity” because it 	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removed the government’s decision-making responsibility. He likely wanted to keep other 
options on the table as well.495 Even more angered was party secretary Haakon Lie, who 
thought Gerhardsen let the proposal pass because of a personal preference for adoption – a 
clear example of a rift between the party’s right wing and Gerhardsen that would increase in 
strength.496 The right-wing believed their fears were confirmed a year later when Einar 
Gerhardsen, at a NATO summit meeting, surprisingly urged a postponement of the issue of 
placing medium-range missiles in Europe, and stating that Norway had no intention of storing 
nuclear warheads or building missile bases on its soil.497 
There was, as Tamnes has stated, “a striking continuity in the way Norway [...] looked 
to the United States for leadership and military assistance.”498 Apart from the screening and 
reassurance Norway was by and large a loyal ally, contributing especially with its merchant 
fleet and intelligence, always eager to make the Americans take the Northern flank seriously. 
The built-in dilemma of this balancing act became “acute from the late 1960s onwards as the 
Northern Flank assured greater importance for the allies.“ With the expanding Soviet Kola 
base and northern fleet, the Northern flank was significantly strengthened as part of NATO’s 
shift to flexible response.499 Last, the balanced approach to ‘security’ included the entire Nordic 
region – what came to be known in the 1960s as ‘Nordic balance’. This was initially an 
analytical tool, used by journalists and academics to describe the relatively stable security 
situation in the North as a result of the balance between the different foreign and security 
policy orientations among the Nordic countries. In turn, the concept became a part of the 
foreign policy vocabulary.500 
This complex balance was part of the MFA’s outlook, and part of the Europeans’ 
vocabulary, in the 1960s and early 1970s. Political scientist and policy adviser Johan Jørgen 
Holst introduced the concepts of deterrence and reassurance in his 1967 publication Norsk 
sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv, which was aimed more towards policy-makers than 
academics.501 Holst had close ties with the MFA and the foreign policy leadership throughout 
his tenure as Head of Research (1970-76) of the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs 
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(NUPI)502, member of the Labour Party’s International Committee503, and as member (1967), 
board member (1973) and later chairman (1982-86) of the EMN.504 Apart from this, and even 
more importantly, Lange embodied, and Lyng and Stray continued, this balanced approach 
and subsequently shaped the MFA in its image.  
As explored below, the balanced concept of ‘security’ played out in a number of more or 
less subtle ways during the EC-case. To foretell two examples: the Europeans’ and the 
government’s rejection of an association with the EEC in 1961 was, apart from tactical 
considerations, rooted in the fact that the US saw it as natural for NATO-members to apply 
for full membership. Norway, the Europeans argued, had to apply for membership – otherwise 
the Soviet Union could interpret it as a step towards neutrality. However, applying for 
membership, negotiating, and then choosing some sort of association or trade agreement in 
the end, would not send the same signals of neutrality to the mighty neighbour in the east. 
Equally, the Europeans relentlessly shot down Nordek, the Danish proposal for a Nordic 
customs union following de Gaulle’s second veto, because it upset the frail Nordic security 
balance. 
Since the introduction of Marshall Aid, Norway’s foreign economic policy was formed 
at the intersection of the preferred Atlantic and global solutions, and the European integration 
process that actually took place, as noted by historian Helge Pharo in is summary of the years 
between 1947 and the British application for membership in the EEC in 1961.505 The OEEC 
united Nordic countries in a single organisation, including non-aligned countries such as 
Sweden, without any supranational elements apart from a strong Atlantic connection, which 
fitted nicely with the Norwegian government’s philosophy. However, both the US and 
continental states wanted closer, supranational co-operation, accelerated liberalisation of trade 
and a possible customs union. The US persistently supported Western European economic 
integration, Franco-German rapprochement and federalist solutions, especially under 
President Eisenhower. Initially, such plans were not to the liking of Britain and the 
Scandinavian countries, which instead pursued a loose consultative arrangement through the 
so-called UNISCAN – a forum that lasted until the creation of EFTA in 1960.506 The course 	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chosen by the Norwegian government, then, reflected its traditional closeness to Britain and 
hopes of global, or at least Atlantic, solutions to economic co-operation. However, as 
Lundestad has noted, throughout the 1950s all British attempts for “unambiguously Atlantic 
solutions” were opposed in Washington. The long-term commitment of the US government 
towards European integration would direct future developments.507 
With an Atlantic orientation, export interests that were either more global (or included 
Britain and Sweden as important markets), a deep-seated aversion of supranationalism, and a 
view of Europe as the Other, the Norwegian government dispassionately observed continental 
integration efforts from afar until they threatened the established Norwegian postwar strategy 
of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’.508 
When French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the pooling of coal and steel 
resources in Western Europe, those who took an interest in Norway considered it a positive 
development towards peace in Europe, but did not envision any direct Norwegian 
involvement. The Schuman Plan, drafted by Jean Monnet, sprang out of the conviction that 
rapprochement between West Germany and France, and closer economic and political 
integration, could be made possible by sectoral functional integration, rather than lofty 
federalist schemes. It was also a French answer to the American demand that West Germany 
be economically integrated. The Norwegian government rejected participation en principe (also 
it was not invited to take part), due to the a priori principle of a supranational authority, and in 
any case the plan had little economic interest for Norwegian businesses.509  
However, foreign policy elites, and particularly Halvard Lange, recognised both the 
symbolic significance of the two former archenemies co-operating over the two war industries, 
and the geo-political importance of tying West Germany to Western Europe, and in turn the 
Atlantic Community. Already in 1949, Lange made it clear to a US audience that, “the only 
possible solution, as we see it, is to bring the Western German Federal Republic into the 
family of democratic Western Europe.”510 With the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in the six 
respective capitals of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
during the winter and spring of 1952, a new, dynamic integrationist centre had been 
established in the heart of Europe. 	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The Pleven-plan for a European Defence Community, connected to common European 
political institutions, was a French response to American demands that West Germany had to 
be remilitarised, sparked by the outbreak of the Korean War. When the Pleven-plan was 
presented in 1950, the Norwegian government had scarcely broken away from its policy of 
neutrality and taken a big leap into NATO. The government would not go against the 
creation of a European Defence Community, but could not envision Norway participating. 
The northern flank of NATO could not be under the command of a future continental army, 
but had to be closely tied to the US command. “Norway rejected direct military co-operation 
with the continent and confirmed its place in the Atlantic circle”, concludes historian Nils 
Røhne.511  
Following the death of the EDC at the hands of the French parliament, the resurgence 
of European integration at the Messina conference in 1955, the subsequent creation of a 
common market (EEC), and a sectoral atomic energy community (EURATOM) through the 
treaties of Rome (March 25, 1957) forced the Norwegian government to confront continental 
developments. The Six agreed to create a customs union by mutually reducing tariff and 
quantitative restrictions in three turns each 4th year, while simultaneously building an outer 
customs wall. This would constitute a customs union within 12 years (with the possible extension 
to 15 years). As the negotiations of the Six appeared to be successful, Great Britain launched 
an alternative solution: a larger free trade area (FTA) including all of the OEEC countries.512 
The British proposal aimed to engulf, or possibly block the creation of, the EEC.513 As 
Milward points out, the FTA served a dual purpose of confronting the emerging common 
market while cooperating with the Six and bringing them into a multilateral non-
discriminatory world.514 The Norwegian government feared the consequences of a continental 
economic bloc: a closed customs union would raise barriers that could threaten the 
government’s strategy of export-led growth. As MoCS Skaug stated early in 1958: “the best 
alternative for us would be that the Six never reached an agreement. We would then be able 
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to continue our efforts on the basis we had through GATT and the OEEC, and in other 
ways”.515  
The other Norwegian concern was the US’s warm embrace of the EEC. Although 
initially welcoming the FTA, the Americans firmly stressed that it should include the EEC as a 
unit, and only come into existence after the ratification of the treaties of Rome. They did not 
want to jeopardise the overriding policy of rapprochement between France and Germany and 
further developments towards a European federation.516 Washington gave priority to the 
plans of the Six over the British Atlantic schemes. 517 For the Norwegian government, 
however, the FTA could possibly ensure open markets while linking Norway – at a safe 
distance – to the integration project the US supported.518 In many ways, the FTA was very 
close to an ideal solution and the government was willing to go far to reach an agreement.519 
However, in November 1958, the FTA stranded on French aspirations, and soon the EEC 
developed into the most significant market-political centre of Europe.520 The creation of 
EFTA in 1960 – comprising Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Austria and 
Portugal – must be seen in the context of the failed FTA-talks. It was a British backup 
solution, but would, in the end, prove unsatisfactory.521 The long dreaded closed continental 
preference area was now a reality, with the EEC and EFTA seemingly “determined to go 
their separate ways, and to regard each other as a rival, not a partner”.522 
In March of 1960, Halvard Lange maintained that he still preferred “broader 
integration within an Atlantic framework”.523 While the Danish MFA and British Foreign 
Office made elaborate plans for every eventuality, including membership in the EEC, no such 
plans existed – nor were even considered – at the Norwegian MFA at the turn of the 
decade.524  
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The political elite and enlightened opinion makers were blind to the possibility of 
applying for negotiations with the EEC until Britain turned towards the Continent in 1961. If 
anything, the government hoped Britain would make sure that any solution to the market split 
was open, intergovernmental and somewhat Atlantic. The diplomats in the MFA were no 
exception – the only deviant being proto-European Einar Løchen. Eriksen and Pharo sum up: 
 
“There were no proponents in the government, in the Storting there was a handful of politicians 
(...) sporadically interested in European matters. Neither Norwegian participation in continental 
co-operation, nor the relationship with the continent as such was placed on the agenda by the 
press or the research community of social scientists. Public polls confirm the impression of 
scepticism and indifference”.525  
 
This is significant, in order to understand the massive shift in policy and entrenched 
perspectives a Norwegian bid for membership negotiations with the EEC entailed. Through 
their work with membership negotiations, the Europeans drew on, defended, shaped and tried 
to mediate with the concepts of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’, which were challenged in a variety 
of ways in the face of an EC that in key areas had fundamentally different solutions. Another, 
more fundamental, challenge came with ‘1968’, the youth, and the new radical left who 
considered growth in itself as harmful and as a manmade menace, and who rejected the 
security that the postwar period was founded upon as ill-concealed neo-imperialism. 
 
 ‘1972’ – a Norwegian ‘1968’ 
In Norwegian history, ‘1972’ marks the biggest political earthquake in its time as a sovereign 
state. As Gleditsch and Hellevik write, the membership issue was experienced as a battle over 
“Norway’s future in totality” and “no section of society was left untouched”.526 The struggle 
between the respective ‘no’ and ‘yes’ campaigns represented a clash between the young, 
radical left, primary sectors, periphery and grass roots movements, on the one hand, and the 
old, conservative, social democracy, export industries, centre and the elites, on the other. In 
many ways it was a distinctly Norwegian ‘1968’. 
“’1968’ did in fact not come to Norway in 1968”, as historian Tor Egil Førland eruditely 
notes; the year merely represents changes in behaviour and worldview occurring around that 
time. 527  Feeding into the question of joining the EC was a rebellion against ‘the 
Establishment’ – the Labour Party elite and its corporative state apparatus – and its alleged 	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allegiance with continental capitalism.528 The winds of ‘1968’ and its anti-imperialism, anti-
capitalism, anti-bureaucracy, anti-establishment and anti-war, therefore, carried much of the 
spirit of ‘1972’. It was a revolt against the embedded dogmas of the postwar era. ‘1968’ in 
Norway, as in Paris, Washington, and most of the West, came to be a symbol of the fight for 
individual freedom and self-determination. This paradigmatic shift – in sexual behaviour, 
music, drugs, art, sub-cultures, ecology, women’s and educational rights, to name a few areas 
– had many similarities across Europe, and in some ways also transgressed the East-West 
divide. 529  The link between ‘1968’ and the question of membership in the European 
Communities was, however, peculiarly Norwegian.530 
Even more important was, if you will, the ‘Norwegian’ element of the no-movement. 
Mainly the primary sector – but also certain trade unions – played to deep-rooted national 
sentiments and historically loaded scepticism of Europe as explored above. This, many 
political scientists argue, reinvigorated longstanding divisions between the traditional political 
centre and the peripheries. Analysing electoral behaviour, geography and history, Stein 
Rokkan’s influential 1967 study holds that one of the fundamental divisions in the Norwegian 
electorate was between the centre and periphery, which was rooted in the slow liberation, 
modernisation, and democratisation processes that took place between 1814, through 1905 
and The Second World War, and the 1960s.531  
Political scientist Henry Valen argued that the EC-issue cut across ‘normal’ patterns of 
political conflict, and brought into play many historical cleavages, particularly the urban-rural 
and the centre-periphery conflicts explored by Rokkan. The dominating conflict in the 
referendum, then, was between periphery and centre, in both a regional and socio-cultural 
context.532 The pro-Europeans held the majority in and around Oslo, and some of the major 
cities and in municipalities with export industries, but opposition dominated the rest of the 
country. At Røst – a small fishing community on the outer part of the Lofoten islands – 93,5 
percent voted against membership. “For the coastal fisherman”, Tamnes explains, “the 
national traditions were connected to the peripheral perspective, woven into the prevailing 	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circumstances. For the coastal fisherman, the EC was a foreign, continental project. He feared 
that membership would force upon him deep and fast societal changes threatening his 
livelihood and his way of life.533 One of the two most cited reasons for voting against 
membership in the EC was the perceived negative effect on the primary sector.534 
These conflict patterns led to unfamiliar alliances and conflicts within the political 
system, demonstrated by the marked shifts in the national elections that followed. The Labour 
Party lost 12 mandates and 11.2 percent of the vote (going from 46.5 percent in 1969 to 35.3 
percent in 1973), while the newly formed Socialist Electoral Alliance (SEA, Sosialistisk 
Valgforbund) took the elections by storm, gaining 11.2 per cent of the votes, and 16 mandates 
out of a total of 155. The Liberals were split into two different parties over the issue and took a 
beating from the electorate.535 However, it was the combination of the two forces, epitomised 
by the creation of an extra-parliamentary ‘People’s Movement Against Membership in the 
Common Market’ (PM), that worried the pro-Europeans and eventually also secured a 
majority vote against membership in the EC. A ‘grassroots’ resistance against membership in 
the Community had been in place since 1961, but remained divided between national 
conservative and leftist groupings until 1970. 
‘Action against membership in the Common Market’ was created in the autumn of 
1961 starting with a petition signed by 143 public personalities. The group consisted largely of 
Labour Party members and former communists, many of them with close links to the “Protest 
against nuclear weapons” movement organised in 1960-61. There was some tension between 
the Labour Party faction and those belonging to the newly established SPP. An independent, 
though similar, organisation was created in Bergen, coining the slogan: ‘No to the sale of 
Norway’. The Bergen Committee was more successful in reaching out to the non-socialists. 
The information committee of 1962, created in late December, was the bourgeois counterpart 
to ‘the 143’. At this stage, extra-parliamentary opposition was divided, though attempts at 
cooperation were made. In late January of 1963 – after de Gaulle’s press conference – a 
‘national conference’ was called uniting leftist and bourgeois forces. In fact, a national council 
was created with former Minister of Salaries and Prices, Gunnar Bøe (Labour), as chairman. 
Bøe had left the government due to disagreements over the membership issue 
In 1967, there was little organised extra-parliamentary campaigning on either side. But 
by 1970, the anti-membership movements united to become the ‘People’s Movement’ 	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(initially many had fought for the name ‘independence movement’). Barrister Arne Haugestad 
became the daily manager of the organisation. He had already prepared a legal study of the 
EC for the agricultural organisations. Hans Borgen – Centre Party parliamentarian (1950-69) 
with many leading positions within the agricultural organisations – was elected as chairman, 
while leading trade unionist Ragnar Kalheim was elected deputy chairman.536 The alliance 
between left and right was thus complete. The committee also had strong connections to the 
Workers’ Youth League (WYL). The WYL, working with two unions, was instrumental in the 
creation of ‘The Labour Movement’s Information Committee against Norwegian 
membership in the EEC’ (LMIC) in January 1972, which legitimised resistance within the 
Labour Party. The People’s Movement covered 60 percent of the LMIC’s expenses.537 At its 
height, the People’s Movement had roughly 130.000 members (roughly one in every ten No-
votes), 510 local divisions, 5,000 local officers and a strong central secretariat with 13 people 
on full salary. The PM’s efficiency and impact was also fuelled by volunteerism.538 
For the established elites, this was a cultural revolution. EMN campaign manager and 
former Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie had “never seen such a strange alliance between 
ardent communists and reactionary farmer politicians”.  Lie was horrified that “for two years 
the agricultural sector pumped who knows how many millions of kroners into a communist 
guerrilla warfare”, which rendered “the political parties more or less helpless.”539 This ‘left 
wing’ of the ‘no’-side consisted of a substantial number of people from Lie’s own Labour Party 
– an opposition with roots that went far back: the old left that felt that the leadership, in 
supporting membership in the EC, had left its socialist principles behind. Many also wanted 
Norway to pull out of NATO. The old left was joined by a new generation of politicians (after 
1950) who were deeply concerned with foreign and security policy issues, especially the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. They too, fought to bring ‘proper’ socialist ideology back 
into the party, and loathed the bourgeois tendencies of the leadership. Last, in the late 1960s, 
even younger WYL politicians brought a marked ‘anti-capitalism’ and spirit of ‘1968’ into the 
mix. The slogan ‘Socialism or the EEC’540 captured the essence of the struggle.  
The battle within the Labour Movement was especially hard because of generational 
divisions, and divisions between its right and left wing. At an extraordinary national 	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convention of the Labour Party in April 1972, Einar Gerhardsen made a remarkable speech. 
Trying to keep the party from breaking in two, he stated: “We know that a not insignificant 
part of the Labour Party voters will vote ‘no’. (...) As I’ve said, if the party does not have any 
leading members and officials against membership, we should get some, to make it clear that 
everyone can belong to the Labour Party, including those who vote ‘no’ in the referendum”. 
Elder statesman Einar Gerhardsen effectively sanctioned the EC-sceptics of the Labour Party, 
giving them the ultimate stamp of approval.541 In the end, roughly 40 percent of Labour 
voters in the 1969 election went against the advice of the party leadership and voted ‘no’. So 
did almost half of the members of the NCTU.542  
Another challenge emerged to the left of Labour. Since the late 1950s there was 
increasing opposition to the dominant right wing within the Labour Party, especially with 
regard to foreign policy. In the so-called ‘Easter Rebellion’ of 1958, a WYL division (Socialist 
Students) adopted a resolution against NATO membership, and demanded that West 
Germany should be denied nuclear weapons. During the Easter holidays, the Socialist 
Students gathered signatures in support for their resolution from over half of the Labour 
Party’s parliamentary group. Following a string of protests from the young politicians, the 
party leadership, headed by Haakon Lie, excluded several party members and the Socialist 
Students division as a whole.543 These developments were at the root of the creation of the 
SPP in 1961, which had the explicit aim of taking Norway out of NATO, to ban nuclear 
weapons, and to end the ‘block mentality’. The immediate reason for its creation was debates 
within the Labour Party about pre-stocking nuclear arms on Norwegian soil. However, SPP 
also captured the disappointment among many in the left wing of the Labour Party who 
thought it had moved too far from its socialist roots. SPP worked for a planned economy, an 
extensive social security system and economic democracy.544 
In 1961, the SPP was elected to the Storting with two representatives, ending the Labour 
Party’s absolute majority. In 1963, the non-socialist parties and the two SPP representatives 
toppled the government after its clumsy handling of a tragic mining accident in Svalbard. The 
SPP kept their two mandates in the 1965 elections. They lost them in 1969 due to internal 
divisions, only to return as the main force behind the 16 mandates of the SEA in the 1973 
elections. During the EC-struggle in the 1970s, the SPP collaborated not only with the rest of 	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the left wing but also with the bourgeois forces within several of the extra-parliamentary 
organisations working against membership. The SPP, together with the communists, were 
crucial in the early mobilisation phase of the People’s Movement. Polls showed that they 
made up 32 percent of the members of the PM and 17 percent of those opposed to 
membership.545 ‘1968’ and ‘1972’ was, in this context, as much a critique of “the hegemonic 
narrative of social democratic modernity” as about the EC itself. 546  And the negative 
referendum was seen as a rejection of this modernity. Famous social realist writer Dag Solstad 
– in a novel following two worker families between 1945 and 1972 – captured this feeling: “it 
was a victory of the people, oppressed by Capital and unfree, which moreover had been half-
destroyed by the social democratic class treason”.547  
In 1964, the EMN reported that the first round of membership debates in Norway 
(1961-63) had revealed “a pleasing support for European cooperation” among the youth.548 In 
fact, all youth sections of the parties in parliament, except the socialist people’s and agrarian 
youth, were in favour of a membership application in 1962. In 1967, pro-European 
sentiments prevailed, though there was little enthusiasm. In the WYL, for example, issues 
concerning the war in Vietnam and NATO-membership took precedence. The issue 
remained unimportant, in fact, until de Gaulle resigned and the Community reopened 
membership negotiations with the Hague Summit in December 1969. From then on, the 
WYL would fight for a Nordic solution, and in April of 1970, a unanimous national 
convention “strongly opposed the attempts at getting Norway in to the EEC”.549 At the turn 
of the decade, therefore, the European Movement’s reports were rather more alarming: 
 
“Contrary to 1962, we may expect that several youth organisation will take a negative stance to 
Norwegian membership. This is true of the Workers’ Youth League and the Young Liberals. The 
Christian People’s Party Youth seem to be divided. It is likely that the resistance among the 
Centre Party Youth will be stronger than 7-8 years ago. After the elections to the Board of the 
Norwegian Students’ Society [NSS] in Oslo, we may assume that this will be a centre of 
opposition (...)”550 
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By June of 1970, the WYL, the Liberal Youth, the Centre Youth and the Christian People’s 
Party Youth joined forces in a petition against the centre-right government’s Market Report 
and demanded the membership application be withdrawn. In August they were joined by the 
SPP and Norwegian Communist Party’s youth in the so-called ‘contact committee’. When the 
accession treaty was signed in January of 1972, those same groups – now joined by 
‘Norwegian Rural Youth’ and ‘Norway’s Youth Society’ – started the ‘Youth Front against 
the EC’.551 By the time of the referendum, then, all youth parties, except the Conservative 
Youth, were firmly against membership, and they contributed greatly to the PM’s campaigns, 
where they served as the volunteers: the ‘foot soldiers’ of the different anti-membership 
movements.552 
“The power elite got their verdict”, read the front page of WYL’s journal ‘Fritt Slag’ 
after the negative referendum.553 ‘The big breakup’, as Olstad calls the period in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, was carried by a new generation. The world was reinterpreted with 
different results. “The revolts and protests of the youth gave new impulses and spurred a 
renegotiating and revaluation of a range of established hierarchies (...) In this way it became 
possible to defeat the established political machinery in the EC-struggle”, Olstad concludes.554 
Equally, historian Terje Halvorsen maintains: “the youth revolt was in full motion and it was 
easy to portray and perceive the EC as the prototype of the Establishment they turned 
against”.555 The calling into question of established truths also meant breaking down old 
hierarchies of authority and power, between the youth and the older generations, students and 
pupils and teachers, employees and employers, women and men. And rebelling against the 
elites – as Norwegian poet Harald Sverdrup wrote in 1969.  
 
“Fucking office men, stamp-lickers, silky-slim dandy-hands, fat jobs, do nothing, go out to 
restaurants, eat smoked salmon with scrambled eggs and grouse in sauce, chug down red wine 
and whisky, goddamn Oslo-sneaks, sissies, wash themselves everyday, smooth-talking with the 
girls, pour port on them, string them along, put kids on them and flee the scene 
Goddamn, 
Chop their heads off, 
Throw them down the garbage chute, the lot of ‘em!”556 
 
Sverdrup, though he was 46 at the time, perfectly captured the rebellious mood of the era. 
‘1968’, as Førland writes, was not least “a skirmish against the structures of authority, with 	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their ideals of obedience and ethics of duty, dominating in Norway as in other Western 
societies in the postwar years.” 557  This entailed a substantial dose of mocking and 
provocation.558 
With the EC-case, in particular the Europeans’ authority – as servants of the government 
and, by extension, the people – would be challenged and called into question. What had, for 
the most part, been regarded as professional recommendations from unbiased experts, was 
now openly called propaganda. With the EC-case, a fundamental renegotiation of the 
meaning of such concepts as ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ took place. The biggest challenge for 
the Europeans was that their arguments, and the very logic they were founded upon, carried 
less validity among many of those who opposed membership. Youth (20-27 years) were the 
only age segment with a clear majority of No-votes. A survey showed that no less than 64 
percent of those between the age of 20 and 24 were against membership in the EC. Another 
showed that over half of the Labour Party voters (from 1969) under the age of 29 voted 
against membership.559 Without the radicalised youth, Finn Olstad concludes, the referendum 
in 1972 could very well have ended with a victory to the yes side.560 
The No-movement was built on the enthusiastic participation of many volunteers, but 
also the generous contributions of the primary sectors. It was easy to create grassroots 
movements under such circumstances.561 Opposite what one might think, Bjørklund writes, 
the movement started as ‘a head without a body’ – that is with a centralised leadership and 
plenty of resources, and information being distributed out to an increasing number of local 
branches. Funds were, as the leader Hans Borgen said, used to discipline the members. In this 
way it was grassroots ideology and top-down management all at once, ensuring not only a 
well-oiled and far-reaching organisational apparatus, but also unity in its communication. 
Incorporating a wide variety of political colours and creeds, this was absolutely necessary.562 
At the centre of the PM’s campaign was the call for ‘self-determination’ (sjølråderett) tied 
to national symbols and historical traditions. “Here was a mobilising potential, not aimed at 
any particular class. Essentially it concerned everyone”, Bjørklund notes. Numbers confirm this: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 Førland & Korsvik 1968 (Ed.) (2006), p. 8. 
558 Lahlum Haakon Lie (2010), p. 529-530. Haakon Lie, for example, discovered that a young party member – EC-
sceptic, former leader of the Norwegian Students’ Society (NSS) and now parliamentarian Einar Førde – had given a 
very unflattering recap of Lie’s appearance at the NSS some time back, describing it as: “one of the most pathetic 
generational meetings imaginable”. Lie was furious: it was outrageous that a book with contributions from party 
members and published by the Labour Movement’s own publisher should portray a leading figure of the Labour 
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559 Halvorsen Partiets salt (2003), p. 384, 388. 
560 Olstad Det farlige demokrati (2014), p. 211-212. 
561 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 161. 
562 Bjørklund Mot Strømmen (1982), p. 218-231. 
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44 percent of those opposed to membership mentioned self-determination and polls showed 
that it transcended social class and geography. ‘Loss of sovereignty’ was one of the two most 
frequent answers to why those who voted against membership had chosen to do so.563 The 
biggest rally against membership, in Oslo June 7, 1972, counted 12.000 participants marching 
under the slogan: “Protect the Constitution. Yes to self-government! No to the EC-Union!” In 
the ‘no’-side’s demands – protection of Norwegian self-determination – national and 
democratic aspects melted together. Patriotism was mobilised: it was a matter of defending 
Norwegian sovereignty against foreign rule from Brussels. Norwegian sovereignty was 
threatened and ipso facto its democracy.564 
How sovereignty and democracy – self-determination – was threatened, depended on 
the outlook. For fishermen and farmers, the PM’s slogan “we want to govern ourselves” might 
mean the continued right to decide their own wages as they had until now with the 
agricultural and fishery settlements under the Labour Party.565 Certainly, the agricultural 
organisations’ main aim was to protect the benefits of the postwar settlement. The campaign 
was heavily financed by the agricultural organisation. “[W]ithout the primary sector’s self-
interest in preventing membership”, Hillary Allen contends, “the outcome could well have 
been the same as in Denmark”. Again the centre-periphery struggle was evident: Oslo was 
already a distant centre, and the EEC was too far away, too centralised, and even less likely to 
take the Norwegian primary sector into account when decisions were made.566 
When the Centre-Right coalition left office in March 1971, the agrarian Centre Party 
entered the no-campaign with full force. Its policy built on two pillars – protection of rural 
Norway, and the primary sector and the national ideology, and their entry reinforced national 
conservative arguments against membership. The opposition within the Centre Party, latent 
since the first application in 1962, was released, and they pulled large parts of the Liberal 
Party and the Christian People’s Party with them. Accordingly, the foundation for a strong 
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564 Bjørklund Mot Strømmen (1982), p. 179, 187; Marianne Sundlisæther Skinner “Norwegian Euroscepticism: Values, 
Identity or Interest” in Journal of Common Market Studies, 50:3, Oxford: Blackwell (2012), o, 422-440. Skinner, 
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565 Bjørklund Mot Strømmen (1982), p. 184. 
566 Hilary Allen Norway and Europe in the 1970s, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1979), p. 148, 161-164, 167. 
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mobilisation of the Norwegian peripheries was laid 18 months prior to the referendum.567 
Centre Party members and politicians now entered the PM and became the backbone of 
many local branches, especially in agricultural communities. The Centre Party was, in the 
end, the party with the highest percentage of ‘No’-votes.568 In the PM’s local newspaper from 
Lærdal – a municipality in Sogn og Fjordane with a strong agricultural sector – the connection 
between democracy and sovereignty was described in this way: “we were taught to believe 
that self-determination, tied to the power and influence of our elected representative organs, 
had always been to the benefit of the every man”. This connection was now under threat, and 
as one PM slogan read: “the question is whether our political democracy will continue to 
function as it has developed since 1814, and if our national independence will be preserved as 
the people decided in 1905”.569 
For the left wing, ‘self-determination’ might mean something more radical. The 
referendum became the most important single event to launch a critique of social democratic 
modernity. As historian Thomas Ekman Jørgensen explains, “increasingly, the heated debate 
transformed the arguments of class struggle into nationalist rhetoric regarding Norwegian 
independence”, connecting it with the tension between centre and periphery – the joint theme 
being a conflict between official Norway and the ‘Norway of the people’.570 By merging the 
concept of the working class and the people, the communist left could proclaim such things as: 
“only the working class and the people defend the national sovereignty today. The monopolist 
bourgeois and their state spearhead the attempts to sell it”, and “the EEC-struggle has 
revealed who the patriots of our day are, who defends the nations interests against 
imperialism, and who’s at the front trying to sell our sovereignty.” Patriotism and class 
struggle was one and the same – the Norwegian capitalist bourgeois were now in alliance with 
its likeminded on the Continent, and threatened both.571  
Also the socialists mixed a fundamental criticism of the Labour Party’s capitalist ‘sell-
out’ with a language of nostalgic patriotism. EC-sceptic Sigbjørn Hølmebakk, previously 
active in the anti-nuclear movement and initiator of the SPP, made this clear: “and the truth 
is, that faith in the Labour Party, is faith in the Conservatives, because they want the same. To 
trust Bratteli is to trust Willoch.” He ended his speech by stating that power elites now 
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experienced what they did not believe was possible, “that the power of the people was 
stronger that the power of capital”.572 
Ragnar Kalheim, second in command in the PM and longstanding Labour Party 
member, also cloaked his socialist arguments in national historical sentiments: 
 
“Our political democracy was not the result of the rulers policies, but that of the oppressed. It 
was the farmers, the intellectuals, together with the national bourgeois that completed the 
Eidsvoll Constitution. If you haven’t understood it before, you should now, as they plan to 
incorporate Norway in the Common Market.”573 
 
And with that the circle was completed: for the oppressed, free-holding farmer – the bearer of 
Norway’s distinct national character in much of the history writing of the 19th Century – was 
indeed one of the most powerful symbols of sovereignty and self-determination in the EC-
struggle.574 
“When we see the foundation for the resistance against the EEC, it appears hopelessly 
naive to believe that this resistance would vanish if only enough information about the EEC 
was disseminated”, Gleditsch and Hellevik concluded in a comprehensive study of the 
respective ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns.575 The Europeans, heavily involved in the pro-European 
information campaigns throughout the decade, knew this. Already by 1961, European Jahn 
Halvorsen warned of what he thought would be one of the great challenges of the EC-debate:  
 
“Examples from our history, our traditions – think about how our democracy blossomed under 
the proud years of Venstre in the previous century – make it easy to play on great emotions. Words 
like ‘national sovereignty’ carry within them a timbre that makes our hearts warmer. If someone 
can make the claim that someone wants to ‘give up’ some of the national sovereignty, it is easy to 
gather in opposition to that person. Registering the real world and the actual situation will easily 
give way to a purely emotional point of view.”576 
 
While they were quick to recognise the great mobilising potential of the arguments of the ‘no’-	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side, the Europeans could neither accept their arguments as having any kind of legitimacy nor 
figure out how to counter them. However, the biggest challenge was perhaps that this was not 
supposed to be their job at all. 
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PART III  
The Europeans and the EC-case 
_________________________________________ 
 
The First Round 
Becoming European, 1960-1963 
 
“Except for a small number of experts, there weren’t many of us who had  
acquired much knowledge regarding the practical development of the Community arrangements.”577 
 
Halvard Lange, in 1966, reflecting on the first round (1960-1963). 
 
The British application for membership negotiations with the Community in the summer of 
1961 was a dramatic change of the UK’s postwar foreign policy and it forced an equally 
dramatic rethink for the Norwegian government. The three chapters of the first application 
round centre around the dilemmas and challenges of a Labour government headed by Prime 
Minister Einar Gerhardsen, who suddenly had to carve out a policy towards the EEC. In this 
entirely new situation, a group of MEDs – those working closest with the EEC – would claim 
substantial decision making power and meticulously recalibrate Norway’s postwar strategy to 
fit a choice they came to see as inevitable: a Norwegian application for membership in the 
EEC. The three years of the first round – from the creation of EFTA to the aftermath of de 
Gaulle’s veto in January 1963 – turned these diplomats into a relatively cohesive group of 
Europeans who shared a passion for and belief in the Community project, and who had 
adopted and internalised aspects of the Communitarian logic and language. 
As we shall see in the following three chapters, the reinterpretation of Norwegian 
postwar foreign policy, the partial adoption of the Communitarian logic, and the forging of 
the community of Europeans all evolved through diplomatic practice. In the contested borders 
and the mediation between the domestic and foreign (political) entities, the Europeans shaped 
Norwegian European policy and, subsequently, themselves.   
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Chapter 5 
Dealing with Britain578 
 
“It is still my opinion that it would be easier for us Norwegians to accept broader 
integration within an Atlantic framework than within a purely European one. This is 
naturally connected to our entire traditional cultural and political orientation, and also 
our economic and security policy situation”.579 
Halvard Lange, March 1960, on the market schism. 
 
The time between the inception of EFTA and the British, Irish and Danish application for 
membership negotiations with the EEC was marked by uncertainty: would EFTA and the 
EEC find a common solution within the OEEC? Would EFTA build a bridge or negotiate en 
bloc with the EEC? Or would each EFTA member deal with the Community alone? As the 
preferred solution of the Norwegian government – an intergovernmental Atlantic free trade 
area – slipped away, the Europeans, dealing with Britain’s changing policy towards the EEC, 
came to the professional conviction that the only option open for the government was to 
follow Britain and apply for a full membership. Domestic decision makers, in the meantime, 
were unable or unwilling to react to the changing circumstances. Thus, many of the policy 
recommendations and, indeed, choices, emanated from the Europeans themselves. They 
convinced Foreign Minister Lange and Minister of Commerce and Shipping Skaug, and by 
the time of the British application in July 1961, an important segment of the foreign policy 
elite had decided that membership was the only viable option. However, the government had 
not decided on the issue, the parliament had not debated the matter, and the public was 
generally unaware of the new situation. What followed, therefore, was a domestic battle that 
only strengthened the Europeans’ belief in a policy that was largely of their creation. 
 
False EFTA-security 
From 1960 onwards the Norwegian Government found itself in a new situation, seeking to 
continue its established foreign economic policy of creating a large free trade area within an 
Atlantic framework. Norway was now a part of a free trade area with the articulated long-
term aim of uniting the two market constellations in Europe. Throughout 1960, EFTA sought 
to keep up with the EEC’s tariff reductions. At the same time, it pursued an agreement 
between the two trading blocs. Though it soon became clear that a purely economic 
arrangement between the Six and the Seven (EEC and EFTA) within a larger OEEC/OECD 	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579 Halvard Lange “Problemer i det vestlige samarbeid – Tale ved årsmøtet”, Chr. Michelsens Institutt for Videnskap og 
Åndsfrihet, Bergen (1960). My translation. 
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framework was unlikely, the Norwegian government – long into the fall of 1960 – held on to 
the vague promise of such a solution.580 By the spring of 1961, it became clear to the Europeans 
and the MFA that the British would seek solutions to their difficulties in solitude. Joint EFTA 
solutions, or coordinated negotiations, now became the government’s preferred strategy. In 
July 1961, however, all such hopes were dashed when the British applied for membership 
negotiations with the EEC, together with Denmark and Ireland. The government now faced 
the choice between membership and association with the EEC. July 1961, thus, marked the 
end of a period of time characterised by probing for possible solutions between EFTA and the 
EEC, and dealing with the re-orientation of Britain. 
The Norwegian MFA had two main tasks in this period: first, to get a general overview 
of the Treaty of Rome, and its implication for the Norwegian Constitution. Assuming that any 
deal between the Six and the Seven would have to take the Treaty of Rome into 
consideration, the government now ordered a substantial analysis. The other main task was to 
carve out a Norwegian stand towards the Six.581, The Norwegian government’s response to 
the EEC’s creation was late considering that the British and Danish administrations had 
contemplated such strategies since the late 1950s.582 
One reason for the late reorientation was that the government, and the diplomats 
working on their behalf, were quite pleased with the EFTA solution. With the establishment of 
the EFTA-delegation in Geneva, Søren Christian Sommerfelt was accredited as ambassador, 
and joined by Counsellor Asbjørn Skarstein and two Embassy Secretaries, Arild Holland and 
Martin Johannes Huslid. Already by May of 1958, Sommerfelt claimed that the future would 
not look bright for Norwegian export industry if they could not gain access to the Continental 
markets, especially those in West Germany.583 After the French put an end to the FTA 
negotiations, in November of 1958 Sommerfelt was one of the first within the administration 
to bring up the earlier Swedish and Swiss idea of alternative solutions.584 Sir Peter Scarlett – 
British ambassador to Oslo – reported in early December 1958: 
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Sommerfelt has been cogitating over possible tactical moves by non-Six. One possibility would be 
the formation of a rival grouping of all non-Six, or alternatively UNISCAN plus Switzerland, 
which would exchange mutual tariff reductions but maintain unchanged their present tariffs vis-
a-vis Common Market powers. He made it clear this was his own personal idea, but the 
Norwegian delegation may possibly propose something like this when OEEC Council meets.585 
 
Sommerfelt, like his political leadership, thought EFTA (created in January 1960) served 
Norwegian interests well because it suited Norwegian commercial interests and would force 
through a necessary modernisation of the Norwegian industrial sector (the so-called home 
industry).586  The uncompetitive agricultural sector was kept out of the agreement, while the 
export oriented fishery industry gained lucrative, though limited, access to the British market 
without having to alter domestic fishery regulation (opening up the waters for foreigners).587 In 
March, Sommerfelt joyfully told his British colleagues, “the whole idea of the European Free 
Trade Area had captured the imagination of Norway in the most extraordinary and 
unprecedented way.”588 EFTA was also supposed to bridge the gap between the two market 
blocs in Europe: 
 
The aim of the EFTA-countries is first and foremost to create an institution to negotiate an 
organised cooperation with ‘the Six’. Our hope is that EFTA will prevent the disintegration in 
Europe that would be the consequence, if each of the ‘outer’ countries were to seek solutions to 
their economic cooperative problems towards the Six on a bilateral basis. Presuming that there is 
a political will, it is - in our opinion - wholly possible to work towards a solution that would serve 
Western Europe as a whole much better than the division that is threatening to solidify now.589  
 
Foreign Minister Lange and the government saw EFTA as a vehicle for a joint solution to the 
market schism, and as a first step towards an Atlantic solution.  
Not everyone was as invested in EFTA as Norway. Denmark’s strong, export-oriented 
agricultural sector preferred a membership in the EEC, and was deeply disappointed that the 
government chose EFTA.590 Moreover, much like the Norwegian export industry, the Danish 	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industrial sector would have preferred a larger European free trade area (though it came to 
accept EFTA). Consequently, the ‘bridge-building’ aspect of EFTA was of great importance 
to the Danish government, and a priority in the short and intense negotiations leading to its 
creation. Denmark needed a market for the agricultural sector (not included in EFTA) to 
capitalise its industrial sector. The interdependence of the two sectors made Denmark a much 
more uneasy and anxious EFTA-partner than Norway.591 
More importantly, the UK was never content with EFTA. It was, from a British point of 
view, a viable way to strike a deal with the EEC while still maintaining a free trade area, 
which had been preferred by British officials since 1955.592 EFTA would give rise to real trade 
advantages, stop the other EFTAns from reaching separate deals with the EEC, and hinder 
the possibility of the UK facing two trading blocs - the EEC and the Nordic customs union.593 
It was a short-term solution: flawed, because the ‘bridge-building’ initiative was little more 
than words, and weak, as it did not take the plans of the Six or the United States into 
consideration.594  
Why then, was the Norwegian government caught off guard by the British application 
for membership negotiations? One reason was the UK’s concern with timing. Harold 
Macmillan (Conservative Prime Minister) was set on applying early in 1961. However, he had 
to time the announcement so as to avoid a blunt rejection from the French, and to gain broad 
support in the government and Parliament. Macmillan did not, for example, give an official 
statement of intention after talks with the new Kennedy administration early in 1961 – talks 
where the US Government made it clear that a British membership in the EEC was a political 
necessity. 595  Though the EFTA partners could speculate about British intentions with 
increasing accuracy, they could not be sure. 
Another factor was that the Norwegian government simply didn’t like what they heard – 
a kind of refusal to accept the drastic changes in British European policy that was taking 
place.596 This again would go a long way to explain why the Danish government was not 
surprised. Already by March of 1961, Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag saw two possible 
outcomes of the British exploratory talks with the Germans and the French: one was that the 	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UK settle their problems with the EEC alone, and the other was a general market solution 
emerging over time.597 As a leading Danish diplomat to EFTA stated in May of 1961, the goal 
for the Danish government had been to secure British access to the EEC as soon as possible, 
so that Denmark could join and avoid harmful discrimination, especially in the agricultural 
sector.598 A third contributing factor could be that British officials were reluctant to fully 
commit to the emerging new policy themselves.599 This, combined with the fact that EFTA 
was an unbalanced organisation dominated by Britain as its greatest power, might have left 
the policy shift under communicated.600  
The Europeans, however, did not miss these signs, and came to openly question the 
sincerity of Britain’s commitment to EFTA, to a Six-Seven solution, and their position in the 
upcoming GATT negotiations. 
 
Sticking to the plan 
As the Norwegian government knew all too well, any solution between the Six and the Seven 
had to be compatible with a larger GATT agreement. On the one hand, they wanted to 
protect weak industries through special arrangements within the EFTA framework. However, 
EFTA’s need to keep up with the EEC’s tariff reductions, thwarted Norwegian hopes of a slow 
pace of tariff reductions, giving the home industry time to adapt to competition. On the other 
hand, the EECs emerging tariff wall – the Common External Tariff (CET) – would hurt 
major Norwegian export industries. This wall could partly be overcome through a new round 
of multilateral tariff negotiations through GATT: the upcoming ‘Dillon Round’601 aimed at 
20 percent tariff cuts across the board. The EEC, however, had a list (List G) of products of 
special importance to one or more of the member states, and thus benefited from a degree of 
protection. The EEC’s Common External Tariff (CET) for List G products was set unusually 
high. This solution hit Norway especially hard, since 60 percent of Norwegian trade with the 
Common Market was with List G products. Aluminium, for example, of which Norway was a 
major producer, had provoked major differences between France (producer) and Germany 
and the Benelux countries (importers), the end result being a high CET of 10 percent.602  In 
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short, the Norwegian government was stuck between a rock and a hard place trying to protect 
some industries, while fighting for the EEC member states to drop their protection on others. 
The problem would be tangible by July 1, when the Six would conduct their second 
internal tariff reduction of 10 percent, and EFTA would respond with its first reduction of 20 
percent. As Minister Skaug made clear on an official visit to the Federal German Republic, it 
was of vital importance to get a speedy solution to the problem of discrimination after July 1, 
1960, and the biggest problem in this respect was the List G tariffs.603  
Accordingly, Norwegian officials had endorsed a Swiss proposal of a solution between 
the Six and the Seven following GATT’s so-called most favoured nation basis.604 This 
proposal was adopted at the EFTA-meeting in Vienna in March. EFTA would reduce its 
tariffs by 20 percent by July 1, 1960, followed by an OEEC reduction of 10 percent. 
Furthermore, the Special Economic Committee set up in Paris was given the task of 
“examining, as a matter of priority, the relationship between the EEC and the EFTA with due 
regard to the commercial interests of third countries and the principles and obligations of the 
GATT (...) It should also provide a vigorous impulse to the GATT negotiations and give 
concrete expression to the determination of the members of both groups to encourage 
progress beneficial both to Europe and to world trade as a whole.”605  
Soon thereafter, however, the Swiss proposal “drowned in exasperation”. The Six, with 
the support of the US government, passed a proposal to accelerate the implementation of the 
common tariff. This would widen the market schism.606 The so-called Hallstein proposal (after 
President of the Commission Professor Walter Hallstein), aimed to reduce the internal tariff 
by 20 percent instead of 10, and another 20 percent by January 1, 1962. The CET was to 
start already on July 1, 1960, and not January 1, 1962, as was originally envisaged. 
The proposal frustrated the EFTA countries. Responding to a joint communiqué from 
Eisenhower and Adenauer stating that the Hallstein proposal was “an important contribution 
to a general lowering of tariff barriers in world trade”, the Norwegian government wrote an 
aide-mémoire to the Canadian and American Governments availing its frustrations: 
 
In the opinion of the Norwegian Government, an accelerated establishment of the common tariff 
would not facilitate negotiations aiming at an effective reduction in the level of protection. (...) 	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The establishment of a multilateral association embracing all Western-European countries within 
the framework of close cooperation with the North American countries is the declared objective 
of the Norwegian Government. (...) On the other hand, a continuing schism in the economic field 
in Europe will undoubtedly have repercussions on the political cooperation.607 
 
The British Foreign Office agreed with the Norwegian point of view, and found the aide-
mémoire “well argued”.608 Through personal diplomacy, Macmillan still pursued a deal 
between the Six and the Seven, trying to persuade de Gaulle and the US administration to 
reconsider their positions. Within the British administration, though, a shift was occurring. In 
the so-called Economic Steering Committee, talks of possible policy options had been on 
going since 1959. By March of 1960, the Foreign Office concluded that all alternatives had 
been exhausted. Any arrangement “between the Six and the Seven would not meet United 
States anxieties, and would not meet the protectionist ambitions of the French and possibly 
others.”609 The recognition of this deadlock, led the Committee in mid-April of 1960 to 
recommend association with the EEC as a policy.610 “The experts”, the Prime Minister was 
told in April, “are increasingly coming to the view that in the end we shall have to come to 
terms with the Six, in some form of association which would be very close to accepting full 
membership of a common market.”611 
When Macmillan met with Lange and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen in early June 
of 1960, he was not yet convinced of the ‘close association’ line carefully explored on a 
diplomatic level. To his mind, the political costs were too high. In a conversation with Lange, 
Macmillan reassured him that “the United Kingdom belonged to the European Free Trade 
Association and would stand by their fellow members.” He confided that he thought they had 
“a difficult hand to play in trying to reach a settlement with the Six and that patience would 
be needed. The important thing was to show ourselves friendly and ready to establish a bridge 
with them.” Lange agreed and was reportedly “very glad to be reassured that the United 
Kingdom Government would not take any steps towards joining (...) without full consultation 
with the Seven.” On a question from Lange about the attitude of the US, Macmillan replied, 
“they were coming round a little to realising that they should not favour the Six at the expense 
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of the Seven.”612 Though Macmillan had received many signals from the US government that 
they preferred solutions in keeping with the Six, the situation with the newly elected President 
Kennedy was unclear. It seems Macmillan’s hopes were going in several directions.613 Lange 
and Gerhardsen, therefore, had no reason to suspect a sudden change of policy from Britain.  
 
Growing concerns 
Long into the autumn of 1960 the government operated with a vague conception of some sort 
of arrangement between the EEC and EFTA, preferably within the OEEC/OECD 
framework. The Europeans within the MFA, on the other hand, became gradually more open 
to other solutions.614  
In November 1960, for example, Commission President Hallstein visited Norway to 
have informal, exploratory discussions with Lange, Skaug and Director General Jahn 
Halvorsen, and to give a lecture to the Oslo Student’s Association. Hallstein was content with 
the ongoing British talks with the Federal German Republic regarding the market issues, but 
ascertained that the Commission wouldn’t suggest any solutions before reviewing the results of 
these talks. Junior Executive Officer at the Economic Department, Arne Langeland, thought 
this attitude corresponded with both the first and second Hallstein-memorandums of 1959. 
The aim of the Commission was, as he saw it, to create a community among the Six through 
the CET, and not to initiate any common European solutions.615 Nevertheless, Hallstein 
brought up what he believed were the three biggest issues if the British were to approach the 
EEC: the Commonwealth, the agricultural system, and its relationship with the US. Skaug’s 
answer was that Norway still considered an Atlantic solution, based on reciprocity, within the 
OEEC/OECD as a minimum solution, and to his surprise, Hallstein concurred.616 
Following the outrage over the earlier Hallstein proposal, the Commission President 
had a tough time selling his European visions in Oslo. In what would become one of the most 
pro-membership Norwegian newspapers, Aftenposten, was a report on Hallstein’s visit under the 
headline “The Common Market is dangerous”.617 During the Q&A-session, following his 
lecture to the Student’s Association, leading Norwegian officials and civil servants charged 	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him with critical questions. Leader of the Free Trade Committee (FTC), Knut Getz Wold, for 
example, wondered why a solution within the OECD could not be found, or why the Six 
couldn’t join the Seven. Jahn Halvorsen followed suit and questioned whether it was true, as 
Hallstein claimed, that difficult technical problems prevented bridge building between the Six 
and the Seven. That no solution had been found to the Six-Seven problem, following the 
French blocking of the FTA-process in 1958, was, Halvorsen maintained, due to a lack of 
political will and not to technical difficulties. Hallstein, not surprisingly, wholly disagreed. On 
the other hand, Halvorsen told British diplomats that in his opinion personal contacts with 
Hallstein were of great importance. Norwegian politicians and officials, he claimed, knew too 
little of the personality and the beliefs of one of the main architects of the Community, and 
tended to attach undue importance to the very different and much more favourable views and 
pronouncements of Dr. Erhard.618 
Norwegian officials clearly resented the EEC’s accelerated plans, which, they thought, 
would hit Norway unreasonably hard. Jahn Halvorsen’s attitude, nonetheless, marks a slight 
shift in attitude among the diplomats who followed the issue closest. Though he was utterly 
critical of Hallstein, Halvorsen’s hope that Norwegian politicians would acquaint themselves 
with the ‘foreign’ views of Hallstein pointed towards a slow, though painful, reorientation. 
Langeland’s analysis, that the EEC never would initiate any common European solution, 
pointed in the same direction. It was dawning on who would become the first two Europeans 
that the government’s chosen strategy might be in need of revision. From this perspective, 
Halvorsen saw Hallstein’s visit as a way for Norwegian ministers to get to know a possible 
future partner. 
The constant British manoeuvring also fuelled Halvorsen and Langeland’s 
reorientation. By October of 1960, Halvorsen wrote, “the British bureaucracy, apparently, are 
getting in the mood for a special settlement between the UK and the Six.”619 De Gaulle’s visit 
to London in April of 1960, the failed British exploratory talks regarding a possible 
membership in the ECSC and EURATOM in the early summer of 1960, and talks with the 
Federal German Republic in August of that same year, confirmed these suspicions. The 
outcome of the talks between Macmillan and Adenauer led to expert discussions and 
investigations into which problems they would face with a possible solution between EEC and 
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EFTA. These discussions ended up with the Müller-Armack plan,620 which aimed for a 
European customs union for industrial products based on the CET minus 20 percent, 
excluding the agricultural sector and the Commonwealth. However, the French scrapped this 
plan in January of 1961.621 Also in October, Arne Langeland had indicated that the British, in 
the long run, feared losing out on the increase in production level, commerce and economic 
integration between the Six, which in turn would threaten their leading political position in 
Europe. Simultaneously, the French, under de Gaulle, added an element of uncertainty. His 
vision for a closer cooperation among the Six, Langeland stressed, aimed at reaffirming 
France’s position as a Great Power.622  
The Europeans had difficulties reading signals from London. This was evident when 
Halvorsen met with Deputy Secretary to the Foreign Office, Patrick Reilly, in November. In a 
preparatory memo to the meeting, Reilly was given clear advice: “[u]ntil we have made more 
progress in our talks with the Germans, there would seem to be little to be gained by 
discussing with Mr. Halvorsen the more difficult aspects of future relations with the Six, such 
as the extent to which the Seven might envisage different types of relationship with the Six. 
(The Norwegians said at the EFTA meetings in Bern that they were in favour of the same 
relationship for all EFTA countries.)”623 This secrecy reflected a lack of agreement within the 
British administration: while some regarded any solutions between the Six and the Seven as 
unattainable and aimed for an association of sorts, Macmillan still pursued an ambiguous 
‘political’ solution with the Germans, hoping to bring the French into tripartite 
negotiations. 624  Tactical consideration also called for secrecy: as British ambassador to 
Sweden, John E. Coulson, admitted during the early talks of a Six-Seven solution within the 
OEEC framework, “[i]f we give the Seven the impression that we are letting them down, we 
shall have the worst of all possible worlds.”625 
It was official British policy to keep its EFTA partners fully informed. Nevertheless, the 
British Government waited until April, at an unofficial EFTA meeting, to confess that they 	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were in fact contemplating joining the Community and accepting the Treaties of Rome.626 To 
a Norwegian government unwilling to realise the change coming about, this was precisely the 
problem: since the Labour government, so used to following Britain in foreign policy matters, 
had the impression that things were as ‘normal’, no new Norwegian policy was contemplated. 
Furthermore, unlike the Danish government, the Norwegian government was perfectly 
content with EFTA until the better option appeared. The Europeans, on the other hand, started 
to prepare for a rather different scenario. 
 
The contours of a brand new policy 
Early in 1961, several incidents made the Europeans take the British movements more seriously. 
First, the new Kennedy administration, inaugurated in January 1961, was clearly positive 
towards a British membership of the EEC. The Kennedy administration was prepared to 
shoulder the economic burdens of a large discriminatory European customs union, for the 
furtherance of a strong Atlantic framework, as long as the UK became full-fledged members 
of the Common Market with all its political implications. 627  Second, Macmillan had 
continued his high-level talks with President de Gaulle in January, and subsequently President 
Kennedy in February, and again in April. Third, Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath, the later 
head of negotiations at the ministerial level, gave an astounding speech regarding British 
European policy during a meeting in the Western European Union (WEU) between the Six 
and the UK in February. Norwegian ambassador to Brussels, Nils Anton Jørgensen, 
dispatched that the speech was received with “unconcealed satisfaction” and that it was 
characterised as “a complete reorientation of British European policy” among the Six.628 Last, 
French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville answered Heath with a warmly inviting speech in 
the Council of Europe in the beginning of March. Though the Europeans could not know this 
exactly, Macmillan had become convinced over Christmas break that the only remaining 
choice was for Britain to apply for membership negotiations.629 Seemingly the French and 
Americans now took a more favourable position towards British membership in the 
Community, and the UK was prepared to give concessions in a prospective negotiation. A 
palpable fear was spreading among the EFTA-countries that Britain would act on its own.630  
At an EFTA meeting in February of 1961, Edward Heath revealed that the UK was 
conducting bilateral talks with the Federal German Republic, Italy and France concerning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 Olesen and Villaume I Blokopdelingens tegn (2005), p. 467. 
627 Lundestad “Empire” by integration (1997), p. 61. 
628 UD 44/585–9 – 01.03.1961, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – CEE. Western European Union meeting 27 February. 
629 Milward The Rise and Fall of National Strategy (2002), p. 336. 
630 Lie “A Gulliver Among Lilliputians” (1995), p. 150. 
	  	   162	  
British problems. But any special problems that other EFTA-members might have, Heath 
made clear, would be taken into consideration. Foreign Minister Lange could only take 
notice. The Norwegian government had no concrete propositions on hand, but was prepared 
to be flexible if new negotiation came about.631 At this point the government had no strategy. 
In this situation, the Europeans started concrete analytical work: “Could we omit 
following Britain when they – one way or the other – force themselves into the Community?”, 
Arne Langeland wrote in a memo, and went on to list the government’s interests if the 
situation should occur:  
 
To secure ourselves against discriminatory arrangements on ferrous alloy, aluminium and 
processed wood products in a wide Western European market; to secure that this Western 
European organisation does not weaken the Atlantic cooperation, economically within the 
OECD, and politically within NATO; and to fit the Nordic cooperation within this frame.632 
 
It was the contours of a brand new policy, the Europeans now tried to fit in with the established 
postwar outlook of the Labour government. 
By April, the Economic Department prepared material on the increasingly probable 
negotiations. Three things seemed clear, Jahn Halvorsen wrote to Lange. First, Norway now 
had to choose between membership and a looser association. Second, the UK was aiming at 
full membership. The US supported this endeavour, and maintained that all non-neutral (i.e. 
NATO) countries should do the same. Last, he wrote, time was of the essence: the Norwegian 
bargaining strength would be greatly improved if they could negotiate simultaneously with the 
UK.633 Moreover, an association could possibly lead to discriminatory arrangements against 
the expanding Norwegian industry, and probably also to rights of establishment for foreign 
businesses in Norway. “We, of course, do not have any guarantees”, Langeland wrote, “but 
the possibilities of avoiding discriminatory arrangements seems greater [with membership 
negotiations] than with negotiations for association.”634 This was echoed from Brussels: with 
an association negotiation Norway would, as experienced in the FTA negotiations, have to 
give “significant bilateral concessions to France”. In the trial of strength that would take place 
in these kinds of negotiations, the Six would be “tremendously strong”.635 
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While Langeland and Halvorsen – together with the Embassy in Brussels – were 
preparing for what seemed inevitable, Sommerfelt wrote a personal letter to Lange, Skaug 
and Halvorsen from Geneva, in which he expressed increasing annoyance with the situation. 
EFTA had always been “the Board of Trade’s baby”, he noted. The UK Foreign Office might 
sabotage a possible Six-Seven agreement as a way of torpedoing EFTA in favour of full 
membership in the EEC, Sommerfelt speculated. Civil servants in the Foreign Office, he 
bitterly remarked, “see it as degrading that a former great power such as Britain today is part 
of a grouping of small, European ‘peripheral’ states”. Though intra-departmental rivalry 
might have played a role, this was clearly an exaggeration. Still, the letter epitomises the 
disappointment felt by many officials and politicians. Sommerfelt, moreover, was especially 
fond of EFTA: “I only hope (...) that the British do not rush matters. If de Gaulle gives them 
his infamous cold shoulder, we have only achieved to demonstrate for the world that EFTA is 
‘for sale’.636 
Following this internal discussion, Halvorsen prepared a memo to be discussed in the 
FTC, which in turn would serve as the preparatory memo for Foreign Minister Lange’s 
statement in the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs (ECFA). The memo confirmed that 
the British were now aiming at something far beyond an economic arrangement. It also 
stressed that EFTA countries had been promised consultations, though these probably would 
be of secondary importance to the British. Furthermore, it said that solution between EFTA 
and the EEC was highly unlikely because it did not take into consideration all of the political 
aspects. Overall, the memo struck a much more positive note than the mere avoidance of 
discrimination, while it listed the constitutional problems and challenges connected to the free 
rights of establishment. Towards the end, Halvorsen turned to the core issue: could Norway 
be seen standing together with the neutral European states, outside an organisation that had 
to be considered as an economic and political union within the framework of NATO?637  
A couple of days before his meeting with the ECFA, Lange received a confidential 
dispatch from Minister Skaug and Halvorsen. They had spoken with Under Secretary of State 
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs to be, George Ball, who had confirmed the Europeans’ 
thoughts concerning the attitudes of the US and the UK. Skaug and Halvorsen gave clear 
advice: it is time to get into a negotiation position, for it is no longer evident that the British 
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have our best interests at heart.638 The conclusion reached by two of the leading Europeans, 
Halvorsen and Langeland, six months before, had reached the political level.  
With these statements, and the support of the FTC, Lange met with the ECFA. The 
parliamentarians of ECFA were deeply divided as to what road Norway should take. 
Opinions diverged from unbridled enthusiasm to dark pessimism.639 Moreover, the domestic 
situation concerned them profoundly. The Storting and the public were in need of “proper 
psychological preparation”, according to Conservative parliamentarian Bernt Ingvaldsen. 
Due to the government’s secrecy, he claimed, the public was lagging behind.640 This was soon 
repeated in the Conservative press: the public and parliamentarians were totally unprepared 
for what was about to happen.641 The ECFA agreed that the government should aim for 
highly coordinated EFTA behaviour. The government, for its part, was willing to discuss the 
Common Agricultural Policy with “the greatest caution”, but it was still “profoundly in 
doubt” as to what would serve Norwegian interests best.642 The day after the ECFA-meeting, 
Foreign Minister Lange wrote to Skaug in Washington: 
 
The assessment from the MFA and the MoCS is that we, whether we choose association or 
membership, scarcely will evade the economic obligations of the Treaties of Rome (...) I am 
therefore in accordance with your judgement that we need to get into a negotiation position.643 
 
Lange was officially on board. He had tested the conclusions of the Europeans, the FTC and 
Skaug with a political audience, and gave his Ministry a cautious green light. 
 
Green light given 
In creating a new Norwegian policy, Langeland started to weigh association against 
membership: not only would Norway be left in an isolated economic position with an 
association, but more seriously, Norway would also be politically adrift, lumped together with 
the neutral countries. Such a development could in the long run effect Norway’s relationship 
with NATO and lead to “a tendency towards returning to the neutrality line that we left in 
1949.” Langeland had, in effect, dismissed association as an option with an argument that 
appealed heavily to Lange’s belief in the Western alliance. Furthermore, he stressed that the 	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Six would only reach association agreements with ‘underdeveloped’ countries, such as Greece, 
or neutral countries, such as Switzerland. Membership, on the other hand, was portrayed as 
almost inevitable: international economic cooperation already restricted the national use of 
economic steering instruments, and the question was “if it wasn’t, in reality, illusory to discuss 
trying to stand on the outside of a long-term development pushed through by strong 
forces.”644 The thrust of the argumentation was so evident and one-sided that the Embassy in 
Brussels felt the need to warn that the issue of choosing between membership and association 
should be handled with the greatest care.645  
Following consultations with the British in which MFA State Secretary, Hans Kristian 
Engen, together with Langeland, had urged London to support coordinated and simultaneous 
negotiations “regardless of what kind of affiliation to the EEC each EFTA-country sought”, 
Engen told the ECFA in early June that the British aimed to make their intentions known by 
the end of the month.646 UK officials had expressed an interest in a coordinated EFTA-
conduct as long as it made sense for the negotiations, but did not want to make any 
commitments.647 They had also told Engen of Macmillan’s upcoming talks with President de 
Gaulle taking place within the month.648, talks in which the British would try to “smoke de 
Gaulle out”, according to Foreign Minister Lange.649 At the end of the meeting, discussions 
turned to whether Norway should visit the Community countries to examine their 
possibilities. Though Jahn Halvorsen had recommended such visits in May, Skaug and the 
government wanted to wait until the EFTA-meeting in London at the end of June.650 As 
Conservative representative Erling Petersen dryly remarked: “it isn’t expedient to send people 
on the highest level to present a Norwegian standpoint, when in fact no Norwegian standpoint 
exists in the main question”.651 
After the visit to London, Langeland had no illusions and did not believe that any 
coordinated EFTA-conduct would come out of the EFTA-meeting in London on June 27-29. 
There was no consensus on what could be achieved through negotiations with the EEC, and 
there were highly divergent opinions on what kind of negotiations should be chosen. The 	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thought of ‘choosing along the way’ between membership and association, strongly supported 
by the FTC, was illusory.652 Neither the US nor the UK would secure their political interests 
through such an arrangement.653 Though Lange stressed the importance of a unified EFTA 
front in the first Norwegian parliamentary debate on the EEC-issue (June 5), the Europeans at 
the core of the events did not believe this to be possible anymore.654 
 
Declaration and Application 
Nevertheless, the government stuck to its initial plan of a coordinated EFTA-conduct and 
‘choosing along the way’, and the ministerial EFTA-meeting at the end of June in London 
proved to be a disappointment. Its outcome - the so-called London-declaration – stated that 
EFTA would continue to function until all its members had found satisfactory solutions to 
their legitimate interests.655 It was the Danish government that had gotten the crucial word 
‘legitimate’ into the London-declaration. This ensured that each country had room for 
manoeuvre, and that they could, if necessary, contest the legitimacy of the other EFTA-
countries’ interests. A Swedish proposal, backed by the Norwegians, to bind EFTA to conduct 
negotiations as a group, was left out of the declaration. EFTA “should coordinate their 
actions”, what this meant in practice was not specified.656 However, as Frøland points out, in 
agreeing to the declaration Foreign Minister Lange had “clearly worked from the premise that 
Norway would seek some kind of formal relation with the EEC, a mandate which, however, 
only implicitly had been given by Parliament.”657 Just shy of a month later – July 25, 1961 – 
the British government, without further notice, unilaterally decided to apply for 
membership.658 Even as a short-term solution, EFTA had proved dissatisfactory to the UK. 
British trade was shifting towards the increasingly successful Community despite the tariff 
barriers. But political changes made the matter more pressing. A Franco-German axis – 
apparent after the Bonn-declaration in the middle of July – paved the way for a Bonn-
Washington axis, bumping Britain down from the ‘second place’ in western power politics.659 
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The Norwegian government was informed of the application by the British embassy in 
Oslo the day after it was recorded, and was concurrently invited to a new EFTA-meeting at 
the end of July. At this meeting, the United Kingdom informed its EFTA-partners that 
exploratory talks would not take them further. The British also gave unequivocal reassurances 
that they would not take on any commitments without consulting the EFTA-countries and the 
Commonwealth. Minister Skaug reported on the recent events to the ECFA at an 
extraordinary meeting on July 31: the UK and Denmark had applied for membership under § 
237 of the Treaties of Rome. The Storting was on summer break at the time, but the 
government had approved of the London-declaration. “With this declaration”, Skaug 
declared to the ECFA, “the roads ahead are either ‘membership’ or ‘association’.” The ECFA 
agreed almost unanimously that the government could not go any further before the Storting 
reconvened after the general election in September. This would not be a problem, Lord Privy 
Seal Heath reported to Norwegian officials, as the continental summer break was about to 
start. The first meeting of the Council of Ministers would be in late September.660  The 
Gerhardsen Government had time, and certainly needed time. Meanwhile, the London-
declaration denoted that Norway could not sit on the fence forever.  
 
A professional conviction 
By July of 1961, the core of personalities among the Europeans were convinced that the only 
option available for the government was to apply for full membership. This analysis developed 
largely because events out of the hands of the Norwegian government changed the game: 
Britain, Norway’s guiding star in matters of European policy, applied for membership 
negotiations with the EEC. It is safe to argue that the Norwegian government, by July of 
1961, had no policy at all, except a strong fear of abandonment.  
The Europeans, however, had slowly abandoned the postwar strategy of 
intergovernmental free trade within a broader Atlantic framework. Minutely following 
Britain’s slow reorientation, they turned towards what had been largely ignored by official 
Norway throughout the 1950s – the Community of the Six. Jahn Halvorsen and Arne 
Langeland were early to realise the changes in British European policy, and both were early 
defenders of a Norwegian membership application. Through a mixture of discontent in 
dealing with Britain, and learning the intentions of the Community and the US, they came to 
see a membership application as the next logical step. Arne Langeland and Jahn Halvorsen 
learnt through their work and developed a professional conviction that membership was the 	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best, and possibly only, solution. Through continuous argumentation, Halvorsen and 
Langeland, together with Sommerfelt, convinced a small circle of leading ministers of the 
political necessity of this application. Three arguments produced by the Europeans reached 
Lange and Skaug: first that the British reorientation necessitated Norway formulating its own 
strategy and that this should be done sooner rather than later. Second, that association - 
unwanted by both the US and the Community – was a poor choice that would undermine 
both political and economic interests. The sheer weight of the evidence made this point 
difficult to ignore. Still, association turned out to be a seductive alternative for all doubters and 
sceptics in parliament as well as the public well into the early 1970s. Last, membership was a 
political necessity. This resonated with Skaug’s, and especially Lange’s, foreign policy views. 
Being on the outside of an enlarged Community could mean political marginalisation. This 
line of argument convinced them to support the membership application in a more 
fundamental way than simply a method of weighing economic pros and cons. Historian Nils 
Røhne maintains that Foreign Minister Lange realised relatively early that Norway, for 
general foreign policy reasons, needed to choose membership.661 This chapter has shown that 
this happened partly as a result of Halvorsen and Langeland’s reasoning in April and May of 
1961.  
This major, though slow, revaluation of Norwegian foreign policy happened largely out 
of the spotlight of both the Norwegian public and parliament. In this vacuum, Halvorsen, and 
Langeland in particular, were allowed to shape foreign policy in an unprecedented manner. 
Not only were they professionally convinced, but they also had an ownership in the new policy 
– membership application. As we will see, these professional convictions would become 
hardened after meeting domestic criticism. After the general election of September 1961, a 
whole new struggle started for the Europeans. 
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Chapter 6 
Domestic Battles 
 
“It’s even doubtful whether the Six will be able to give the neutral countries 
the possibility to reach far-reaching association agreements. (...) 
The civil servants the embassy has been in contact with 
have without exceptions expressed their wish to see Norway 
starting negotiations for a membership in the Community as soon as possible.” 662 
William G Solberg in a dispatch from Brussels, August 31, 1961. 
 
The British, Danish and Irish applications for membership negotiations in July forced the 
government to forge a new European policy, or at least make a principal decision on whether 
to apply or not.663 At the same time it was quite clear that no decision could be taken until the 
Storting was reconvened after the summer break, and in effect would have to wait until the 
parliamentary election in mid-September.664 On the other hand, the Europeans and the MFA 
as such, raced against the clock: the London declaration and the joint EFTA decision in 
Geneva necessitated a certain synchronicity. Through a string of unofficial sounding trips to 
the Six and the other applicants, the Europeans sought to square the diverging timelines.665 
These unofficial soundings, together with an updated report on the Treaties of Rome, a 
survey of the different policies of the EEC and a recommendation from the FTC, would serve 
as the background material for the two parliamentary white papers concerning the 
Community. Preparing these was among the main tasks of the Europeans.666 
During the autumn of 1961, opposition to membership within the ruling Labour Party 
increased: Gerhardsen’s initial position was to apply for an association, because he considered 
this the option most likely to keep the party united, but there were also those who opposed 
any kind affiliation with the Community.667 After a forceful call for uniformity made by Arne 
Skaug, Halvard Lange and Party Secretary Haakon Lie, loaded with arguments and demands 
for rapid decision-making from the Europeans, the Labour Party leadership decided that 
membership was the ‘preferable form of negotiation’ in November 1961. At the same time, a 
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Parliamentary White Paper was presented.668 After a long time of uncertainty, the Labour 
Party came down on an active membership line from February 1962 onwards. In the spring of 
1962, the Storting first voted to change § 93 of the Norwegian Constitution and thereafter, on 
April 28, it voted in favour of applying for membership negotiations with the EEC. Within the 
first months of 1962, the massive opposition and scepticism in the Storting decreased to a 
minority. No such change of heart came about in the general public.669 
The Europeans feared that the prolonged decision making process would leave the 
government without the possibility to influence the negotiations of the British and Danish, and 
would be faced with ready-made compromises and deals. The balance between the timetable 
at home and in Brussels troubled the Europeans right up to the Storting’s vote in favour of a 
membership application in April.670  For ten months, therefore, the Europeans were shaped 
between the diverging pressures of the impatient applicants and the Community and the 
divided domestic scene. The Europeans, already professionally convinced of the need for a 
membership application, tried to guide the domestic decision making process towards this 
goal. EC-sceptics, both inside and outside parliament, heavily criticised the Europeans for this 
active guiding. With much reluctance, the MFA was, for instance, forced to reassess the 
association alternative after having decided at an earlier stage that it was not in Norway’s 
interest. Through several hard fought domestic battles, the Europeans together with the pro-
European political leadership strengthened their resolve and conviction in the membership 
application, and eventually won through. 
 
Tour de Six 
In August, the Europeans planned the government’s unofficial soundings among the Six. They 
recommended keeping it as informal as possible.671 The radical newspaper Dagbladet had 
already headlined that “the people should have the final word”, and these were early signs of 
the growing attention the Europeans would have to pay to public opinion.672 The aim of the 
informal discussions was to understand how the different member states interpreted the 
Treaty of Rome, including its political aims, and in which direction – federal or 
intergovernmental – they thought the Community was heading. 
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On their tour de Six, Einar Løchen, Arne Langeland and Johan Skutle (MoCS) argued 
that the Norwegian government would have to make clear why it hadn’t yet taken a stand. 
They suggested highlighting the constitutional challenges. The Constitution, for example, had 
to be changed for the parliament to be allowed to give up sovereignty to an international 
organisation. For the Constitution to be amended, a proposal had to be submitted within the 
first three years of the Parliamentary term. This, the chairman of the ECFA Finn Moe 
(Labour Party), had done.673 But the treatment of the proposal could not take place before the 
first three years of the next Parliamentary term, which would open after the parliamentary 
election in September of 1961.674 The procedural problems were real enough, though they 
did not tell the whole story. 
Already at this early stage the Europeans played down the association alternative. Løchen, 
Langeland and Skutle, who on their own recommendation took part in the soundings675, 
interpreted signals from the Six, other applicants and the US to mean that association was 
unattainable. This was not an unreasonable interpretation. However, the association 
alternative had major domestic appeal, and the Europeans, together with Skaug and Engen, 
thus reluctantly had to set out “the terms and conditions for an association”.676 
As part of the preparations for the parliamentary white paper, co-ordinated by Arne 
Langeland and the Economic Department677, a revised edition of the so-called Løchen-report 
was printed. The Løchen report – an assessment of the implications of the Treaties of Rome if 
Norway should join – was co-written by Einar Løchen, Arne Langeland and Johan Skutle. It 
bore the name of Einar Løchen, but was not written by him, according to Arne Langeland. 
Løchen made a first draft, but Langeland thought it was “so poor” that he “rewrote the whole 
thing”.678 This is difficult to prove, but it is clear that Langeland wrote much of the actual text 
with good help from Embassy Secretary William G. Solberg in Brussels.679 The revised report 
contained several interesting conclusions. First, it established that the Treaties of Rome did 
not hinder a Norwegian application that aimed to “clarify the conditions for a membership in 
the Common Market”. Furthermore, the report concluded, “the experiences of economic 
cooperation within OEEC have shown that the difference between cooperation between 	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679 UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 21.09.1960, Oslo – A. Langeland – Private note to Embassy secretary William G. Solberg, 
about the Løchen-committee’s report.  
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governments with veto powers and a so-called supranational cooperation, as is the aim of the 
Treaties of Rome, is – in reality – not as big as it might appear to be.” Last, it was established 
that close economic cooperation between Western European countries would facilitate closer 
economic ties with Atlantic powers.680 The Europeans were clearly preparing the ground for 
what they already saw as a political necessity – membership. It was also part of the meticulous 
process of interpreting, and discoursively placing, membership as lying in continuation of 
Norwegian postwar foreign policy. The document was made for domestic consumption – 
specifically for an audience of parliamentarians. Langeland himself had suggested that the 
report should be an appendix to the white paper, and the report was printed and published 
for general distribution.681  
September was full of trekking. From Christian Calmes, Secretary-General of the 
Council of Ministers, Skaug, accompanied by Løchen and Ambassador Jørgensen, heard that 
there was much disagreement between the Six about the formal procedure of the negotiations. 
Norway, therefore, should not worry about the time schedule.682 In conversation with French 
Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville and high-ranking diplomat Olivier Wormser, 
Engen, accompanied by Langeland, enquired about their view on association, membership 
and the time-schedule. Couve de Murville thought the attitude of the Americans had made 
association an undesired option. As for the time-schedule, he believed British negotiations 
would take at least a year, with a ratification process following afterwards.683 At the end of 
September, Skaug finished his hectic round of visits with a meeting with West German 
minister of economy Ludwig Erhard, and state secretary of European Affairs Alfred Müller-
Armack. Skaug initiated the talks by warning the Germans that the Norwegian application 
would take some time because the public needed information, and the government needed to 
“clear up some misconceptions”. The application, Skaug thought, would not be ready until 
the end of November. Erhard answered that the Community wanted simultaneous, but 
bilateral, negotiations with applicants for full membership. Britain would be prioritised before 
Denmark, and if the Norwegian government made a decision by the end of November, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680 UD 44.36/6.84–2 – 23.08.1961, Oslo – A. Langeland, E. Løchen and J. Skutle – The Treaty of March 25, 1957, 
establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome). An overview of the rights and obligations of the 
Member States. The Treaty assessed relative to the Norwegian Constitution, Løchen-Committee, p. 97, 115.  
681 Dagbladet – 12.08.1961. 
682 UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 07.09.1961, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Minister of Commerce and Shipping Skaug’s visit to 
Brussels and Luxembourg, September 12-13. Skaug met with Agricultural Commissioner Sicco Mansholt, Economic 
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683 UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 15.09.1961, Bern – H. K. Engen and A. Skarstein – Memo. Common Market. Conversation 
with Couve de Murville. 
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Erhard estimated, this would leave enough time for Norway. Skaug then asked about the 
difference between an associated and full membership. Erhard replied that associated 
membership meant that one could not participate in the Community institutions and 
therefore could not take part in decision-making. Erhard recommended that Norway apply 
for full membership because it would be easier to accommodate Norway’s specific problems if 
it were a full member.684 
The ministers and the Europeans had learnt three things from the tour de Six. First, all of 
the Six and the British expected a Norwegian application for full membership. Director de 
Schacht went so far as to opine, “not under any circumstance would Norway politically and 
economically part ways with Britain and at the same time place themselves on the outside of 
cooperation between all the other democratic countries in Europe.”685 Second, all of the Six 
argued that Norway would have a stronger negotiation position by applying for membership 
rather than association. Erhard and most of the Commissioners stressed that Norway, with its 
special problems, would be met with understanding during future membership negotiations. 
Couve de Murville argued negatively, by making clear that associated membership was not an 
option. Either way, the end result was that a membership application looked the most 
appealing. Last, the time-schedule was unclear. Most officials thought the negotiations with 
Britain would be long, while some – like Malvestiti and Spierenburg – thought that they 
would be unproblematic and short. 686  Importantly, the reports from the Six and the 
Community echoed the tentative conclusions of the Europeans, and pushed alternative solutions 
even further to the background.  
 
Guiding the process 
Engen and Skaug’s conversations served as the background for the FTC’s discussion. On 
September 15 it concluded: 
 
“Since the membership alternative serves as the best basis for negotiations, and to specify and 
discuss the Norwegian reservations, the Committee considers that the negotiations should be based 
on this alternative. By recommending this procedure, it has not taken a position in the question of 
membership or association. The results of the negotiations will serve as a basis for the government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
684 UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 22.08.1961, Oslo – H. K. Engen and A. Skarstein – Memo to the Foreign Minister. Draft 
plan for informal visits to the EEC; UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 22.09.1961 – E. Løchen – Memo. Conversation between 
MoCS Skaug and Minister of Economy Erhard in Bonn; UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 07.09.1961, Copenhagen – A. 
Langeland – Denmark’s view on the negotiation situation. Danish diplomats had the same view as Erhard. 
685 UD 44.36/6.84–3 – 31.08.1961, Brussels – W. G. Solberg – Possible Norwegian membership in the EEC. 
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and Storting’s future assessment of whether membership in the Community is pertinent or if we 
should seek a looser connection through an association”.687 
 
The informal soundings, the Løchen-report, and the FTC’s recommendation, together with 
statements from interest organisations and reports on the Community produced by the MoCS 
and the MFA, would serve as the foundation of Parliamentary White Paper nr. 15.688 It was 
the Europeans’ job to write it. 
But the Europeans also saw it as their responsibility to inform and prepare the Storting and 
the public for the decision ahead.689 Søren Chr. Sommerfelt, Arne Langeland and Einar 
Løchen contributed with information lectures, articles, publications and books about Norway 
and the Common Market. Efforts peaked in late September and early October of 1961, right 
before the Parliamentary White Paper was submitted.690 The Europeans understood the perils 
of the situation: on the one hand, the only option open, to their professional judgement, was 
to apply for membership; on the other hand, the domestic situation was entirely unresolved. 
Meanwhile, the public was undecided. Even after the Parliamentary White Paper was 
published on October 13, polls showed that just over 50 percent of those who had heard of 
the Community had taken a stand.691 
More alarmingly, the Labour Party was divided on the issue. Up until the parliamentary 
elections in September 1961, the government postponed discussions regarding the EEC. In 
the parliamentary election, to the “general astonishment” of the Labour leadership, the 
Socialist People’s Party – formed by those excluded by the Labour Party and in opposition to 
the government’s foreign and security policy – took two seats in the Storting, leaving 
Gerhardsen with a minority government.692  
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Up until the election, the Labour leadership had not given any statements on the EEC-
issue, and it was generally acknowledged that those who favoured membership were in the 
majority. The preparatory work of the Europeans had, therefore, gone silently ahead. A week 
after the election, Prime Minister Gerhardsen – deeply concerned with keeping the party 
united – came out in favour of an associated membership. A ‘half-membership’, Gerhardsen 
thought, would get a majority in the Storting and keep factions within the party content. The 
challenge, for Gerhardsen, was that he held a minority opinion within the almighty Labour 
Movement Central Board (LMCB). 693  Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, Norwegian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU) chairman Konrad Nordahl, and vice party leader 
Trygve Bratteli spearheaded the majority within the LMCB. After coming out in favour of an 
associated membership and realising that he was in minority, Prime Minister Gerhardsen 
forcefully engaged himself to secure a long and detailed decision-making process within the 
party, involving the entire apparatus down to its very grassroots.694 
In this situation the Europeans actively engaged with the public to clear up any 
‘misunderstandings’. Søren Chr. Sommerfelt, for instance, thought that Norway should “as a 
participant in future negotiations about a European solution, at least mentally prepare for the 
development that most likely will come about during the 1960s (...) political thinking should be 
awoken through the debate that will take place.”695 But not any political thinking: the Europeans 
wanted to guide public and parliamentary opinion towards the conclusion they had already 
reached. They did not, for instance, use the Press Department, which would have been the 
traditional way to communicate the MFA’s opinion to the public. Instead the Europeans 
themselves first engaged in an uncoordinated effort to educate and inform the public.  
Their work with the parliamentary white paper pulled in the same direction. The 
internal division of the Labour Party led the government to decide that the white paper would 
be without a conclusion. That is, without a clear recommendation from the government for or 
against a membership application.696 The purpose was to inform the Storting, and let it discuss 
the issue on a ‘free basis’. In light of the parliamentary debate, the government would propose 
its preferred form of application. Preparing the white paper, CIEC had discussed the issue 
many times, and it was recommended that even though the government did not chose 
between association and membership, the FTC’s statement – which recommended 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 Svein Dahl “Den skjulte pakt”. Manuscript, Historical Institute, Univesity of Trondheim, p. 5. While the Labour 
Party held absolute majority, historian Svein Dahl strikingly asserted that when the LMCB ”(...) had spoken, it had 
decided what the government, the majority of the Storting and the trade unions should mean”. 
694 Fevang ”Norge - nissen på lasset” (1995), p. 71-79. 
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membership – should be attached to the final document. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
significantly, this statement was sent to the different interest organisations for their opinion. 
The Europeans exercised considerable administrative power, for they had recommended that 
the statement became a part of the white paper, and they had decided to send it to the interest 
groups. The end result, therefore, was a parliamentary white paper that, even without a clear 
conclusion, was wholly membership positive. Before the government decided to ‘leave the 
ending open’, the Europeans had written extensive parts of the white paper, and even prepared 
an alternative conclusion that in the end was left out: 
 
“On the background of the statements from the above-mentioned advisory committees and the 
employee/employer organisations and the business community, and considering the information 
gathered through consultations with other EFTA-countries and the European Economic 
Community, the government is of the opinion that the significant Norwegian interests that are 
concerned, are best safeguarded by Norway, at an early stage, applying for negotiations with the 
EEC based on membership.”697 
 
Gerhardsen and his supporters pushed for a prolonged decision-making process and an 
association alternative through party channels; the Europeans worked for a quick decision and a 
membership line through corporative channels. 
When discussed in the ECFA, sceptics in parliament did not fail to comment on the 
underlying message of the parliamentary white paper. With both Jahn Halvorsen and Arne 
Langeland present at the meeting, Trond Hegna – belonging to the left wing of the Labour 
Party – claimed, “in much of the material prepared and crafted by different groups of experts, 
there has been an obvious tendency towards facilitating the material with the aim of 
membership”.698 In the next ECFA-meeting, Hegna resentfully remarked, “[w]ell, the thought 
[behind the white paper] is evident, there’s a purpose – an objective one seeks to obtain 
without saying it directly. Some of the expressions used, I would say, are of a more 
propagandistic character.”699 Equally, Centre Party representative and former ambassador 
Erik Braadland accused the Europeans of having “done incredibly little” to clarify the 
association alternative, saying they had displayed “a form of diplomacy, in this case, which 
seems unconvincing”.700 Braadland also wrote a hostile article for the Centre Party paper 
Nationen. The obligations of the Treaties of Rome were too far-reaching, he argued, and drew 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697 UD 44.36/6.84 Parliamentary White Paper (1961-62) Om Norges stilling til de europeiske markedsproblemer. Tilrådning fra 
Utenriksdepartementet av 1961 godkjent ved kongelig resolusjon samme dag. (Draft). 
698 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting October 28, 1961, 10AM, Trond Hegna. 
699 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 7, 1961, 9AM, Trond Hegna.  
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historical parallels to the Danish-Norwegian union and the Constitution of 1814.701 Those in 
favour of an application tried, much the same way as the Europeans, to play down the 
significance of choosing between different forms of applications. “The British kept on 
travelling for 1 and ½ year, trying to test the terrain”, Skaug contended, “[t]hey came to the 
conclusion that the only way to find out anything, was to start negotiating. I think we are in 
the exact same situation.”702 It was, in other words, a matter of choosing the preferred starting 
point; one could still choose along the way. 
By late autumn of 1961, therefore, the public, parliament and government was divided 
and undecided. The Europeans had worked extensively with preparations at home, their 
conclusions shaped by the intersection of their talks with the Six and applicant countries, and 
their perceptions of the domestic situation. Lange and Skaug, together with the Europeans, 
knew that an associated membership was all but impossible to obtain. Moreover, both foreign 
policy and economic considerations, as analysed by the Europeans, spoke in favour of applying 
for full membership. There were also tactical considerations: Norway’s bargaining strength, 
the argument went, would increase considerably by negotiating together with Britain and 
Denmark. Moreover, signals sent to the international community by applying and failing, 
were fundamentally different than those sent by not applying at all. A non-application would 
put Norway in the same category as the neutrals, and open up the possibility of Soviet 
pressure. 
The Europeans’ strategic documents and public engagement went beyond what one 
would expect from diplomats in service of a government that had yet to reach a final decision. 
The sense of policy ownership was strong. 
 
Diverging pressures 
Envoys wrote back with their different assessments of the postponement of the principal 
decision by the government. To Ambassador Sommerfelt in Geneva, the situation was not 
dramatic: the government could wait until February 1962 without hurting Norway’s chances. 
Britain and Denmark were negotiating things that would not affect Norway negatively, he 
contested, and either way, the EFTA-countries had agreed to wait for one another.703 
Sommerfelt was rather alone in his opinion. The Brussels embassy, for one, wholly disagreed: 
February would be too late, it said, and would decrease the government’s bargaining strength 	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702 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting October 28, 1961, 10AM, Arne Skaug. 
703 UD 44.36/6.84–4 – 09.10.1961, Geneva – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – Deadline for Norway’s start of negotiations with 
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and room for manoeuvre. Moreover, Ambassador Jørgensen complained, “when we, after all, 
have left the impression in the six capitals that a decision would be reached after a 
parliamentary debate about the issue in October, I believe that a long postponement would be 
unfortunate and seem very inappropriate.”704 Skaug chose Jørgensen’s, and not Sommerfelt’s, 
dispatch to make his point to the ECFA. A decision, one way or the other, would make the 
diplomatic process much easier, Skaug contended. It was easier to get information and 
establish contacts if Norway had a formal connection with the Community, whether that was 
through a membership or association application.705 
It seems both the Europeans, and the Foreign Minister and Minister of Commerce and 
Shipping were a bit puzzled by the situation. Lange, for example, asked Director General 
Halvorsen whether it was possible to apply without specifying if it was for membership or 
association. This was not an option, Halvorsen replied; one had to choose. If membership was 
chosen, Norway had to accept the principles of the Treaty of Rome.706 Two days later, Lange 
laconically summarised the situation at the opening of the Storting debate: “If we choose to 
start negotiations on the basis of membership, many reasons seems to speak in favour of us not 
waiting too long with the decision.”707 
At the same time the MFA, MoCS and the FTC continued indefatigably with what 
would become the next parliamentary white paper – an addition to the already existing white 
paper.708 It would, unlike the first white paper, present a clear conclusion. Responding to the 
critique, the government charged the MFA and the MoCS with assessing the association and 
trade agreement alternatives more thoroughly. The option of ‘remaining on the outside’, as 
the trade agreement was called, was quickly rejected because it would “lead to stagnation in 
our exports”.709 The association alternative was, on the other hand, dealt with in an extensive 
report written by Arne Langeland. The report was entirely negative with regard to an 
associated membership: there would be limited access to a major market; Norway would be 
kept from influencing common policies; it would be detrimental to the wishes of the US; 
special demands and reservations on the part of Norway would be met with counterclaims 
from the Six; and association negotiations would only begin after the British and Danish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 UD 44.36/6.84–4 – 19.10.1961, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – After the EEC negotiations.  
705 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting October 28, 1961, 10AM, Arne Skaug. 
706 UD 44.36/6.84–4 – 18.10.1961 – Jahn Halvorsen – Memo to the Foreign Minister.  
707 UD 44.36/5–4 – 24.10.1961 – Foreign Minister Lange’s statement in the debate opening the Storting. The market 
problems.  
708 UD 44.36/6.84–4 – 20.10.1961 – Addition II to Parliamentary White Paper nr. 15 “overviews and reports 
regarding the European market problems. 
709 UD 44.36/6.84–6 – 27.11.1961 – Draft from the MFA and MoCS. A general assessment of the consequences of 
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negotiations were completed.710 Langeland, as before, based his assessment on what had 
transpired on the tour de Six. There was no need to dwell on an alternative that, to his mind, 
didn’t exist. Those parliamentarians sceptical to membership had demanded a thorough 
analysis of an association alternative – but this was hardly what they hoped for.711 
Not surprisingly, the Norwegian postponement was not well received in the 
Community. Vice President of the Commission Robert Marjolin said that a delay until 
February would be unfavourable as the British might find solutions to their problems that 
were detrimental to Norwegian wishes.712 Paul-Henri Spaak was unsure – he would repeat 
many times – about whether Norway showed the will needed to take part in the Communities 
political cooperation. And, as Jørgensen reported, “all of the Six” were now waiting for the 
Norwegian application.713 And it also caused reactions among the EFTAns. In particular, the 
British were growing increasingly impatient.714  
Following many dispatches conveying disappointment among the Six, the frustration 
among the Seven, and how the government was pressed for time, Lange and Skaug, together 
with Minister of Industry Kjell Holler and Party Secretary Haakon Lie, tried to unite the 
party behind the membership line, wanting the additional parliamentary paper (nr. 67) ready 
by December 8.715 The ECFA held a total of five meetings to discuss the EEC at the end of 
November. Minister Skaug informed the ECFA that the government wanted a decision from 
the committee before Christmas.716 At a later meeting, Skaug handed out a report prepared 
by Halvorsen to make his point: Sweden, Austria and Switzerland would apply for an 
association in mid-December, and Portugal would apply for something similar to the 
agreement the Community had reached with Greece in January. With no decision before 
Christmas, Norway would be the only EFTA-country yet to take a stand.  
Furthermore, Skaug estimated that a Norwegian application after Christmas meant real 
negotiations in April. By that time, Denmark would negotiate issues concerning Norway, such 
as rules of establishment and capital transfers. If these issues were settled, they would be 
difficult to reopen as every negotiation position taken by the Community had been negotiated 
between the Six first. Thus, reopening issues would mean an entire new round of intra-	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Community negotiations. Last, the Six were planning to create a Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). Norway would only be invited to take part in the preparatory work, said Commissioner 
of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt, after they had applied for membership.717 
Several parliamentarians reacted to the strong pressure applied by Skaug. Kjell 
Bondevik (Christian People’s Party), for example, thought that, “to rush through, despite 
everything, would be the worst thing to do in this situation”.718 The ardent anti-Common 
Market man, Hans Borgen (Centre Party), moreover, complained that the FTC was given too 
little time, and in any case was composed of the wrong people. To this Skaug answered that 
even though the FTC was not specifically created for the Common Market issue, the same 
experts would most likely have inhabited it.719 
Still, the Labour Party ended up postponing the issue again. On December 1, the 
matter was sent through its entire organisation, including regional and local divisions.720 The 
postponement led to the strange situation in which the leadership came out in favour of 
membership before the grassroots organisations had given their recommendations. On 
November 22, the NCTU came out in favour of applying for membership, and on November 
30, the LMCB unanimously recommended, “it would be for the best for Norway to apply for 
negotiations on the basis of membership”.721 The government had first aimed to propose the 
white paper on December 8, and also ask for authorisation to start negotiations on the basis of 
full membership. When the parliamentary group met on November 29, the Prime Minister 
presented a new, more thorough, procedure. The end result was something in between, with 
leadership making their recommendations in favour of full membership negotiations, while a 
final decision would have to wait until the national convention on February 15, 1962. Before 
the national convention, the government would abstain from making a final decision.722 The 
rest of the parliamentarians and the ECFA were informed of the decision through the 
newspapers723, and later by the Labour Party’s parliamentary leader, Nils Hønsvald: 
 
“It was, as you know, the government’s intention to present the additional white paper some time 
next week as a step in the treatment of this case. The Labour Party’s parliamentary group have 
now asked the government to postpone the white paper, with the aim of delaying the final 
evaluation until after New Year. The background for this [choice] is the public debate [...] It has 	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718 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting November 25, 1961, 10AM. Kjell Bondevik. 
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721 AA – Labour Movement Central Board Meeting 30.11.61. 
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not at all been possible to have a factual debate. Those against, have served – I have to say – the 
simplest sort of demagogy...”724 
 
Nils Hønsvald’s reasoning was that those opposed to membership had muddied the decision 
making process. Gerhardsen, for his part, aimed to “get as much support for the decision we 
will reach as possible”.725 On the other hand, the unanimous LMCB’s decision meant that 
Gerhardsen supported the decision to apply for full membership. To this, Gerhardsen 
commented that he had wanted to make a well-informed decision, and that he therefore “had 
waited for a long time to make his final decision”. The unanimous decision of the LMCB, he 
unenthusiastically remarked, “covered his view as well”.726 Strong forces within the Labour 
Party worked against a membership application. And outside the official political circles, the 
left wing of the Labour Party, and those to the left of Labour, were organising extra-
parliamentary demonstrations against any kind of membership, with slogans circling around 
‘sovereignty’, anti-NATO, anti-capitalism and anti-German sentiments.727 These were the 
demagogues Hønsvald referred to.  
From December onwards, therefore, the Europeans began countering the ‘demagogy’. 
When a Centre Party parliamentarian held that their Swedish sister-party claimed a 
Norwegian association would be in the interest of Sweden, for example, Halvorsen 
immediately wrote to Lange and requested permission to gather evidence to the contrary and 
send it to ECFA.728 Equally, Langeland wrote a letter to the editor of Arbeiderbladet to correct 
what he felt to be incorrect and simplified statements made by leftist Health Director Karl 
Evang regarding the rules of voting within the Community.729 Following the Community’s of 
a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on January 14, Nationen (Centre Party) contended that it 
opened up “frightening perspectives for Norwegian agriculture”.730 The following day, Arne 
Langeland responded by sending a secretary to the Norwegian Farmers’ Union to debunk the 
false claims made in Nationen.731 This was, one could argue, simply a matter of informing the 
public of factual matters, but it was done with much persistency and considerable conviction. 
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Towards an application 
In anticipation of the final ‘go-ahead’ from the government, the Europeans finished the 
additional white paper and prepared for two parliamentary debates to take place before the 
application could be sent: one debate regarding the amendment of § 93 of the Constitution 
and a second debate on whether and how to apply for negotiations with the Community. 
Apart from preparing the white paper and debates, the Europeans continued to defend 
the membership policy. This was done either by engaging in polemics with newspapers such 
as Nationen, or by creating extensive documents in favour of membership - this was especially 
important in order to secure support within the Labour Party. One of the last things Arne 
Skaug did as minister before becoming ambassador to London732, was order a political 
document from the Europeans. Cabinet members used the highly polemical document in 
lectures or discussions in order convince doubters within the Labour Party prior to the 
National Convention on February 15. The document followed a strict format of objections to 
membership on one hand, and counter-arguments on the other. One headline, for example, 
read,  “Bourgeois or social-democratic economic policy”, with the first sentence, “Some 
people have claimed that the Treaties of Rome binds the member states to a bourgeois or 
private-capitalist economic system. But this is a misunderstanding, or even worse a deliberate 
misinterpretation”. The scepticism towards surrendering sovereignty was countered with the 
argument that the labour movement had never been nationalistic or isolationist. It had always 
sought solidarity and cooperation across borders, to harness the capitalist powers and secure 
peace. It was “against this background we have to understand the question of national 
sovereignty”.733 Foreign Minister Lange received another document, prepared by secretary 
Eivinn Berg, to be used at the Convention. The Foreign Minister was to give a speech on the 
special economic arrangement Norway needed, and the conclusion read: “a Norwegian 
membership in the EEC can not be seen as preventing the creation of industrial democracy 
giving influence and participation to the workers in the workplace”.734 That a conservative 
diplomat from shipping circles such as Eivinn Berg could engage in classical socialist 
scholasticism, showed the rhetorical limberness of the Europeans. 
The Labour Party came out in favour of membership. The first draft of parliamentary 
white paper nr 67 “About Norway’s position to the European Economic Community and the 
European efforts of cooperation”, was completed on February 21. The white paper was now 
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to be discussed by the government and the FTC, before being debated and voted on in the 
Storting. Foreign Minister Lange, joined by Halvorsen, met with the ECFA in late February to 
give his account of the situation. Lange could finally declare that the government was intent 
on applying for full membership. On the other hand, Lange thought the presentation of the 
white paper would have to be postponed for another week in order to include the remaining 
comments from the FTC. He stipulated that a debate in the Storting could take place at the end 
of March or beginning of April.735 The news of yet another delay, and the strong opposition 
among EC-sceptics, caused an outburst from the Embassy in Brussels. Jørgensen, or at that 
time perhaps more likely Asbjørn Skarstein (moved to Brussels to take care of EEC matters), 
demanded a certain level of realism in the Norwegian negotiation strategy.736 
The government discussed the draft of an additional white paper nr 67 at the end of 
February and sent it back to the Economic Department, where secretary Berg edited it. One 
of the changes made was to substitute the word ‘union’ with the word ‘community’. ‘Union’, 
in the heated debates over loss of sovereignty and fear of continental powers, elicited historical 
memories of Danish-Norwegian and Swedish-Norwegian unions. Every detail was streamlined 
in order to secure a majority. 737  Based on the white paper, the ECFA then gave its 
recommendations to the Storting in March. Soon thereafter, the Storting adopted a new § 93 of 
the Constitution: a ¾ majority in the parliament was needed in order to pool sovereignty with 
an international organisation within a limited area. The constitutional obstacle to membership 
had been removed.738 From a rather heated parliamentary debate regarding the constitutional 
amendment, the Europeans created a register of arguments used against the government and 
the membership application. Some of the accusations were directly aimed at the Europeans. 
The harshest allegation was that they had done a poor job in translating the word ‘union’ to 
‘community’. Parliamentarian Trygve Bull (Labour), for example, thought that the original 
German word ‘zusammenschluss’ had to serve as the basis for translation.739 
In the now deeply divided ECFA, accusations against the Europeans were equally harsh. 
The Committee’s recommendation was soon ready, and it was already evident that there 
would be at least one minority statement. Chairman Finn Moe was frustrated by the process, 
and complained that they couldn’t even agree on simple factual matters. The minority feared 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting February 21, 1962, 15:10PM. Halvard Lange. 
736 UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 21.02.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen (A. Skarstein) – Norway’s position in relation to the 
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that an application under § 237 – that is for full membership – was not only a matter of 
choosing the preferred basis of negotiation, but bound the government to membership. With 
much justification, they argued against the rather weak argument that applying only meant 
choosing a starting point, and that Norway could change to an association along the way. This 
notion stemmed from “The Free Trade Committee’s fatal misunderstanding”, Trond Hegna 
(Labour) claimed, and it was this misinterpretation that had created bitter divisions within the 
ECFA. Hegna also accused the Europeans and others, in their selection of statements from 
interest organisations’ statements in parliamentary white paper nr 15, of hiding the differences 
of opinion that were expressed. Finn Moe replied that the MFA and MoCS had to withhold a 
lot of information, for example a discussion regarding special arrangements, in order not to 
weaken Norway’s negotiations position. Furthermore, Langeland’s document on the 
association alternative was heavily criticised for being “significantly polemic with the aim to 
show how impossible this [option] is”.740 Last, the Europeans translation of the word ‘union’ to 
‘community’ was once again condemned for being deliberately mistranslated. Berg had 
indeed chosen the word ‘community’ as he felt ‘union’ had an unfortunate historical ring to 
it.741 In the newspaper Dagbladet, journalist Alf Rolfsen wrote about it under the headline “The 
binding text of the Treaties of Rome and the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Norwegian twist”.742  
It is worth noticing that much of the criticism and distrust was aimed specifically against 
the Europeans. It was of course due to the fact that they had produced much of the material 
available for scrutiny. But there were also two underlying assumptions in the criticism: first, 
that the Europeans were wholly intent on membership, and second that they pursued this policy 
regardless of ‘real’ Norwegian interests. These first, and one must assume unpleasant, 
encounters with parliamentarians, the press and public, proved the explosiveness of the issue 
to the Europeans, and clearly show that they were keenly aware of the historically loaded 
connections between the foreign domination of Denmark and Sweden and the imagined 
domination of ‘Europe’. 
The parliamentary debate regarding Norway’ s possible negotiations with the Common 
Market commenced on April 25. The MoCS had prepared much of the material for the 
debate, but Arne Langeland had prepared a long memo for the Minister of Commerce and 
Shipping regarding the minority statement from the ECFA. Here he nuanced and refuted 
their arguments. Among other things, he argued against the minority’s understanding of the 	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use of a qualified majority in the Community. For Langeland, this was not a matter of 
exploiting small countries, as he felt the minority claimed, but a design that protected smaller 
countries. Furthermore, he wrote that it was “pure demagogy to claim that foreigners can buy 
Norwegian mountain ranges as long as they have enough money.”743 The whole document 
went on like this, and was meant as an arsenal of arguments to be used by Minister 
Gundersen during the debate. 
After 40 hours of debate over four days, where almost every parliamentarian and 
minister participated, the Storting first rejected a proposal by Finn Gustavsen (SPP) not to apply 
for any kind of membership at the present time, but instead ask for a purely commercial trade 
agreement after Britain’s membership had been secured, with 148 votes to two. Then votes 
were cast over the minority proposal of applying for associated membership negotiations (§ 
238). There were two different statements proposing this, one tabled by Johs. Olsen and 
Trond Hegna (Labour) and one prepared by Per Borten, Erik Braadland, Hans Borgen 
(Centre Party) and Kjell Bondevik (Christian People’s Party).744 The proposals were defeated 
by 112 votes against 38. Last, the Storting approved the proposal of the majority to apply on 
the basis of article § 237 of the Treaties of Rome. Thirty-seven parliamentarians voted against, 
among them seven from the Labour Party.745  
“Can it be defended (...) to contemplate an alternative that places our country outside 
the development that is taking place, and which will lead to a new constellation (...) for the first 
time in recent history will include Britain?” Lange asked in the debate, “[m]y judgement is 
that such an alternative is out of the question, and I cannot understand the arguments 
underpinning such a point of view.”746 To Lange and the Europeans, Norway could not, in this 
situation, remain on the outside. After ten months of intense domestic debates the government 
was ready to apply for membership. 
 
Shaped in the Middle 
The Europeans came into the domestic debate with a ready-made professional conviction: 
Norway needed to apply for full membership negotiations. Through their diplomatic 
connections and travels they came to the conclusion that association was out of the question, 
as it was unwanted by the Six, the other applicants, and the US. They shared this opinion 	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with Lange and Skaug. The Europeans worked with the membership issue through two 
parliamentary white papers, two parliamentary debates and several domestic battles. Faced 
with growing domestic resistance, the Europeans sought to guide the debate. This was especially 
the case with parliamentary white paper nr 15, in which the Europeans wanted enough positive 
statements to make the argument in favour of membership evident, even without a conclusion. 
The reactions were strong: the Europeans were accused of deliberate misinformation and forced 
to revisit the association alternative. In this domestic climate, their resolve and conviction 
hardened and they increasingly engaged in debates against those opposed to membership. 
From 1962 onwards, the government officially came out in favour of membership, the 
Europeans task was therefore to prepare for the upcoming parliamentary debate. Ministers, 
such as Arne Skaug, drew extensively on the Europeans expertise in order to counter the many 
arguments against membership.  
But the Europeans were equally influenced by the attitudes and reactions from the 
Community. Not only was their timeline largely structured to meet the expectations among 
the Six, Langeland and Skarstein, among others, internalised Communitarian arguments. 
Langeland’s argument that supranational institutions and majority voting would protect the 
smaller countries was a typical example.747 Another example was when Skarstein (or possibly 
Jørgensen) wrote that the EEC was a peace movement on par with the League of Nations or 
the United Nations.748 These new arguments became part of the domestic debate. As will be 
seen, the Europeans’ negotiation strategy was also increasingly shaped by Communitarian logic. 
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Chapter 7 
A matter of trust: ‘embracing’ the political implications 
 
“When you’re on the inside, you are taken care of. 
Substantial problems would be solved, as turned out to be the case. 
But no one believed.”749 
Arne Langeland, May 2012, on trusting the Community. 
 
By the end of September 1962, the newly appointed Norwegian Minister of Commerce and 
Shipping, O. C. Gundersen, confronted Jean Rey, commissioner responsible for the EEC’s 
external relations, about rumours of the EEC giving Norway and Denmark some sort of 
limited membership, while giving the UK a full membership. Rey replied evasively: countries 
that did not want to participate in political cooperation could get such an arrangement, but 
for countries that accepted the Treaty of Rome and wished to take part in political 
cooperation, this “would probably be the development”. 750  The background was a 
memorandum produced by Rey himself, before the summer recess, proposing a new doctrine 
on enlargement enabling the EC to ‘close the door’ after Britain.751 
The challenge Norway faced was twofold. First, the government had not been successful 
in convincing the Six of its political will to secure membership. It had not, in full, accepted the 
acquis communautaire, that is, the Treaty of Rome and its political intention, and the 
Community’s existing body of legislation. Second, and explicitly linked to this, the 
government had not accepted or shown a positive will to take part in the on going and future 
plans of a political community that were taking shape amongst the member states. Norway 
needed, as seen from the Community, to embrace the political implications of membership. 
Within a month of the conversation between Gundersen and Rey, the Europeans 
reassessed the entire Norwegian negotiation strategy. This reassessment was, in many ways, a 
return to the preliminary plan as envisioned by leading Europeans, before it was scrapped for 
domestic reasons. Now that it seemed the EEC would ‘close the door’ after Britain, and after 
frenetic reporting and proposals to revise the strategy made by the Europeans, the government 
slowly altered its approach. After the government’s reluctant nod of approval, the Europeans – 
dominating the negotiation apparatus – were quick to implement drastic changes. In short, 
the plan was to fully accept the Treaty of Rome and its political intentions, radically cut the 	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list of demands for special arrangements, and postpone difficult and intricate questions until 
membership was secured.752 It was too little, too late. With President de Gaulle’s veto on 
January 14, 1963, the new approach was never tested and the only ones who had truly 
embraced the political implications of membership were the Europeans and a small circle of 
politicians surrounding them, first and foremost Foreign Minister Halvard Lange. De Gaulle’s 
veto, the subsequent prolonged silence on the membership issue, and the fact that the strategy 
of ‘embracing’ the political implications went largely untested, have led historians to disregard 
the implications of this policy shift.753 
However, the Europeans’ swift change of strategy demonstrates how they had accepted a 
Community-thinking based on political trust. Rather than trying to obtain clear legal 
exemptions in advance of membership, the Europeans argued that the government should 
accept the policies of the Six and ‘work through the Community’. Moreover, a clear show of 
political will, and readiness to participate in the formation of a political community, could 
pave the way for successful negotiations. The right attitude would create goodwill among the 
Six, making it easier, in turn, to obtain special arrangements within certain sectors, so the 
argument went. 754  The Europeans’ internalisation of ‘Communitarian logic’ is crucial to 
understand their politisation in the mid-1960s and also puts the Bratteli government’s pro-
European policy in the early 1970s in a different perspective. Many of the Bratteli 
government’s policy choices emanated from the Europeans, and the lessons learnt by the end of 
the first round were reintroduced and reinterpreted in the early 1970s. 
Since Norway was the last country on the applicant-wagon, the Europeans learnt these 
lessons second-hand. The concept of ‘working through the Community’ had been borrowed 
directly from the Lord Privy Seal, and British chief negotiator Edward Heath, as Britain 
struggled with the agricultural negotiations during the fall of 1962. The ability to create 
goodwill while embracing overarching political implications was an emulation of Danish 
policy. Accordingly, the strategic shift was a result of the Europeans’ interpretation of 
Community, and British and Danish attitudes and actions. 
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Diverging views on political cooperation 
As Frøland argues, the mandate given by the Storting to the government in April of 1962 
neither excluded nor assumed membership.755 An application under § 237 was merely “the 
best starting point for our country [will be] to seek negotiations on the concessions Norway 
can achieve, on the basis of full membership”.756 Just as the British application, it was a choice 
to clarify its relationship with the EEC.757 Furthermore, the application for membership 
negotiations was approved by 113 votes to 37 in parliament. This meant that a single vote 
changing from ‘yes’ to ‘no’ would give parliament the necessary one quarter needed to block 
entry into the Community (as stipulated by the newly adapted § 93 of the Constitution). The 
mandate given to the government was wafer thin and explicitly conditional. 
Most arguments in favour of membership were, in reality, arguments against remaining 
on the outside.758 If Norway did not join, she would loose out on an enlarged EEC, including 
Britain, Denmark, Sweden (under § 238) and a booming German market. An enlarged EEC 
would comprise about 70 percent of traditional Norwegian export markets. Remaining on the 
outside would hit Norwegian exporters hard. Furthermore, it would be increasingly difficult to 
attract foreign capital. In sum, staying “outside the EEC would jeopardise [the] (...) 
modernisation policy and negatively affect economic growth, employment and ultimately 
national welfare.”759 Equally, with Britain and Denmark on the inside, and the EEC strongly 
supported by the US, membership had to be interpreted as a continuation of the 
government’s Atlantic profile, because an explicit choice of not applying for membership could 
be interpreted as a drift towards semi-neutrality.760  
The costs and benefits of membership were uncertain. There would certainly be major 
restructuring costs for the highly protectionist and uncompetitive agricultural system and most 
likely for the fishery sector as well (though this was counterbalanced by the fact that an 
enlarged Community would take roughly 50 percent of the unprocessed fish produce and 36,1 
percent of the processed and canned fish).761 Seemingly, the government was willing to accept 
some restructuring costs for the Norwegian agricultural sector within the newly established 
CAP. A majority of the political parties and agricultural organisations, though, warned that 	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both the income level of farmers and the country’s level of self-sufficiency had to be 
safeguarded.762 The latest parliamentary white paper estimated that participation in the CAP 
would lead to an immediate income loss for farmers of some 20 percent.763 With regards to 
fisheries, no established common policy existed. 
To this was added uncertainties regarding rights of establishment and the so-called free 
movement of capital. Both would challenge the Labour Party’s established policy of funnelling 
money to selected industries with competitive advantages. The party hoped to accept the 
principles of the Treaty of Rome while simultaneously avoiding its consequences through 
special rules and demands.764 Last, the governments feared a weakening of the Nordic 
identity. Sweden and Finland would not become full members of the EEC, so a Danish and 
Norwegian entry would therefore challenge the Nordic ‘foreign policy solidarity’. Moreover, 
membership could endanger the Nordic labour market and the process of harmonisation of 
social policies. This Nordic argument, though, was substantially weakened by the Danish 
willingness to seek membership on its own. 
However, “the most significant generalised cost”, in the words of Frøland, was “the 
danger of drifting into a supranational structure”.765 None of the political parties had ever 
spoken in favour of federalist concepts of Europe. Neither had any Norwegian NGO. Not 
even the Norwegian Council of the European Movement (NCEM) displayed an inclination to 
federalist ideas.766 Few politicians were enthused by the political intentions of the Community. 
Skaug and Lange, for example, neither believed in nor wanted a development towards a 
political federation. They hoped, with some right, that the new members – together with 
France – could steer this process towards more intergovernmental waters.767 Producing 
documents for domestic consumption, the Europeans argued along the same lines: British, 
Danish, Irish and Norwegian participation in the emerging political community would 
significantly alter its character and further development.768 Once convinced by the Europeans, 
both Skaug and Lange would trade certain steps toward supranationalism and some sort of 
political community for keeping in step with US and British foreign policy and remaining at 
the core of the Atlantic Community. 	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Gerhardsen, on the other hand, who had accepted the application with great reluctance, 
was less prepared for such a trade. Throughout the post war era, Gerhardsen had been 
sceptical towards the process that tied Norway closer to Western cooperation. This had been 
evident during the NATO debate, and throughout the 1950s he repeatedly demonstrated that 
he wanted Norway to distance herself from, or not whole-heartedly subscribe to, Western 
cooperation. Gerhardsen’s wish for an association was, therefore, more than a tactical 
consideration; it also reflected which position he wanted Norway to have in the world.769 
Lange reflected in the early 1950s that Gerhardsen was “in his heart against NATO and a 
supporter of [Norway having] a similar position as Sweden, but his intellect tells him that it is 
impossible to propose such a policy at the moment”.770 At the first governmental conference 
following the election in September of 1961, Lange felt that Gerhardsen’s association line 
would leave Norway in a skewed position to NATO (i.e. semi-neutral).771 
Supposedly Gerhardsen, after the first government meeting on the EEC, told Skaug that 
the MFA should emphasise economic aspects.772 The long internal debate (September 1961 – 
February 1962) had led Gerhardsen to accept the need for a membership application, but he 
would have no talk of political implications. In fact, Gerhardsen ascribed the Labour Party’s 
loss of absolute majority in the parliamentary election of 1961, in part, to “people who 
disagree with our foreign and security policy”, remarking bitterly in December, “[i]f the SPP 
didn’t have the Common Market issue we would have endured this”.773 His reaction to the 
creation of the SPP, and the brewing rebellion within Labour towards postwar foreign policy 
embodied by Halvard Lange, was to appease. One way of doing this was to discuss the EEC 
in purely economic terms, thus disentangling it from security policy, and consequently the 
combustible issue of NATO. Subsequently, in the final parliamentary debate before the 
application was handed in, Gerhardsen argued that the Treaty of Rome did not “provide the 
legal basis for political cooperation”. Norwegian membership in the EEC, he went on, was 
“not, at the same time, a decision to take part in political cooperation”.774 As Eriksen and 
Pharo maintain, this interpretation of what membership would entail, reflected a mixture of 
shrewd strategy and wishful thinking.775  
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Actually, the fact that the Six were discussing political cooperation was an important 
factor in the British government’s decision to apply. 776  Since the spring of 1961, two 
consecutive Committees (Fouchet and Cattani) had worked to formulate proposals for 
organising cooperation in the political field. After a summit in July of 1961, the Six signed the 
so-called Bonn Declaration. Though vague on a number of points, it represented an advance 
towards formalised political cooperation. Following a draft treaty for a ‘Union of States’ 
tabled by the French Government in November of 1961, and reflecting the Gaullist concept 
of nation states as the only important units within international politics, talks of political 
cooperation stalled. 777  Talks were re-launched with several bilateral meetings between 
President de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer and Italian President Fanfani, respectively, during 
the spring of 1962. Finally, on April 17, the Foreign Ministers of the Six met in Paris. 
Significant progress was made, but in the end the Belgians and Dutch “refused to sign any 
treaty until the British had joined the European Economic Community and could take part in 
the political discussions”.778  
Schematically, one could say that there were at least three intertwined conceptions of 
what a political union should look like: a Gaullist, a European and an Atlantic view. 
Depending on how they regarded the orientation (who would be involved) and the depth of 
the political community (how supranational it would be), decision makers would subscribe to 
different aspects of the three conceptions.  
The Gaullist political community was to be intergovernmental in its institutional layout 
and independent of US influence. In his press conference on May 15, 1962, President de 
Gaulle made this abundantly clear: After stressing that the Fouchet plan, and following 
French elaborations of it, served as the best way to build a political union – he went on to 
demarcate the Gaullist vision from both the supranational ‘European’ vision, and the British 
(or American) ‘Atlantic’ vision. First of all, any supranational political union would be 
unrealistic and impracticable. “[S]ince no one policy could be imposed on each of the six 
states”, de Gaulle warned, “one would refrain from making any policies at all”. The 
Community would be paralysed. This in turn would force Europe to “follow the lead of some 
outsider who did have a policy”, he said. “There would perhaps be a federator, but the 
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federator would not be European”. Thus, by way of supranationalism, Europe would be led 
by the US. This threatened the French conceptualisation of Europe.779 
The Atlantic vision – shared by the British, leading politicians among the Benelux 
countries, the Monnet Action Committee and the Kennedy administration, amongst others – 
saw the US and Europe in an equal and interdependent partnership within the framework of 
NATO. Washington, initially welcoming the Fouchet Plan, had by the spring of 1962 come to 
the conclusion that it ran counter to deeper political integration, a policy the US had long 
supported.780 A cornerstone of President Kennedy’s Grand Design was a strong Atlantic 
framework, “an outward-looking Europe with a strong American connection”.781 Part of this 
plan was full British membership of the EEC.782  
The British version of the Atlantic vision differed from the American vision in regard to 
the level of supranationalism. Here, Washington was closer to the ‘Europeans’ than to the 
British. Kennedy supported the Benelux countries’ wish to establish political cooperation 
within the institutions of the Treaties of Rome. The Benelux countries had, ever since the 
French ‘Union of States’-suggestion, pushed for a political community that would eventually 
introduce majority voting and increased powers to the parliament. The Monnet Action 
Committee, and its supporters, shared this view. In a joint declaration on June 26, 1962, the 
committee argued, “the ‘true federator’ was not some outside power, as General de Gaulle 
had implied, but the ‘new method of collective action, which operated within the European 
Community.”783 The Six now had to rapidly conclude a treaty setting up a political union 
along similar lines, while also negotiating a British entry to the Community. The British 
government, on the other hand, had much sympathy for the Gaullists’ emphasis on 
intergovernmentalism. The general concerns were that supranational institutions would lead 
to ‘government by bureaucracy’, without parliamentary control. Opposite the Gaullists, 
however, they shared the Atlantic orientation of the ‘Europeans’ and the Kennedy 
administration.  
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However, on April 10, 1962, in a statement to the Ministerial Council of the Western 
European Union (WEU), Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath came out strongly in favour of a 
political union where member states would “marshal the collective resources, energies and 
skills (...) in a position of leadership – an aggregate of power within the free world, standing 
shoulder to shoulder with the United States.”784 Though never committing the government to 
anything, Heath’s “acceptance of the logic of extension of the Community to the fields of 
foreign policy and defence, and his open-mindedness about future institutional development” 
was fundamental, and something new in British politics.785 Still, it was not the first time he 
had conveyed such opinions. Already at the opening of negotiations between the Six and the 
UK (October 10, 1961, Paris), Heath stated that Britain “fully share the aims and objectives, 
political and otherwise, of those who drew up this [Bonn] Declaration and we shall be 
anxious, once we are members of the Community, to work with [you] in a positive spirit to 
reinforce the unity which [you] have already achieved”.786 As historian Piers Ludlow notes: 
“The most striking feature of Lord Privy Seal’s speech in Paris was the warmth of its pro-
European rhetoric”. This was a deliberate tactical choice, for they had been “repeatedly urged 
by their continental colleagues to present the British decision to approach the Community in 
the most pro-European fashion possible.”787 
The Danish MFA had also picked up on signals from its continental colleagues. In late 
October of 1961, at the first meeting at the Ministerial level between Denmark and the 
Community, Danish foreign minister Jens Otto Krag made it perfectly clear that he did not 
come to Brussels to negotiate the Treaties of Rome. Denmark wanted “to fully take part in the 
Community, and whole-heartedly and without reservations accepts the aims and intentions of 
the Community.” Krag went on to specify that “[w]e share, not only, your economic aims. 
We are just as ready to take part – fully and actively, and on equal terms with the other 
member states – in a closer political cooperation with the intention of strengthening European 
unity, as determined by the Bonn Declaration of July 18 this year [1961].”788 At the second 
ministerial meeting between Denmark and the Community, Krag repeated the message: 
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“behind the Danish application for membership (...) was a clear political desire to take part in 
the EEC’s efforts for European unity”.789 
By the early summer of 1962, many diverging, interlinked and competing ideas of a 
European political community had surfaced. Both the British and Danish governments 
understood that a show of political intent, full acceptance of the acquis communautaire – though 
this was not a formal aspect of the opening of negotiations at the time – and display of 
readiness to take part in further political integration was vital for the negotiation atmosphere. 
Certainly, an unwillingness to display commitment to any of the ideas for a political 
community, after a markedly delayed application, could be ruinous to the Norwegian 
government, and Lange and the Europeans were, of course, fully aware of this. 
 
The initial negotiation strategy 
Various members of the government, and more evidently, several sections of parliament, 
would emphasise elements on the list of pros and cons differently – but essentially the 
Europeans were faced with the challenge of balancing and presenting these domestic demands 
in a way that was palatable to the Six and the Commission. Already in January of 1962, Arne 
Langeland produced a document that was meant as a blueprint for the Norwegian negotiation 
strategy. A crucial component of his approach was the acceptance of the political implications 
of the Treaties of Rome.  
The EEC, Langeland argued, did not have any economic reasons for wanting Norway 
to become a member. In fact, he later wrote, “our entry into the Common Market and our 
exports will almost exclusively create new problems for the six current member states”, while 
many of the Norwegian problems were socio-economic in nature.790 Langeland reasoned that 
the Community’s willingness to let Norway become a member rested on geopolitical 
considerations, such as Norway’s NATO membership and close proximity to the Soviet 
Union. As the years 1961-62 were marked, not least, by the Berlin and Cuba crisis, it is fair to 
assume that the Europeans’ persistent emphasis on geopolitics was not just a matter of tactics. It 
was “against this general political background”, Langeland assessed, “that we have any hope 
of getting their understanding for our economic problems”.791  	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If the Community’s understanding for the need to keep Norway as part of the western 
camp could be secured, the next step would be to link the government’s regional policy with 
the strategic need to keep the northern part of Norway (the one closest to The Soviet Union) 
populated. Regional policy was to be understood as security policy. If this political need of 
keeping the north populated was accepted, the need to protect and secure the incomes of 
small and traditional fishing communities and uncompetitive farmers working under harsh 
conditions could be seen in a different light. Langeland thought these solutions could be 
recognised and possibly accepted as de facto permanent, against the background of Norway’s 
everlasting disadvantages: it’s geographical placement to the north, its topography (roughly 45 
percent of Norway could be categorised as mountains), its climate, and the adjoined structural 
challenges. Second, as Ambassador Skaug later learned from his British colleagues, the 
Norwegian challenges should be presented as “regional problems in the Western European 
context”.792 
The third component of the initial negotiation strategy was to keep the discussions about 
Norwegian economic problems ‘open’. The negotiators should avoid pressing for specific 
solutions. A response to the fact that the Community would deal almost exclusively with 
Britain793, it was also an assessment of how the government – conceivably – could turn its late 
application into an advantage. With Norway as the last applicant, and by keeping options 
open until the last minute, the negotiators could secure satisfactory solutions for ‘insignificant’ 
Norway without setting off a landslide of compensatory claims from the other applicants. For 
this to work the domestic organisations would have to keep an open mind, and not press for 
‘hard core’ demands within their specific sectors.794 
The last, least tangible, but perhaps most important aspect of the strategy was to create 
political understanding and goodwill through a two-fold strategy. First, as we will see below, to 
invite officials from the Community and the Six member states to Norway and show them the 
unique structural challenges faced by Norwegian fishermen and farmers. Second, by publicly 
and openly accepting the political intentions of the Treaty of Rome, and expressing Norway’s 
“wish to take part in this political cooperation”.795 The idea was that if Norway could get into 
a negotiation position as fast as possible, display a firm political will to participate, create 	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understanding through public diplomacy, and ‘keep an open mind’ as to the shape of the 
prospective solutions – the chances of successful negotiations would increase.796 
As the Europeans knew, the procedure ran as follows: after the official application had 
been handed to the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, a statement would be made 
by the Foreign Minister, elaborating on the reasons behind the application and the specific 
problems membership would pose. This would be followed by an explorative phase of 
negotiations, where the point was to define the problems at hand and reach a vue d’ensemble. It 
was during this phase that Norway would let its general views ‘mature’ in Brussels, while 
creating goodwill and understanding. Accordingly, as secretary Berg put it, Norway had to 
acknowledge “the political character of the Community, and proclaim their willingness to 
cooperate to reach these political objectives, that is the foundation of the Treaty”.797 For 
Langeland, as for Berg, this ‘embrace’ was crucial. After what the Europeans hoped would be a 
long explanatory phase, real negotiations could commence. However, the negotiations would 
not unfold as anticipated. 
 
Between strategy and trust 
The Europeans’ initial strategy was a fine, if not impossible, balancing act: on the one hand, 
there was strong opposition in parliament and government to discuss, or even mention, the 
political implications of membership. On the other hand, show of political will and stressing 
political aspects was at the heart of the strategy for securing membership. 
Langeland’s early considerations received strong backing from General Director 
Halvorsen and ambassador Jørgensen (or Skarstein) in Brussels. 798  Furthermore, both 
Gundersen and Lange understood the need to create political goodwill and understanding 
among the Six. Nonetheless, Gundersen’s report to the ECFA at the end of March, though 
following many of Langeland’s recommendations, fell short of ‘embracing’ the political 
implication. In his long and thorough presentation of the government’s declaration, political 
aspects were not mentioned once.799 Equally, at a meeting of the Norwegian ambassadors to 	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797 UD 44.5./85–14 – 24.01.1962, Oslo – E. Berg – Memo. The European Communities (CECA, CEE and 
EURATOM). Political and institutional aspects of a membership or association. 
798 UD 44.36/6.84–8 – 21.02.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Norway’s position concerning the economic and 
political Community in Europe; UD 44.36/6.84–10 – 22.03.1961, Oslo – J. Halvorsen – Notes regarding Draft of 
presentation to the Committee on Foreign Affairs; Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014. At this point it is 
probable that Asbjørn Skarstein had taken over the day-to-day running of the Embassy in Brussels. 
799 UD 44.36/6.84–9 – 12.03.1962 – O. C. Gundersen – Memo to the cabinet from the MoCS. Our negotiations 
with the European Economic Community; UD 44.36/6.84–10 – 26.03.1962 - Minister Gundersen’s report to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs; SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting March 26, 1962, 10AM – O. C. Gundersen. 
Langeland was also present at the meeting. 
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the EEC countries, London, Copenhagen and the EFTA delegation, Lange asked for the 
application and declaration to be worded carefully. Although there was a slim majority in the 
Storting, “several objected strongly to the political cooperation between the Six”.800  Domestic 
considerations prevailed. However, Lange’s speech to the European Movement around the 
same time, leaves little doubt that he was frustrated with the restrictive line: 
 
“The debate here in Norway regarding closer affiliation with the other countries of Western 
Europe, has thus far largely been concerned with the economic aspects of this cooperation, and 
we have experienced that those opposing (...) are stronger than many believed. (...) Even amongst 
those who are convinced that we need to find our place in this new Western European 
cooperation, many see affiliation with the expanded European Economic Community as a 
necessary evil, and they are almost exclusively concerned with how to guard the country against 
the adverse effects they assume this will have.”801 
 
Though the Europeans and the foreign policy leadership were frustrated, little could be done. 
Following Gundersen’s presentation and the meeting of the ambassadors in mid-April, 
Langeland renewed his efforts at creating a negotiation strategy; the parliamentary debate 
deciding if and how Norway should apply was only weeks away. Once again Langeland 
stressed that membership in the EEC had to be presented as a continuation of the Labour 
government’s foreign and security policy of the postwar era. It was in Norway’s best interest to 
become a full member, not least to avoid exclusion from a dynamic community that included 
all the countries that guaranteed Norwegian security, save the US. In this light, association 
was not an option. It was necessary, therefore, to create understanding by making political 
arguments: 
 
“It is hardly realistic to try to create a kind of ‘European enthusiasm’ in Norway. It would run 
contrary to profound traits in the Norwegian mentality. [...] But, we have to be able to create an 
understanding for the fundamental foreign and security policy interests we have to protect, in this 
world of which we are a part.”802 
 
Langeland clearly resented the way Norway’s relationship with the Community was discussed 
solely as an economic issue. If, on the other hand, a political argumentation could be 
established this would have positive “repercussions for our negotiation strategy vis-à-vis the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 UD 44.5/85 – 16.04.1962 – Minutes. Meeting of envoys, from Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering 
(1997), p. 339. 
801 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – 10.06.1962 – Speech by Foreign Minister Lange, 11.04.1962. My translation. 
802 UD 44.36/6.84–11 - 18.04.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland – Memo. Norway’s relationship with the EEC. Certain 
remarks. 
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Common Market and for the external presentation of our case.” It was important to avoid 
pushing purely economic questions to the fore, and show a certain level of trust and that 
Norway wished to take part “as a loyal member”. Already in the application, therefore, the 
government should accept not only the Treaties of Rome, but also the political community, as 
stipulated in the Bonn Declaration.803  
Langeland’s remarks reveal a blurring of trust as strategy, and plain trust, as he 
increasingly came to see the Community, not as a necessary evil, but as a force for good. 
Thus, he believed outstanding problems could be solved once on the inside. Only weeks later, 
discussing the declaration, he would state this plainly, “personally, I don’t consider it wise to 
strain our negotiations with such reservations [on rights of establishment and capital 
movements]. We are, after all, joining a Community.”804 To Langeland, Europe – in the 
shape of the EC – was no longer the ‘Other’. This shift in thinking was emblematic for 
Langeland and Halvorsen, and they were soon followed by Solberg, Skarstein, Frydenlund, 
Berg and Ibsen Jr., and later still by Holland, Halvard Lange and Arne Skaug.805 
Among them all, Lange’s shift was the most incremental, yet profound. Throughout the 
1950s, Lange had seen continental integration as problematic to the Atlantic Community. 
Cooperation in Western Europe had to be “a part of the bigger unit that we call the Atlantic 
Community. One thing is certain: cooperation between democracies in Europe must never 
become exclusive, never lead to isolation”, he told the Storting in 1950.806 In the spring of 
1960, he still regarded broader integration within an Atlantic framework as “naturally 
connected to our entire traditional cultural and political orientation”.807 With the British and 
Danish application, strong US support, and the adoption of the Europeans’ interpretation of 
membership as a continuation of the Atlantic strategy – the barriers between ‘Atlantic’ and 
‘continental Europe’ broke down. Following strong, and bitter, domestic opposition to 
membership, it seems Lange developed a similar understanding as the Europeans, 
simultaneously juxtaposing and trying to reconcile ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’: 
 
“[W]e have often been hesitant, yes, even sceptical to proposals and projects of supranational 
cooperation between Western European countries. (...) One important reason for this is probably 
that Norway is relatively young as a fully sovereign state. Another reason is that we are in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
803 UD 44.36/6.84–11 - 18.04.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland – Memo. Norway’s relationship with the EEC. Certain 
remarks. 
804 UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 02.05.1962 – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to state secretary Engen. EEC – time 
schedule and negotiation strategy. 
805 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. 
806 S.tid, 7b 1950, p. 1722.  
807 Lange “Problemer i det vestlige samarbeid” (1960). My translation. 
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fringes of Europe. A third factor is that, unlike many of the countries on the European mainland, 
Norway came out of the war with its national pride and unity, its coherence strengthened, and 
not weakened. (...) One could say, that we have – somehow – come to overlook the simple fact 
that when all is said and done, Norway is a part of Europe, a part of Western Europe, of free 
Europe. Whether we like it or not, this is where we geographically belong, and we all have our 
cultural roots in this part of the world. Actually, the 1930s, with Nazism and fascism advancing 
in Europe, created a barrier between Norway and Continental Europe, and created the one-
sided orientation towards the West, towards the Anglo-Saxon world, which became even more 
pronounced as a result of our experiences during the Second World War. The consequence has 
been that we have given far too little attention to what has been going on in mainland Europe 
the last 17 years. And the scepticism, one could even use as strong an expression as anxiety that 
has surfaced during the last months of debate – is a manifestation of the lack of knowledge of 
contemporary Europe.”808 
 
In this speech to the European Movement, Lange explained the tectonic shift of mentality he 
had gone through, and how deeply his perception was rooted in historical narratives of 
Norway’s place in the world. The speech is not without self-criticism: it was, after all, ‘his’ 
foreign policy that had prevailed for the last 17 years, but now it was time to realise that 
Norway was, in fact, a part of Europe. 
 
A half-hearted declaration 
The morning of May 2, 1962, Ambassador Jørgensen delivered the Norwegian membership 
application to the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers Christian Calmes. The 
Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, who was present at the ceremony, immediately 
asked Jørgensen if Norway was ready to join the political union taking shape. Jørgensen 
replied cautiously by referring to the wording of the application, where the government 
accepted the aims of the Treaty of Rome.809 An explorative phase of negotiations would 
commence as soon as Lange presented the government declaration, following the application 
in Brussels. This declaration was the task ahead for the Europeans.  
Langeland was quick to pinpoint agriculture and fishery as the main issues that 
negotiators should push for special solutions. If the government could obtain passable 
solutions in these two fields it would have a deep psychological impact domestically, and it was 
“the domestic impact and the relationship with the parliament that must be the yardstick of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
808 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 –Speech by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, 11.04.1962. My translation. 
809 UD 44.36/6.84-12 – 3.5.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – CEE. The delivery of the Norwegian application. 
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our negotiations”, he argued.810 Furthermore, the Europeans hoped satisfying results for the 
primary sector could be traded against the ‘embrace’ of the political aspects of the EEC. The 
newly appointed Head of the 5th Economic Office, Tancred Ibsen Jr., for example, stressed 
the importance of underlining Norway’s willingness to participate in the political cooperation 
of the enlarged Community:  
 
We must, already in the government declaration, uphold the political framework for the 
negotiations without consideration of the domestic hesitations that I clearly see are present. The other 
option, namely to give a politically careful declaration, due to domestic considerations, and then, 
in the course of the negotiations, expand the framework, would be harmful for the entire 
atmosphere of the negotiations.811 
 
The Europeans completed the first draft of the government declaration in the beginning of 
May. The Treaty of Rome and the Bonn declaration were explicitly mentioned, and the draft 
stressed Norway’s wish to participate in both economic and political cooperation. The rest of 
the document emphasised the distinct Norwegian geography, climate and topography and the 
structural challenges they created.	   The language of the declaration aimed to create an 
‘emotional’ understanding of Norwegian problems, underscore how Norway was ready to join 
the political and economical cooperation and show that special solutions to Norwegian 
problems, due to geographical, social and structural peculiarities, would have minimal effects 
on the Community as such.812 Thus, it communicated what was to become the mantra of the 
Europeans: Norway was a natural and distinctive part of Western Europe. 	  
Now followed intense debates on the wording of the declaration. Rumours were already 
spreading that the French government was negative to the Norwegians’ applying in the first 
place. Chancellor Adenauer confirmed these rumours in a meeting with Foreign Minister 
Lange.813 Equally, such rumours surfaced at a Nordic civil servant meeting in Copenhagen. 
Apparently, the French had decided to let the Danish join the community regardless of the 
British negotiations, while “they had not decided if Norway qualified for membership or 
not.” 814  These early warnings made Ambassador Skaug (London) and Ambassador 	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811 UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 07.05.1962, Oslo – T. Ibsen Jr. – Memo. CEE. The Norwegian Government’s declaration. 
My Italics. 
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Sommerfelt (EFTA, Geneva) adopt Langeland, Halvorsen and Ibsen Jr.’s logic: Skaug wanted 
to embrace the positive factors of a membership, while Sommerfelt wanted to play down the 
parts about tariff rates for the home industry, arguing that the experiences from EFTA had 
shown that the Norwegian home industry had sustained the tariff reductions among the Seven 
much better than first feared, making it “unrealistic and essentially unnecessary” to try to get 
special arrangements. 815 
At the same time, domestic forces pulled in the opposite direction. The Ministry of 
Agriculture had prepared a memorandum demanding “permanent special reservations” from 
the CAP within the Community.816 Equally, the fishery organisations wanted “permanent 
reservations” from a future Common Fishery Policy (CFP). Obviously, making demands for 
reservations from a policy that did not exist was problematic. Receiving a memo that had 
incorporated the demands, Director General Jahn Halvorsen, who had strongly supported 
Langeland’s strategy, crossed over all such references with a red pen. In a second revised draft 
of the declaration, Jahn Halvorsen reported that he had removed all “diverging opinions to 
the road we should follow.”817 In the face of rumours from abroad and hardening demands 
domestically, Ibsen Jr., Skaug, Sommerfelt and Halvorsen gathered in support of Langeland’s 
initial negotiation strategy. 
July 4, 1962 a delegation consisting of Foreign Minister Lange, Minister of Commerce 
and Shipping Gundersen, and 9 diplomats travelled to Brussels to read the government 
declaration. Detrimental to the initial negotiation strategy, engineered by the Europeans, the 
declaration was half-hearted. The reservations were many, not only in the field of fishery and 
agriculture, but also concerning capital movement and rights of establishment. The Europeans 
had successfully negotiated explicit demands of “permanent reservations” out of the 
declaration. Still, this was the badly concealed aim.818 However, the most striking feature of 
the Norwegian declaration, as opposed to the Danish and British declaration, was the absence 
of support for the political objectives. Lange could defend not mentioning the Bonn 
declaration with the changed circumstances since last summer819, but the declaration was 
cleansed of words like “union” and “supranationalism”. The government was only willing to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 UD 44.36/6.84–13 – 14.05.1962, London – A. Skaug – The Norwegian government declaration; UD 44.36/6.84–
14 – 09.06.1962, Geneva – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – CEE. Norway’s negotiations. 
816  UD 44.36/6.84–13 – 19.05.1962 –Ministry of Agriculture – The negotiations with the EEC. 
817 UD 44.36/6.84–14 – 14.06.1962, Oslo – The Norwegian government declaration to the EEC. 
818 UD 44.36/6.84 – July 2, 1962, Oslo – Memo to Regular Department. Opening meeting for the Norwegian 
negotiations with the European Economic Community in Brussels, July 4, 1962; UD 44.36/6.84 – July 6, 1962 –A. 
Langeland – Memo. EEC. Norwegian Governmental statement given July 4, 1962 in Brussels. EEC.  
819 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting June 13, 1962, Halvard Lange. “One talks of the forms of political 
cooperation in an enlarged economic community, but no one talks about the Bonn declaration.” 
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“develop closer economic and political cooperation among Europe’s countries and 
peoples”.820 The bottom had fallen out of the Europeans grand strategy.821  
 
Rumours 
Due to the workload created by the British negotiations, President of the Commission Walter 
Hallstein envisioned the next meeting at the ministerial level at the end of October. Following 
the continental holiday the Community did not intend to reopen the negotiations with 
Norway, and Denmark, until considerable progress had been made in the UK negotiations, 
especially regarding agricultural issues.822 The Europeans considered the French unwilling to 
give any admissions to the British on agricultural issues, but considered the British more 
flexible.823 Conversely, the Danish MFA feared the British government would present a long 
list of demands for the adaptation of British farmers to the CAP.824 The truth must be sought 
somewhere in the middle, and as Ludlow contends: 
 
“[D]omestically Macmillan could not give ground on British agriculture without risking Labour 
Party abuse and, more damagingly, sniping from his rivals amongst the Conservatives; but 
internationally, French obstinacy on the CAP was almost impossible for the five other EEC states 
to overcome without a much greater readiness to compromise on the part of the British. With 
movement possible in neither direction, deadlock was the inevitable result.”825  
 
Either way, one effect of this ‘deadlock’ was that the latecomer Norway was pushed even 
further down on the Community’s ‘to do’-list. This endangered the subtle, or even timid, 
approach of letting Norwegian demands ‘mature’ in Brussels. Another effect was that forces 
within the Community, fatigued by lengthy negotiations, started contemplating whether one, 
or possibly two, difficult new members would not be enough. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meetings March 30, 1962; April 04, 1962; April 9, 1962; April 11, 1962; June 13, 
1962. See also Eriksen and Pharo Kald krig og internasjonalisering (1997), p. 342. In the ECFA discussions the strange 
situation occurred that sceptics pushed to include passages on the political intent of the Treaties of Rome; moderate 
supporters of membership (the majority) wanted to tone down these aspects, and portray it as a purely economic 
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wanted to talk of the long-term political goals of the community in lofty statements.  
821 In some ways, the Norwegian government was faced with the same problem as the British. Strong sectoral 
demands and a very conditional language hampered the application. As their British colleagues, the Europeans had 
initially recommended that the Norwegian application for membership should be based on the full acceptance of the 
acquis communautaire. Ludlow ”A mismanaged application” (1999), p. 276. 
822 Rasmussen Joining the European Communities (2004), p. 133-136. 
823 UD 44.36/6.84–17 – 11.04.1962 – A. Langeland – Foreign Minister Couve de Murville’s visit to Norway, 22-26th 
August 1962. Memo. Elements for discussion about Norways relationship to the EEC. 
824 Rasmussen Joining the European Communities, p. 133-136. 
825 Ludlow ”A mismanaged application” (1999), p. 281-282. 
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The reactions from the Commission, several of the Six, and the US following the 
Norwegian declaration were more than reserved. The Commission asked the, by now 
familiar, question, if Norway really wanted a full membership and to take part in the 
integration process.826 Not surprisingly though, the most negative reactions came from Paris. 
In late August, French foreign minister Couve de Murville, in conversation with Lange, 
brought up the lengthy Norwegian application process and the obvious scepticism towards the 
EEC the Norwegian parliament and people harboured. Lange could only concur that these 
attitudes existed, but stressed that “the attitude of the Norwegian people towards Europe was 
about to undergo a profound change […] Increasingly the public realised the very strong 
political reasons for Norway to bind it self to the European Community.”827 This was the 
intended effect of the Europeans strategy, though not necessarily an accurate description of the 
actual situation. 
The French foreign minister was not convinced: in the Gaullist optic Norway would be 
“some sort of British ‘satellite’ within the Community”.828 In a conversation with the Danish 
Ambassador to Paris Eyvind Bartels, Couve conveyed how he saw the enlargement issue in 
connection with the plans for a political union: the chances for multilateral political 
cooperation, as envisioned by the ‘federalists’, was “non existing”. France, therefore, 
intensified their bilateral discussion with West Germany. Indeed, since July, de Gaulle had 
courted Adenauer to secure a ‘core’ political union between France and Germany, which 
could be expanded upon later. In September, de Gaulle embarked upon a successful two-
week visit to West Germany, which had a lasting effect on Franco-German relations.829 
In this light, Couve was concerned by the Scandinavian attitude towards political 
cooperation and “in the case of Norway there was nothing to be done.” He mentioned his talk 
with Foreign Minister Lange as an example: Lange had declared that Norway felt quite safe 
under the American nuclear umbrella, “it is, however, clear that, sooner or later, the US will 
‘lâcher l’Allemagne’ [release Germany], and therefore, France had to build its connections with 
Germany well in advance.”830 On ambassador Bartels’ question of the possibilities of an 
integrated European nuclear force, Couve fretted and replied that underneath President 
Kennedy’s colourful rhetoric was the unchanged power politics of the US. Lastly, Bartels 
mentioned that Denmark wanted to be a part of the political cooperation. Couve replied that 	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827 UD 44.36/6.84–17 – 30.08.1962, Oslo – Memo. 
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830 UM GS 108 B 2–7 – October 3, 1962, Paris – Eyvind Bartels – Dear Erling. 
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Denmark was the most Continental of the Scandinavian countries, and that Danish policy in 
the last couple of years had been realistic and characterised by common sense. But, he 
recalled, Denmark is also connected to the Nordic countries. Bartels’ recommendation home 
was that the government should stress its will to join Europe “for better or worse”.831  
Clearly, the French government saw Norwegian and Danish membership as 
problematic, but for different reasons. The Danish government was near desperate to gain 
access to the Community’s agricultural market. Herein lay the main reason why France would 
want to keep Denmark on the outside: for every year on the outside of the newly established 
CAP, Danish farmers would lose market shares to French (and Dutch) farmers, especially on 
the all important German market. On the other hand, France wanted to maintain a good 
relationship with Denmark as a possible way to drive a wedge in the Anglo-Scandinavian 
relationship. Either way, Denmark had immediately followed the British application, and 
compellingly embraced the political aspects of the Treaty of Rome. As a result of their 
eagerness it was much more difficult to rebuff their application.832 
Norway was in a slightly different position to the French. Despite Lange’s recent 
conversion, he, as the rest of the government, could only accept membership in the EEC as 
part of a wider Atlantic framework. On this there was a general political consensus – no one 
contemplated joining the Community without Denmark and Britain.833 Furthermore, since 
the Second World War, Norway had a strong tradition of following Britain in most major 
foreign policy issues, and even the most pro-European politicians hoped that an enlargement 
would ‘open up’ the Community, and tie it more closely with the US and NATO. President 
de Gaulle’s plans of a European ‘third force’ ran counter to this outlook. When it came to 
broader foreign policy issues, therefore, the French fears of Norway being a ‘British satellite’ 
were not unfounded. The hesitant and cautious Norwegian approach, in turn, made it easy 
for the French to point out the lack of political will. General Director Halvorsen knew that the 
argument about ‘lack of political will’ was “quite a rationalisation”. But he also knew that the 
application and declaration of the Norwegian government had played into the hands of those 
who wanted to keep Norway on the outside.834 
Soon negative reactions were accompanied with rumours of decision-makers wanting to 
offer some sort of limited membership. At the end of September, Per Federspiel – Danish 	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832 Olesen and Villaume I Blokopdelingens tegn (2005), p. 408-411, 490, 494. 
833 There was no strong economic sector (as for example the Danish farmers) in favour of a solo membership. 
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delegate to the advisory assembly of the Council of Europe835 – confronted West German 
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder with the rumours: 
 
To my surprise, Schröder answered by posing two questions: 1) What would you say, in Denmark, if 
the Community first accepted Denmark and the UK as full members, and gave all the others, i.e. 
Norway, Ireland, the three neutrals and Turkey either different or the same association deal? 2) How 
would you respond, in Denmark, if only Britain was accepted, and all the other applicants became 
temporarily associated? (…) These thoughts were, according to Schröder, “hanging in the air”. (…) 
Shortly thereafter I met the Norwegian minister of Commerce and Shipping, O. C. Gundersen, and 
I told him of the incident. He had just returned from Washington, but he stated that these thoughts 
were not foreign to him.836 
 
Following Federspiel’s report, Minister Gundersen confronted Commissioner Jean Rey. As 
mentioned in the introduction, Rey, a convinced federalist, drew the line between 
membership and association, as between wanting to participate in the emerging political 
union or not. Rey’s wish to ‘close the door’ after Britain, was motivated by fear of a 
heterogeneous and slow Community. The more federalist inclined, such as Jean Monnet and 
Paul-Henri Spaak, feared that too many new half-hearted member states would block the 
plans for the kind of political integration they envisioned (after the retirement of de Gaulle). 
For entirely different reasons, de Gaulle pondered the same ideas: in October both the 
Norwegian and Danish EFTA ambassadors reported that de Gaulle might be willing to accept 
a British entry “mais pas tous ces scandinaves [but not all these Scandinavians]”. The plan, 
according to the rumours from Quai d’Orsay, was to give the remaining applicants a satisfactory 
association. It should not be difficult to convince the Norwegians to chose this alternative, it 
was reported, while the Danes might be bought off with promises of satisfactory deals in the 
agricultural sector.837  
The plans for a ‘small enlargement’ also tempted the Dutch, as they hoped a speedy 
British entry could counter the Paris-Bonn axis, and simultaneously keep their main 
competitor in the agricultural sector, namely Denmark, out. On the other hand, tales were 
told of a Danish membership being given, regardless of British, Irish and Norwegian 
negotiations. Danish Prime Minister, J. O. Krag, was quick to deny that Denmark would join 
the Six without the United Kingdom.838 Last, Chancellor Adenauer’s scepticism towards 	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enlargement had long been common knowledge. Adenauer exhibited what Eriksen and Pharo 
calls “the mirror image of Norwegian euro-scepticism”.839 An enlargement would strengthen 
the social democratic and protestant influence on the Community, and he feared that “Britain 
and several of the Scandinavian applicants might soon be governed by left-wing 
administrations totally out of sympathy with the goals of European integration.”840 Once 
again, such fears were not totally unfounded. It was suggested, for example, that one reason 
why Prime Minister Gerhardsen had chosen a long internal decision-making procedure was 
that he “expected the future to bring a coalition government in the Federal Republic and a 
Labour Government in the United Kingdom (...) on the vague premise that the more Socialist 
governments there are in Europe, the better”.841 However, the biggest concern of Adenauer 
was that a British-Scandinavian entry might prolong the process towards a political union or 
unsettle Franco-German rapprochement. As a result, he increasingly came to see enlargement as 
disruptive to what had been his overriding foreign policy goal since the early postwar years, 
and consequently warmed to de Gaulle’s ideas of political unity à deux.842  
Thus, by October 1962 – as the British negotiations were about to move into their final 
stage – several ideas of ‘limited’ enlargement circled. The British, as Ludlow puts it, were 
“opposed by the two most powerful statesmen in continental Europe”. Denmark, Ireland and 
Norway, therefore, faced the same opposition. But there were also plans of letting Britain join, 
and possibly Denmark, while keeping Ireland and Norway on the outside, and other rumours 
of letting Denmark join, regardless of the other applicants. The government was now faced 
with the possibility that the door could be closed after the UK, and that Denmark might ‘slip 
in’ before it was thoroughly shut.  
At the EFTA ministerial meeting in Oslo, late October, Minister Gundersen laconically 
concluded that “nothing of significance” had happened in the Norwegian negotiations since 
July.843 The negotiations with the British had taken up most of the Community’s time: 
Combined with the hesitant declaration and the evasive attitude to the political integration, 
the Norwegian strategy was ‘mistaken’ for passivity and lack of political will among the Six. In 
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this situation, the question was how to convince the Community that Norway still wanted a 
full membership? 
 
Reassessment 
To counter the rumours of a ‘limited’ enlargement, the Danish government was quick to 
launch a diplomatic offensive. Danish ambassadors made enquiries to the governments of the 
Six, and they responded unanimously: Denmark would be allowed to join the EEC.844 In fact, 
they all welcomed a more or less simultaneous accession of Denmark and the United 
Kingdom.845 However, the Danish diplomats heard different things about Norway. Belgian 
Vice Foreign Minister Fayat, for example, while stressing that there were “no talks of 
association” for Denmark, brought up the considerable problems regarding both fishery and 
agriculture in regards to Norway.846  
Despite all the reassurances, the Danish government wanted to make sure they were on 
the right track.847 To convince the Six that Denmark should be “full and legitimate members 
and at the same time as Britain” the government restated its interest in participating in the 
political cooperation in Europe through a concerted effort. Jens Otto Krag and Foreign 
Minister Per Hækkerup increasingly stressed the political aspects of a Danish EC-membership 
both internally and publicly. At a ministerial meeting between Denmark and the Community, 
on November 12, 1962, Foreign Minister Hækkerup reiterated Krag’s political embrace of 
October 1961. 848  This diplomatic effort, historian Morten Rasmussen writes, “was 
supplemented by a European round-trip by Per Hækkerup to the capitals of the Six and 
Britain to explain the Danish attitude to the political dimension of the EC.”849 
Around the same time, the British negotiations seemed to regain their momentum. The 
limited support given by the Commonwealth countries, in September, was for a moment 
forgotten, after a surprisingly pro-European Conservative Party conference in October 1962. 
Simultaneously, Macmillan opened the long-awaited Conservative campaign to gain the 
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electorates support for joining the Community. 850  Furthermore, Heath, after travelling 
Europe in September and early October, was reaffirmed that “substantial goodwill towards 
British membership remained among the Six” and that many of the Five wanted to press 
ahead with the negotiations as fast as possible. The positive tone of Heath’s discussions in 
Bonn, for example, was therefore interpreted as very promising.851  At the EFTA ministerial 
meeting in Oslo, therefore, Heath proclaimed that Britain and the Six would meet every 
fourteenth day, and that this was a clear sign of the EEC’s wish to intensify negotiations to 
secure a rapid conclusion.852 Days after the EFTA-meeting, such prospects faded as the 
Community and Britain entered the quagmire of British domestic agriculture.853 
Still, throughout October, the Europeans must have had the clear impression that 
Denmark and Britain were on the move; that they were both responding to the rumours 
amongst the Six; and that Norway was the only country lagging behind. From Copenhagen 
the Europeans learned that the Danish had successfully disclaimed the rumours about their 
possible association. But it was still “doubtful if Norway could fulfil the demands of a full 
membership.”854 A few days later Director General Halvorsen painted a gloomy picture to 
Foreign Minister Lange:  
 
 “What may happen is that the United Kingdom (and Denmark) become members of the EEC 
and Norway will be left outside, possibly in cooperation with Sweden, trying for some sort of 
association with the EEC. We will, not only be politically isolated, we will lose the certainty of 
getting within the tariff barriers of a Common Market that will include the UK.”855  
 
Halvorsen urged the Foreign Minister to bring it up in his account before the parliament, and 
make “an unambiguous statement”. Three days later Halvorsen, together with Langeland, 
drafted Lange’s account to the parliament: the government should, as Denmark, underline its 
intention to obtain a full membership and will to participate in the future political cooperation 
of Europe.856 Ambassador to The Hague, Otto Kildal, recommended the Foreign Minister to 
declare these intentions to Paul-Henri Spaak and Commission President Hallstein at the next 
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Council of Ministers meeting, set for November 12.857 The same advice came from Paris: 
Norway now had to convince the Six that it wanted full membership, with all its 
consequences, through “some sort of propaganda effort.”858  From Stockholm the MFA was 
advised not to mention the agricultural problems, but instead, for tactical reasons, embrace 
the CAP.859 The same message came from Washington: The US still welcomed a Norwegian 
membership, but it was Norway, not the Community, that needed to show flexibility.860  
The British advice, Halvorsen reported, was to reduce the list of demands for special 
arrangements.861 As Langeland and Skarstein wrote to the Parliamentary Liaison Committee, 
Norway had to learn from the British negotiations. The Community was not inclined to 
discuss matters of principle: if Norway adhered to the Treaty of Rome practical solutions 
would be found. As Ludlow notes, the Six had repeatedly urged the British “to put their trust 
in the CAP, not simply as it was, but as it would develop once Britain had a strong voice 
within the Community”.862 This was precisely Langeland and Skarstein’s point: the applicants 
had to drop conflicting national solutions and adopt and work within the Community policies. 
This view they shared with several of the British negotiators. Heath – and many with him – 
hoped that the UK could “work through the Community machinery”, and Langeland and 
Skarstein urged the Norwegian government to follow suit.863 
Both the Danish political embrace and Heath’s notion of ‘working through the 
Community machinery’ substantially shaped the reassessment of the Europeans. Moreover, it 
was created in a climate of overwhelmingly negative reactions to the government’s 
declaration, from the Six, the US and the other applicants. The new strategy, to be 
implemented from November 1962 onwards, resonated with the communitarian thinking 
adopted by Langeland, Halvorsen, Skarstein and the rest of the Europeans, that now enjoyed 
the support of large part of the Foreign Service together with the political leadership of the 
MFA and the MoCS.864 By early November Foreign Minister Lange’s views were in perfect 
synch with the Europeans’ reassessment.865 	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Implementation 
With the support of Foreign Minister Lange, the Europeans implemented a major strategic 
shift. This came about quickly as the Europeans overwhelmingly inhabited the negotiation 
apparatus: State Secretary Engen was appointed as deputy chief negotiator, and the MFA and 
the MoCS shared the responsibility of coordinating the negotiations. On the recommendation 
of Engen and Skarstein, the MFA was given the authorisation to appoint representatives from 
within the MFA and from other ministries as they saw fit.866 Skarstein, Ibsen Jr. and Knut 
Frydenlund were sent to the Embassy in Brussels, while Solberg was placed as an observer 
with the EEC’s ad hoc secretariat created to handle the negotiations, and housed in the 
Council Secretariat in Brussels. At home the negotiation secretariat was established with 
Gudmund Saxrud and Paal Djønne (both MoCS), Arne Langeland (MFA) and Arne Lie 
(Bank of Norway, Norges Bank).867 Their assignment was, as Langeland wrote, to secure “as 
uniform as possible a view on questions of interpretation and presentation”.868 Furthermore, 
Halvorsen, Skarstein and Skaug were part of the negotiation delegation. In short, the 
Europeans enjoyed much freedom to appoint and compose the apparatus, and held most of the 
key positions within it.869 
As a first measure, Langeland suggested to set up four working groups in Brussels, as fast 
as possible. “A separate apparatus in Brussels would force a certain pace”, he argued, and 
“would in turn act as a catalyst and incentive for our own internal preparations.”870 In a 
meeting with Jean-François Deniau (director of external relations for the Commission), Engen 
aired the idea to set up a separate apparatus in Brussels. Deniau thought it to be a good idea, 
and went on to inform that the Commission intended to give the Norwegian government a 
questionnaire regarding the declaration of July 4.871  
The second measure was, as the Europeans had forcefully argued, to give a carefully 
balanced ‘embrace’ of the political implication of membership. On November 12, following 
Danish foreign minister Hækkerup’s convincing reaffirmation, Foreign Minister Lange, 	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balancing domestic constrains and demands from abroad, stated: “…Norway wished to 
participate in the cooperation that was on-going on the basis of the Treaties of the European 
Communities and contribute to the development of ever closer integration of the national 
economies.”872  Lange went as far as the Norwegian government could go in officially 
‘embracing’ the political implications. Already before the statement, when Lange discussed 
Norway’s acceptance of the political implications of the Community in the Storting, it had 
caused quite a stir and rumours of a non-confidence motion.873 Discussing the Council of 
Minister’s meeting with the ECFA, Lange explained that his statement was a clarification of 
Norway’s position and that it was ready to participate in the integration process, and “that we 
of course were aware that such a process had a political content.”874 He went on to echo the 
view of the Europeans: 
 
“I don’t think there is any doubt that it was favourable for the atmosphere of the negotiations, that 
Norway stated this in Brussels. Because it is evident that the reactions after a closer study of our 
declaration of July 4 (...) have been that we listed so many and such fundamental problems that 
they had to question whether the Norwegians really wanted a full membership, and wanted to 
participate in the integration process. At this point in Brussels, I though it was important and right 
that this misunderstanding was cleared up.”875 
 
The negotiation strategy had come full circle: Lange officially supported and fought for what 
the Europeans had maintained throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. Lange’s shift was 
well received in both the Commission and the by the US administration. However, it had not 
been cleared with the Storting in advance, and domestically he was now on thin ice.876 “The 
wish for membership had almost disappeared in all the problems we had listed”, he told 
ECFA, and this was what he had corrected. The MoCS soon shared Lange’s support of the 
‘new’ strategy. In December, Minister Gundersen informed the CIEC, that the rumours of a 
‘limited enlargement’ “were now buried”. Gundersen went on to explain that the experiences 
from the British had taught the Norwegian negotiators that a “Community approach”, as he 
called it, gave satisfactory results. It was:  
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“probably not possible to demand all sorts of imaginable and unimaginable matters resolved in 
advance. We had to keep this in mind, and we should view these questions from within, as 
members of the Community. The solutions to the problems that may occur, would be prepared by 
the Commission, that is an impartial European bureaucratic unit, where we will be 
represented.”877  
 
These were, looking back at the rhetoric up until the autumn of 1962, new and surprisingly 
strong statements in favour of negotiating with the EEC on the basis of trust. The source of 
this reassessment was, as we have seen, the Europeans. And in this case, Gundersen’s statement 
can be directly traced back to Langeland. In late November, Langeland suggested that the 
negotiation apparatus already prior to the entry “tried to assess the negotiation result that we 
can realistically hope for, then try to get political support in advance for a negotiation strategy 
that aims at this.” To ease the negotiations, the rule had to be – despite the expert ministries 
wish to have “guarantees for this and that” – not to bring up problems of future 
harmonisation. Langeland restated that he wanted the Norway to ‘work through the 
Community machinery’, and finished his memo by warning that if the government wanted to 
reserve themselves to details in the EEC already in the negotiations, “the EEC were justified 
in saying that we haven’t understood the point of joining a community”.878 
When de Gaulle gave his press conference, January 14 1963, unofficially closing the 
door on Britain, and therefore Denmark, Ireland and Norway, the government, spearheaded 
by the Europeans, were in the process of changing the entire negotiations strategy. The new 
approach, informed by the reactions from the Six and the US, inspired by the approaches of 
the Danish and British, and constructed by the Europeans – was based on trust. Forged through 
diplomatic practice, the notion of ‘working through the Community machinery’ or following a 
communitarian approach was internalised and became a part of the government’s strategy, at 
least in the two ministries dealing with the EC-case.879 
Regarding Denmark, historian Morten Rasmussen counterfactually concludes that it 
seems unlikely “that Denmark could have been excluded from the EC if the enlargement 
negotiations had succeeded after such a display of European enthusiasm.”880 This does not 
necessarily hold true for the Norwegian case. Though the embrace of the political implications 
of membership for the Europeans was based on a real internalisation of trust in the Community, 
and though this notion of ‘working through the Community machinery’ was adopted by the 	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MFA and MoCS – the ‘new’ strategy was largely untested, and Lange’s balanced statement in 
November, though a big step in the domestic context, was only seen as a small and necessary 
first step in Community circles.  
 
Silence 
The day after de Gaulle’s infamous press conference, State Secretary Hans Engen wrote to 
Foreign Minister Lange that Norway should stick to their plan – Britain would try to continue 
their negotiations, and so should Norway.881 Halvorsen, trying to analyse the situation, 
suggested that, if the negotiations stopped completely, the government should state publicly 
that it had lost its the best option. In the mean time Norway should strengthen the EFTA 
cooperation and coordinate trans-Atlantic economic policies within the OECD framework.882 
Langeland argued along the same lines. His main concern was the domestic mood: 
 
“Internally in Norway it must be equally important to try to intercept any reaction to the 
European policy and channel a possible unrest into new endeavours to expand Western 
cooperation in one shape or the other. (...) We must avoid any sense of disaster or calling into 
question of the economic arguments we have used regarding the benefit of membership in an 
expanded EEC.”883 
 
The plan, as envisioned by Engen, Halvorsen and Langeland, was to keep European 
cooperation on the agenda in order to seek solutions to short-term trade issues and in order to 
keep the membership option present domestically until a new situation occurred. In short, the 
idea was to return to the ‘old’ Atlantic rhetoric and practical cooperation within EFTA, while 
waiting for the ‘new’ solution to become attainable.884 
Lange was not overly optimistic regarding the reopening of negotiations. The only one 
able to bring President de Gaulle back to the table was Chancellor Adenauer. Lange rightly 
assessed that Adenauer was “too anxious to consolidate the Franco-German alliance to be 
willing to expose the relationship with France to any strain”. But he agreed with the rest of the 
analysis of the Europeans: should the negotiations officially stop, Norway had to return to 
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882 UD 44.36/6.84–22 – 18.01.1963 – J. Halvorsen – Memo. The breakdown of the negotiations with the EEC.  
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EFTA, and – importantly – find forums and ways to maintain contact with the EEC.885 For 
the time being the government could do little but to wait and see.886 
As of January 29, after a last meeting, the negotiations between the British and the Six 
were suspended indefinitely. Enduring pressure and accusations from the other Five and the 
British, Couve stood his ground and could only repeat his President’s conclusion: Britain did 
not fulfil the requirements of the Treaty of Rome, and could therefore not join. This was a 
conclusion that none of the other parties, except perhaps for an increasingly isolated 
Chancellor Adenauer, agreed with. The last efforts ended on a bitter note.887  
With the membership issue officially out of the picture, the Central Committee of the 
Labour Party and the NCTU issued a joint statement that unequivocally re-established the 
Atlantic strategy. The Norwegian government would work for the “widest possible 
cooperation with a united Western Europe in close contact with North America and all peace-
loving nations”.888 There seems to have been general agreement on this return. What it meant 
for the long-term prospect of membership in the EEC, on the other hand, was both unclear 
and disputed. On the one hand, Prime Minister Gerhardsen held a press conference to disarm 
the ‘no’-side: there was no need for an anti-membership campaign, he argued, because 
Norway now “must see what Britain does”, and make cooperation in EFTA as effective as 
possible.889 For Gerhardsen, the EC-debacle had first and foremost been an internal party 
problem and his main concern now was to heal the wounds.890  
Foreign Minister Lange, on the other hand, struck a slightly different chord. Lange 
wanted to “maintain the opportunity to resume real negotiations for a solution that unites 
Western Europe (...) on the broadest possible basis”.891 In the foreign policy debate in the 
Storting, following the counsel of Halvorsen, Lange held that, “the best solution, and the lasting 
solution, which we had hoped to find through an enlarged EEC, we now have to forego, at 
least for the indefinite future”.892 While Lange, and the Europeans with him, may have hoped 	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886 UD 44.36/6.84 N – 26.01.1963, Oslo – E. Berg – Minutes: Meeting of the negotiation delegation 23.01.1963. 
887 N. Piers Ludlow Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC, Cambridge: Cambridge (1997), 
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LANDSORGANISASJON and the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the LABOUR PARTY, called to discuss the 
breakdown of the negotiations. 
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the Common Market at a press conference on February 11. 
890 Bergh Storhetstid (1987), p. 502. 
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Liaison Committee, February 4, 1963. 
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that membership of the EEC would continue to be the long-term aim of the government, it 
was apparent from the speeches of the various parliamentary leaders, that this aim was now 
generally regarded as unattainable. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s appeal to the ‘no’-side to ‘call 
off the fight’ gave the impression that membership was no longer a live issue for the Labour 
Party.893 
With the membership issue now off the political agenda, the Europeans moved on to the 
next battle: to try to retain as much of the diplomatic apparatus as possible. At the last 
negotiation delegation in February, Engen argued to keep “a core of EEC-experts” and the 
apparatus at home more or less intact.894 Both the diplomats and the political leadership of 
the MFA had come to terms with the fact that a Norwegian presence in the Community had 
to be slightly downscaled, but as Halvorsen said: “it is not satisfactory to have a representation 
so small that what we manage to cover is more or less random. We should also be up to date 
with regard to possible future negotiations with the EEC.”895 Halvorsen gathered supporting 
statements from the Ambassadors Jørgensen (Brussels) and Sommerfelt (EFTA), and sent the 
memo to Engen who immediately sent a memo to Lange. Repeating what Halvorsen wrote he 
added that both the Danish and British delegation in Brussels was to be expanded. He could 
agree to cut two positions at the Norwegian Embassy, further cuts would be “irrational” and 
the remaining five positions was “the absolute minimum”.896 
But the MFA had to retreat further still.897 End of March, the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) demanded that all extra appointments in Brussels were to be recalled, all assistants were 
to be relocated and that the expense account of the Embassy in Brussels was to be set at the 
same level as before the negotiations.898 The situation frustrated many of the Europeans. Chargé 
d’Affaires to Brussels, Asbjørn Skarstein complained that the cuts were “hardly defendable” 
and maintained that it would be “an invaluable benefit” to have more people employed.899 
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Since the abrupt French de facto veto, the remaining five had sought to keep channels 
open to ensure that Britain did not rethink their entire European alignment. Four months 
later, however, remarkably little had materialised of the contacts between Britain and the 
friendly five. Essentially, the problem faced by the Benelux countries, West Germany and 
Italy was to strike a balance between marking a properly measured dissent from the French 
position; keeping the British as close as possible; and reviving the Community. By June all 
parties, including the French, were keen to settle the issue, which threatened to keep the EEC 
from regaining its vigour. Rather than settling on a consultation mechanism between the Six 
and the UK within the Community, which – as the French and the Commission argued – 
could endanger the solidarity and working methods of the Six, a solution outside was chosen. 
July 11, the Six and Britain agreed to quarterly meetings within the framework of the Western 
European Union (WEU). Headquartered in Brussels, the Commission would also take part in 
the discussions. Thus, a compromise – satisfactory to all – had been reached.900 
News of the links in the making sparked a renewed effort from the Europeans and the 
political leadership of the MFA to maintain its manpower in Brussels. Late in May, Lange and 
Skaug (now Ambassador to London), met with Heath. In direct opposition to the position 
taken by the majority of government, Lange stated that Norway would be interested in 
consultations through the WEU. Heath, acutely aware of the delicate balance found regarding 
their own consultations, replied that “the best approach would be to try to secure consultation 
for the United Kingdom first and slip the Norwegians and the Danes in gradually”.901 
With this Skarstein and Engen jointly drafted a long memo to the Foreign Minister.902 It 
was a point-by-point rebuttal of the flawed strategy of low-key presence chosen by the 
government. First, they argued that both the fishery and agricultural attaché had to stay in 
Brussels. Keeping the fishery attaché, for example, was essential since the planned common 
fishery policy of the Community would be of “the utmost importance for Norway”. Second, 
Skarstein and Engen pointed to the fact that the Commission had expressed the importance of 
solid contacts between themselves and the applicant countries. Third, the other EFTA 	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901 FO 371/171383 – 22.05.1963 – Meeting with Mr. Lange, Norwegian Foreign Minister and Norwegian 
Ambassador, May 15. Opting for a solution within the WEU, which was limited to the Six and the UK, it is probable 
that Heath knew that there was scant hope of delivering upon his promises. The British were in effect admitting that 
the issue of on going relations between the Community and its neighbours was to be solved by Britain and the Six, 
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902 UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 28.05.1963, Oslo – Chr. Brinch and T. Stokke – To the MFA. The foreign economic work 
by the Embassy in Brussels; UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 29.05.1963, Oslo – H. Engen and A. Skarstein – Memo to the 
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countries had all strengthened their delegations to the Community. “[W]e are dealing with 
Norway's representation to a European major power [and] our absolute biggest and most 
important trading partner”, the memo ended, “[t]he evaluation of our representation must be 
viewed in this light, and not in the light of the shifting situation with regard to our negotiations 
with the Community.”903 In a rare personal letter, Foreign Minister Lange took the European’s 
point directly to the Minister of Finance Andreas Cappelen: "I think it is clear, on the basis of 
what is stated above, that a reduction of staff in Brussels as proposed by the MoF, will not 
satisfy the legitimate demands of a Norwegian representation in Brussels necessary for our 
commercial interests."904In fact, Lange – clearly angered by the line chosen by his government 
– now suggested adding personnel to the Brussels Embassy. Prime Minister Gerhardsen and 
the majority of the cabinet were highly critical of the approach taken by Lange, and in the 
end he was forced to retreat from his stance.905 
 By the summer of 1963, Britain had greatly expanded its representation in Brussels and 
formalised its contacts with the EEC through the WEU. Sweden had increased its presence in 
Brussels (almost matching the UK) and Denmark was expanding too.906 By contrast, the 
British ambassador to Oslo could report that, “no effort has been made to establish a so-called 
permanent contact with the EEC on a ministerial level”907, and later concluded: “there seems 
little doubt that, as regards contacts with the EEC, the Norwegian Government will be 
content to let other people make the running. There are no indications that the Norwegians 
are in the least unhappy about our new arrangement with WEU”.908 The MFA and MoCS 
complaints that “Norway was the only one of [the EFTA] countries that had not established 
any form of contact beyond diplomatic representation in Brussels” fell on deaf ears. Almost a 
year after de Gaulle’s veto, and only after prolonged discussions, the Government could 
barely agree to “establish some contact with the EEC in the not too distant future”.909 Only a 
month thereafter hopes of such contacts vanished as state secretary to the MFA, Jens Boyesen 
regretfully noted that contacts at the ministerial level should be kept to a minimum to avoid 
agonising debates.910 The official policy was silence. 	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Conclusions: the Europeans and their policy 
 
Within three years, the Europeans, and through them the political leadership of the MFA and 
MoCS, had fundamentally changed their attitude towards European integration – from 
distrust, via acquiescence, to eagerness. Their rethink of the entire Norwegian negotiation 
strategy in the autumn of 1962, and the passionate appeals to retain manpower in Brussels 
after de Gaulle’s veto, revealed the normative and emotional ties with the cause.  
It is evident that the shift started when the Norwegian government’s only strategy 
disappeared and left a massive decision-making vacuum to be filled by the Europeans. They 
were professionally convinced that membership was the only available option, but also gained 
an unusual ownership of the policy choice. A nucleus of Europeans managed to convince the 
foreign policy leadership of the need for membership, but after, the British, Danish and Irish 
applications followed nearly a year of indecision from the government. This prolonged 
decision-making process only hardened the Europeans’ resolve, as they staunchly defended a 
policy that, in large part, they had created. In the pre-negotiation contacts between the 
Community and the Norwegian government, following a reserved Norwegian declaration, the 
Europeans learned to embrace the political implications of membership. This marks the last 
stage in the consolidation of the Europeans: what began as a strategy of trust became – through 
their diplomatic practice and adaptation of ideas from the Community via the Danish and 
British – actual trust. By the fall of 1962, the Europeans had adopted important elements of the 
Communitarian language,  – and juxtaposed themselves against displays of Norwegian 
distrust in ‘Europe’.  
The reason the Europeans recommended membership (and not association) was essentially 
political, and it was shaped by interactions with diplomats, politicians and officials from the 
Six, Denmark, the UK and the US. Norway’s traditional ally, the USA, informed the 
Europeans that it hoped Norway – as a NATO-member – would apply for full membership. 
The British informed them that Norway could only rely on Britain’s bargaining strength if it 
applied for full membership. And the Community informed them that it only accepted 
requests for associated memberships from underdeveloped or neutral countries. Confronted 
with this, the Europeans started a meticulous recalibration and reformulation of Norwegian 
foreign policy and created a narrative and line of argumentation, which placed membership 
in the EEC in continuation of Norway’s postwar policy. This stand was perhaps only a 
rhetorical manifestation of the geo-political changes that had taken place but, apart from fears 
of loss of markets, the explicit weight put on continuity – that it was not a break with the past 
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– became one of the most important arguments in the referendum 10 years later. Indeed, 
continued ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ were the main mantras of the Europeans and the foreign 
policy elites in the campaigns of 1971-72. 
What we see, therefore, is that the Europeans themselves and the government’s foreign 
policy were transnationally constituted by their continuous interpretation and mediation of 
ideas, ideologies, language, positions and material concerns through diplomatic practice. With 
de Gaulle’s veto of January 14, 1963, the membership issue was soon ‘actively forgotten’ by 
the majority of the Norwegian political elite, and the path chosen by the government was one 
of silence. It is against this background we need to understand the Europeans’ increasing 
participation in informal and non-governmental pro-European networks. 
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The Second Round 
Politicised Diplomacy, 1962-1971 
 
“The combination of working for a Movement and engaging in information efforts  
regarding European matters, is not always beneficial.”911 
Tim Greve speaking to the Working Committee of the EMN (December 1967). 
 
The two chapters of the second round explore the politicisation of the Europeans between de 
Gaulle’s first veto and the Centre-Right coalition’s demise in March 1971. Politicisation 
happened in two ways: first, through the involvement in pro-European networks and 
organisations with efforts to keep membership on the agenda in the mid-1960s, and second, in 
administrative and political battles with EC-sceptics, particularly Prime Minister Borten of the 
Centre-Right coalition. As will be argued, overwhelmingly pro-European forces crowded the 
new diplomatic spaces where the Europeans operated. And it was with these forces that the 
Europeans became entangled, via information campaigns, most importantly through their entry 
into the European Movement in Norway (EMN) in 1965-67. This gives a whole new 
dimension to how the Europeans worked with the EC-case in the 1970s, particularly in relation 
to public diplomacy and information, which were coordinated through these networks. In the 
mid-1960s, the Europeans became boundary-spanners for the European cause. 
The Europeans’ political affiliations were instrumental in these processes of politicisation. 
The social democratic connection shaped early information efforts and the Europeans’ entry 
into the EMN. Their professional and personal links to Foreign Minister Lange and to the 
foreign policy orientation he represented, pulled them into official participation in the EMN, 
as Lange left the MFA in 1965 to become chairman of that very organisation. Equally, the 
Conservative-Labour alignment on this issue, and their dominance within the MFA and 
among the Europeans, was crucial to their resistance against the so-called Nordek negotiations 
that took place between 1968 and 1970. The growing tensions between Borten and the 
Europeans, in particular, would reveal just how politicised they had become, and how much the 
EC-sceptics distrusted them. 
The MFA, EMN, Labour and the Conservatives all helped produce the same discourse 
the Europeans had been instrumental in articulating in the early 1960s: membership was an 
economic necessity. But even more important was the political orientation, continued Atlantic 
anchoring, and peace and security as it had been established in the late 1940s. 
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Chapter 8 
Boundary Spanners for the European cause 
 
“As you may know, the ‘European activities’ 
 in this country have experienced a slump during the last half-year. 
However, we are now reorganising this committee,  
and there will be a new office in Oslo from new year”912 
 
EMN secretary Erik Hoff to Mr. Zöldi (December 1963). 
 
The time between de Gaulle’s first veto in January of 1963, and Britain’s second attempt at 
joining the EEC in 1966-67, is often described as an eventless period in Norwegian-
Community relations. In political terms, this is true: the government, the Labour Party and 
the Storting on the whole took the French 1963-veto calmly, and most politicians were, as 
historian Helge Pharo puts it, “greatly relieved” that the EEC-debacle was over. 913 
Furthermore, as seen above, any form of dense diplomatic contact with the EEC was 
effectively shut down in 1963 – Norway returned to its Atlantic outlook.  
Just as Gerhardsen had before, the Centre-Right coalition – taking office in 1965 – 
moved very carefully as the EC-issue re-emerged in 1966-67. They hoped for a long period of 
peace concerning the European question, and when the divisive issue reappeared, a policy 
securing coherence was chosen. 914  Accordingly, there was little public debate and few 
suggestions of intensified official connections with the Community.915 Membership was not 
discussed in any detail in the foreign policy debates in the Storting between 1963 and 1966, and 
it was a non-issue during the election campaign of 1965. The issue was “not only put on ice, it 
was placed at the bottom of the deep-freezer.”916 Due to this political silence, this period is 
also gravely understudied in the Norwegian historiography.917 
However, based largely on hitherto unexplored archives918, this chapter will argue that 
it was precisely during this period of inaction on the shifting governments’ part, that a broad 
pro-European network – which the Europeans became a part of – took shape, expanded and 
formalised its links. As will be argued, the Europeans went from being passive and peripheral 
participants in the early attempts of an information campaign (1962-63), to centrally placed 
contributors – interlinking the Norwegian Council of the European Movement (NCEM, by 1965 	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renamed the European Movement in Norway (EMN)); the MFA and administrative apparatus; the 
various foreign connections; the economic interest groups; and the membership positive 
political parties. The combination of the Europeans’ boundary-spanning diplomatic capacities 
and wholly pro-European connections, and their frustration with the government and 
conviction that membership was the right solution, made them take on new and important 
roles within these networks. The transition culminated, and this chapter ends, with the 
Europeans enrolling en masse in the EMN, and the MFA officially funding its activities (1965-67). 
The immediate repercussions of this development were not dramatic. But it is impossible to 
understand how the Europeans worked with the subsequent Nordek and EC negotiations, and 
the referendum campaign, without first exploring how they became boundary-spanners for 
the Europeans’ cause. 
 
The European Committee (1962-1963) 
Early attempts to coordinate an information effort directed towards the public, grew out of 
four interlinked concerns. First, the long internal decision-making process of the Labour Party 
preferred by Prime Minister Gerhardsen, from the summer of 1961 to the early spring of 
1962, had revealed considerable and growing scepticism towards Norway applying for 
membership in the EEC.919 Second, the parliamentary white paper presented in October 
1961 had, even without a clear conclusion, created much opposition in the Storting and the 
ECFA. Specifically, there was strong criticism of the Europeans for downplaying the negative 
effects of membership, and not investigating the association alternative seriously. The early 
and uncoordinated efforts of the Europeans to inform the public and parliament on the matter 
did little to change this perception.  
Third, a call for a referendum by the radical liberal newspaper, Dagbladet, and the 
Liberal Party (Venstre) – difficult to ignore once it was on the table – made public opinion 
much more important.920 Important segments of society had organised – academics, trade 
unionists, artists, parliamentarians, teachers, farmers and fishermen – and were actively 
working against membership. Movements like ‘De 143’ and ‘Opplysningsutvalget av 1962’, though 
still not organised across the right-left axis, had mass appeal; the response from the public 
both surprised and scared the administrative, economic and political elites.921 Last, after many 
years of general disinterest in the European question, polls conducted as late as March 1962 	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920 Already the day after the British decision to apply for membership July 1961, the newspaper Dagbladet called for 
an advisory referendum, and got vague backing from the Liberal Party leader Bent Røiseland. Tor Bjørklund Hundre 
år med folkeavstemninger: Norge og Norden, 1905-2005, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (2005), p. 100. 
921 Bjørklund Mot Strømmen (1982), p. 38-43; Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering (1997), p. 332. 
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revealed that a considerable segment of the electorate could not name the six member states 
of the EEC, and that 16 % had never heard of it.922 This was unsettling, as the whole issue 
could be settled by a referendum in the not too distant future.923 In this climate, those in 
favour of membership saw the urgent need for a flow of positive and illuminating information.  
In the spring and summer of 1962, therefore, business organisations, pro-European 
forces within the government, and the NCEM started planning for a “ceaseless information 
campaign” to counter the “false propaganda regarding the Common Market going on” and 
“get talking with ‘the common man’”. 924  By early June a number of meetings and 
conversations regarding the need for an information campaign took place. The Labour 
Party’s parliamentary group and ESCFA’s decision in favour of a consultative referendum, on 
April 10 and 12 respectively, fuelled the spike in activity.925 Immediately thereafter, at a 
meeting held in the University’s Old Ballroom, Foreign Minister Lange gave clear advice to 
NCEM: “We have a significant and unmet need for an unbiased and objective information 
service, and the Norwegian Council of the European Movement have a mission that I hope it 
will commence with full force in the coming months.”926 The NCEM acted on Lange’s 
encouragement.927 During the following months, the board decided to create a ’coordinating 
body’ for the upcoming information campaign and to create a committee “with the aim of 
Norwegian membership being accepted through a referendum”.928 Chairman of NCEM 
Chief Justice Terje Wold – a senior Labour politician and former Minister of Justice – then 
called several meetings to find people willing to take part in, and a chairman to head ‘The 
European Committee’, as it was to be called.929  
In order to find future members and get the Committee up and running, Wold 
contacted the MFA for help. Soon, secretary Magne Reed was given leave from the MFA to 
work as secretary for The European Committee for one year.930 More importantly, future 
private secretary to Lange, Knut Frydenlund did “quite a lot of work to bring the original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
922 Eriksen and Pharo Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering (1997), p. 333 
923 As seen above Minister of Commerce & Shipping, Arne Skaug, had noted the need for information to the public 
as early as September 1961, in a conversation with Ludwig Erhard. UD 44.36/6.84-3 – 22.09-1961 – E. Løchen – 
Memo. Conversation between Ministers Skaug and Erhard in Bonn. 
924 NSA–7B–16 – 10.02.1962 – J. Ihlen – To O. Malterud. The Common Market and the Social Liberal Party; NSA–
7B–16 – 30.04.1962 – Memo. The Common Market – Inf. efforts. 
925 Trond Gabrielsen Med en følelse av fellesskap. Samarbeidstanken som omskapte Europa, Oslo: Grøndahl & Søn Forlag 
A/S (1975), p. 49; UUKK 12.04.1962. 
926 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Statement from the chairman, no. 56, 10.06.1962. Speech by Foreign Minister 
Halvard Lange, EMN’s meeting at the University’s old Ballroom, 11.04.1962. 
927 The NCEM was also encouraged by Chief Justice Jens Chr. Hauge. 
928 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Summary. 
929 The full name was The Committee for Norwegian membership in the European Communities’. 
930 NSA–7B–16 - 05.06.1962, Oslo - O. Malterud - Memo, D. Hirsch. Information Campaign. Common Market. 
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members together”.931 In July of 1962, Knut Frydenlund was sent to Brussels as permanent 
press attaché. From the MFA: “in connection with the necessary information campaign here 
at home, it would be helpful to have a man in Brussels with the responsibility of getting 
material for this work”. 932  Apparently Frydenlund did much more. With his excellent 
connections as part of the Labour Party’s polito-administrative core, he helped bring together 
a powerful group of Norway’s political, legal and economic elite for the institutive meeting of 
The European Committee.933 These were early signs of the Europeans’ boundary spanning for 
the cause. 
Though they were not members of the Committee, powerful figures such as Asbjørn 
Petter Østberg, Konrad Nordahl, Sjur Lindebrække,934 and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen 
were all involved in shaping it into a broad committee, “established on its own”, and without 
clear ties to any one particular organisation.935 The NCEM’s direct participation, for instance, 
would make the ‘neutral’ organisation too blatantly pro-European. It would smack of 
supranationalism and federalism – not a very helpful combination for Norwegian domestic 
politics.936 Wold, as it turned out, agreed. He opened the institutive meeting by stressing that 
the NCEM “should not have anything whatsoever to do with the information campaign 
directly”.937 Then all of NCEM’s participating members withdrew their names from the 
European Committee once it had been established.938 
Moreover, the European Committee could only have hidden government backing, as it 
was meant to be a ‘non-party affair’.939  However, Gerhardsen and Lindebrække’s first 
suggestion for a ‘neutral’ chairman – famous nuclear physician Gunnar Randers – was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
931 FO 371/171357 – 22.01.1963, Oslo – J. F. Walker – Report on the Committee for Norwegian Adherence to the 
Common Market. Dear Copeman. 
932 UD 44.36/6.84 B. - File 1 – June 27, 1962, Oslo – Tor Myklebost, Presseavdelingen – Notat til 
Utenriksministeren. 
933 The August 2 institutive meeting was attended by Chief Justice Wold, Secretary Eivind Berdahl (National 
Committee for International Youth Work), Chief Justice Jens Chr. Hauge, shipping director Per Hegnar, Labour 
Party secretary Lie, secretary Kåre Norum (Chairman of the Norwegian Union of Teachers, active in the resistance 
movement during the war), director Randers, secretary Reed (MFA), and Chief Justice Wikborg.  
934 Leader of the Norwegian Employers’ Confederation (NEC), Leader of the NCTU and Conservative Party Leader, 
respectively. 
935 NSA–7B–16 - 05.06.1962, Oslo - O. Malterud - Memo, D. Hirsch. Information Campaign. Common Market.  
936 After the departure of Duncan Sandys, Winston Churchill’s son-in-law, as leader of the European Movement, in 
1950, the Movement gained a much more federalist profile with Paul-Henri Spaak (1950-55), Robert Schuman 
(1955-61), Maurice Faure (1961-68) and Walter Hallstein (1968-74) as Presidents. John Pinder “The Influence of 
European Federalists in the 1950s” in Thorsten B. Olesen (Ed), Interdependence Versus Integration, Odense University 
Press: Odense (1995), pp. 213-245, p. 226-227. 
937 NSA–7B–16 – 06.08.1962, Oslo – A. P. Østberg, Director NEC – Regarding the Common Market. 
938 NSA–7B–17  – 23.10.1962, Oslo – E. Wikborg – Memo. 
939 FO 371/171357 – 22.01.1963, Oslo – J. F. Walker – Report on the Committee for Norwegian Adherence to the 
Common Market. Dear Copeman. 
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scrapped.940 The Prime Minister’s brother, Rolf Gerhardsen941, had warned that Randers, a 
strong protagonist of nuclear power, would provoke “a nuclear struggle” within the Labour 
Party. As the anti-nuclear and anti-EEC movements on the left overlapped, Randers would be 
a poor choice as chairman.942 The Prime Minister took action, calling on Trygve Lie to 
become the Committee’s chairman instead.943 This choice was obviously less party-neutral. 
But with Trygve Lie, the Government had secured an elder statesman with considerable 
foreign policy capital who was loyal to the Prime Minister, and who was not too obviously 
linked to any of the factions within the Labour Party.944 
At a funding meeting in late October 1962945, a budget of “no less than 2 million” was 
secured with sizeable contributions from various business sectors.946 The business sector, 
however, wanted to keep a low profile as it already dominated the funding. A high-profile role 
would be counter-productive when trying to reach ‘the common man’, they argued.947 In fact, 
all the powerful segments of society wanted the European Committee to be established, but 
few wanted to be explicitly linked to it.  
Following a careful strategy, then, to avoid provoking EC-sceptics unnecessarily, it was 
decided that the European Committee should go public when it was reasonably certain that 
British negotiations would succeed. Following several meetings between Wold and Haakon 
Lie, and coinciding with the opening of the final phase of British negotiations with the EEC 
on October 27, 1962, the European Committee felt certain enough to proclaim its 
establishment in a leading newspaper948: 
 
“Just as our foreign policy’s fundamental principles up until now have gathered support from an 
overwhelming majority of the people, cutting across party boundaries and interest conflicts that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
940 NSA–7B–16 – 06.08.1962, Oslo – A. P. Østberg – Regarding the Common Market. 
941 Leader of Oslo Labour Party. 
942 NSA–7B–17 – 06.09.1962, Oslo – P. Johansen – Conversation with Rolf Gerharden (R.G).  
943 FO 371/171357 – 22.01.1963, Oslo – J. F. Walker – Report on the Committee for Norwegian Adherence to the 
Common Market. Dear Copeman. Trygve Lie was foreign minister during the war, in the grand coalition following 
the war, and in the first Labour Government (November 1945), until he – February 1946 – became the first 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
944 FO 371/171357 – 22.01.1963, Oslo – J. F. Walker – Report on the Committee for Norwegian Adherence to the 
Common Market. Dear Copeman. 
945 NSA–7B–17 – 23.10.1962, Oslo – E. Wikborg – Memo. Invited were: Cand. Oecon. Per Dragland (NCTU); 
Director Knut Hald, Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI); Director Per M. Hansson, Storebrand; Director T. 
Kokaas, Norwegian Commercial Association (NCA); Director Malterud, NSA; Bank Manager Melander, 
Creditbanken; Director Kaare Pettersen, Norwegian Bankers’ Association (NBA); General Director Østbye, Norsk 
Hydro; Director Aavatsmark, Federation of Norwegian Forrest Owners (FNFO). 
946 NSA–7B–17  – 01.11.1962, Oslo – M. Reed – Memo. Meeting regarding funding of the European Committee’s 
work. 30.10.1962. 50 % was to come from the industry, 20 % from the banking sector, 20 % from the shipping 
community, and 10 % from commerce, insurance and professional organizations. 
947 NSA–7B–18 - 03.12.1962 – Cooperation with the European Committee. 
948 AA - Haakon Lie - Df/A/053/4/1/L0003. They met 01.08, 27.08, 06.09, 11.09, 17.09, 06.10, 23.10.1962. 
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create divisions in other questions, the Committee for Norwegian membership in the European 
Communities [European Committee] has gathered supporters and co-workers representing 
different political views, professions and interests.”949 
 
As agreed, the Committee portrayed itself as a broad coalition working in favour of 
membership in the EEC, and framed membership as a continuation of Norwegian postwar 
foreign policy. As the British negotiations moved into its final stages, the Committee hoped it 
could finally start its ‘ceaseless information campaign’.  
Yet the campaign never got off the ground. Before the European Committee could 
agree on its course of action, the membership negotiations were brought to a definite halt by 
de Gaulle’s veto. Still, it was remarkable that a Committee of such esteemed people, with solid 
funding and a common aim, were unable to organise any sort of campaign for almost three 
months. A dispatch from the UK embassy in Oslo gives a clear indication of why this was the 
case: “on establishment it had great difficulty in getting itself organised internally and suffered 
from being too large and top heavy, with too many important people with half thought out 
ideas, and too few to work these out to their proper conclusions and put them into 
practice.”950  
Though it was meant to be a broad ‘people’s movement’, the European Committee was 
dominated by big names from the political, legal and economic elite and had only vague plans 
for a general information campaign.951 Cutting out the NCEM, who had expert knowledge in 
planning such events and producing information material, and with very limited involvement 
by the Europeans, who were the most knowledgeable people regarding the negotiations and the 
EEC, the Committee could lay claim to very little actual expertise. Furthermore, the British 
reported that the European Committee “found some difficulty in persuading the institutions 
with which they wished to co-operate, that they were non-political and only wished to present 
the facts about the Common Market.”952 This seems very plausible, and indeed not too 
surprising. The image of ‘neutrality’ was clearly difficult to maintain with so many Labour 
politicians involved. It would take almost ten years for the government and pro-European 
forces to recognise that no amount of general information or so-called political neutrality 
would address the problems raised by those opposed to membership. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
949 Aftenposten – 29.10.1962. The statement was written by G. Randers, T. Wold and M. Reed. NSA–7B–16 – 
06.08.1962, Oslo – A. P. Østberg – Regarding the Common Market. 
950 FO 371/171357 – 22.01.1963, Oslo – J. F. Walker – Report on the Committee for Norwegian Adherence to the 
Common Market. Dear Copeman. 
951 NSA–7B–17 – 23.10.1962, Oslo – E. Wikborg – Memo. 
952 FO 371/171357 – 22.01.1963, Oslo – J. F. Walker – Report on the Committee for Norwegian Adherence to the 
Common Market. Dear Copeman. 
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The most important reason for the Committee’s impotence, however, was Prime 
Minister Gerhardsen’s manoeuvring. He kept the Committee from ever being an effective 
organisation. This is evident from an argument between Trygve Lie and Gerhardsen at a top 
brass meeting of the Labour Party in November. Lie complained that the Committee had 
“plenty of funds, but few ideas or organisations through which they could work, and would be 
glad to trade the former for the latter”. He had hoped for close collaboration with, and much 
help from, the Labour movement. Gerhardsen intervened and forcefully emphasised that the 
Labour Movement “must not compromise [itself] by accepting material, and least of all 
money from the Committee”. The Committee should not expect to pick up speed until it was 
clear that Norwegian membership in the EEC was imminent. This left Lie, and many others 
present, “fretfully wondering why the government had encouraged the formation of the 
Committee, and what the latter was expected to do with itself for the time being”.953 
In a sense, the European Committee was a product of the Labour Party State’s 
corporate machinery. Personnel, money and ideas flowed freely between parties, organisations 
and ministries. Still, the membership issue was divisive, both within the Labour Party and 
among the general public. Wary of the reactions from both the left wing and ‘the common 
man’, neither business circles nor the government wanted to get their hands dirty. Instead, a 
not very convincing ‘neutral’ profile was chosen. 
The Europeans were not actively and directly participating in these early attempts at an 
information campaign. This is important because it shows that although leading multilateral 
economic diplomats, such as Langeland, Halvorsen, Berg, Solberg, Ibsen Jr. and Skarstein 
had become professionally convinced Europeans, they were not politicised to such a degree as 
to break with established diplomatic norms. Engaging with the public through organised 
campaigns was still uncharted territory for diplomats in the early 1960s. Reed and 
Frydenlund’s partaking in the European Committee were early signs of the Europeans playing 
the role of ‘boundary-spanners’ in the information campaign. Terje Wold had requested help 
from the MFA, and Foreign Minister Lange had nudged the two diplomats in this direction. 
However, Reed was only a secretary and Frydenlund kept a safe distance. Perhaps direct 
involvement was unnecessary within the Labour Party State. They could, as Frydenlund did, 
help out the Committee from afar. In fact, the Europeans first got directly involved as a 
consequence of the enduring passiveness of the Labour Party and the tensions within the 
Centre-Right coalition: as sand was gathering in the governmental machinery, and tacit 	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Common Market. Dear Copeman. 
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norms broke down, the Europeans chose – and were chosen to – the informal arenas. 
 
The merger: 1963-1964 
After de Gaulle’s veto, it seemed like the EC-issue vanished just as fast as it had appeared. The 
European Committee, though, did not cease to exist. As a lack of general information 
regarding the EEC was evident; the respective No-movements had decided to continue their 
work; and Norway’s relationship with the Community was important regardless of the 
membership issue, the Committee informed, on February 22, 1963, the public that it would: 
 
“[C]ontinue its work, in close contact with the Norwegian Council of the European Movement 
[NCEM], to give unbiased information about the further developments, and, together with the 
democratic forces in other countries, work for the realisation of the fundamental ideas of the 
Community, in a united Europe in close contact with the North American democracies.”954 
 
With immediate membership off the table, and more long-term European cooperation back 
on the agenda, the NCEM re-entered the stage. Reed sought the advice of his MFA 
colleagues, Europeans Eivinn Berg and Arne Langeland. Berg was sceptical about the merger 
because the European Committee and the NCEM served fundamentally different purposes. 
The Committee was a typical action committee, viewed by the public “as a propaganda 
committee linked with the referendum”. The NCEM, on the other hand, had a longer history, 
and had largely stayed away from the membership debacle. “For these reasons, the EMN is 
probably better equipped [...] to head an active and productive education and propaganda 
effort in the current situation”. Berg thought the work of the NCEM could be “compromised 
by this statement of formal cooperation”. Langeland, the more senior of the two, thought it was 
a tricky question: yes, the NCEM was probably more ‘objective’ in the eyes of the public, but 
did they have the manpower and the means to carry out systematic and long-term work?955  
In a letter to Jahn Halvorsen inviting him to a meeting on the merger issue, Reed 
argued that since the NCEM and the Committee had overlapping members, and since the 
Committee had managed to establish a far-reaching network of regional offices, the 
Committee should be absorbed by the NCEM. Once membership negotiations were back on 
the table – the thinking was – the Committee could be resurrected to take on the propaganda 
efforts directly linked with the referendum. To Reed’s mind the Committee would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
954 Aftenposten – 22.02.1963. At the same time the chairman, Trygve Lie, resigned and left it to Gunnar Randers to 
lead the Committee. Aftenposten – 29.03.1963. 
955 UD 44.36/6.84 P.–1 – 18.04.1963, Oslo – E. Berg – Memo to Langeland. The European Committee. Remarks to 
Reed’s memo. 
	  	   231	  
“betrayed its mission” if it did not “make use of the intermediate time to build a nation-wide 
organisation”.956  
While there were few written records of communication between the Europeans and the 
Committee until January 1963, the memos and letters appearing after the veto had a distinct 
familiarity and ‘matter of courseness’ to them. With Lange, Frydenlund and Reed957 involved 
in setting up the Committee, it is highly probable that the remaining Europeans such as 
Halvorsen, Langeland, Skarstein and Berg kept in touch with Magne Reed during the 
Committee’s short-lived and unsuccessful campaign. It is equally likely that this connection 
was kept largely ‘off the books’, as formal connections with the MFA would send the wrong 
signals.958 Once the membership issue was out of the public eye, Halvorsen, Langeland and 
Berg were formally drawn into the discussions. All the Europeans recommended continuing the 
information campaign while being cautious not to unnecessarily taint the NCEM. By March 
of 1964, the NCEM leadership could present the amalgamation of the European Committee 
and the NCEM to its board members: 
 
“To avoid that our established contacts and the material gathered would be lost, and to keep the 
organisation that was created from withering away – keeping it intact for the struggle that will 
come sooner or later – the Committee has been merged with the Norwegian Council of the 
European Movement, whose chairman, Chief Justice Terje Wold, was the one who took the 
initiative of establishing the Committee in the first place.” 959 
 
The NCEM was strengthened with the inclusion of the apparatus and resources of the 
European Committee, and could boast new offices in Oslo and the hiring of a new permanent 
secretary.960 While advising on the merger, most of the Europeans still kept their distance. But 
even with official silence, they had clear opinions on the matter: information was needed. 
 
The Social Democratic Connection 
Between 1962 and 1965, a dense network of ‘enlargement positive’ German, Norwegian and 
other Social Democrats took shape. This Social Democratic Connection was partly facilitated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 UD 44.36/6.84 P.–1 – 02.04.1963, Oslo – M. Reed – Memo. The European Committee. Aims and tasks. 
957 RA/PA-0992/A/Aa/L0006/0001 – 22.05.1963, Oslo – M- Reed – Summary from the meeting of the working 
committee, 15.05.1963. Reed returned to the MFA during the summer of 1963. 
958 UD 44.36/8–1 – 26.07.1962, Oslo – Chief Justice E. Wikborg, Lawyers Wikborg og Rein – Visit from president 
A. M. Donner of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The only trace of these connections in the MFA archives is a 
meeting between Chief Justice Wikborg, Chief Justice Wold, State secretary Engen and Director General Halvorsen 
discussing a visit from President of the ECJ Andreas Matthias Donner (1958-1964). 
959 RA/PA – 0992/F/L0002 – 03.1964, Oslo – P. Hegnar, G. Randers, E. Wikborg – The European Committee. 
960 RA/PA – 0992/D/L0015 – 06.12.1963, Oslo – E. Hoff – Dear Mr. Zöldi; RA/PA-0992/A/Aa/L0006/0001 – 
16.11.1962, Oslo – M. Reed – Summary: meeting of working committee, 09.11.1962. Both the new vice chairman 
and the first secretary of the NCEM (Wikborg and Hoff) came in via the European Committee. 
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by the Europeans via the NCEM and the German organisation Komite für Europäische und 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (KEIZ), headed by Albert Zöldi.961 
Via Knut Frydenlund, Zöldi’s organisation and the NCEM established “a productive 
cooperation”, arranging student trips to the EEC-countries and getting speakers from the 
Community to visit Norway already by 1962. On the insistence of Frydenlund, the NCEM 
formalised its cooperation with Zöldi and KEIZ in late 1963.962 By 1964, information trips to 
the Community for parliamentarians, press, fishermen, foresters, civil servants, students and 
the business community, were “a permanent part of the European Movements activities”.963 
By 1965, permanent secretary of the NCEM, Erik Hoff, took part in the board meetings of 
the German organisation. Within three years, then, the Social Democratic KEIZ-NCEM 
connection had been thoroughly institutionalised as a valuable part of the European 
Movements information campaign.964  
The cooperation between the MFA and KEIZ seems to have happened almost by 
chance. During the first EC-round in early May of 1962, Alfred Mozer, the chef de cabinet of 
the Commissioner of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt, had suggested that he and Mansholt pay an 
official visit to Norway.965 Alfred Mozer was a socialist and, surprisingly, one of the few 
officials in the Commission who had been active in groups and networks furthering European 
integration, such as the European Movement. Mozer had an impressive network of contacts, 
especially among the Social Democrats of Europe, such as Olof Palme, Willy Brandt and 
Bruno Kreisky.966 In late May, however, Mozer told the Norwegian Embassy in Brussels that 
he was invited to another event in Norway taking place at the same time as the planned tour of 
Norway. The organisers of this other event were Albert Zöldi and KEIZ.967 Trying to 
straighten out the double booking, the MFA suggested that the official visit could be 
coordinated with the second event in September.968 By way of coincidence, then, the Europeans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
961 That this was a Social Democratic endeavour is evidenced by the fact that the vice chairman of the NCEM and 
member of the Christian Peoples Party (Kristelig Folkeparti), Erling Wikborg, as late as 1965, was poorly informed 
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Oslo - E. Wikborg - The relationship between the NCEM and other organisations with similar aims. 
962 RA/PA – 0992/D/L0015/0003 – 06.12.1963, Oslo – E. Hoff – Mr. Zöldi; RA/PA – 0992/D/L0015/0002 – 
19.11.1963 – K. Frydenlund – Dear Magne, MFA. Furthermore, Frydenlund suggested that Labour Party 
parliamentarian and NCEM board member Rakel Seweriin, became a representative in Zöldi’s organization. 
963 Gabrielsen Med en følelse av fellesskap (1975), p. 53. 
964 RA/PA-0992/D/L0015/0004 – 12.04.1965, Oslo - E. Wikborg - The relationship between the NCEM and other 
organisations with similar aims. 
965 UD 44.36/8–1 – 14.05.1962, The Hague – E. Berg – Visit to Norway by representatives of the Commission. 
966 Seidel The process of politics in Europe (2010), p. 94-95, 118; Seidel “Actors and Ideas” (2009), p. 297; Wielenga, Friso 
(translated) “Who was Alfred Mozer”. Alfredmozerstichting.nl 
http://www.alfredmozerstichting.nl/general/Information/Who+was+Alfred+Mozer (last visited 23.1.2013). 
967 Together with the Norwegian National Committee for International Youth Work (NIU). 
968 UD 44.36/8-1 – 17.08.1962 – W. Fredriksen – Memo. Visit to Norway by Mansholt, Mozer and Rey. In the end, 
the Commissioner responsible for external relations, Jean Rey, attended the event instead of Mansholt. 
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came to know of the KEIZ and soon learned that Zöldi had already arranged seminars in 
Vienna, Bern and Copenhagen.969  According to Eivinn Berg it “operated as an intermediary 
between the Norwegian organisers and the Commission in Brussels”.970   
The ties between the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Norwegian 
Labour Party had grown increasingly stronger since the end of The Second World War. 
Leading Norwegian Social Democrats, such as Haakon Lie, Halvard Lange and Trygve 
Bratteli had offered their services for the reintegration of the SPD in the Socialist 
International and were responsible for the pragmatic attitude of Norway to the integration of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into the western camp. Young Social Democrats 
such as Knut Frydenlund, Reiulf Steen and Per Kleppe also nurtured close connections with 
German Social Democrats after participating in socialist exchange programs to Germany 
early in their careers.971 As historian Robin Allers has explored, ties to Willy Brandt were 
especially close.972 In September of 1963, after Norwegian-Community connections had 
ground to a halt, Brandt contacted Halvard Lange via the Norwegian Ambassador to Bonn, 
Hersleb Vogt, to propose the following: 
  
“To possibly alleviate the current difficulties in the relationship between Norway and the 
Common Market, and with a view for a better future, contacts should be established at expert-
level between the Labour Party and SPD. Of course, these conversations between experts would 
have to be completely informal (...) through such contacts [we] could possibly prevent adverse 
effects which would otherwise manifest themselves.”973 
 
It is highly likely that at least part of these expert meetings were arranged via the NCEM-
KEIZ connection, or at least that the two arrangements formed part of the same whole. 
Albert Zöldi belonged to the transnational network of European Social Democrats and 
Socialists. Furthermore, Zöldi had direct access to the Commission, and could arrange 
meetings, lectures and trips with high-ranking civil servants and officials on short notice.974 
According to Allers, it was member of the Bundestag and Social Democrat Erwin Lange, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
969 UD 44.36/8–1 – 24.05.1962, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Seminar in Norway and possible visit by Mansholt. 
970 UD 44.36/8–1 – 30.05.1962, Oslo – E. Berg – Notat. CEE. Seminar in Norge. Visit to Norway by representatives 
of the Commission. 
971 Reiulf Steen Der hjertet banker – Bilder fra et liv, Oslo: Gyldendal (1986); Per Kleppe Kleppepakke. Meninger og minner 
fra et politisk liv, Oslo: Aschehoug (2003), p. 78-85; Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 109-110. 
972 Brandt emigrated to Norway in 1933/34, was given a Norwegian citizenship (1940) and learnt to speak 
Norwegian fluently, he married first the Norwegian Anna Carlotta Thorkildsen (1941-1948) and then Norwegian Rut 
Brandt, to whom he was married almost to the very end. He regained his German citizenship in 1948. 
973 RA/S-6173/Db/L0001/0006 – 17.09.1963, Bonn – H. Vogt – Dear Halvard Lange. 
974 UD 44.36/8–1 – 16.02.1965, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Visits from Norwegian delegations and study circles; 
RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ - 26.08.1967, Brussels – O. Hansen – EMN; RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ -  05.09.1967, 
Brussels – O. Hansen – Dear Eriksen. 
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had established KEIZ.975 Moreover, Zöldi had met Labour Party Secretary Haakon Lie as 
early as August 1960.976 Haakon Lie, who had cultivated valuable links with many German 
Social Democrats ever since the war, entered the NCEM in the mid 1960s.977  
After Brandt and Lange’s communications, the KEIZ-NCEM cooperation intensified: 
Frydenlund and Zöldi planned three large-scale information trips to the Community for 
Scandinavian civil servants and parliamentarians in 1964.978 Moreover, the NCEM planned 
an information trip for the industry organisations to the EEC and three or four trips of 
Community experts to the North of Norway.979  After facilitating and planning ahead, 
Frydenlund left most of the planning and execution of events and trips to the NCEM.980 In 
the following years Haakon Lie, among others, would initiate numerous study trips for 
Norwegian politicians, trade unionists, journalists and students to Bonn and Brussels via the 
NCEM-KEIZ channel in the years ahead.981 
In these times of official silence, the informal connection suited the right wing, pro-
NATO, pro-European Labour Party politicians well. From their point of view, Gerhardsen’s 
policy of domestic appeasement was detrimental to Norwegian interests and Norway’s 
relationship with the Community. Moreover, as Knut Frydenlund enthusiastically wrote to 
Secretary Reed: “the advantage with the ‘Zöldi arrangement’” was that it would “not become 
an EEC thing, but would include OECD, the CoE etcetera”.982 Put differently, events 
arranged by Zöldi would not be interpreted as membership propaganda. By outsourcing and 
diversifying the information effort it was possible to keep up a steady flow of information and 
visits without spurring too much domestic debate.983  
 
Consolidation: 1965-1967 
The Europeans’ participation in the European Movement in Norway (EMN, 1965) materialised in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
975 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 109. 
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Bildungsgemeinschaft, which perhaps explains how he got in touch with NIU.  
977 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 109; S-1275/Db/Box 277/Folder 2. 
978 RA/PA-0992/D/L0015/0002 – 09.11.1963 – A. Zöldi – Letter to Frydenlund. In this context, it is not without 
significance that Frydenlund in 1963 became the personal secretary of Halvard Lange, a position he held until Lange 
left office in 1965. Petter Rusten Norsk Utenrikspolitikk i støpeskjeen? En holdningsanalyse av utenriksminister Knut 
Frydenlund 1973-1976, Unpublished MA thesis, Oslo: University of Oslo (2010), p. 6. 
979 RA/PA-0992/D/L0015/0005 – 17.08.1964 – Dear Mr. Zöldi; RA/PA – 0992/D/L0015/0005 – 02.06. 1964 – 
Dear Mr. Zöldi. 
980 Between 1964 and 1969, the NCEM via Hoff, and later General Secretaries S. K. Eriksen (early 1967) and E. M. 
Bull (late 1967), planned most of their trips and conferences, in Norway and the Community, with KEIZ. 
981 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 109. 
982 RA/PA – 0992/D/L0015/0002 – 19.11.1963 – K. Frydenlund – Dear Magne, MFA. 
983 RA/PA – 0992/D/L0015 - 15.05.1964 – E. Hoff – Dear Frydenlund. The pro-European Labour backing had to 
be indirect. In a letter to Frydenlund, May 1964, Hoff complained that since it had been difficult for the Labour 
Party and NCTU to contribute financially to the European Committee and the NCEM, the least they could do was 
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boundaries between the EMN itself, the Social Democratic Connection and their diplomatic 
environment. Yet, there was no direct or official link between the Europeans and the EMN until 
1965. Director General Jahn Halvorsen broke this barrier by becoming a deputy board 
member of the EMN early in 1965.984 The symbolic significance of a leading European 
officially joining the organisation must have been strong.985 But the real breakthrough, that 
officially ‘legitimised’ the link between the MFA and the EMN, was the election of former 
Foreign Minister Halvard Lange as chairman of the EMN in November 1965. To understand 
this, one needs to consider that most of the Europeans, a generation of diplomats who entered 
the service after the war, had spent their entire career with Lange as their captain. The 
Europeans simply felt a strong personal loyalty to Lange. As Halvorsen wrote in a personal 
letter to Lange after the Labour Party had lost the 1965 election: “[I]t is not only the 
foreigners that will now lose an institution – for a while (?). Many of us, including me, have 
never worked for any other Foreign Minister. You have shaped our entire way of thinking and 
our attitudes, and this influence will stick with us.”986 
And Lange himself, so used to the apparatus and people surrounding him, did not shy 
away from drawing on the Europeans’ expertise after he had left office. In November 1965, he 
wrote to Jahn Halvorsen: 
 
“I have agreed to replace Terje Wold as chairman of the Norwegian Council of the European 
Movement and in this capacity I hope to initiate a fairly informed discussion about our 
relationship with Europe and the challenges of European integration. I can not exclude that I will 
ask for you help in this regard.”987 
 
The lines between formal and informal, politics and administration, and indeed, personal and 
professional convictions, had become blurred after 20 years of Labour Party rule. 
With Lange’s election, it seems that the EMN was further professionalised. In an 
interview where he looked back on his career as Foreign Minister, Lange readily admitted that 
the government had “made a mistake in not preparing the public opinion in Norway” for the 
membership issue.988 Consequently, Lange once again put information activities on the top of 
the list of priorities. By November of 1965, the EMN’s information efforts were explicitly 
linked to the prospects of enlargement, as it appealed to “the governments and people of the 	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985 RA/PA-0992/G/L0001/0002 – Memo. Halvorsen had met with the NCEM regularly since February 1961. 
986 RA/S-6173/Db/L0001/0006 – 23.09.1965, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Dear Halvard. 
987 RA/S-6173/Db/L0001/0006 – 11.11.1965, Oslo – H. Lange – Jahn Halvorsen. 
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Six member states of the European Economic Community to make possible the negotiations 
to enlarge the Community, in order for a united and democratic Europe to contribute, with 
renewed strength, to peace and economic growth to the peoples of the earth”.989 
The informal Social Democratic connections up until 1965, and Lange’s entry into the 
EMN, should be understood in connection with the emerging ‘Social Democratic alternative 
for Europe’, developed by the Labour Party in opposition (1965-1971). In fact, the Social 
Democratic connection explored above was in some ways a prelude to this rethink. From 
1967 onwards, supported by the newly elected Party Chairman Trygve Bratteli (1965), a small 
policy-planning unit (Arbeiderbevegelsens utredningskontor, “Tenkeloftet”) headed by future Minister 
of Commerce and Shipping, Per Kleppe, created the Labour Party’s European Policy.990 
Knut Frydenlund was one of its most influential members.991 In close cooperation with 
German, British and Scandinavian Social Democrats, the Norwegian Labour Movement 
created a positive and politically charged European policy that aimed for a more egalitarian, 
less ‘capitalistic’ EEC, with stronger democratic institutions (such as the European 
Parliament). It was a way for the Labour Party to launch a positive vision of how to change 
the Community as a member state.992 With the change in leadership from Gerhardsen to 
Bratteli, the Labour Party leadership no longer penalised being openly pro-European. 
Also, the business and non-socialist sectors of the EMN consolidated their efforts. The 
Norwegian Section of the European League for Economic Co-operation (NS-ELEC), one of 
the founding organisations of the International European Movement, was set up in 1965. The 
names of the original members and business sectors taking part were familiar. Rolf Roem 
Nielsen, director of the Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI), headed the establishment. 
The secretariat of the NS-ELEC was the same as the EMN.993 Indeed, as Director Roem 
Nielsen explained in a letter to the Secretary General of the ELEC, Yvonne de Wergifosse: 
“We have a lot of committees and bodies dealing with European  and international economic 
questions, and to some extent the same persons are in   and behind most of them. We would 
like now to try to concentrate the administration, the secretariats, of some of the 	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990 Kristoffersen “A Social Democratic Vision for Europe?” (2010), p. 218-219. 
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992 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009); Steinnes The British Labour Party (2010); Steinnes “Socialist party networks in 
northern Europe” (2009); Kristoffersen “A Social Democratic Vision for Europe?” (2010). 
993 HAEU – LECE-0208_04 – 31.08.1965, Oslo – R. Roem Nielsen – ELEC. The other original members were Rolf 
Østby, Director General of Norsk Hydro; Alf Ihlen, Managing Director of A/S Strømnes Værksted; Johan Melander, 
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committees.”994 
This was certainly true: the NS-ELEC had almost the exact same members as, say, the 
working committee of the EFTA Action Committee, and from 1965 onwards both were to be 
administered by the EMN.995 There were financial reasons for the consolidation as well: the 
same business sectors financed all three of the organisations and, according to Chief Justice 
Wikborg, they wanted to rationalise the cooperation.996 A complex network of pro-European 
organisations redoubled their efforts in Norway in the mid-1960s, and the Europeans took part 
in different capacities. For example, Martin Huslid – while on leave from the MFA, working 
as a representative of the Norwegian Export Council in Brussels – joined ELEC in the mid-
1960s. As he returned to Norway and the MFA in 1970, he remained a member of ELEC and 
joined the Norwegian Section.997 
With the Centre-Right government taking office in 1965, the EMN and the MFA re-
evaluated their ties. The coalition government consisted of the highly pro-European 
Conservatives, the highly membership sceptic Centre Party, and two parties split on the EC-
issue. This constellation spoke in favour of loose ties. However, in February of 1966, the 
Working Committee of the EMN could report: “The secretariat has received a statement 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it has, after the change of Government, evaluated its 
cooperation with the European Movement in Norway. The Ministry has concluded that this 
cooperation should continue, and, if possible, be expanded.” 998  With this rubber stamp of 
approval, Conservative Foreign Minister John Lyng (1965-1970) formalised the ties between 
the MFA and the EMN.  
It was thus in a climate of consolidation and formalisation, that the Europeans officially 
entered the EMN en masse999: Jahn Halvorsen – the first to join in early 1965 – remained a 
board member until 1966, and an active part of the EMN until the referendum.1000 Gunnar 
Rogstad, the Director General of the Economic Department after Halvorsen became 
Ambassador to Brussels, became a board member in 1966. Tim Greve, former chef de cabinet 
for Halvard Lange and future Director General of the Press Department, was present at the 	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November 1965 meeting, and became, together with Knut Frydenlund, a board member in 
early 1967.1001 In November 1967, Director General of the Economic Department at the 
time, Asbjørn Skarstein, joined them.1002 In 1967, Haakon Lie also tried to headhunt European 
Terje Johannessen to replace Erik Hoff as EMN secretary. But Johannessen chose to be an 
informal contributor to the EMN, while continuing to work for the MFA.1003 
By 1967, the MFA’s political ties to the EMN had also grown remarkably strong: Erling 
Wikborg (Foreign Minister for three weeks in 1963); Halvard M. Lange (Foreign Minister, 
1946-1965); Svenn Stray (Foreign Minister, 1970-1971); and Knut Frydenlund (Diplomat and 
politician at the time, and Foreign Minister, 1973-81 and 1986-87) were all board members. 
In late 1967, as an ultimate sign of the formalised ties, the MFA secured extra funding of 25, 
000 NOK under chapter 190 (unforeseen conferences), with the remark that it wanted to give 
financial support to the EMN, enabling it to take part in meetings abroad. It was a clear sign 
that the MFA did not intend to hide its support.1004 
 
Boundary-spanners for a cause 
The Europeans’ gradual entanglement in different pro-European networks between 1962 and 
1967 is crucial in order to understand the unusual role they came to play in struggles within 
the Centre-Right coalition over the membership issue, and the Labour government’s 
membership campaign of 1971-72. Four major developments explain how the Europeans took 
on a new role as boundary spanners for the European cause: 
First, the Europeans belonged to a new generation of multilateral economic diplomats, 
with a broad domestic and international network of contacts, expert knowledge of complex 
foreign economic issues that through their mere placement and tasks came to challenge the 
traditional Weberian norms. Second, these networks came into play in the non-governmental 
arenas as the persistent and deliberate official silence, chosen by both the Labour Party and 
coalition governments left the Europeans frustrated by trailing behind other applicant countries 
and fearful that the entire membership issue might slip away. Third, the shift of government 
in 1965, which ended twenty postwar years of Labour Party rule, was a litmus test of the 
entire administration. Much evidence points towards the right wing of the Labour Party being 
instrumental in drawing the Europeans into the EMN – particularly Halvard Lange, Haakon 	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Lie and the young European, Knut Frydenlund – precisely at the moment of flux when 
Gerhardsen stepped down. To these developments should be added the fourth and most 
important ingredient, the Europeans’ growing commitment to the European cause. Nothing in 
the two governments’ policies could be interpreted as a call for the Europeans to take part in 
pro-membership campaigns or organisations – they participated, therefore, out of personal 
conviction.   
It was this set of circumstances that made the Europeans into ‘boundary spanners’ for the 
European cause. As part of the pro-European campaigns and organisations, the Europeans 
operated outside and within the MFA, assumed a diversity of roles in both the governmental 
and non-governmental arenas, and mediated a growing number of actors and organisations in 
an increasingly integrated and complex political environment, with the intent of securing a 
Norwegian membership.1005 Through their work with the EC-case, not only did domestic and 
foreign policy issues, and politics and diplomacy, become blurred, but so did personal and 
professional convictions. In the Europeans work with the membership issue and the Nordek 
negotiations under the Centre-Right coalition, headed by the increasingly membership sceptic 
Per Borten, personal convictions would become a recurrent bone of contention. 
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Chapter 9 
The Europeans and the Centre-Right coalition 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Suddenly the question of Europe has been revitalised. It’s like the floodgates have been opened (...)  
Now the question is: what do we want?”1006 
Jahn Halvorsen to Halvard Lange in October of 1969 as the issue of enlargement returns. 
 
This chapter explores the differences of opinion, and political and administrative battles, 
between the Europeans and the pro-Europeans, on the one side, and their own Prime Minister 
Per Borten (Centre Party) and the EC-sceptics, on the other. In the years of political silence 
and after the Labour Party hegemony had definitely been broken, the Europeans became 
engaged in non-governmental, pro-European networks as a way of keeping membership on 
the agenda. It was almost a protest against the official policy of non-engagement. And it was 
certainly one of the repercussions of the administration being passed on from the Labour 
Party to the Centre-Right coalition in 1965. With the new coalition, the Europeans would face 
the challenge of a divided cabinet, double communication, and shadow boxing over the 
membership issue. By defending the membership line – the official policy of the government – 
against a Prime Minister and Centre Party that increasingly looked for alternatives to 
membership, the Europeans became deeply politicised. Following the reasonably cordial 
experience of the second application (1967), the Nordek negotiations (1968-1970) witnessed 
the Europeans trying to stop what they saw as a dangerous step towards a more unclear security 
profile and a definite distraction from the preferred path to membership in the Community. 
When the prospects of membership arose again, following de Gaulle’s sudden retirement and 
the relance of the EC in The Hague in December 1969, pretences were set aside. Soon the 
Europeans were in the middle of a bitter clash between the pro-Europeans and EC-sceptics of 
the government, and were in fact decisive in its demise. In March 1971, when the Labour 
Party took over the government offices with the unequivocally pro-European Trygve Bratteli 
as Prime Minister, he was joined by a deeply politicised group of diplomats. 
 
An application without friction 
As in the previous round, the issue of membership was sparked by the British application, and 
motivated by the fear of remaining outside an enlarged market, rather than any desire for 
membership. 1007  Most historians agree that the Norwegian 1967 application had a 	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‘hypothetical’ hue to it, due to de Gaulle’s continued resistance against British entry.1008 The 
second round was a gentle breeze compared to the flare-up that preceded it and the storm 
that would follow.  
This is not to say that the Centre-Right government or the administration calculated 
another veto. They prepared to apply as the Labour government had done before them. Even 
following de Gaulle’s press conference in mid-May, where he listed a great many reservations 
to a British entry into the Community, the conclusion was that “whether these reservations 
will turn out to be a major obstacle can only be made clear in the coming negotiations”.1009 As 
late as October of 1967, Vice President of the Commission Sicco Mansholt told Borten that 
he did not anticipate another veto from de Gaulle, but feared that Paris “would do its utmost 
to prolong the negotiations”.1010 The general mood, then, was that any negotiation would be 
long and difficult. Leaving for Brussels with the application, Terje Johannessen, for instance, 
let the press know that he doubted the possibility of real negotiations.1011 The matter was less 
urgent both for those opposed and those in favour. 
The combination of a change of government in Norway and a tamer version of the 
EEC – particularly following the Luxembourg compromise – produced a rather different 
political debate in the second round compared to the rounds that came before and after. 
On paper it looked like the Centre-Right government might split on the issue at an early 
stage: five of the fifteen ministers had advocated for an association agreement in 1962, 
including Borten and Kjell Bondevik (Christian People’s Party (CPP) chairman). Two 
ministers – Dagfinn Vårvik (Centre Party) and Helge Seip (Liberal) – had opposed 
membership as editors of the newspapers Nationen and Dagbladet, respectively. All six 
Conservative ministers, on the other hand, were firm supporters of membership, including 
Foreign Minister and father of the coalition John Lyng, though he often acted as an arbiter 
between the opposing groups of ministers. Most ardently pro-European was MoCS Kåre 
Willoch. On balance, the government was in favour of membership in the EEC.1012   
In the Storting the majority was clear: the Conservatives and the Labour Party – with 
well over half of the seats between them – maintained their position from 1962. Since the 
early 1960s, Labour Party leadership had tried to carve out a socialist vision of Europe. And 	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with pro-European Trygve Bratteli taking over from Einar Gerhardsen as party leader this 
vision became much more pronounced. In opposition, the Labour Party had more space to 
zealously proclaim the Party “the pioneer of a new era and a new order in Europe”.1013 
Accordingly, the Centre-Right government could only survive the membership issue if the 
minority opposing membership abandoned their position. The Liberals were quick to fall into 
line, but for the Centre Party and the CPP it took several months of soul searching. Instead of 
breaking up the coalition over a question that might never arise, a slow, meticulous pace was 
chosen. When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson (Labour) called a meeting in December 
1966, to inform his EFTA partners of British intensions, the government made no principled 
statements.1014 This made good sense as the British continued probing well into the spring of 
1967, and the government lived well with a deliberate policy of non-decision.1015 
On April 28, 1967, the British formally announced to its EFTA partners that it intended 
to apply for membership and the government began rapidly hammering out a time schedule: 
the Market Committee was to submit its report by May 12; the business organisations would 
give their opinions by May 25; the MFA would complete a draft of the white paper by the 
same time, which would then be discussed by the cabinet in early June, and presented on June 
16. On July 24, the Norwegian application was submitted in Brussels, but no real negotiations 
commenced, and on November 27, de Gaulle issued his second veto to the British.1016 
Developments within the Community also helped ease the tensions within the coalition. 
French policy under de Gaulle had led to a slower pace of economic integration and halted 
the introduction of general majority voting. With the Luxembourg compromise – which 
ended a dispute between France, the five and the Commission over financing the soon unified 
Community and the powers of the Commission vis-a-vis the member states – France retained 
her right to veto when issues of national importance were at stake. It was a compromise the 
other member states could live well with as few among them shared Commission President 
Hallstein’s federalist visions.1017 This made the ‘loss of sovereignty’ argument less convincing, 	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and those ambivalent towards membership were more inclined to explore the option. Borten’s 
objections to the Treaty of Rome remained, as in 1962, that membership was unconstitutional 
as it could erode the legislative powers of the national parliament.1018 However, the weakening 
of the Commission, to the advantage of the Council of Ministers made it “less difficult” for 
Borten to argue in favour of negotiations: “I assume that many, like me, would feel safer when 
the development of this kind of cooperation takes place at a pace set by the governments of 
each member state, without pressure from a built-in supranational institution”.1019 There was 
not a full-blown federalist to be found in political Norway, and Borten’s argument that any 
closer, supranational, political cooperation would need a separate treaty to be ratified in the 
Storting was accepted across the board. The parliamentary white paper reflected this, and 
stated:  
 
“Through membership of the EEC Norway today assumes no political obligations. By the 
weakening of the supranational element which has taken place in practice (...) the individual 
member states will have crucial influence on the formation of further cooperation within the 
EEC.”1020 
 
Structural and economic patterns pulled Norway closer to the continent as well. Close 
economic ties with Britain were slightly weakened, while the Nordic countries (as a result of 
EFTA) and the EEC both surpassed Britain as Norway’s most important export markets. In 
Norden, Sweden was by far the largest market, while West Germany was the largest receiver of 
Norwegian goods within the EEC. With Britain, Denmark and possibly Sweden participating, 
Norway could not remain outside a customs union that would receive 75 percent of its exports 
and deliver 70 percent of imports.1021 If Norway remained on the outside, while Britain, 
Denmark and Sweden entered, its EFTA preferences would all but disappear. This was, 
Borten told the Storting, “the strongest argument in favour of Norway taking part in the new 
Common Market in Europe”. 1022  
Also, in foreign policy terms, the EEC appeared more positive. With Willy Brandt’s 
emerging Ostpolitik, West Germany became a more appealing partner. This, combined with 
the incipient détente between the two superpowers shaped Norway’s European outlook; it  led 
to the government into being slightly less focused on American military guarantees. At the 	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same time, many politicians and others became more critical towards the US due to their 
involvement in the Vietnam War. In Norway, Foreign Minister John Lyng (1965-1970) would 
capture this sentiment by endorsing both détente and Ostpolitik, and – at least in rhetoric – by 
distancing himself from what was seen as the strict Americanism of his predecessor Halvard 
Lange.1023 
All of these developments enabled the coalition to apply without too much friction. 
Even so, the application itself was full of reservations and conditional in nature. The 
compromise reached in the agricultural sector, for instance, was ambitious or even 
improbable: with the muttered acceptance of the Conservatives, the government aimed to get 
the EEC to accept the entire Norwegian agricultural sector as protected under the common 
regional policy of the EEC.1024 Like the Gerhardsen government before them, the coalition 
made entry conditional on British membership, promised a consultative referendum before 
parliament made its final decision, and only submitted the application “as the best means of 
clarifying the basis for Norway’s relations with the EEC”.1025 When parliament debated the 
government’s recommendation in July of 1967, only 13 voted against it (compared to 37 in 
1962). 1026 After de Gaulle’s veto, the application remained in Brussels along with those of the 
other three applicant countries. When the issue arose again in late 1969, it would have more 
similarities with 1962 than 1967: the EC reinvigorated, with plans for economic and monetary 
integration and political co-operation. 
 
Subtle political battles 
The creation of the Market Committee was one reason for the lack of open confrontation 
between the Europeans and Borten and the EC-sceptics at this stage. In February 1966, Foreign 
Minister Lyng proposed the Market Committee as a long-term planning unit that would 
prepare the coalition for the difficult choices ahead and possibly produce some common 
ground. It issued a yearly report on developments within the Community (until 1971), 
produced much of the material for the white papers on the EC during the years of the 
coalition government, and consisted of civil servants from the MFA, MoI, Ministries of 
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Fisheries and Agriculture and the MoCS. 1027 On the suggestion of Borten, his own state 
secretary – Emil Vindsetmo – was chosen to head the Committee.1028 Ahead of the second 
round, the Market Committee was charged with the task of exploring how the Community 
had evolved.1029 Vindsetmo soon proposed it expanded its scope to “describe how current 
rules and regulations in Norway diverge from the Treaty of Rome and the common policies 
and agreements reached within the EEC”.1030 In April 1967, the Prime Minister gave him the 
additional task of assessing the advantages and disadvantages of membership and non-
membership.1031 
The leading role given to Vindsetmo, until the coalition government left office in March 
1971, reflected the general trend of the Prime Minister’s Office gaining more control in 
foreign policy issues, and the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policy, especially 
with regards to the EC-issue. But it also reflected a more specific tension within the coalition, 
in which the Prime Minister sought to control knowledge production, and keep an eye on the 
pro-European Conservatives and officials within the MFA.1032 Borten effectively kept out the 
MoCS and Willoch (officially also the Minister in charge of Nordic affairs) by making 
Vindsetmo head of the Market Committee, the Nordek negotiations and the early preparation 
for the EC-negotiations.1033 However, it was broadly recognised that Vindsetmo, both due to 
his role and his character, was well placed to smooth out differences within the government, 
and both Willoch and Lyng, who might have felt their territory invaded, characterised him as 
a hard-working, able and amicable man.1034 Vindsetmo, then, was at once a symptom of the 
distrust within the government and a remedy for the same. 
For the Europeans working closest with him – Holland, Ølberg and Johannessen – Emil 
Vindsetmo would remain the ‘sphinx’, ‘the great riddle’ and ‘a formidable poker player’. 
None of them could tell if he was placed in the Market Committee as a way of getting Borten 
on board with membership, or as a way of checking the Conservatives and the Europeans. 
Neither did anyone seem to know where he stood politically: did he belong to the CPP and 	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was a hesitant pro-European, as Holland thought, or, as Lange speculated, one of Hans 
Borgen’s men (Centre Party) and more fiercely against membership than Borten himself?1035 
In his years as Borten’s state secretary, Vindsetmo built up a position as the link within 
the government. “Without him”, Arbeiderbladet claimed in early 1970, “it would hardly be 
possible to overcome the differences within the government.” He was the éminence grise of the 
market issue: “towards the politicians he appeared as an expert and towards the civil servants 
as a politician (...) a double-role which has given him great influence”.1036 In the 1970s, 
however, this double-role would create tension rather than smooth things out. 
Still, already in 1966-67 there were several minor collisions. As during the first round, 
the pro-Europeans and Europeans were worried about timing and tone. Already when Wilson 
was invited to the December meeting in 1966, Ambassador Skaug had underlined that the 
Prime Minister should give “maximum positive support to Wilson’s initiative”. Willoch 
supported this arguing that Norway should avoid giving the impression that it was half-
hearted. Borten simply replied that he didn’t think anyone expected Norway to make a 
decision before the British had submitted their application in Brussels.1037 When Britain 
applied in May, Willoch and Lyng argued that Norway should follow as soon as possible as 
this would strengthen its bargaining position. To make his point, Lyng brought forward a 
dispatch from Ambassador Halvorsen saying that a Norwegian postponement could lead to a 
psychological backlash in Brussels.1038 The sooner the application was handed in “the clearer 
Norway’s political commitment to wholeheartedly take part in the EEC would stand”, the 
Embassy in Hague wrote days later.1039 Ambassador Kildal complained that Norway would 
end up in “a splendid last place”, just as in 1962.1040 However, it did not change the 
government’s position, which gave priority to a thorough domestic political process.1041 
There were also disputes regarding the white paper, particularly the agricultural 
chapter, which aimed for “permanent special arrangements” for Norwegian agriculture.1042 
Jahn Halvorsen worryingly wrote to Willoch asking whether the term ‘permanent special 
arrangements’ was compatible with the Treaty of Rome, to which Willoch replied with a 
vague formulation from the white paper: “it must be assumed that special arrangements, 	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though permanent in their character, may be subject to revision by the institutions of the 
Community at certain intervals.” The government would only seek “permanent 
arrangement” that it “thought the Treaty of Rome provides the basis for”, Willoch reassured 
Halvorsen.1043 This could, for example, mean deficiency payments via the regional policy 
funds, something Mansholt had told Borten while visiting Norway.1044 However, those more 
sceptical towards membership wanted a permanent exemption from CAP as such. Aware of 
these differences, the government avoided going into details in the white paper.1045 
Moreover, several ministers thought the MFA’s first draft, and particularly the summary 
and conclusions, was too pro-European. Borten complained that the whole paper needed to 
be totally restructured.1046 The government therefore agreed to appoint a working group 
consisting of state secretary Vindsetmo, Ambassador Rogstad and Director General Skarstein 
to revise the draft. The Prime Minister and Minister Bondevik wanted the conclusion of the 
revised draft to say that the EEC’s political aims were now firmly in the background, and they 
wanted the ‘Nordic aspects’ brought more to the foreground.1047 Moreover, Borten wanted to 
remove statements about association not being a good solution for Norway. In fact, in the 
final version of the paper, association or other solutions were mentioned explicitly as viable 
options should membership prove undesirable or unattainable.1048 
For the Europeans who understood membership in the context of the broader foreign 
policy outlook of Norway, this was disappointing. In a letter to Lyng, Halvorsen complained 
that the white paper “does not contain much about the political aspects”. To remedy this, 
Halvorsen offered to write an article in Aftenposten in which he would explain the political 
aspects of the Community. He was in doubt, however, since “everything can be 
misunderstood by those who want to misunderstand”.1049 Instead, Halvorsen gave a speech 
about membership and security policy. Implicitly talking about Norway too, he argued that 
Europe’s responsibilities towards the developing countries, détente between east and west and 
North Atlantic cooperation was “much more important for British membership in the EEC 
than her economic situation (...)”.1050 This was also reflected in the MFA’s first draft of the 	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parliamentary white paper: “greater Western European unity would increase the possibilities 
of further détente” and make the Atlantic partnership more equal.1051  
Last, while in support of the membership application, Borten also made several moves 
that proved otherwise. In May, for example, Borten, to the particular dismay of Willoch, 
called for a Constitutional analysis made by legal experts outside of the administration. The 
end result was that three esteemed legal scholars reaffirmed that § 93 of the Constitution 
covered membership in the EC.1052 And at the last minute – on June 12 – Borten, after 
conferring with his political hinterland, asked if Norway could not send an application similar 
to the Swedish application. Sweden wanted to apply for negotiations and choose along the 
way. The proposal was unacceptable to the majority of the government: the entire white 
paper was built up around an application for membership under article 237.1053 However, 
such double-communication would become part of Borten’s standard repertoire regarding the 
EC-case. 
Most of the issues that had been settled rather amicably in 1967 would return in full 
force in 1970. Many of the ‘subtle political battles’, as Frøland called them, not only revealed 
the distance between the Centre Party and the Conservatives, but also Prime Minister 
Borten’s deep-rooted scepticism towards the Europeans.1054 His suspicion was perhaps not 
without reason, for while the administration prepared for a possible membership application, 
people like Lange, Bratteli, Haakon and Trygve Lie, Aase Lionæs, Frydenlund, Finn Moe (all 
Labour), and Greve, Skarstein, Skaug, Sommerfelt, Jens Boyesen (all MFA) and Conservative 
Svenn Stray, to mention a few, met for the annual meeting of the EMN in the Storting to listen 
to a speech by Ambassador Skaug about the problems facing Europe.1055 For a man who trod 
water in hope of a better solution, it was important to keep track of the obviously pro-
European diplomats. And their differences of opinion would be revealed in subtle and less 
subtle battles – not least during the Nordek negotiations. 
 
Opposing Nordek 
The Danish invitation to create an elaborate customs union modelled on the Treaty of Rome 
at the February 1968 Nordic Council meeting in Oslo took its Nordic partners by surprise. 
Nordek, as was its name, was meant as a ‘Danish Design for EEC Membership’, and was 	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never intended as a substitute to membership in the Community.1056 As in all Nordic 
negotiations, ‘the friendly language of Nordism’ framed the political discourse. As Frøland 
argues: “in principle, no one opposed stronger Nordic co-operation, as opposition would 
prove to contradict Nordic identity.”1057 Accordingly, none of the governments wanted to be 
seen as breaking off the negotiations. 
Opposite of Danish intentions, Norwegian Prime Minister Per Borten and the Agrarian 
Party in Norway – who had up until then shown little interest in Nordic solutions – 
enthusiastically pursued Nordek as an alternative to membership in the Community.1058 With 
Finland’s de facto dependency on Soviet acceptance, and Sweden’s armed neutrality, such 
cooperation might block Norwegian entry into the Community. By circumventing the EC-
issue, Borten saw the possibility of keeping the coalition together. Borten and the Agrarian 
Party, thus, put Norden first. The Conservatives, together with segments of the Liberal Party, 
however, placed Europe first. Nordek was a dangerous step towards neutrality, and the 
suggested customs union would be dominated by Danish agriculture and Swedish industry, 
they argued. Furthermore, Nordek risked blocking the road to EC-membership. Somewhere 
in between, the Labour Party contended that the best strategy was to work for Norden in 
Europe.1059 This approach – which the pro-Europeans, in the end, chose to abide by – was seen 
as a way to avoid the membership issue becoming a choice between Norden and Europe.1060 
In May of 1968, the Storting accepted that Norway take part in the Nordek negotiations 
on the premise that it did not complicate Norway’s relationship to EFTA or future 
negotiations with the Community. Following de Gaulle’s resignation (April 1969) and The 
Hague Summit (December 1969), the EC opened its doors to applicants and the entire thing 
fell apart: Denmark lost interest and turned its gaze to the continent, and Finland started to 
postpone further negotiations in fear of Soviet reactions. Still, for much of the spring of 1970, 
the Nordek- and the EC-option co-existed, and the increasingly divided Norwegian 
Government wobbled along this twin-track. In April of 1970 it was clear that enlargement 
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negotiations with Denmark and Norway would commence over the summer, and Finland 
finally broke off negotiations. The Nordic interlude had come to an end. 1061 
The entire Nordek debate “worked as a dummy for the pending EEC issue in 
Norwegian politics”.1062 A mirror image of the EC-struggle, Borten and other EC-sceptics 
pushed for concluding the Nordek negotiations, while the Europeans together with other pro-
Europeans raised concerns, delayed and contested it. The Europeans argued that the 
government should put Europe first as a continuation of Norway’s security and foreign policy 
since the war, and embedded the policy in Norden-in-Europe-rhetoric. In an increasingly 
antagonistic environment, the Europeans opposed Nordek through policy advice, 
administrative resistance, and pro-European non-governmental networks. 
 
Slipping into neutrality 
Most of the Europeans were intuitively unenthused by the initial Danish plan. Drawing on the 
extensive experience of failed, exclusively Nordic plans, and the evident success of creating a 
Nordic industrial common market by way of EFTA, the reactions to the Danish plan were not 
surprising: “if we’re to agree to anything based on a Nordic foundation, it has to happen 
within a bigger framework (...) the easiest path towards intimate Nordic co-operation today, 
must be canalised through EFTA”, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt concluded days after the Danish 
proposal.1063 Equally, Willoch was advised by the Free Trade Committee in early March to 
strengthen EFTA and ignore Nordek.1064 Even Emil Vindsetmo concluded that it was only 
“within EFTA that the Nordic region [could] achieve its identity and try out its abilities and 
possibilities to act as a unit.”1065 The first reaction was therefore bewilderment and frustration. 
As Holland later reflected, Danish domestic politics were now complicating Norwegian 
foreign policy matters.1066 
Throughout the negotiations, the Europeans dealt with Nordek much the same way 
doctors deal with epidemics – damage control. An outbreak of unwanted Nordism somehow 
had to be squared with the meticulously planned road to membership in the EC. As historian 
Dag Axel Kristoffersen has argued, although Nordek “did not have any explicit ambition in 
dealing with foreign policy issues the Foreign Ministry rather early in the process pointed to 	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the difficulties raised by the Nordic countries different orientations in external policy.”1067 
More specifically, the Europeans, with Jahn Halvorsen and Arild Holland at the head, argued 
against a Nordic customs union by consistently drawing attention to the negative effects on 
Norwegian security- and foreign policy. 
The most persistent argument was that if Norway joined a Nordic Customs Union 
dominated by Sweden, it risked ‘slipping back to neutrality’. Several Europeans voiced this 
concern early on.1068 This lay in direct continuation of Langeland’s arguments during the first 
round of negotiations: if Norway stayed on the outside of the EEC, it risked becoming, or 
being perceived as, a more neutral part of Western Europe. This, in turn, would 
fundamentally weaken the Northern flank of NATO. Thus, EC membership would anchor 
Norway more firmly to the Western alliance, while Nordek would loosen those ties.  
These concerns were particularly timely in 1968: in June a major Soviet military 
exercise on the Kola Peninsula “climaxed in a sudden demonstrative deployment of an 
armoured division along the Norwegian border, guns pointing westward.” Also in 1968, came 
the first of many major Soviet fleet exercises in the Norwegian Sea.1069 Moreover, anti-
Americanism and anti-NATO sentiments were on the rise: Swedish Minister of Education 
Olof Palme’s active participation in a public demonstration against the US war in Vietnam in 
February 1968 had caused outrage within the American administration.1070 In Norway too, a 
strong leftist resistance to the Labour Party’s Atlantic Alliance as embodied by Halvard 
Lange, was picking up momentum. This, coupled with the upcoming renegotiation of the 
Norwegian NATO membership in 1969, inherently bringing it back into public discourse, was 
seen as a potential threat to Norway’s postwar foreign policy.1071 Short term, Nordek might 
lend credibility to the anti-NATO factions. Long term, Nordek would create an image of a 
neutral Nordic bloc, threatening Norway’s position within NATO.1072 
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 was seen as a concrete 
manifestation of abstract fears. Sigurd Ekeland, Halvorsen’s right hand in Brussels, thought 
that the events in Prague signalled a new period of East-West-tensions, and warned that 
Nordek could disrupt a fragile balance in the region.1073 In the spring of 1968, an almost 	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united front of diplomats stationed in the EC capitals, particularly Jahn Halvorsen, warned 
against the repercussions of Nordek. In August of 1968, these diplomats joined forces in a 
large internal MFA-meeting to repeat these warnings. Several prominent Conservative 
representatives, such as parliamentary leader Svenn Stray, raised the same concerns.  
Kristoffersen asserts that this “possibly influenced the decision to explore [foreign policy] 
aspects of Nordek.” Without prior discussions with the Cabinet, Foreign Minister Lyng 
charged his ministry with the task of evaluating foreign policy issues related to Nordek. The 
report presented to the government in January of 1969 had evaluated “whether and in what 
way Nordek may entail difficulties for the achievement of our European goals and affect our 
foreign and security policy”. Not surprisingly, it concluded that it was detrimental to both.1074 
 
Quick – Slow – Quick 
Arild Holland’s role in managing the Market Committee (MC) and as the Foreign Ministry’s 
chief negotiator on Nordek, serves as an example of the eagerness of the Europeans in the EC 
negotiations, as opposed to in the Nordek negotiations. After the second veto by de Gaulle, 
the Europeans were very much in the same place as after the first veto: keen to keep working on 
EC-matters while headed by a government that preferred political silence. Holland addressed 
the situation, and stipulated two options: To await further developments and put all 
preparations on halt, or to keep on preparing, setting up the negotiation delegation and 
establish working groups. Referring to the closing down of all activities after the first round 
(January 1963), Holland thought the first option would prove “regrettable”. But he also 
understood that marching ahead as if nothing had happened would be politically impossible.  
He therefore suggested that the MC resume its work, as it had done since 1966, and be 
given a further mandate to study the problems that could appear should Norway join the EC. 
There was a semantic difference: the Committee would “not prepare a negotiation scheme”, 
but simply “make sensible use of the time of waiting we have ahead of us”. Since the 
Committee would simply continue its work, Holland remarked, it would have the additional 
benefit of sparing the government from officially appointing a new committee. In the end, the 
government did not give the Committee its additional mandate, but it continued producing 
reports on developments within the EC. Thus, some of the machinery and knowledge 
production was kept intact.1075  
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However, as the Nordek negotiations demanded more resources, the MC was given 
fewer. In 1967, the MC had a budget of nearly 100.000 NOK, by 1969, the budget was cut in 
half; it only managed to spend 24.031 NOK, and in 1970, it had a budget of 25.000 NOK.1076 
One of the reasons for the meagre spending of the Committee was that the manpower needed 
for its work was busy with the Nordek negotiations. A tangible example of how the Nordek 
negotiations took the momentum out of the EEC preparations, Holland complained that it 
was challenging to muster enough manpower for the EEC work, and, not surprisingly, argued 
to keep the reports coming even though membership was not on the horizon.1077 
Arild Holland, Asbjørn Skarstein and Gudmund Saxrud (MoCS) formed the core of the 
Nordek negotiation delegation, which was headed by Emil Vindsetmo. In his memoirs, 
Holland describes how the Nordek negotiations seemed surreal, since everyone knew that 
Denmark would join the EC as soon as the door opened, and de Gaulle only had a few years 
left as President. After de Gaulle’s resignation in April of 1969, Holland told Vindsetmo, “in 
reality Nordek was now doomed to fail”.1078 But long before de Gaulle’s resignation, Holland 
argued that a Nordic customs union would not be beneficial to Norway in economic terms. 
Swedish industrial and Danish agricultural goods would flood Norwegian markets, and the 
quid pro quo, for example, in the fishery sector, would not be enough to counter this. More 
importantly, however, these economic imbalances would work to Norway’s disadvantage in 
future enlargement negotiations with the Community. To negotiate en bloc would prove 
difficult, if not impossible, and was not preferred by the EC in any case.1079 The Danish 
steppingstone would be a Norwegian stumbling block. Arild Holland had in fact concluded a 
priori – that is before the Danish Nordek-proposal - that a “Nordic solution would complicate 
future negotiations with the EEC, as the problems facing each country are different (...) a 
Nordic cooperation would thus only weaken Norway’s negotiation position vis-à-vis the EEC, 
instead of strengthening it”.1080  
Early in the Nordek negotiations, Saxrud and Holland were sent as the Norwegian 
representatives to the first Nordic civil servant’s talks following the Danish proposal. They 
resisted any political commitment to the Nordic project, and instead insisted on further 
exploratory talks.1081 Holland stresses that they did this without instructions from home.1082 	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But it is clear that their conduct was in line with the sceptical attitudes within the coalition 
government: there was unilateral distaste for both the suggested agricultural common market 
and the initial supranational set-up. Not least due to Norwegian resistance and foot-dragging, 
the negotiations were prolonged and the final treaty approved a customs union with many 
loopholes, underpinned by weak institutions.1083 Holland, however, went further still: there 
was no need to set up study groups and have expert talks. Norway should instead make its 
scepticism known from the start to avoid walking backwards into a Nordic solution. Or, put 
differently, since Nordek negotiations actually might succeed, Norway should decline from the 
outset in order to avoid future obstacles to EC membership – this opinion was not shared by 
the majority of the government. 1084 
Holland’s recollection of the last Nordek negotiation speaks volumes of how uninspired 
he must have been by the whole endeavour: 
 
“In my heart of hearts I thought the whole thing was nonsense, but we had to... We were civil 
servants you know, so we just had to do the job. But I wasn’t exactly passionately interested, no, 
because I thought it was nonsense. (...) The last Nordek meeting was to take place in Reykjavik, 
with the Prime Ministers and such. I wasn’t bothered. I told Per Martin Ølberg: ‘You go to this 
nonsense’. And Skarstein went [too], and Skarstein returned shaking his head. Deals were struck 
with slippery Danes in the staircases and what not. Skarstein was appalled. I stayed at home, 
went skiing.”1085 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the government was committed to not let Nordek disrupt 
possible membership negotiations with the EC. Holland, therefore, was not acting against the 
advice of the government; rather, he was simply convinced that Nordek was an obstacle to EC 
negotiations. The reactions of the Six mostly confirmed this view. Even the Germans, though 
they publicly endorsed Nordek, were concerned, and the German Foreign Ministry could not 
understand how Denmark and Norway could be part of two customs unions.1086 The French 
– not surprisingly – were unequivocal in maintaining that Nordek would obstruct EC 
accession.1087 Also the Commission warned that a Nordic customs union would be “the 
perfect alibi” for the large, though relative silent, part of the Community who still wanted a 
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small enlargement.1088 What Holland did do, however, was to display a striking disinterest in 
constructive engagement with the Nordek issue: this could be labelled administrative 
resistance. From the outset, Nordek was seen as “creating a massive headache” and something 
that needed to be ‘contained’ and ‘handled’.1089 
Opposite, only days after The Hague Summit, Holland wrote an extensive memo 
drawing up an elaborate and accelerated administrative game plan for the EC-
negotiations.1090 In mid-December, Skarstein, Holland and Ølberg consulted each other, and 
Holland suggested that Skarstein – now Director General of the Economic Department – step 
out of the MC, as he was likely to become a part of the negotiation delegation, and possibly its 
leader. Holland nominated himself as the new member of the Committee, and Ølberg as its 
new secretary. And so it went.1091 As he envisioned negotiations beginning in the summer/fall 
of 1970, Holland argued that there was an urgent need for appointing a negotiation 
delegation, to create a negotiation strategy and to get in touch with the Commission and the 
Six.1092 Already before Christmas, however, Holland received signals from Vindsetmo that 
things would not move ahead as quickly as he hoped.1093  
While the Nordek negotiations were met with reluctance and inertia, the upcoming EC-
negotiations spawned a collective humming among the Europeans. The spring of 1970, 
therefore, was marked by an increasing tug of war within the government, and between the 
Europeans and Prime Minister Borten.  
 
Co-ordinated efforts 
Kristoffersen convincingly argues that the diplomats feared Nordek would risk “undermining 
years of well-prepared strategy on the EEC question and would disrupt the overarching goal 
of joining the Six.” However, he does not find traces of any co-ordination, and sees their 
efforts as “the sum of individual opinions that coincided with each other”.1094 This conclusion 
seems to overlook the strong ties that had developed between the Europeans since the early 
1960s, and also their connections beyond the MFA. Arguably, the last piece of the puzzle, 
which gives the Europeans’ efforts an element of co-ordination, can be found within the EMN. 
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The Hague Summit of December 1969 rejuvenated the Europeans, but also instilled in 
them a sense of decisive urgency. “We’re closing in on Christmas – a Christmas out of the sign 
of frustration”, Halvorsen wrote to EMN chairman Halvard Lange, and continued, “[i]t will 
be exciting to see what we will land on in Norway. The EEC is no straight path to salvation, 
but it is the only chance we got. If we slip – if the whole thing slips – I think there will be 
troubled times ahead.”1095 Or, as Industrial Counsellor Huslid wrote in December 1969, “our 
mission has to be to become a full member of a united Europe”. The government should 
therefore not tie itself to Nordek, which was of “doubtful economic significance and value” 
and would “make the Swedish – and perhaps also the Finnish – neutrality problem our 
own”.1096 The Europeans – together with many of the Conservatives – were now wholly intent 
on shifting focus towards the EC.  
They all found it perplexing when the Prime Minister argued that, “[o]ne should keep a 
balanced attitude in relationship between Nordek and the EC, but hold on to the intention of 
Nordic cooperation.”  While Foreign Minister Lyng wanted to keep the ‘European 
perspective’ in mind while swiftly finishing the Nordek negotiations, Prime Minister Borten, 
together with many of his EC-sceptic colleagues in the Cabinet, could only agree to gradual 
internal preparations for EC-negotiations – secretly hoping the Nordic solution would make 
them redundant. While Minister Willoch suggested that he should travel to Brussels to start 
sounding out the Six, Prime Minister Borten wanted to keep contacts with the EC to a 
minimum, referring to the Finnish Prime Minister, who had stated that “travelling to Brussels 
would complicate Finland’s position vis-à-vis Nordek”.1097  
A report from Dutch vice-foreign minister de Koester’s visit to Oslo confirmed the 
confusion: in a private conversation with the Norwegian Prime Minister, Borten had not 
mentioned membership in the EC a single time. Instead, he spoke of ‘solutions’ and 
‘arrangements’. He also made it clear that younger people in Norway in general were strongly 
opposed to membership. De Koster then visited the MoCS and MFA, and found that the two 
Ministries, contrary to the impression Borten had given, were well underway with a 
negotiation scheme for the upcoming enlargement talks.1098 Borten tried to steer the process – 
for example by keeping Minister of Commerce and Shipping Kåre Willoch away from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1095 RA/S-6173/Db/L0002/0003 – Christmas Card 1969 – J. Halvorsen – Dear Åse and Halvard. My Italics. 
1096 RA/PA-0636/D/Db/Dbf/Dbfb/L1704/0003 – M. Huslid – Norges Industri nr. 11, 1969 ”Ny markedssituasjon i 
Europa?”  
1097 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 05.01.1970; 12.01.1970; 23.02.1970. Berntsen 
Staurberaren (2007), p. 232-237 
1098 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0003 - 02.1970 - Unknown - Memo. Conversations with Brandt, Bonn 17-
18.02.1970. The Dutch report was given to Brandt, who shared it with the Norwegian Labour Party leadership. 
	  	   258	  
Nordek, and by making Emil Vindsetmo head of the negotiations, but this became 
increasingly difficult in the face of frustrated Conservatives and ‘rebellious’ diplomats.  
At the same time, fears were mounting among the pro-European Labour leadership: the 
WYL started to turn against EC membership. Even after Finnish President Urho Kekkonen’s 
definitive rejection of the Nordic plans, AUF “strongly opposed attempts made to get Norway 
into the EEC and demanded that all efforts were put into the work with the Nordek-
agreement”.1099 And in June, the WYL – for the first time – joined the Young Liberals, the 
Centre Youth and the Christian People’s Party Youth in signing a petition that demanded the 
Centre-Right government withdraw its application in favour of Nordic cooperation.1100 Such 
sentiments found sympathy among the more senior politicians within the Labour Party. 
Though Nordek was buried, the EC-sceptics needed an alternative, and gathered around 
Norden as a symbol of everything the Community was not. As one prominent EC-sceptic 
noted: “I think we will have to chose. We have to prioritise. And for me the answer is obvious: 
Norden first.”1101 
In this climate, the government’s twin-track was seen not only as a tragic waste of 
energy, but potentially dangerous. Halvorsen probably captured the despairing mood among 
the Europeans quite precisely in letters to Lange in January 1970: “The current lack of stance is 
not only generally unfortunate, we are also unable to defend concrete interests since we no 
longer know in which light to interpret them. Obviously, we still stand by our membership 
application. But who can honestly say that it is still valid?”1102 As the Finns had created an 
‘either-or’ situation, Borten’s twin-track risked diluting the membership issue. 1103  The 
Europeans’ fears were not unfounded, only days before Halvorsen’s letter to Lange, the Prime 
Minister told the Swedish journal Veckans Affärer that he was doubtful about the EEC for two 
reasons. First, because Norway had a different legal tradition and social structure than the 
EEC countries. Second, because the EEC had a bureaucratic superstructure, which for 
Norway would mean a step towards authoritarianism. Borten, therefore, warned the Swedes 
that cooperation with Norway should “not be seen as a bridge to the EEC”, and that Nordic 
cooperation had “an intrinsic value”.1104 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1099 National Board of the WYL, April 11-12, 1970. Quoted from Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 144. 
1100 Halvorsen Partiets salt (2003), p. 384. 
1101 Thorbjørn Berntsen. Quoted from Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 157. My Italics. 
1102 RA/S-6173/Db/L0002/0003 – 20.01.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Dear Halvard. 
1103 RA/S-6173/Db/L0002/0003 – 20.01.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Dear Halvard; FCO 30/697 – 09.01.1970, 
Oslo – K. A. East – Norway: EEC and Nordek. 
1104 NSA–7B–30 – 16.01.1970 – Swedish journal Veckans Affärer. 
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From the spring of 1970, the Europeans sought to counter tendencies of Nordic 
isolationism among Norwegian politicians, lend their expertise to disseminating a Norden in 
Europe alternative, and protest against the government’s inaction by way of non-governmental 
networks. 
An interesting example of the first was Halvorsen’s attempt at getting major Norwegian 
political parties to apply for membership in Jean Monnet’s Comité d’Action pour les États-Uni 
d’Europe (Action Committee, AC). In late May of 1969, Halvorsen reported to the MFA that 
the AC was wholly against a Nordic bloc entering the Community, and suggested that the 
enlargement should be limited to the UK.1105 Important political and technical issues were 
discussed in the AC, and it wielded real power, Halvorsen warned. “All of this passes our 
political parties by”, Halvorsen wrote in a letter to Lange, “the consequence being that we 
become increasingly isolated. A contributing factor is, of course, that the close Nordic party 
connections draw us into Nordic isolation.”1106 Despite repeated efforts by Halvorsen, none of 
the parties had “showed the slightest interest” in the Action Committee, but with Nordek 
looming as an alternative to the Community he was intent on trying again.1107 Ultimately 
these efforts failed, but Halvorsen’s understanding of the situation and suggested solution is 
worth noting: connecting Norwegian politicians to broader transnational pro-European 
networks was seen as a way of extracting them from purely Nordic networks and drawing 
them closer to Europe. 
Another, more successful, effort was co-ordinated through the EMN. Spurred by pro-
European Conservative and Labour Party politicians, the Europeans helped counter the Norden 
first alternative that was about to catch the popular imagination. In April of 1970, former 
Labour Party Secretary and EMN board member Haakon Lie contacted Ambassador to 
Copenhagen Arne Skaug: “Halvard Lange has asked me to prepare some material for the 
debate on Norwegian membership in the EEC which we will soon have.”1108 The EMN 
planned to publish a series of 15-20 pamphlets that would deal with different aspects of the 
Community in relation to Norway.1109 Arne Skaug was asked to argue against Nordek being 
an alternative to EC-membership, while stressing how Nordic co-operation could easily 
continue after a potential Norwegian entry into the Community. Haakon Lie continued:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1105 Kristoffersen “Between Nordic Co-operation and European Integration” (2009), p. 91. 
1106 RA/S-6173/Db/L0002/0003 – 20.01.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Dear Halvard. 
1107 RA/S-6173/Db/L0002/0003 – 20.01.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Dear Halvard. A Labour Party delegation 
was coming to Brussels, among them Knut Frydenlund. 
1108 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 30.04.1970, Oslo – H. Lie – Dear Arne. 
1109 NSA–7B–30 – Regarding information efforts about the EEC. With a budget of 150.000 NOK. Arne Skaug’s 
piece had the title ”Norden og EEC”. 
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“Norden should contribute considerably to the EEC a) by democratising the Community b) 
through work which aims to control international business, by establishing a new distribution of 
welfare and social policy, a European environmental policy, and a coordination of research- and 
technology resources.”1110 
 
This was in line with the positive social democratic vision for Europe. Before taking the 
assignment, Skaug – as a good civil servant – conferred with Foreign Minister Svenn Stray 
(Conservative), who had taken over after John Lyng in May 1970. Not surprisingly, Stray – 
also the vice chairman of the EMN – approved. Skaug then wrote to Lie: “I’ve talked a bit 
with Stray and he understands that I am working on this case. However, it is quite clear that I 
need to be totally anonymous, and we therefore have to find someone else that can be listed as 
the author to what I possibly write.”1111 Lie agreed.1112  
Skaug was motivated by the same fears of a Nordic alternative as Halvorsen, Holland, 
Ekeland, Skarstein and Ølberg. In June of 1970, Skaug reported that Danish officials were 
puzzled by the continued Norwegian support of Nordek, as that would mean a Nordek 
without Denmark.1113 The Danes had for long distanced themselves from the Norwegians as 
they thought it would harm their negotiation position vis-à-vis the EC. 1114  Skaug 
contemptuously wrote to Lie, “[the] agitation in favour of Nordek as an alternative to EEC-
membership is a quaint, distinctively Norwegian phenomenon”.1115 
In preparing his manuscript, Skaug drew on the expertise of his fellow Europeans. Skaug 
thought “Holland or Ølberg at the MFA, or possibly Per Kleppe” could write about how 
Norden together could shape the Community. He proposed that he and Ambassador Jens 
Boyesen “produce something about what representatives of small states can accomplish in 
international organisations, based on the experiences we have”.1116 Furthermore, Skaug 
wanted to draw on an old MFA-report concerning what “could be ‘saved’ of the Nordek-plan 
should Norway and Denmark join the EEC”, and suggested: “Ølberg can take care of this 
issue”.1117 Ølberg, moreover, was to lead an EMN correspondence course with the title 
“Norway’s place in Europe”.1118 In the EMN’s production of pro-European material, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1110 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 30.04.1970, Oslo – H. Lie – Dear Arne. 
1111 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 15.10.1970 – A. Skaug – Dear friend. 
1112 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 21.10.1970, Oslo – H. Lie – Dear friend. 
1113 UD 44.36/6.84–34 – 30.06.1970 – A. Skaug – Memo. 
1114 UD 44.36/6.84–32 –  09.03.1970, Copenhagen – A. Skaug – Memo. 
1115 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 08.06.1970, Copenhagen – A. Skaug – Dear Haakon Lie. 
1116 Boyesen had been head of the NATO delegation and Skaug head of the OEEC delegation in the mid-1950s.  
1117 AA – Arne Skaug – Box 40 – 08.06.1970, Copenhagen – A. Skaug – Dear Haakon Lie. 
1118 NSA–7B–30 – Regarding information efforts about the EEC. 
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Europeans now served as ‘the brain trust’, ready to lend their expertise to a pro-European 
coalition consisting of politicians both in government and opposition.1119 Clearly, Stray, Lie 
and Skaug all knew that they were operating in the normative grey areas of what a diplomat 
should be doing. As will be discussed below, this was one among many steps the Europeans took 
towards redefining and challenging the boundaries of diplomatic norms. 
Last, the Europeans were disconcerted by what they saw as the government’s insufficient 
sense of urgency. As many times before, a comparison was drawn with the eagerness of the 
Danes. Danish Minister of Economy and Markets Poul Nyboe Andersen’s activity was 
contrasted with the lack of any Norwegian ministerial visits to Brussels.1120 These views were 
shared and articulated within the framework the EMN, as at a conference of the European 
Movement held in February: 
 
“[S]everal big guns were brought to bear on the same target, notably Ambassador Halvorsen and 
Skaug from Brussels and Copenhagen respectively, Director Roem Nielsen of the Norwegian 
Federation of Industries and Mr. Halvard Lange, now Chairman of the European Movement in 
Norway. The first two named took full advantage of the remarkable freedom senior Norwegian 
officials enjoy to express their opinions in public. They emphasised the need for realism, that 
events (and the Danes) were on the move, that if Britain and Denmark were admitted to the EEC 
there would be little left of EFTA or Nordek, that the Community were not begging the 
Norwegians to join and that Norway could not have all the advantages without paying the full 
price of membership.”1121 
 
To this Lange added that there was ‘great confusion in Europe’ and demanded that the 
government contacted the Commission and Council to ensure the credibility of the 
Norwegian application. 1122  The British diplomat who wrote the report referred to the 
remarkable freedom senior Norwegian officials enjoyed, but it is more precise to speak of the 
remarkable degree of consensus among political and administrative elites under the postwar 
Labour hegemony. During the tumultuous years at the turn of the decade, both under the 
coalition and Labour government, this consensus eroded.  
Prime Minister Borten soon countered these demands and accusations at a press 
conference at the beginning of March. Ambassadors ought to be discreet in airing personal 
opinions, he warned, clearly thinking of Halvorsen and Skaug. There was no need to send a 
delegation to Brussels to make the Norwegian position more thoroughly understood, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1119 Lahlum Haakon Lie (2010), p. 533. The membership issue bridged the political divide between Lie and Stray. 
1120 UD 44.36/6.84A–3 – 02.02.1970, Oslo – A. Skarstein – Memo. 
1121 FCO  30/697 – 02.03.1970, Oslo – K. A. East – Dear MacGlashan. Norwegian Candidature for EEC. 
1122 RA/PA-0992/A/Aa/L0011 – 25.02.1970, Oslo – Summary from the EMN’s annual meeting, 25.02.1970. 
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continued, while parrying questions of whether this was a unanimous decision by the 
government. He underlined that it would be the main objective of Norwegian negotiators to 
ensure that Norwegian interests were provided for in a satisfactory way, but if it appeared that 
negotiations for membership were not making progress, the government would have to 
examine the question of an association agreement or other arrangements which might as far 
as possible satisfy Norwegian interests. As a British diplomat present at the press conference 
dryly noted: “this formula derives from the Storting proceedings of 1967, but to pin ones fall-
back position to the mast before the first shot has been fired, suggests a lack of stomach for the 
fight.”1123 Surely, the Europeans would have agreed. 
 
Distrust and Downfall 
As mentioned, The Hague Summit reopened the door for British, Danish, Irish and 
Norwegian membership negotiations. The official invite came in the spring of 1970. But The 
Hague was meant as the beginning of much more: the EC planned to extend its 
responsibilities to foreign and monetary affairs (as suggested in the Davignon and Werner 
reports respectively), and completed and found solutions for the long lasting problems of 
agricultural financing, the EC’s own resources, and the budgetary powers of the European 
Parliament.1124 This, combined with the retirement of de Gaulle and Chancellorship of 
Brandt (October 1969), signalled a much more ambitious Community. With the prospect of 
membership in this revived EC, distrust between the Europeans and Prime Minister Borten 
flared up and eventually was at the centre of the coalition government’s downfall. 
On March 12, 1970, chargé d’affaires at the Brussels Embassy Sigurd Ekeland, along with 
his Danish and Irish counterparts, was invited to meet the leader of the political committee 
Belgian Étienne Davignon. Davignon informed them of the progress of his report, and offered 
to keep them informed of future developments. The applicants would be asked to declare their 
acceptance of the decisions made by the EC on the matter, Davignon said, and handed a 
memorandum to Ekeland and the others. Ekeland sent Davignon’s invitation and a 
Norwegian translation of the memorandum (originally in French) to the MFA. The 
memorandum referred to paragraph 15 of The Hague Communiqué which stated that the 
foreign ministers would prepare a report before the end of July with “[...] suggestions sur la 
manière de faire progresser l’unification politique”, which Ekeland translated to “suggestions 
of how to progress towards a political unification (politisk samling)”. After having translated the text 	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1124 Jan van der Harst ”The Hague Summit: A new start for Europe?” in Journal of European Integration History, 2 
(2003), pp. 5-9. 
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from French to Norwegian, Ekeland wrote that it was important to find a Norwegian 
expression that captured the meaning of ‘unification’, which had, he maintained, become an 
expression of closer political cooperation more generally.1125 
The answer to be given to the EC was cleared with Foreign Minister Lyng and 
Secretary General Thore Boye, but not discussed in the cabinet. It was sent to the Embassy in 
Brussels in a Norwegian version, and confirmed Norway’s positive attitude towards “political 
unification in Europe” and “political cooperation in Europe”. The two words 
(unification/cooperation – samling/samarbeid) were used interchangeably by the MFA as a 
translation of unification. Jahn Halvorsen then translated the Norwegian answer back into 
French. This time “political cooperation” in Europe was translated as “l’unification politique en 
Europe” and “union politique”.1126  
The dispute that followed was a symptom of a much larger problem. Going through the 
MFA’s and the Market Committee’s two separate drafts for a parliamentary paper at a 
government conference in June, Borten noted that the letter sent by the MFA on March 25 to 
the Council of Ministers referred to the drafts. In the letter, Borten said the Norwegian 
government reaffirmed its positive attitude to political unification in Europe. This had not 
been discussed by the cabinet, and was regrettable since people would now ask whether “we 
presuppose, not only economic cooperation, but also political. In our application for 
membership [from 1967] nothing is said of political aspects.” Svenn Stray, who had taken 
over for John Lyng as Foreign Minister only weeks before, was not aware of why these words 
were chosen, and admitted that they might be exaggerated. However, political coordination 
beyond consultations, Stray assured Borten, would entail an entirely new treaty.1127 Just as 
Ekeland had suggested, the MFA were streamlining the language. They wanted the 
‘l’unification politique’, which was translated to ‘political unity (politisk enhet)’ in the Market 
Committee’s fifth report (April 7, 1970) to be translated as “political unification”. This was a 
politically weaker word than ‘unity’, the MFA maintained, and left the ‘end point’ of the 
unification process open. The MFA and the Foreign Minister kept the phrase in the 
parliamentary paper, thus overriding the suggestion of Vindsetmo to remove it.1128 
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The Europeans also wanted to refer to the political aspects of the Treaty of Rome in the 
opening declaration to the Community (June 30) that they were preparing. In a way they were 
back to the discussions of 1962. The Europeans’ first draft read: “we also want to take part in 
the future political cooperation (...) with the aim that Europe will play a role in securing 
international peace and security”. But this section was deleted.1129 After consulting with 
Davignon, Halvorsen recommended that the declaration say political cooperation would be 
discussed at a later stage, but also that “we are aware of the aims of the Treaty of Rome 
(finalité politique)”.1130 This was too much for EC-sceptics inside and outside the government. In 
a separate statement within the ECFA, Centre Party leader John A. Austrheim reminded 
members that parliament had not agreed to the political finality of the Treaties of Rome, and 
that new developments within the EC now “pointed towards a political unification”. This 
could be in violation of the Constitution. Arild Holland, preparing a memo for the Foreign 
Minister, wrote that a new institutionalised political cooperation would have to be agreed to 
by the separate member states. But by accepting the Treaty of Rome, and the finalité politique, 
there would be “indirect political ramifications”. “One cannot, in a modern society, isolate 
economic factors from other factors, for example the political ones”, Holland concluded.1131  
Discussing the draft in a government conference, several ministers strongly opposed  
Norway’s seeming approval of Community plans that were not yet clearly defined. Borten 
asked whether the Market Committee and Vindsetmo had reviewed the draft, as was the 
established procedure. Stray said that the draft was prepared in the Economic Department, 
but sent to the MC for comments. The plan, under the previous Foreign Minister, had been 
that the MC would take part in the drafting. This had not happened. Instead, the Economic 
Department handed the draft straight to the Foreign Minister who in turn asked the Market 
Committee for comments. “The spirit and the tone of the draft had not been discussed by the 
whole Committee”, Vindsetmo concluded. Borten was clearly aggravated and said that “for 
the future tasks that belong to the committee should not be taken out of their hands”.1132  
In that same government conference, Borten again brought up Ambassador Halvorsen’s 
French translation in which ‘cooperation’ was translated as  ‘union’. This time, Stray admitted 
there had been a mistake. The mistranslation was Halvorsen’s responsibility, but the matter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1129 UD 44.36/6.84–33 – Draft opening declaration at the EEC-meeting in Luxembourg, 30.06.1970. Produced by 
the MFA, to be discussed at the Government Conference, 18.06.1970. 
1130 UD 44.36/6.84–33 – 17.06.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen - Norway’s opening declaration. 
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not bringing it to the cabinet was Lyng’s.1133 At a press conference the following day, Borten 
held Lyng personally responsible for the ‘unfortunate’ administrative and political oversight. 
The letter translated by Halvorsen did not represent the government’s view, and the MFA 
had no mandate to make such a statement, he said. Lyng responded that the letter was a 
‘routine answer’, and that he was unaware of the erroneous translation.1134 At the next 
government conference, Stray said that the MFA would enforce more firmly the rule that 
instructions from the MFA should be followed unless explicit permission to the contrary had 
been given.1135  
The Europeans were now under supervision, which led to stricter routines. When 
Ekeland, for instance, wanted to add some ‘goodwill’ sentences after the government had 
approved the final version of the declaration, Holland immediately called Halvorsen and 
“asked the Embassy to avoid such supplements”.1136 Increasingly, Stray and the Europeans 
came to see Vindsetmo as Borten’s can opener of the usually hermetically sealed Economic 
Department. Opposite, after having experienced the Europeans’ strong political commitment to 
the European cause during the Nordek discussions, Borten was adamant in keeping 
Vindsetmo and himself inside of the MFA and close to the Europeans.  
The issue with the ‘mistranslation’ was a storm in a teacup, but illustrated the lack of 
trust between Borten and the Europeans.1137 The MFA and the Europeans worked to avoid 
stirring up domestic debate over an issue that could easily get out of hand and tried to keep 
the matter in house. In any case, they concluded, it seemed highly unlikely that the European 
Political Community (EPC) would move beyond consultations.1138 At the same time, they 
worked to keep references to the Community’s political goals in the opening declaration of 
Stray. This had to do with the need to accept the acquis communautaire – the legal foundation, 
current functioning, and future intentions of the Community1139 – and to create goodwill. 
However, as in 1962, the end result was a vague proclamation that made no reference to 
planned political cooperation and did not explicitly accept the acquis. 1140  When real 
negotiations opened on September 22, 1970, Stray, responding to a direct question from the 	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EC delegation, had to declare that the Norwegian government accepted the acquis and the 
finalité politique.1141 
Also, the choice of who should head the negotiations at the deputy level revealed 
tensions between the EC-sceptics and the Europeans. Actually, disagreements were already 
evident in 1967 when Lyng suggested Jahn Halvorsen as the Head of Negotiations (HoN) and 
Borten pushed for Sommerfelt.1142 In early January of 1970, the MFA drew attention to the 
fact that during the 1967 negotiations the HoN was meant to be found among the diplomats 
and report to the MFA, but that Vindsetmo, under the Prime Minister’s Office, headed the 
Nordek negotiations. Simultaneously, the MFA suggested that Halvorsen be appointed to the 
MC, which they assumed would turn into the future Negotiation Delegation (ND).1143 It is not 
unlikely, therefore, that the MFA thought of Halvorsen when highlighting the need for a 
diplomat with broad international experience.1144 
It was at this point that Vindsetmo asked to be released from his position as state 
secretary.1145 To Vindsetmo’s mind, the difficult job of holding the sceptics and enthusiasts 
together had only been possible because he represented the whole of the government (while 
reporting to the Prime Minister). Now he feared that he would become another piece in the 
MFA apparatus, answering to the Foreign Minister. But his relationship with Borten had also 
soured. As far as the sources give a clear answer, Vindsetmo was not against membership in 
the EC, but fearful of supranationalism. Most of all he was a strong supporter of the bourgeois 
coalition, and might have thought Borten was gambling with its future existence.1146 The 
government feared, however, that by giving up Vindsetmo they would remove the single bolt 
that held it all together. For four years the Conservatives had accepted Vindsetmo’s position 
above the MFA on market issues for precisely that reason.1147 After being persuaded by 
Borten and a unanimous cabinet asked him to stay on, Vindsetmo agreed to continue as state 
secretary.1148 The Labour Party Press (Arbeiderbladet) speculated on what Vindsetmo might 
have asked for in return: “Vindsetmo has probably gotten his way when it comes to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1141 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 172. Stray could not understand the ruckus in parliament and press his acceptance of 
the acquis communautaire had created. RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference –24.09.1970. 
1142 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0025 – Government Conference – 05.091967; 12.10.1967. 
1143 RA/S-1005/D/Da/L0139 – 09.01.1970, MFA – Memo to members of cabinet. Norway and Nordek/EEC. 
Composition of internal apparatus for the negotiations. 
1144 UD 44.36/6.84–32 – 05.01.1970 – Suggestions for the negtoiation delegation and negotiation secretariat etc. 
1145 He had applied for the job as county governor in Telemark. 
1146 Borten and Vindsetmo had also disagreed on a tax reform. 
1147 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 219. 
1148 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 08.01.1970; FCO 30/697 – 09.01.1970, Oslo – K. A. 
East – Norway: EEC and Nordek. 
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composition of the negotiation delegation and who it should answer to.” Behind this sentence 
Arild Holland put a big exclamation mark.1149 
In the following months, the initiative slipped out of the hands of the MFA and into 
Vindsetmo’s. In February, Vindsetmo – and the EC-sceptics of the coalition – won approval 
for the Nordek Committee taking charge of preparing the EC negotiations, and that this could 
begin in mid-March.1150 Renamed the Working Committee on European Market Problems (a 
telling name), it was headed by Vindsetmo.1151 Stray and the MFA responded. The MFA 
wanted to appoint the HoN already in early April, but was instructed to wait until Norway 
had been positively invited to negotiations. 1152 In mid-June, the MFA tried again and 
recommended the appointment of Director General Asbjørn Skarstein.1153 Foreign Minister 
Stray also made it clear that the HoN should head the negotiation delegation at home, and 
that they ”shall report directly to the Foreign Minister, if the government agrees that the 
Foreign Minister will have the primary responsibility for the negotiations”. Borten asked what 
would happen to Vindsetmo’s committee, to which Stray replied that he presumed it would 
be dissolved. Stray had suggested Skarstein instead of Halvorsen because “he had the 
impression that not everyone in the coalition trusted Halvorsen”. If trust was the issue, Borten 
replied, he would want Vindsetmo or Governor of the Central Bank in Norway (Norges Bank) 
Knut Getz Wold as HoN. This, of course, could only mean that if trust was the issue, it could 
not be Halvorsen (or Skarstein for that matter). After some back and forth, the government 
asked Vindsetmo, who said he would have to think about it.1154 
The decision was made following two government conferences on July 30 and 31 – a full 
month after Norway had given its opening statement in Luxembourg. There was agreement 
on the delegation and HoN, but Vindsetmo refused to report directly to Stray and the MFA. 
Rather, he wanted to report to the government’s so-called EEC-committee.1155 Stray could 
not accept this. He had political responsibility for the negotiations and would not share it: “if 
Vindsetmo’s solution will prevail, we will have a ‘half-minister of markets’”. Whoever acted on 
behalf of the government would have to be a minister. The HoN on the other hand had to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1149 Arbeiderbladet – 10.01.1970 – “Hard namdaling satte Regjeringen på plass” by Jens Solli. 
1150 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 16.02.1970; 02.03.1970. 
1151 UD 44.36/6.84 E.-4 –  03.03.1970 – Speech to the cabinet regarding the appointment of a civil servant 
committee for the preparation of Norway’s negotiations with the European Community.  
1152 UD 44.36/6.84 E.–4 – 03.03.1970 – Memo; UD 44.36/6.84 E.–4 – 14.04.1970 – Memo. 
1153 UD 44.36/6.84–33 – 16.06.1970, MFA – Memo. The MFA was sure that Skarstein would be chosen and made 
this known to their British counterparts. FCO 30/697 – 17.06.1970, Oslo – K. A. West – Norway’s Application for 
EEC Membership. Halvorsen and Sommerfelt were considered less likely candidates. 
1154 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 26.06.1970. 
1155 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA – 27.08.1970 – Svenn Stray. Prime Minister Borten (Chairman), Foreign Minister 
Stray, Minister of Commerce and Shipping Grieg Tidemand (Conservative), Minister of Finance Ole Myrvoll 
(Liberal) and Minister of Church and Education Kjell Bondevik (Christian People’s Party). 
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a civil servant. Vindsetmo agreed that he outwardly had to appear as a civil servant (to the 
EEC) but “at home he had to be something more than a civil servant”. He also thought the 
negotiation secretariat, to be headed by Holland and placed under the MFA, was a bad 
solution. With no agreement reached between Stray and Vindsetmo, the cabinet moved on to 
other candidates. After some deliberation, Foreign Minister Stray suggested Ambassador to 
Bonn, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt. The cabinet agreed; Sommerfelt was not as pro-European as 
the MFA’s previous recommendations.1156 In a hurry and unable to get hold of Sommerfelt, 
who was on holiday at his cabin in Hallingdalen (which shows how little he expected to be 
named HoN), they flew in with a helicopter in order to get his consent.1157  
The ND was appointed that same day, July 31, 1971.1158 In the end it was dominated by 
officials from the MFA and remained under its direction. Four out of nine civil servants in the 
ND; seven of the ten appointed advisors, and all six of the negotiation secretariat were from 
the MFA.1159 In what amounted to a vote of confidence Stray got his way with the rest of the 
cabinet.1160 
Trust continued to erode during the fall. In November, during a conversation with West 
German state secretary von Braun, Stray claimed that Norway’s application was primarily 
politically motivated because “we had a feeling that we belonged in Europe”. Those opposed 
were mostly anti-NATO people, with neutralist tendencies, and those who feared the 
economic consequences of membership and “for their existence” (farmers and fishermen). 
However, the latest polls (which Stray had gotten from the EMN) showed that 51 percent of 
the Norwegian electorate favoured membership.1161 In conversations with several French 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1156 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 30.07.1970; Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 171. 
1157 Sommerfelt did not think that he could continue as Ambassador to Bonn, while heading the negotiations. And 
the solution did create some communication problems. However, he would remain in both positions, with the added 
benefit of having Willy Brandt’s ear. Interview – Eivinn Berg – 18.12.2012; Sommerfelt Sendemann (1997), p. 143-144; 
FCO 30/698 – 06.11.1970 – J. A. Robinson – Sir C. O’Neill. 
1158 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 31.07.1970. 
1159 Negotiation Delegation: Svenn Stray (Foreign Minister, Conservative), Otto Grieg Tidemand (Minister of Commerce 
and Shipping, Conservative), Søren Chr. Sommerfelt (Ambassador, MFA), Emil Vindsetmo (State Secretary, PMO), 
Asbjørn Skarstein (Director General, MFA), Tor Stokke (Director General, MoCS), Odd Gøthe (Director General, 
MoI), Hermod Skånland (Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Norway), Gunnar Gundersen (Director General, 
MoA), John Ringen (Director General, MoF), Erik Dons (Ambassador, MFA), Jahn Halvorsen (Ambassador, MFA). 
Advisors: Sigurd Ekeland (Counsellor, MFA), Arild Holland (Assistant Director, MFA), Gudmund Saxrud (Assistant 
Director, MFA), Håkon Skaarer (Assistant Director, MFA, Ottar Bergflødt (Assistant Director, MoA), Carl Bjørge 
(Assistant Director, MoF), Per Martin Ølberg (Head of Office, MFA), Martin Huslid (Head of Office, MFA), Bjarne 
Solheim (Head of Office, MFA), Johan Skutle (Head of Office, MoCS). Negotiation Secretariat: Holland, Saxrud, 
Skaarer, Ølberg, Huslid, Johan Dahl (Consultant, MFA). 
1160 That this was leaked to the press did not help the atmosphere within the Centre-Right coalition. Dagbladet – 
03.08.1970 – ”Kabinettspørsmål” by Per Vassbotn. 
1161 Ra/PA-1451/D/Df/L0007/0001 – 12.11.1970 – P. M. Ølberg – Memo. State secretary von Braun’s 
conversation with the Foreign Minister, 11.11.1970.  
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officials, Sommerfelt had repeated these arguments almost verbatim. 1162  Borten sent 
Sommerfelt’s report to his press secretary and state secretaries, and responded vigorously to 
Stray’s conversation. “Members of the government would be wise to stick to the government’s 
own white paper”, Borten wrote to Stray, “I cannot help but express my disagreement with 
such statements (...) being made to leading representatives of an EC-country. This will hardly 
make the government’s work with the market problems any easier.”1163  
Borten’s response revealed the core of the disagreement: for while the Europeans and 
Stray were eager to convince the EC-representatives of Norway’s European credentials, and 
trusted that they could find good solutions together, Borten saw those same representatives as 
opponents and not people to share personal thoughts with. His greatest concern was the 
perspective of Norway being absorbed by a continental union.1164 
Nonetheless, for his Centre Party, permanent special solutions for the primary sectors 
was a sine qua non and it is a fair to say that coalition’s demands for special solutions, which had 
survived since 1967, would have never been approved by the EC.1165 This fact was at the root 
of the coalition’s demise. In a conversation with Ambassador Halvorsen in February 1971, 
Jean-François Deniau, Commissioner in charge of coordinating the enlargement negotiations 
with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway, jokingly asked if Norway wanted the 
entire country to be given a special solution in the agricultural sector. To this Halvorsen could 
only answer that the government would soon present its position on agriculture and fisheries, 
for it was, in fact, what the coalition wanted. This prompted Deniau to say that many had 
come to the conclusion that “Norway was so different from the conditions in Europe (...) that 
it was questionable whether Norway could become a member of the EEC”. He then 
suggested that Norway might be better suited for a ’Swedish solution’. This would not 
safeguard Norwegian interests in any way, Halvorsen replied. Norway did not have any 
foreign policy reservations, only two very specific problems: agriculture and fisheries. “It is the 
first time I have heard such statements (...) from people that are directly involved in the 
negotiations”, Halvorsen reported home.1166 
Holland immediately instructed Halvorsen to investigate whether these statements were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1162 UD 44.36/6.84–36 – 21.11.1970 – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – Memo. France’s view on the Norwegian membership 
negotiations.  
1163 Ra/PA-1451/D/Df/L0007/0001 – 08.12.1970, Oslo – S. Stray – Prime Minister Per Borten, Oslo. Prime 
Minister’s letter 17.11.1970; Ra/PA-1451/D/Df/L0007/0001 – 17.11.1970, Oslo – P. Borten – Regarding the 
report of the conversation with state secretary Braun, 11.11.1970; Berntsen Staurberaren (2007), pp. 348-351. 
1164 Berntsen Staurberareren (2007), p. 351. 
1165 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 173. 
1166 UD 44.36/6.84 – 08.02.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – EC. Norwegian negotiations. Conversation with 
Commissioner Deniau. As both Halvorsen and Deniau said, several others, such as the French (including Monnet) 
had made similar noises. Even Willy Brandt would at a later stage suggest this. 
	  	   270	  
broadly representative. Halvorsen reported that the general mood was positive: Norway was a 
welcome member, but many permanent representatives believed that “everlasting exemptions 
for an entire country would be something entirely new for the EC”. They were ready to find 
solutions that had “a hint of compatibility with the Treaty of Rome and later provisions, and 
that did not appear to openly break with established principles”. Without draping the 
solutions in the language of acquis, no agreement could be reached.1167 
At this stage, the coalition was worn. Borten had threatened to resign already in May of 
1970, and the Centre Party had contemplated pulling out of the government over the EC-
issue several times. While the Conservatives had sought to keep the coalition going, Stray had 
been much more confrontational than his predecessor Lyng. It was like pulling at a loose 
thread, therefore, when Halvorsen’s Deniau-report was leaked to Dagbladet on February 19, 
1971, under the headline “Member of the EEC Commission excludes Norwegian 
membership”.1168 In fact, Halvorsen’s confidential report had first been shown to two leading 
figures in the People’s Movement by Prime Minister Borten himself on a flight to a Nordic 
Council meeting in Copenhagen. His motivation is unclear, but it might have been a way of 
saying that they needn’t worry too much – Norway would not obtain membership in any 
case.1169 Neither Borten nor the People’s Movement was the original source for Dagbladet.1170 
However, “through a series of indiscretions and inaccurate disclaimers Borten was caught in 
his own web”, Tamnes sums up the intricate events that followed, and this eventually led to 
the government’s resignation on March 17, 1971.1171  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1167 UD 44.36/6.84 – 11.03.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – EC-Norway. 
1168 Dagbladet – 19.02.1971 – “Medlem av EEC-kommisjonen utelukker norsk medlemskap” by Per Vassbotn. 
1169 This was one of the reflections of Arne Haugestad, who together with John Lager received Halvorsen’s report 
from Borten, according to Berntsen Staurberaren (2007), p. 365. 
1170 Press secretary Ole N. Hoemsnes leaked it. Skjebnedøgn. Om Borten-regjeringens fall Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag 
(1986). See also: Per Vassbotn Da Borten falt – gjensyn med regjeringens lekkasje og forlis 1971, Oslo: Cappelen (1986). 
1171 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 173-174. In a Press Release, Borten finally admitted that he had shown the report to 
Lager and Haugestad, but not that he was Dagbladet’s source. Borten’s two press associates Bye and Hoemsnes and 
Director General of the Press Department Tim Greve (MFA) drafted the statement. Haugestad later noted that the 
statement was so poorly written that it almost seemed that whoever wrote it wanted a government crisis. Without 
much evidence, Berntsen speculates: “to this we can note that Tim Greve was not one of Borten’s usual advisors, 
but that he, as an ardent EEC-supporter, probably wanted a crisis”. Berntsen Staurberaren (2007), p. 377. 
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Conclusions: politicised Diplomacy 
 
When the Europeans entered the EMN it marked a definitive step towards privileging the cause 
of membership as a goal in itself. This nuances the traditional impression among historians 
that the civil service stood up well to the change of government in 1965. Calling it “the first 
serious post-1945 test of the political loyalty of the civil service”, Trond Bergh, for instance, 
describes Norwegian civil servants at the time as “extremely apolitical”, with ‘very few’ leaving 
their job for political reasons.1172 While the Europeans did not leave their jobs, the change of 
government prompted them to follow their political convictions through informal and non-
governmental connections and organisations. Increasingly they would take on roles as 
boundary-spanners for the European cause. 
The repercussions were not immediately evident as the level of conflict in the second 
application was softened by several factors. However, the Europeans openly questioned the 
purpose of the Nordek negotiations, effectively prolonged it through administrative resistance, 
and organised and expressed their opposition through the EMN. The Europeans were 
exploring uncharted territory with regards to diplomatic conduct, and Borten confronted 
them. The placement of Vindsetmo inside the MFA, and the string of conflicts that erupted 
after The Hague Summit should be understood in this light: Borten and the EC-sceptics were 
directly and indirectly calling the Europeans’ loyalty into question.1173 The preceding two 
chapters, therefore, casts the conflict between the civil service and those opposed to 
membership leading up to the 1972 referendum in an entirely new light: the Europeans’ 
political engagement in 1971-72 was the product of a glacial shift in diplomatic practice, the 
demise of the Labour Party hegemony, the distrust of Borten and the EC-sceptics, and their 
personal and professional engagement in pro-European networks. 
The networks of the Europeans were, not surprisingly, overlapping with the MFA’s 
connections and coincided with their political affiliations. But as the previous two chapters 
have shown, early information campaigns, the social democratic engagement in the EMN, 
and the resistance against Nordek saw a great deal of cooperation (hitherto unexplored by 
historians), which broke with traditional barriers in foreign policy formation. Transnational 
social democratic networks, the close collaboration of the Labour Party in opposition, and the 
Conservatives in government; and the coordinated efforts of business sectors and political 
parties all shaped the membership issue. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1172 Bergh, ”Norway: The Powerful Servants” (1981), p. 504-505. 
1173 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 167, 168; Berntsen Staurberaren (2007), p. 338, 407. 
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The arguments produced by the Europeans in favour of membership showed a great deal 
of consistency. Just as in 1962-63, membership was placed in the broad context of postwar 
prosperity and security. Particularly during the Nordek negotiations, when tensions regarding 
NATO membership ran high and resistance against the postwar order was mounting, the 
Europeans adamantly argued that Norway risked slipping into neutrality with a Nordic solution. 
At the same time, membership in the EC was seen as a way of anchoring Norway to the 
western alliance. New elements were entering the discourse, too: membership was increasingly 
understood in the context of pooling resources to help developing countries, and as a way of 
reaching a balanced partnership with the US. We see, therefore, the continued process from 
the Europeans to discoursively fit new elements into the overarching and established concept of 
security and prosperity. 
The concept of trust was at the heart of the coalition’s demise. The more the 
Conservatives and Europeans trusted the Community, treating them as potential partners and 
not adversaries, the more they based their negotiation tactics on trust. Whereas the more they 
shared information with EC officials or engaged in the communitarian jargon, the less the EC-
sceptics trusted them. This lack of trust, and the conflicts that followed, further politicised the 
Europeans. Not only was it the government’s official policy to apply for membership, it was also 
a policy in which the Europeans took a great deal of ownership. In March of 1971, when the 
Labour Party took over the government offices with the unequivocally pro-European Trygve 
Bratteli as Prime Minister, Bratteli was joined by a group of diplomats who were used to 
moving beyond established norms, eager to reach an agreement with the Six, and ready to 
convince the voters of the need to join. 
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The Third Round 
Between Europe and Norway, 1969-1972 
 
“The government fought, you know, and we were supposed to be on the government’s side, as civil servants. 
So, we were the faithful servants, we were not the disloyal servants, it was the other way around.”1174 
 
Arild Holland on accusations that the Europeans believed too much in the cause. 
 
In the early 1970s, the trajectory and entanglements of the Norwegian debates and policies 
towards Europe since the early 1960s, the emerging convictions and networks, the politisation 
of the Europeans since the first application and the specific potentials and capacities of 
diplomatic practice connected to the EC-case (and more generally in the development of 
multilateral economic diplomacy) manifested themselves in a series of innovative and norm-
breaking diplomatic activities by the Europeans.  
The next three chapters explore three ways in which the Europeans worked with the EC-
case in the early 1970s, by tracing ideas, practices and tensions that had developed throughout 
the 1960s, and which gained a peculiar shape in the intense negotiations until the signing of 
the Treaty of Accession (January 1972)1175 and the heated debates and campaigns leading up 
to the referendum (September 1972). All three were innovative attempts at bridging the gap 
between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’. All three displayed the in-betweenness of their diplomatic 
practice. And all three of them exploded the traditional diplomatic norms. In exploring these 
practices, we will see just how important the developments in the diplomatic field were in the 
formation of Norwegian European policy, as both negotiation results and campaigns bore the 
mark of the Europeans boundary-spanning capacities. Moreover, we see that the Europeans were 
as concerned with changing Norwegian perceptions and positions as they were in changing 
those of the Community. To find the middle ground, they translated and interpreted ideas 
across borders: particularly in the fisheries negotiations, the Europeans’ foreign policy formation 
was a truly transnational endeavour, which ended up changing the EC itself. 
None of this made Norway a member of the EC. The Europeans would play a crucial role 
in the campaigns prior to the negative referendum, both as a ‘symbol of Europe’ for the ‘no’-
side and as inspired facilitators and educators touring the country for the European cause. 
The shock of the ‘no’, and how the Europeans made sense of it, is discussed in the epilogue: 
integration as a vehicle of peace, a pro-European political discourse, lives on today as a shared 
memory affirming that the Europeans fought for a just cause. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1174 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. 
1175 Eighteen months: ten ministerial meetings, seventeen at deputy level and countless expert consultations. 
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Chapter 10 
The Public Diplomacy of Physical Connectivity 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The best bargaining chip we had was to be ourselves.”1176 
Arne Langeland on how Norway and the Europeans could get their message across. 
 
To this author’s knowledge, no studies of the public diplomacy practices of the applicants 
during the first enlargement exist. This chapter, therefore, explores an under-studied and 
important aspect of the enlargement process: in fact, by 1971, according to the Commission, 
information trips to the EC from applicant countries had increased significantly, and Norway 
was number one both in increase and frequency of visits. 1177  Public diplomacy, then, 
represented one of the few arenas in which Norway was leading.  
As will be argued, one of the most consistent and enduring aspects of the Norwegian 
negotiation tactic – in, and between, all three rounds – was what this thesis calls the public 
diplomacy of physical connectivity. Simply put, this entailed arranging extensive excursions, 
conferences and trips between Norway and the Community. For the Norwegians coming to 
Brussels, Bonn, The Hague and Luxembourg, the aim was familiarisation with the institutions 
and inner workings of the Community. In regard to the Community’s representatives, the 
idea was that they should travel the distance, experience the climate, the steepness of the 
mountains, and feel the cold.  
The EC case ending in a referendum, there was a direct link between multilateral 
negotiations and public opinion, and on the most contested topics of negotiation such as 
agriculture and fishery, the EC and Norway stood far apart. Bridging this gap, the Europeans 
recognised that they had to move beyond material give-and-takes. For the negotiations to 
succeed immaterial things such as ‘understanding’ and ‘trust’ needed to be built up – long 
term – on both sides. Public diplomacy, in this context, was an instrument to create 
understanding, and build and manage the relationship between the EC and Norway, and 
through this, influence thoughts and mobilise actions to advance their interests and values.1178 
Importantly, this was a distinct kind of public diplomacy, which was aimed, on the one hand, 
at the domestic electorate and, on the other, at the policy elites of the Six and the Community 
institutions. Last, it was a way of promoting Norway’s soft power in what the Europeans treated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1176 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. 
1177 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 05.05.1971, Brussels – H. W. Freihow – EC. Visitors from Norway. 
1178 Bruce Gregory “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation”, The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy, 6:3/4 (2011), p. 353; Jan Melissen Beyond the New Public Diplomacy Clingendael Paper No. 3, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (2011), p. 10.  
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as a ‘Community space’.1179 As will be seen, the MFA’s public diplomacy was largely planned 
and executed in the already established MFA-EMN-KEIZ triangle. In this triangle, the 
Europeans coordinated, facilitated and, as experts, contributed to the content of continuous 
encounters between the EC and Norway.  
The Europeans wanted to connect and overcome the mental distances between 
Norwegians and Continental Europeans, in the broadest sense. This could be understood as 
an example of what political scientist Costas M. Constantinou has labelled homo-diplomacy.1180 
The aim being to make both parties accept that Norway was a natural part of Europe, and to 
make the EC representatives understand that Norway was also a distinct part of Europe – in 
need of special arrangements. The most important medium to get this last message across was 
Norwegian nature. But the Europeans’ efforts could also be understood as the production and 
maintenance of diplomatic sites – Norwegian nature but also the Embassy in Brussels and 
other sites – for encounters they hoped would create the much-coveted understanding and 
trust.1181 From this point of view, the strategy was, in the most profound way, an attempt to 
make others see the membership issue through the Europeans’ eyes. By materialising both the 
closeness and the distance between the two entities – travelling between them – the Europeans 
reproduced their in-betweenness and diplomatic gaze. 
 
The Evolution of Physical Connectivity 
Arne Langeland and Asbjørn Skarstein were the first to articulate the need to invite officials 
from the Community and the six member states to Norway and show them the unique 
structural challenges faced by Norwegian fishermen and farmers. Equally, they called for 
Norwegians to visit the Community institutions. This formed part of the strategy envisioned 
during the first round of enlargement talks, and was born out of the dual recognition that the 
EEC did not need Norway as a member state for economic reasons, and that the Community 
officials knew very little of Norway (and vice versa). This educational process, it was argued, 
could best be secured through ‘personal experience’. In other words, Norwegian students, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1179 Jan Melissen Beyond the New Public Diplomacy Clingendael Paper No. 3, Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael’ (2011), p. 19. The positively loaded version of this Melissen calls ‘holistic public diplomacy’. 
Comprising this communication inwards, Jozef Bátora gives a broad definition of public diplomacy: “...public 
diplomacy comprises all activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of 
a country’s soft power.” Jozef Bátora Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada Discussion 
Paper in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (2005), p. 4; Joseph S. Nye Soft 
Power. The Means of Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs (2004). 
1180 Costas M. Constantinou “Diplomacy, Spirituality, Alterity” in Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian 
(Eds.) Sustainable Diplomacies Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2010), pp. 67-85, p. 68. What Constantinou describes 
is a mental shift in encountering the Other, altering the Self, and thus enabling the Self to understand the Other in a 
new way. For this to be successful one needs both to embrace Otherness, and to engage in mediation of Sameness. 
1181 Neumann Diplomatic Sites (2013), Pp. 4-7.	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journalists, parliamentarians, businessmen and organisations were to physically come to 
Brussels. Equally, representatives from the Community, and politicians, parliamentarians and 
journalists from the six member states were invited to see and experience Norway.1182 
In 1963, following de Gaulle’s first veto, Frydenlund – press attaché to Brussels during 
the first round – put his thoughts on future public diplomacy efforts to paper. He reiterated 
the importance of getting key officials and influential people in Norway interested in Europe, 
and to nurture relations with key personnel in the Community. As an example, Frydenlund 
mentioned how members of the Monnet Action Committee – who had often floated the idea 
of a ’small enlargement’ – could be ’worked on’ by the embassies and invited on trips to 
Norway.1183 Thus, public diplomacy through ‘personal experience’ remained one of the 
important tools of the MFA. However, the actual number of MFA-organised trips was kept to 
a minimum following the first round of enlargement talks. 
Instead, as cooperation between the MFA and the NCEM (EMN, 1965) developed 
between 1962 and 1965, an increasing number of visits between the Community and Norway 
were planned and arranged jointly, with the MFA playing the role of co-ordinator at arms 
length. Only gradually did this joint venture become an integral part of the MFA’s public 
diplomacy. As late as February 1965, Ambassador Jørgensen wrote from Brussels: “quite 
frequently groups and delegations of Norwegians come to Brussels to study the European 
Communities”. As far as Jørgensen knew, the trips were often organised by Zöldi in Bonn, 
whose Norwegian contact he assumed to be the EMN, and the expenses were covered partly 
by the Commission. The embassy had been informed of the Norwegian delegations coming to 
Brussels “only by chance and last minute”. Jørgensen therefore requested Holland in the 
Ministry to contact the EMN and ask them to inform the Embassy of up-coming visits as early 
as possible.1184 Though such visits were “of the highest priority to the embassy”, the planning 
was rather haphasard until the Europeans entered the EMN from 1965 onwards.1185 
As seen above, after the formalisation of co-operation between EMN, KEIZ and the 
MFA, and especially in connection with the second round (1967), the number of trips 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1182 UD 44.36/6.84 – 05.02.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to the Foreign Minister. The 
relationship with the EEC; UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 02.05.1962 – A. Langeland and A. Skarstein – Memo to State 
Secretary Engen. EEC – Time schedule and negotiation tactic; UD 44.36/6.84–12 – 08.05.1962, Oslo – Draft. The 
Norwegian Governments declaration to the European Economic Community. (Prepared by the MFA); UD 
44.36/6.84 – 14.06.1962, Oslo – MFA. The Norwegian Governments declaration to the EEC. 
1183 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–1 – 16.03.1963, Brussels – K. Frydenlund – Dear Hans Engen! As an example of the 
importance of Norwegians visiting the EC-Six he mentioned how the Liberal Youth where pro-European thanks to 
Magne Lerheim’s stay at the College of Europe in Bruges. Lerheim later became a part of ’Yes to the EC’-campaign. 
1184 Which Holland quickly sorted out: UD 44.36/8–1 – 20.02.1965, Oslo – A. Holland – To the EMN. CEE. Visits 
from Norwegian delegations and study groups. 
1185 UD 44.36/8–1 – 16.02.1965, Brussels – N. A. Jørgensen – Visits from Norwegian delegations and study groups. 
Jørgensen’s very limited knowledge of KEIZ reflects the fact that he was not a part of the inner circle of Europeans. 
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exploded, and the ties between the three grew stronger.1186 Illustrative of this was the EMN’s 
wish to hire Junior Executive Officer Terje Johannessen from the MFA as their new 
permanent secretary.1187 Another indicator was the increasing use of Europeans as speakers at 
EMN events, and the use of MFA material for EMN publications. Already in 1966, Asbjørn 
Skarstein went on a lecture tour to Trøndelag (central-Norway), and Tim Greve – before he 
entered the EMN – was sent to Gjøvik on behalf of the MFA and EMN to give a lecture 
bearing the telling title ‘Towards European unity’.1188 Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen’s speech at 
Statsøkonomisk Forening in 1966 was – after arrangements between Director General Rogstad, 
EMN secretary Erik Hoff, and Tim Greve – printed and issued in 2500 copies jointly by the 
EMN and the MFA.1189 A last and significant development was Director General of the MFA 
Press Department Tim Greve’s entry into the working committee of the European 
Movement. This was the engine room of the EMN, and Greve remained part of the working 
committee until the referendum in September 1972.1190 
This led to a further professionalisation of the joint public diplomacy efforts from 1968-
69 onwards. In October of 1968, Halvorsen wrote an extensive memo to the EMN: “in the 
first, formative years of the EEC, before the co-operation had the depth it has today and while 
Norwegian knowledge of the Community was very limited”, Halvorsen maintained, “it was 
natural that the exchanges first and foremost aimed at general information.” Now that the 
continuous exchange had “found a certain form” it was time to move beyond general 
information. Halvorsen now suggested that they invite more limited groups of representatives 
from different economic sectors, such as the agricultural, fisheries or industrial sector, and give 
them targeted information. The groups should, Halvorsen continued, systematically be sent to 
the embassy in Brussels for orientations, and participants should give feedback to the EMN in 
order for them to continuously improve the trips.1191 
Early in 1969, the EMN and the embassy in Brussels planned to arrange special 
excursions to Norway for Community representatives and Commission civil servants for the 
MFA. Tim Greve assured that “it would be possible that the MFA could finance the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1186 RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0010 – Summary: board meeting, February 21, 1967. 
1187 RA/PA-0992/A/As/L0010 – Summary: Working Committee, 10.01.1967; RA/PA – 0992/A/As – L0010 – 
Summary: board meeting, 21.02.1967; Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. Johannessen declined the offer. 
1188 RA/PA – 0992/A/Aa – L0010 – Summary: Working Committee, May 12, 1966; RA/PA – 
0992/A/Aa/L0010/– February 16, 1966 – Summary: Working Committee, February 16, 1966. 
1189 RA/PA – 0992/D/ - L0015/0009 – 29.11.1966 – To Gunnar Rogstad, from Erik Hoff; RA/PA – 
0992/D/L0015/0009 – 13.12.1966 – To Tim Greve, from Marit Nersund; RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0010 – Summary: 
board meeting in the Storting, December 15, 1966. Jahn Halvorsen Fellesmarkedet videre fremover. Foredrag holdt i 
statsøkonomisk forening 28. Nov. 1966, Oslo: Europabevegelsen i Norge (1966). 
1190 RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0010 – Summary: board meeting 03.05.1967. 
1191 RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ - 15.10.1968, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Visits to the EEC (EMN). 
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remaining costs even though the European Movement was listed as the organiser (...).”1192 As 
seen above, the MFA had just secured the EMN an extra funding of 25,000 NOK under 
chapter 190 (unforeseen conferences). 1193  Such a conflation of roles and finances was 
problematic, and became one of the peculiar aspects of the Europeans’ part in the information 
efforts leading up to the referendum. 
By 1970, co-operation was tried and tested. In June of 1970, for example, Haakon Lie 
and the EMN would set up a trip to Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany for 
Norwegian representatives of the fishery sector. The programme consisted of visits to ports, 
producers and organisations. The whole trip was planned and organised by the EMN, the 
Ministry of Fisheries, the embassies in Brussels and The Hague. The EMN, through funds 
from business organisations, paid for most of the trip, while the MFA gave a one time 
contribution of 10,000 NOK.1194 For other trips, the KEIZ would be involved, and the 
embassies in Brussels and elsewhere would contribute with lecturers.1195 This, more targeted 
effort, was complimented by other kinds of information: Greve printed and distributed a 
French and German version of a manuscript on the Norwegian economy and the EC – 
‘L’économie Norvégienne et l’Europe’ – written by Counsellor to Brussels Sigurd Ekeland.1196 
Another strategic effort was to get a special issue focussing on Norway into the Revue du Marché 
Commun – a small, monthly journal with 4000 subscribers, mostly to be found within the inner 
circles of the Community.1197 
The Embassy in Brussels was the main hub of the trips, but other embassies played a 
crucial role as well. The embassy in Bonn, for instance, hosted five parliamentary committees, 
three expert groups of civil servants, five groups invited by KEIZ and Zöldi, and no less than 
10 groups from the Labour Movement and NCTU, totalling 364 people in 1971 (105 from 
committees, 19 civil servants, 130 via KEIZ, 110 via NCTU). The embassy had co-arranged 
all of the trips, and briefed all of the visitors on EC-matters.1198 The Zöldi trips (“our own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1192 RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ - 04.02.1969, Oslo – E. M. Bull – Counsellor Leif Edwardsen. 
1193 RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ - 15.12.1967, Oslo – S. K. Eriksen – Report: Geneva meeting, 6.-7.12.1967, EFTA 
Action Committee.. 
1194 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-3 – 20.06.1970 – EMN – Info and study trips to Belgium, France, Holland and Germany for 
representatives of the fishery sector, 20.-29.09.1970; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – 09.09.1970 – H. Lie – Application: 
economic support for study trip for Norwegian fishery representatives to the EC-countries, 20-29.09.1970. 
1195 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 14.10.1970 – H- Lie, EMN. 
1196 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 08.05.1970 – T. Greve – Memo to the Administrative Department. Additional funds, 
1970, for information efforts in the EEC-countries. 
1197 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – 19.08.1970, Brussels – S. Ekeland – Norwegian application. Information efforts. If the 
issue was good, Norway would have reached precisely the ‘right people’ in relation to the negotiations: “on the 
editorial board sits, among others, Jean-François Deniau, member of the EEC-Commission, Jean-Pierre Brunet, Quai 
d’Orsay’s key person regarding EEC-matters, and also Director General [for industrial, technological and scientific 
matters] in the Commission, [Robert] Toulemon”, Ekeland wrote enthusiastically. 
1198 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 04.02.1972, Bonn – Memo. Groups and delegations on EC-info trips to the FRG, 1971. 
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Zöldi-group” as Lie wrote) were, of course, planned via the EMN, and the ten Labour 
Movement trips were partially paid by the EMN.1199 By the last round of negotiations, the 
public diplomacy of physical connectivity was one of the most established, and widely used, 
parts of the MFA’s tactical arsenal. Press attaché to Brussels, Håkon W. Freihow, could report 
that 35 groups totalling 659 people would visit the embassy during the first six months of 1971 
– leading among the applicants both in increase and frequency of visits.1200 
This important, continuous and growing part of the MFA’s public diplomacy was co-
ordinated and executed through a dense web of pro-European forces that came into place in 
the mid-1960s. In fact, it is impossible to grasp the full veracity of the MFA’s public 
diplomacy, or the Europeans work with the EC-case, without recognising and exploring both 
the formal and informal aspects. In this pro-European web, the Europeans played many roles. 
They were co-ordinators through the overall coordinative responsibilities of the MFA. Trips, 
material, money, contacts were knitted together in the MFA machinery. Here the Economic 
Department, the Press Department and the Market Secretariat were crucial. They were also 
facilitators, or connectors: through their vast network of contacts both on the domestic and 
international scene the Europeans gathered information, invited guests, and put people in the 
same room as each other. As explored above, the intermeshing of the domestic and 
international spheres, particularly in the field of multilateral economic diplomacy, made the 
Europeans’ in-betweenness even more important in this respect. They were of the few actors 
that mastered both scenes, and the interphase between the two. Here those from the 
Economic Department who took part in inter-departmental and corporative organs, the 
Europeans within the EMN, and the embassies (especially Brussels) played the most important 
role. Last, they were experts. The embassies briefed everyone visiting from Norway, and 
Europeans accompanied visitors from the Community to Norway on extensive trips. The 
information became more and more targeted and tailored to speak to trade unionists, 
parliamentarians, fishermen, continental journalists or civil servants from the Commission. 
 
The rationale behind physical connectivity 
A crucial element of the public diplomacy of physical connectivity, which remained constant 
throughout the three applications, was to create a certain level of trust in ‘Europe’ among 
Norwegian officials and the public, and a genuine understanding of Norway’s peculiar 
problems on the Community side. In doing this, the Europeans produced, maintained and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1199 AA/Dd/A/053/3/3/L0011 – 1971 – H. Lie – A general plan for our work up to the referendum. 
1200 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 05.05.1971, Brussels – H. W. Freihow – EC. Visitors from Norway. 
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performed in particular diplomatic sites that they thought would create the desired result: the 
most important site being Norwegian nature.1201  
Commission President Malfatti’s visit to Norway in late February 1971, right before the 
Centre-Right coalition collapsed, was a one of those opportunities ‘to create a realistic 
impression’. Sommerfelt wrote of how he mediated estrangement between Malfatti and 
Norwegian nature, by facilitating a site that educed understanding: 
 
Yes, Signor and Signora Malfatti experienced our northern winters, with clear weather and cold. 
One day we were standing on the pier of one of Tromsø’s local dignitaries, Alfons Kræmer, and 
saw one of his fishing boats coming in from the Arctic Ocean. It had been out in some rough 
weather, and both the deck and the windows were covered with ice. The boat docked – 
everything was lifeless until the hatch opened on the front deck, and out crawled a creature that 
had to be human, as it walked on two. Everything was wrapped in something black, including 
the hat with long flaps. Inside, behind the scarf one could see a couple of narrow eyes – that’s all. 
It was a miracle how this creature managed to claw his way from the icy deck down towards the 
pulpit. It was then that our Italian guests, especially she, understood that fishing in Northern 
Norway was something special and required special arrangements.1202 
 
The meeting was between the harsh Norwegian nature and the Malfattis – Sommerfelt merely 
made it happen.1203 It is clear that Sommerfelt here engaged in active othering. He describes a 
rough and exotic Norway, and the plot was that the Malfattis changed their perception of 
Norway by experiencing, and accepting, its sheer otherness. But it is also a mediation of 
sameness: Sommerfelt is apparently just as astounded by how the fisherman could survive as 
the Malfattis. They share the experience of being impressed by the stamina of ‘this creature’ – 
and therefore share an understanding. 
Malfatti himself was well aware of both the perceived cultural distance between 
‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’, and also the ambivalence of the centre-right coalition. In preparing 
for the visit, the Commission produced several analytical memos on the general political 
situation in Norway. One memo listed the many reasons why Norwegians were sceptical of 
the Community, and simply concluded that “to understand this attitude it is necessary to keep 
in mind that the Norwegians, who for many years were isolated from the European continent, 
first of all feel proudly ‘Norwegian’, then ‘Nordic’, and only in the final analysis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1201 This was especially important regarding the fishery and agricultural sector – it was in these sectors that Norway 
demanded special (and permanent) exemptions from the Treaty of Rome.  
1202 Sommerfelt Sendemann (1997), p. 149. My translation. 
1203 Constantinou: “Diplomacy, Spirituality, Alterity” (2010), p. 68; James Der Derian: On Diplomacy: A Geneology of 
Western Estrangement, Oxford: Blackwell (1987). 
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‘European’”. 1204  The first question Head of the European Commission delegation for 
negotiations on enlargement of the European Communities, Edmund Wellenstein, asked 
Malfatti to consider prior to his trip to Norway, for instance, was whether “another solution 
than membership is conceivable for a country like Norway?”1205 It was a general challenge, 
therefore, to balance this physical manifestation of distance and otherness, with a continuous 
embracement of being ‘European’. This challenge was especially pronounced while Per 
Borten was Prime Minister. The balance of sameness and otherness was also at the core of 
fostering understanding for the Norwegian fishery claims. Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen, for 
example, ferociously and continuously argued for more visits to Norway in order to stop the 
Community from creating a Common Fisheries Policy detrimental to Norwegian interests.1206  
When Vice President of the Commission, Sicco Mansholt, visited Norway in 1967, the 
Europeans had prepared a speech for Foreign Minister John Lyng: “Your stay in Norway – 
even if it is a short one – gives us the opportunity to show you some parts of Norway, and to 
present to you and discuss with you certain problems in the field of agriculture and fisheries.” 
One of the objectives of the visit was therefore to physically display otherness. At the same 
time, however, the speech highlighted sameness: 
 
“Although Norway is the northernmost country in the European continent, we are part of it. 
Through our application it is not our intention to become European, but to stay European, and 
to share in the responsibility for the future of Europe.”1207 
 
This might seem like pleasantries, but it was seen as crucial for the possible success of the 
negotiations. Recognising the display of otherness and sameness, Mansholt responded, “[i]t 
was in the interest of all of Western Europe that there would remain people in Northern 
Norway.” 1208 Mansholt’s response was partly due to geo-strategic considerations – 
considerations the Europeans had made a vital part of the Norwegian negotiation strategy 
already in 1961-62. The geo-strategic and emotional appeals therefore complemented each 
other, and were repeated again and again (also when Malfatti discussed the matter with MFA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1204 HAEU – FMM-21 – 15.02.1971 – P. M. Marocco – Appunto sulle reazioni Norvegesi all’eventuale entrata della 
Norvegia nella Comunita’. 
1205 HAEU – FMM-21 – 24.10.1971, Brussels – E. P. Wellenstein – Note pour M. le Président Malfatti. Objet: 
Préparation du voyage en Norvège. My italics. 
1206 44.36/8 CEE–4 – 15.05.1968, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Visits between EEC and Norway. 
1207 UD 44.36/8–3 1.4.67-31.1.68 – Pre-13..10.1967, Oslo – Draft. Foreign Minister’s speech at the government’s 
dinner for vice-president S. Mansholt, 13.10.1967. 
1208 UD 44.36/8–3 – 17.10.1967 – P. M. Ølberg – Vice-president Mansholt’s visit. Statements regarding agricultural 
policies, after conversations with the agricultural organisations. 
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officials)1209. The argument that a depopulated north would weaken NATO’s northern flank, 
and therefore was a European concern, was particularly important in relation to the fishery 
and agricultural sector. Thus, in a deputy meeting between Norway and the EC, Sommerfelt 
maintained, “if Norway joined the Community it had to be a Communitarian responsibility to 
prevent depopulation of the Northern most coastal areas of Europe.”1210 
The leading role in the public diplomacy of physical connectivity was played by 
Norwegian nature. As EMN secretary Einar M. Bull said the aim was to “show our barren 
north to create a realistic impression: that Norway within a European economic community 
will depend on special arrangements”. Both the embassy in Brussels and the EMN agreed 
that, “such trips would be of major importance to create the necessary understanding for our 
problems among caseworkers in the Commission”.1211 From the time Frydenlund was made 
press attaché, the role of the embassy in Brussels remained to “take care of the planning of 
visits to Norway by representatives of the Common Market.”1212 Håkon W. Freihow, press 
attaché to Brussels between 1971 and 1972, remembered the embassy as constantly trying to 
“highlight the Norwegian topography so as to make them understand Norway’s distinctive 
character, and thus the fairness of our negotiation position.”1213 Holland, co-ordinating the 
visits from Oslo, remembered the tactic this way: 
 
The ‘tactical assessment’ – if you were to call it that – was to show Norway, to the continental 
Europeans in the EC, as a country they didn’t have any knowledge about. So, we arranged 
extensive trips for leading representatives of the Community to all parts of Norway. They 
couldn’t begin to comprehend the vast distances, the scattered settlements etc. and that Norway 
was a special country in Europe, until they had visited. (...) I can’t even begin to count how many 
times I have accompanied EC representatives to Kirkenes and even Grense Jakobselv [the border to 
Russia]. They had then travelled thousands of kilometres from Brussels and seen for themselves. 
And they were convinced of the legitimacy of our problems.1214 
 
The aim was, as stated in the intro, for them to travel the distance, experience the rough climate 
and the steepness of the mountains, and feel the cold. As Geoffrey Allen Pigman notes, public 
diplomacy is “an essential component of the soft power resources employed by 	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1210 UD 44.36/6.84–40 – 10.06.1971 – Neg. Del. – Memo. Summary: Deputy meeting, EC-Norway, 08.06.1971. 
1211 RA/PA-0992/D/L0001/ - 04.02.1969, Oslo – E. M. Bull – Councellor Leif Edwardsen. 
1212 UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 27.06.1962, Oslo – T. Myklebost, Press Department – Memo to the Foreign Minister; 
UD 44.36/6.84 B.–1 – 16.08.1962, Oslo – O. C. Gundersen – To the Royal Wage and Price Ministry. Necessity of 
personell in regards to the negotiation of Norway’s possible affiliation to the EEC. 
1213 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 18.12.2012 
1214 Interview – Arild Holland – 20.02.2013. 
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governments”.1215 This was true of the Norwegian MFA’s strategy towards the EC in the 
1960s and 1970s, too. In this light it seems the Europeans relied on the soft ‘persuasive’ power 
of Norwegian nature.  
The rationale behind facilitating physical connectivity between Norway and the 
Community was twofold: on the one hand, the Europeans wanted to connect and overcome the 
mental distances between Norwegians and Continental Europeans, in the broadest sense. It 
was a project of making Norway a natural part of the Community, by making both known to 
each other. On the other hand, it was a way of showing Norway’s uniqueness to 
representatives of the Community. It was a way of materialising the distance, and thus the 
differences between Norway and Continental Europe. Accordingly, and deliberately, the 
Europeans communicated two things at once: ‘Norway is a natural part of Western Europe’ and 
‘Norway is a distinctive part of Western Europe’. Essentially, they regarded this as a vital – and 
perhaps only – way of bridging the distance between the Norwegian negotiation position and 
what the Community could offer. 
 
The diplomatic gaze 
By exploring how the Europeans and others evaluated the practice of physical connectivity, we 
see that the aim was to mediate estrangement between Norway and the Community by 
changing both. Nature, as we have seen, played a crucial part in this, in addition to other sites 
such as the Embassy in Brussels, Community institutions, and the actual travelling. The public 
diplomacy of physical connectivity could be understood as the creation, performance and 
maintenance of a wide diplomatic site, which reproduced the in-betweenness of the Europeans, 
and therefore also aimed to reproduce their understanding of the encounter.  
Terje Johannessen took part in many of the trips to the north of Norway, and 
remembered them as counterproductive: “they came to Norway with certain expectations, 
after we had described the terrible conditions, and then they came to Finnmark [northern most 
region of Norway] and there they found impressive barns and automatic irrigation systems 
that they could only dream of – and they said ‘why should they have more money’?”1216 
Opposite, Jahn Halvorsen was convinced that ‘field excursions’ made a lasting impression on 
Community representatives and served Norwegian interests.1217 Martin Huslid’s reflections 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1215 Geoffrey Allen Pigman “International Sport and Diplomacy’s Public Dimension: Governments, Sporting 
Federations and the Global Audience”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 25:1, (2014), pp. 94-114, p. 97. 
1216 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
1217 UD 44.36/8 CEE.–4 – 15.05.1968, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Exchanges between the EEC and Norway. 
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following a visit to Norway from three civil servants of the Commission’s DG industry, 
however, captures the complexity of such exchanges: 
 
“Of course, it is difficult to assess the ‘usefulness’ of such a visit. The gentlemen undoubtedly 
revised some of their preconceptions and got a truer image of the conditions under which 
Norwegian industries (...) operate.  For example, they got a vivid impression of the huge distances 
(both to raw materials and markets) and the substantial investments in infrastructure that is 
needed. (...) I therefore think that such a visit has contributed to the creation of more awareness 
of, and understanding for, our problems among men that work with economic questions that 
directly concern us. (...) Finally, the visit has contributed to personal contacts that might come in 
handy. For me, and I suppose others at the embassy here [in Brussels], the visit will have made 
our access to these men and their field of work easier”.1218 
 
It was only natural that any measurable success depended on many other factors out of the 
Europeans’ control, what is interesting is why they felt the strategy succeeded/failed: a 
significant turn in the Community’s attitude towards Norway occurred in the summer of 
1971. At this point the EC realised that Norwegian fears of not being able to ratify an 
agricultural or fishery agreement unanimously rejected by the interest groups were real. 
According to Allers, the Norwegian negotiators intended to turn the question into a political 
one, among other things, through a string of visits to Norway: from the Foreign Ministers of 
France and Italy, several Ministers of Agriculture, and Commissioner Deniau. Allers 
concludes, “the Norwegians took them to the Northern coast and flew them in small planes 
over the mountainous landscape in order to illustrate the conditions under which the farmers 
had to work. This strategy certainly had an effect on German representatives”. The Dutch 
Minister of Agriculture Pierre Lardinois, however, remained “unimpressed by the 
mountainous landscape that was meant to change his view on Norwegian special rights. 
Presumably the weather was too good and the scenery too idyllic to drive home the 
argument”, Sommerfelt bitterly recalled.1219 In both examples, how Norwegian nature was 
experienced was perceived as the defining factor. It is the site that educes understanding.  
The public diplomacy of physical connectivity was part of a broad range of diplomatic 
(and non-diplomatic) efforts co-ordinated by the MFA. The MFA arranged exchanges and 
trips for almost all organisations, sectors, and businesses. Through the embassy in Brussels, 
groups of Norwegians met Commission officials, leading politicians, and their ‘opposite 	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1219 Robin M. Allers“Attacking the Sacred Cow. The Norwegian Challenge to the EC’s Acquis Communautaire in the 
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numbers’ in the different EC countries. The shipping sector and the NSA, for example, 
shaped their policies and responses through “a close and continuous contact with the 
Norwegian embassy in Brussels”, with Eivinn Berg being their point of contact in the early 
1970s.1220 Opposite, the MFA and EMN invited “Europeans to Norway”. This was not only 
for them to experience Norwegian nature, the EMN secretary once wrote to the Information 
Service of the EC, but also because Norwegians in the districts “need to receive impulses from 
abroad to pose questions, discuss, learn to know others and express their own opinions  
(...)”.1221 
A fundamental trait of this practice, then, was as much about changing the Norwegian 
outlook as it was about changing the position of the EC.1222 More fundamentally, the 
Europeans sought, as political scientist James Der Derian phrased it, to mediate 
estrangement.1223 That is, to create or sustain understanding of the Self and the Other. As 
seen above, Constantinou, building on this, describes a mental shift in encountering the 
Other, altering the Self, and thus enabling the Self to understand the Other in a new way. For 
this to be successful, Constantinou maintains, one needs both to embrace Otherness, and to 
engage in mediation of Sameness. The Europeans, negotiating on behalf of Norway, engaged in 
something similar to such homo-diplomacy: the physical, interpersonal dealing between 
Community officials and Norwegians was meant to foster both recognition of Sameness, and 
respect for Otherness. In the broadest sense, and for the Europeans to succeed, ‘Norway’ had to 
change its self-perception when encountering ‘Europe’, and thus change its understanding of 
‘Europe’.1224 If they all accepted that they were, in fact, Europeans – then the differences could 
be understood on another level. 
Seen from another angle, the Europeans produced and tried to maintain a diplomatic site 
that could mediate estrangement. In a deeper sense, then, the recognition of ‘sameness’ and 
‘otherness’, of Norway being both a natural and distinctive part of Europe, physically 
manifested through actually travelling between the two entities, locating the experiences in 
Brussels and Norwegian nature, the continuous meeting of the international and the domestic 
scene through the Europeans, all of this, reproduced their point of view – their diplomatic gaze. 
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1222 Melissen Beyond the New Public Diplomacy (2011), p. 10. 
1223 Der Derian On Diplomacy (1987). 
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Chapter 11 
Communitarian Boomerang 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Holland said there was no logic in this situation. (...)  
unbelievable though it seemed, the Norwegian candidature for EEC membership  
was in danger of foundering over this issue. It was a political and emotional problem.”1225 
Arild Holland referred by British officials (July 1971) 
 
The fishery issue was one of the most difficult and important in the whole negotiation. 
Following the Pompidou-Heath summit (May 1971) where political agreement on most major 
outstanding issues had been agreed between France and Britain, the last remaining issues 
were fisheries. It prolonged Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway’s signing of the accession 
treaties several months, to January 1972, and threatened to dislodge the entire enlargement.  
There were three reasons for this. First, fishery was the most important singular issue for 
the Norwegian government, and acquired, apart from the economic dimension, a political 
and historical-emotional dimension, which made it the litmus test for ‘membership’ as such. 
Second, at the core of the fisheries negotiations was a longstanding and oft-bitter dispute 
about access to Norwegian waters between Britain and Norway. This dispute became 
entangled in the enlargement negotiations, and made both parties change strategies several 
times. Third, on the eve of the opening of negotiations, the EC launched its own Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) aiming at Community-wide equal access to national waters. This 
infuriated the applicants who all had fish rich waters, and not least Norway whose coastline 
would become the food basket of the enlarged Community’s fishery fleets.   
This chapter follows the Europeans’ work with the fisheries issue from the early 1960s as 
they designed and defended an alternative communitarian fishery policy (the establishment 
line), got it through the domestic machinery, and operated it in the complex multilateral 
negotiations between the applicants and the EC. The way the Europeans negotiated the fishery 
issue took shape from the many overlapping roles they, as MEDs, inhabited in the domestic 
and international arenas and their personal conviction. As we shall see, at the core of the 
negotiations was the use and interpretation of the acquis communautaire. The paradoxical end 
result was that the Europeans’ communitarian strategy failed to bring Norway into the 
Community, but greatly shaped the final fishery agreement between the Six and the other 
three applicants who joined the EC in 1973. Through the combined pressure of the four 
applicants the Community withdrew and revised its own common policy. 	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The establishment line 
As we recall, the Europeans orchestrated, and were well on their way to implement a 
fundamental rethink of the Gerhardsen government’s negotiation strategy in the autumn of 
1962. At that time the Europeans had adopted elements of the communitarian logic, and 
shaped Norwegian policy and strategy accordingly. The establishment line, which would 
reappear in the 1970s, was born under such circumstances. 
It was clear from the wording of the Treaty of Rome that some form of common policy 
for fisheries was to be developed within the Community to complete and complement the 
common agricultural policy.1226 The Six had very diverse national systems of duties on fish 
products, with France having by far the highest levels of protection, with duties up to 50 % on 
certain types of fish.1227 The harmonisation of the different regimes and liberalisation of intra-
Community fish trade began on January 1, 1962, slowly dismantling the French system of 
protection. Threatened by competition from other member states and non-EEC countries, the 
French government and fishery industry lobbied the EEC for a CFP.1228 The Commission 
responded and proposed a conference of the Six in order to develop a CFP as soon as 
possible.1229 Third countries that had applied for membership would be allowed to submit 
written statements to be taken into consideration by the Community.1230  
These developments, in the midst of the first round of enlargement negotiations, created 
a serious challenge for the Norwegian negotiators. The Six had not settled on a common 
fishery policy, but it was clear that they aimed for a policy of ‘equal access’ for all member 
states to each other’s fishing waters. As Norway had very rich fishing waters and was a major 
exporter of fish products, the dilemma, it seemed, was to find a balance between protecting 
domestic waters and gaining access to a major market: more than 20 percent of total fishery 
export went to the Six. An enlarged EEC would, in 1962, receive roughly 50 percent of the 
unprocessed fish produce, and 36,1 percent of the processed and canned fish.1231 However, 
the social, cultural and socio-economic importance of the fishery sector was even greater: the 
Norwegian fishery industry consisted of a fishery population scattered all along the coast, 
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owning or sharing ownership of relatively small fishing vessels.1232 Roughly 50 percent of the 
fishery population lived in the north of the country, and as late as 1970, 40 percent of 
employment in that region came from the fisheries sector.1233 The existing fishery regime 
prioritised small vessels, a national concession and landing system, and rigorous routines for 
rights of establishment, not only to protect an economic infrastructure, but as part of a 
postwar policy of regional development. Moreover, in a Cold War context, keeping the north 
populated had geostrategic importance too. As it turned out, the conference of the Six never 
materialised. The French refused participation of third countries. But in late 1962, the fishery 
conference – set for January 1963 – was an important reality. Norway had been invited to 
present a memorandum, and the Europeans and the Ministry of Fishery (MoF) worked hard to 
develop a response.1234 The ambitious aim was to “work through the Community machinery” 
and shape the CFP from the inside. Norway being Western Europe’s biggest fisheries nation, 
they imagined they would be heard.1235 
In discussions with British officials in Oslo, October 1962, Director Generals Halvorsen 
and Gundersen (MoF) presented “an outline of what they thought should be the common 
fisheries policy of an enlarged Community, taking into account the basic fisheries problems of 
Western Europe”. With the Treaty of Rome as their starting point, the Europeans and the MoF 
had prepared a memorandum they thought would “help not only Norway but the Six also”. 
To Halvorsen and Gundersen’s mind, the Treaty of Rome took no stand on the extension of 
territorial waters: each country should be able to maintain their territorial and fishery limits. 
Moreover, as they interpreted the Treaty of Rome, the ‘rights of establishment’ (Articles 52-
58) were applicable. A foreign person or company could establish business in the territory of 
any member state, but would have to abide by the laws of that member state. “[T]he Treaty 
provided for equal but not free access to waters within fishery limits”, Halvorsen concluded, 
therefore citizens of other EC states would be free to fish within Norwegian fishing limits 
provided they were residing in Norway. This was the establishment line.1236 Back home the 
Europeans had high hopes: “the strength of the memo”, it was claimed at a negotiation 
delegation meeting in November 1962, was that it had “succeeded in getting the fishery 
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industry to look at the issues from a common European, and not just a Norwegian, perspective”.1237 
After persistent advice from the Europeans and the MoF, Foreign Minister Lange and Minister 
O. C. Gundersen seriously contemplated postponing the fishery negotiations until 
membership was obtained, and shape the CFP from the inside. De Gaulle’s veto in January of 
1963 meant that the establishment line was never tested, though it seems unlikely that this 
strategy would have succeeded.1238 What is curious, however, is how the establishment line 
survived for a full decade to be reintroduced in the third round of negotiations. 
One reason was that while the Community’s CFP started to take shape from 1966 
onwards, Norwegian hopes of being able to shape the process were never outright rejected. In 
October of 1967, vice president of the Commission Sicco Mansholt, for instance, thought it 
“very plausible” that Norway join intra-Community fishery negotiations on a consultative 
basis as long as Norway was in membership negotiations at the time.1239 Likewise, as late as 
the end of April 1970, Dutch MFA state secretary de Koster had argued that since the 
Community had not established a fishery policy, Norway could simply “veto any decision that 
the Norwegians could not accept”, once on the inside.1240 Thus, the notion that Norway could 
shape the CFP once membership negotiations commenced, survived and became an explicit 
part of the governments reasoning. 
During the second round, therefore, the establishment line survived in ambiguous terms. 
Avoiding explicit statements on the issue, the parliamentary white paper of 1967 concluded 
that whether Norway needed special arrangements or not could only be assessed when the 
CFP took shape. As in 1962, the government wanted to be consulted, and in these 
consultations the negotiators would present the establishment line. The conclusions from 1967 
were largely repeated in the parliamentary white paper of June 1970.1241 Based on material 
from the Market Secretariat, and in large part written and coordinated by the Europeans, it 
concluded: “The adverse effect of a possible access for foreign fishery vessels to fish within our 
fishery zone could be limited by the implementation of regulations for access to fishing on a 
non-discriminatory basis.”1242 The Europeans had helped build the boat, but had no idea if it 
could stay afloat in multilateral waters. 
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Special status 
Seemingly, the establishment line was sunk the very day the negotiations commenced. In the 
mid-1960s, after a period internal strife, France resumed its pressure on the Commission to 
develop proposals for a comprehensive CFP – including a Community funding mechanism 
beneficial for the French fishing industry. Accordingly, in 1966 the Fisheries Division of the 
Directorate-General for Agriculture of the Commission set up a package of proposals with a 
common organisation of the fishery market, and a structural policy incorporating the principle 
of “equal access to and use of fishing grounds in maritime waters coming under the 
sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of member states”.1243 Two years later, a modified 
proposal to the Council added exceptions to the principle of equal access: certain waters could 
be reserved for the local population of the coastal region concerned if that population 
depended primarily on inshore fishing.1244 After a series of uninspired negotiations between 
the Six and amendments by the Commission, the CFP (1968-1970) remained a low 
priority.1245  
It was rather abrupt, therefore, that the Six reached an agreement on the CFP on the 
eve of the re-opening of negotiations with the four applicants, on June 30, 1970. Several 
developments contributed to breaking the deadlock. First, the French – hitherto opposed to 
the principle of equal access – shifted their focus from inshore fisheries to distant water 
fisheries, aligning with the Dutch and Germans, who wanted access to other member states’ 
waters for its deep-water fleet.1246 Also, with enlargement back on the agenda, the Six, and 
especially the French, wanted to make the CFP part of the acquis communautaire before 
negotiations started.1247 Third, “by linking the issue of equal access to fishing waters and the 
CFP structural fund”, as historian Michael J. Geary explains, the Commission was able to 
“reconcile French and German objections to the original Commission plan for the fishing 
industry.”1248 Only hours after Foreign Minister Stray read the Norwegian government’s 
opening statement in Luxembourg on June 30, 1970, a combination of structural changes, 
classical intra-EC horse-trading, and the very anticipation of new member states, secured a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1243 Utenriksdepartementet, Rapport om De Europeiske Felleskap (1971), p. 93. 
1244 Commission 1968, Proposition de reglement ..., (Journal Officiel des Communauté Européenes), p. 2.  
1245 Geary Enlarging the European Union. (2013), p. 164. Reflecting the low priority, the Fishery Division was staffed by 
5 or 6 persons. It was led by the French M. Simonnet. 
1246 O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 251. 
1247 Geary Enlarging the European Union (2013), p. 165; O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 250-251; Robin M. Allers 
“Norges mann i Europa” in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, (2009), pp. 286-298, p. 290-291. 
1248 Geary Enlarging the European Union (2013), p. 165. 
	  	   292	  
deal on the CFP. With Western Europe’s biggest fishery nation knocking at the door, the 
hurried settlement resembled “a wedding without a bride”.1249 
The Centre-Right government would remain divided on the fishery issue until its 
disintegration in March of 1971. On one side, the Conservatives supported the establishment 
line. On the opposite side, the Centre-, Liberal- and Christian People’s Party, together with 
the fishery industry, demanded permanent and exclusive Norwegian fishing rights within the 
12-mile zone – a ‘national line’.1250 This division shaped Foreign Minister Stray’s opening 
statement. Following the established recipe, it was a detailed description of the special 
problems Norway would face inside the Community due to its geography, nature and socio-
economic structure.1251 As a high-ranking Dutch official remarked, “if the British had made 
the opening statement Norway did, we wouldn’t even have opened negotiations”. 1252 
However, the aim in the fishery sector had remained “to take part in all negotiations which 
touch upon questions relating of fishery policy”.1253 Ambiguity was maintained. 
The Council’s adoption of the resolution on the CFP, therefore, was nothing short of a 
‘symbolic catastrophe’.1254 Sceptics in the government, parliament and public were confirmed 
in their fears that a small country like Norway would have little influence within the 
Community, even on issues of vital national importance. Moreover, the resolution hardened 
the fishery sector’s opposition to membership, which would remain “a wall of hostility and 
suspicion” throughout the negotiations.1255 The decision infuriated the Europeans: Halvorsen 
told Mansholt that the Community’s statement had felt like “a cold shower”, and left the 
impression that the resolution was “aimed especially at us”. Mansholt admitted that the 
timing was ‘awkward’, but stressed that the Community was open to innovative use of rules of 
establishment and concessions that did not discriminate based on nationality. The resolution 
did not “challenge the validity of the fishery zone” Mansholt said. Though it laid down the 
principle of equal treatment it was the “coastal state’s right to establish which rules that should 
apply for fishery”. Mansholt went on to list concrete measures that could be taken, and 
generally left the impression that the Commission would be very accommodating if the 
Norwegian proposal was given the ‘right language’. This was encouraging, but Halvorsen 
feared that the Community’s ill-timed announcement would lead the government to adopt a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1249 UD 44.36/6.84-35 – Rhein-Zeitung – No date found. 
1250 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 173. 
1251 Allen Norway and Europe (1979), p. 95. 
1252 Allers “Attacking the Sacred Cow” (2010), p. 60; Le Monde - 02.07.1970. Equally, French Minister of Agriculture 
Duhamel deplored the Norwegian demands for permanent exceptions. 
1253 Quoted from Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 103. 
1254 Allers “Norges mann i Europa” (2009), p. 291-292. 
1255 Allen Norway and Europe (1979), p.: 99 
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tough defensive position, “whatever people like Mansholt (...) might say about the 
Community’s preparedness to adopt a flexible attitude in their relations with the new 
member[s]”.1256 And he was right. 
Discussing the matter in late August, the government now chose an alternate path to the 
establishment line. Against the recommendation of the Market Committee, Minister of 
Fisheries Einar Hole Moxnes secured a majority for “negotiating on the basis of continued 
prohibition for foreign fishermen to fish within the national fishery limits. Our negotiators 
should actively work to create understanding for this view in the up-coming negotiations and 
among the applicant countries”.1257 The primary aim of the memorandum presented at the 
first proper ministerial meeting on September 22, 1971, was to convince the Community that 
Norway needed a permanent and total exemption from the future CFP: 
 
“As regards the resolution adopted by the Council on the same day on the common fishery policy, 
we are aware that this is a fishery policy designed for the Community as it exists today. In its 
decision the Council and Ministers drew up certain guidelines for the common fishery policy. The 
enlargement of the Community will bring about substantial changes within the fishery sector, 
which, in our view, must lead to other solutions for the fishery problems in certain important 
fields”1258  
 
With this statement, the government rejected large parts of the CFP as unacceptable in an 
enlarged Community. On the other hand, the Community had asked the Norwegian 
government for full and formal acceptance of the acquis communautaire, which Norway had 
failed to present in the opening statement.1259 The government tried to balance two strategies 
that, in their pure form, were logically incompatible: to accept the CFP as a future part of the 
acquis, and to refuse it.1260  
Only on the firm insistence of the German presidency could the Six agree not to leave 
the Norwegians completely empty-handed.1261 The Community was “prepared to recognise in 
due course, the attention which it will be appropriate to ascribe to the problems faced by 
Norway in the fisheries sector”. After long and heated discussion, a statement drafted by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1256 UD 44.36/6.84–34 – 03.07.1970 – J. Halvorsen – Conversation with Vice President Mansholt; FCO 30/697 – 
06.07.1970, Brussels – J. A. M. Marjoribanks – No title. 
1257 RA/S-1005/DA – Box 139 – 24.08.1970 – To the members of the government. From Minister E. H. Moxnes. 
Negotiation scheme with the EC – the question of fishery zones; RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government 
Conference – 26.08.1970. Foreign Minister Stray actually preferred not making any statement. 
1258 UD 44.36/6.84–35 – Statement by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Svenn Stray, at the meeting 
between Norway and the Council of the European Communities, Brussels, 22nd September, 1970. 
1259 Allen Norway and Europe (1979), p. 96. 
1260 Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 93 
1261 Allers “Norges mann i Europa” (2009), pp. 291-292. 
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Norwegian delegation was annexed to the ‘Summary of Conclusions’: “It is the Norwegian 
point of view that the common fishery policy for the enlarged Community should be 
negotiated between the EEC and applicant countries.”1262 The conclusion of the meeting was 
to agree to disagree, but the Norwegians had accepted the full acquis communautaire, and any 
complete redefinition of the CFP had been firmly rejected by the Six.1263 
In a conversation with Permanent Representative of France to the EC Jean-Marc 
Boegner, Halvorsen was told that the government should try to “get the Norwegian casus 
isolated, and solve it at the end of the negotiations, so as to not set precedence for the British.” 
This was the reason why the French urged the Community to establish a CFP, he maintained. 
Boegner assured Halvorsen that there was “French willingness to solve the Norwegian fishery 
problem”.1264 From October onwards, then, the fisheries issue was discussed in technical 
deliberations between Norwegian and Commission experts. This was, in reality, a stalling 
technique to keep fisheries off the official negotiation agenda until substantial progress had 
been made with the British, but also to postpone real negotiations until the CFP was 
implemented and became an official part of the acquis on February 1, 1971. 1265  The 
government could (and had to) accept this postponement, since the Community had already 
granted Norway special status in the September meeting. 
 
The establishment line resurrected 
These developments did not mean that the Europeans gave up the establishment line: “we are 
not a special problem”, fumed Ambassador Halvorsen in September of 1970, “with Norway 
as part of the EEC, the fisheries would be given a completely new dimension”. The CFP as it 
was “would be incomplete if Norway joined”.1266 The ambition remained therefore, and with 
the combination of administrative ingenuity and the downfall of the Borten government, the 
strategy would be resurrected by the Bratteli government. 
From December onward, as the coalition government was crumbling, internal 
discussions intensified. A strategy on market organisation, including fishery zones, and a 
memo on the economic consequences of membership for the fishery industry were prepared 
by the end of January. Regarding the fishery zones “further elaboration on the establishment 
line” had to be ready for a government conference by the end of January.1267 At the centre of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1262 UD 44.36/6.84–35 – 22.09.1970, Brussels – 1st Ministerial Meeting – Summary of Conclusions. 
1263 Tamnes Oljealder 1997, p. 173. 
1264 UD 44.36/6.84–35 – 03.10.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Conversation with Ambassador Boegner. 
1265 Geary Enlarging the European Union (2013), p. 169. 
1266 UD 44.36/6.84–35 – 29.09.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Memo. Norway and EEC.  
1267 UD 44.36/6.84–37 – 11.12.1970, Oslo – Memo. EEC negotiations. Norwegian preparations.  
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the domestic preparations was the negotiation secretariat: situated in Oslo, and headed by 
Arild Holland, it functioned as the coordinative hub, filtrating and harmonising the 
recommendations from ‘below’ and the strategies from ‘above’. Before the negotiation 
delegation would make a recommendation to the government, technical deliberations would 
take place in a Working Group (WG) on fishery questions.1268 Earlier in the preparations, 
Holland had made his right hand Per Martin Ølberg the secretariat responsible for fishery 
questions, and he was the obvious choice as the MFA’s representative to the WG.1269 
In January 1971, the WG discussed four, by then, well-known options: the national line; 
the establishment line; dividing the coast in two in order to get regional exceptions from the 
CFP for the Northern part of Norway (the regional line); or to fall back on the agreements of 
the London Convention of 1964 (the status quo line). The WG was in full agreement that the 
existing structural regime of the EC was unacceptable. Furthermore, the last two options were 
unanimously rejected as undesirable. This left the WG, much like the government itself, 
discussing the national and establishment lines.1270 
The representatives from the fishery industry, who dominated the WG, backed the 
national line, maintaining exclusive fishing rights for Norwegian fishermen within the 12-mile 
zone, and exclusive rights to land fish. They feared that rules of establishment would either 
not be accepted as part of the CFP’s structural regime, or be too difficult to enforce.1271 The 
representatives of the government in the WG wanted the “more communitarian” establishment 
line.1272 Ølberg emphatically defended this view: 
 
“The issue must be understood in a wider context. (...) The explorative talks [with the EC and 
other applicants] had shown that the establishment line sufficiently secured Norwegian interests 
(...) The two alternatives (...) are therefore, in practice, very similar to each other regarding their 
possibility to secure the interests of Norwegian fishermen. The establishment line, furthermore, 
has the presentational advantage of adhering to the non-discrimination principle. The solutions 
we reach for the fisheries cannot be seen in isolation from other sectors. A tough stance in the 
fishery sector will reduce our chances of getting satisfactory solutions in other problematic areas. 
Last, Norwegian membership in the Community will offer the benefits of big markets for 
Norway, which is a strong argument for the EEC to oppose a Norwegian demand for exclusivity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1268 WG: representatives from the fishery industry, and headed by Director General Gundersen of the MoF. 
1269 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. As Holland recalls it, he recognised that the experts from the MoF were 
“totally dictated by the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organization [NFSO]. (...) so we had to get some expertise 
from within the MFA”. 
1270 Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 104. 
1271 NSA–7B– 32 – 29.01.1971, Oslo – J. H. Dahl – Summary of meeting. CC, 29.01.1971. 
1272 NSA–7B–32 – 30.01.1971, Oslo – R. Sæther – Memo for Director Malterud. Meeting in the CC, 29.01.1971. 
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within the fishery zone.”1273  
 
To these arguments was added the fear that if the negotiators presented the national line in 
Brussels, the Community would immediately counter with the regional line, dividing the 
Norwegian coast in two. Once the regional line was on the table, it would be almost 
impossible to back-peddle and introduce the establishment line. Hard lining on the fishery 
issue could jeopardise the future membership of Norway. In the end, however, the 
representatives of the fishery industry and organisations prevailed, and the WG recommended 
the strict national line.  
Normally, the procedure would be that the WG’s recommendation went straight to the 
negotiation delegation, which in turn made its recommendation to the government.1274 Once 
the WG’s recommendation reached the negotiation delegation, substantial changes would be 
very difficult. There can be little doubt that Ølberg warned Holland that the establishment 
line was under threat. The only way to save it, as Arild Holland saw it, was to intercept the 
recommendation from the WG before it went to the negotiation delegation. Holland therefore 
brought the so-called Consultative Committee (CC) – consisting of government officials and 
representatives from the major business organisations – into the decision-making procedure. 
Representatives from the fishery and agricultural sectors had “been consulted quite 
thoroughly”, he argued, while the other business sectors “who are directly affected by the 
outcome of the negotiations, have not been brought into the picture whatsoever”: 
 
“I will therefore recommend that the Consultative Committee is brought directly in to the matter 
in advance, before the Negotiation Delegation sends its proposal to the Government. As for the 
fishery approach, this could be done so that the report from the Working Group for fishery 
questions is sent to the Consultative Committee for an opinion.”1275 
 
By involving the representatives from the pro-European export industries of the CC, the 
demands of the fishery sector would be placed in the ‘wider context’ Ølberg spoke of. It was 
last minute – the report of the WG had already been sent to the negotiation delegation – but 
they had not given their final recommendation.1276 Not surprisingly, the CC produced a 
different recommendation than the WG1277: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1273 NSA–7B– 32 – 29.01.1971, Oslo – J. H. Dahl – Summary of meeting. CC, 29.01.1971. 
1274 The Government would then consult CIEC, and thereafter opt for a policy. 
1275 UD 44.36/6.84-37 - 28.01.1971, Oslo - A. Holland - The Norwegian negotiation preparations and the CC. 
1276 Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 104.  
1277 NSA–7B–32 – 29.01.1971, Oslo – J. H. Dahl – Summary of meeting. CC, 29.01.1971. 
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“The General Secretary and Chairman of the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organisation 
[NFSO] were especially invited to take part in the meeting, and they staunchly defended 
upholding the status quo [national line]. This view did not find resonance with the other 
members of the committee, who all thought that the alternative the government-side had 
presented was a good negotiation strategy.”1278 
 
Through innovative use of administrative power, Holland secured the establishment line.1279 
In February, the strategy was finalised by the negotiation delegation and sent to the 
government.1280 Signs pointed to the government leaning towards the ‘national line’, but it 
disintegrated and was replaced by a pro-European Labour government before it reached a 
final conclusion.1281 The Europeans’ strategy would live to fight another day. 
Heated discussions within the Bratteli government would follow. The Chairman of the 
influential NFSO who had staunchly defended the national line in the CC-meeting in January 
– Knut Hoem1282 – was now the Minister of Fisheries of Bratteli’s government. Though we do 
not know for sure, Bratteli probably appointed him in an effort to win over a man with a 
strong standing within the fishery community.1283 On April 14-15, the government would 
meet for an extraordinary conference on the two key questions of agriculture and fisheries. 
Arild Holland hoped it would result in decisions on broad policy lines, enabling the 
negotiation delegation to make statements on both subjects at the next meeting of deputies.1284 
Although the new government had not yet taken any decisions, it did “have a clear 
understanding of Community thinking”, he told British officials.1285  
The morning before the extraordinary government conference, Foreign Minister 
Andreas Cappelen hosted an ambassador’s conference to listen in on the tactical 
considerations from all the different capitals, before real negotiations started. The 
ambassadors thought that the government could count on support from the Germans and the 
quite possibly the Dutch and French. The German position was ambivalent since they, 
together with the Dutch, had pushed for the CFP to be concluded only a year earlier. The 
Norwegian government did, however, have an unwavering ally in Chancellor Brandt. Brandt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1278 NSA–7B–32 – 30.01.1971, Oslo – R. Sæther – Memo for Director Malterud. Meeting in the CC, 29.01.1971. 
1279 FCO 30/1024 – 21.04.1971, Oslo – G. A. Crossley – Dear Adam. Holland told British officials that state 
secretary Vindsetmo had supported the involvement of the CC. 
1280 NSA–7B–32 – 30.01.1971, Oslo – R. Sæther – Memo for Director Malterud. Meeting in the CC, 29.01.1971. 
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Historisk Tidsskrift. volum 92, nr. 02 (2013), p. 239, 243. 
1282 Hoem had worked as secretary in the MoF (1951-1955) before he started working for the NFSO. In 1964 he 
became Chairman of the NFSO, a position he held until 1987, apart from just shy of one year as Minister. 
1283 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 162. 
1284 FCO 30/1024 – 02.04.1971, Brussels – D. A. Hannay – EEC/Norway 
1285 FCO 30/1024 – 21.04.1971, Oslo – G. A. Crossley – Dear Adam. 
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did not understand why the German delegation had voted in favour of the CFP, he had told 
Sommerfelt. Accordingly, the Germans would be flexible, he thought. Ambassador to Paris 
Hersleb Vogt thought the French might support the establishment line. They had been 
lukewarm towards the CFP since the beginning, and faced similar problems with their inshore 
fishermen as Norway. In fact, they had suggested a similar establishment solution in the 
internal discussions and might welcome a total reconstruction of the CFP. 
Ambassador Halvorsen said that as it looked, every applicant had a different view of 
how the fishery issue could be solved. Norway was not without possible allies, but the other 
three applicants had in common that “they waited for Norway to make the first statement, 
and thus bear the brunt of the burden”. He still believed, however, that the establishment line 
would be the easiest to defend. Commissioner Mansholt, among others, had told him that if 
Norway chose the establishment line, the EC could hardly object as it was based on 
communitarian principles. Gundersen (MoF), while he warned that the Commission was 
“strongly attached to the current solution”, agreed with Halvorsen’s assessment. The two 
main designers of the establishment line in the early 1960s thought it was the only possible 
solution that could gain traction in the Community while satisfying the fishermen at home.1286 
At the extraordinary government conference, Sommerfelt presented the recommended 
strategy. Hoem rapidly made it clear that he still preferred the ‘national line’ – the CFP as it 
was now would be “a disaster” for Norwegian fishermen. He argued that, “it should be 
possible to make the EC accept a regional special arrangement for [the whole of] Norway, 
whereupon the right to fish within the Norwegian fishery zone would be permanently reserved 
for Norwegian fishermen”.1287 Hoem’s was a minority opinion. Based on the advice of the 
negotiation delegation, strongly supported by the ambassador’s conference, while responding 
to Hoem’s concerns, the government agreed to adopt a strict ‘establishment line’.1288 
 
Multilateral Flip 
On March 30, Foreign Minister Cappelen informed the Community that expert talks had 
revealed that the CFP would raise substantial problems for Norway, and requested the issue 
be brought up in the main negotiations.1289 At the meeting of deputies on May 4, the 
Norwegian delegation handed over a memorandum on fishing within fishery zones and gave a 
statement underlining the “grave problems” the existing provisions of the EC on access to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1286 UD 44.36/6.84A–3 – 15.04.1971 – J. Dahl – Meeting of Envoys 13.04.1971 about the EC negotiations. 
1287 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference (Staur Gård) – 15.04.971.. 
1288 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 28.04.1971; Almlid “Splittelse og dobbeltspill” (2013), p. 
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national fishery zones would create for Norway.1290 On the other hand, it clearly emphasised 
that the government wanted communitarian solutions, and expressed the desire that fishing 
within the fishery zone should be anchored in the rules of establishment of the Treaty of 
Rome. “The principle must therefore be that only those who are established in the coastal 
state, will have the opportunity to fish within the country’s fishery limit”, it concluded.1291 As 
chief negotiator Sommerfelt told his EFTA partners shortly thereafter this “applied to the 
whole of the enlarged community”.1292 However, the combination of the proposed new legal 
order in the fishery sector and the Community’s recognition of Norway as a ‘special case’ 
created unforeseen multilateral dynamics. Most important was the change in the British 
negotiation position.  
Throughout the negotiations the UK government tended to ‘suffer from schizophrenia’ 
on the fishery question and changed its course several times.1293 The British inshore fishermen 
opposed the equal access provisions of the CFP just as fiercely as the Norwegians. However, 
the distant-water fishing industry held the opposite view, and it was the latter view that 
initially won through. The first official British reaction to the CFP was that its equal access 
provision could be accepted in some restricted form, to gain access to the rich Norwegian 
fishing waters.1294 This initial British position must be understood in the context of the many 
fishery negotiations throughout the postwar era, where Britain’s main concern had been to 
secure access to Icelandic and Norwegian waters. Ever since Iceland had warned that it 
contemplated a unilateral expansion of its fishing zone to 12 miles in 1956-57, the Norwegian 
fisheries organisations had pushed for a similar move. The government had long been rather 
sceptical to such a move, and sought instead to reach an international agreement. But after a 
string of failed conferences in the late 1950s, the government turned and unilaterally 
expanded its fishery zone to 12 miles in 1961. The British responded by calling for a fisheries 
conference to find a common solution. At the London Convention of 1964, the UK proposed 
dividing national waters between an inner six miles reserved for local fishermen, and an outer 
six miles accessible to foreign fishermen. The London Convention – signed by all participants 
except Norway – caused much bitterness. Then Foreign Minister Halvard Lange complained, 
“the main intention of the British by convening this conference was to launch a fundamental 	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attack against the Norwegian 12-mile zone.”1295 In October of 1970, Britain’s transitional 
access to Norwegian waters ran out. Moreover, the British feared a further extension of the 
Icelandic fishery zone to 50 miles (which Norway could duplicate). These developments made 
equal access within an enlarged Community appealing to the British government.1296 
On the one hand the Norwegians tried to develop an entirely new CFP, and as a back 
up they clung to ‘special status’. British negotiators felt this “led the Norwegians to adopt until 
the very last a somewhat reserved and highly individual attitude which made progress by 
anybody harder to achieve.” British chief negotiator at the deputy level Con O’Neill argued: 
“There can be little doubt that, in the early stages, the Community believed they would be 
able to settle fisheries by fobbing us and the Irish off with very limited concessions, and then 
proceeding to offer much more generous treatment to Norway (...)”1297 Norway’s ‘special 
status’ gave the fisheries negotiations – already a sensitive issue in which it was easy to 
compare and visualise zones and exceptions – a marked distributive streak. This created a 
problem for the British, Danish and Irish, as it became difficult to accept deals that gave 
noticeably worse terms than Norway.1298  
The British negotiators had been aware of the establishment ideas since the early 1960s, 
but it became a problem only from February 1971 onwards as the Europeans fought the policy 
through on the domestic scene .1299 The UK would gain nothing by supporting equal access, if 
Norway consistently with the CFP could effectively exclude them from Norwegian waters.1300 
Learning the full details of the Norwegian proposal in May, British Minister in charge of the 
negotiations Geoffrey Rippon, quickly dismissed it as unacceptable to the UK. The British 
response was the ‘6+6’ proposal: balancing demands from the inshore and deep-water 
fishermen, this entailed that “waters within a 6-mile limit only (...) should be reserved for 
vessels genuinely belonging to the ports from which such waters are being fished”, while the 
outer six-mile zone would be accessible for Community vessels.1301   
Both now tried to persuade the other to abandon her position. On hearing rumours of a 
tactical shift, Director General Gundersen told British officials that the “‘6+6’ initiative was 
politically impossible”. Gundersen instead thought the Community would accept the strict 
Norwegian establishment line. Since the degree of national discrimination involved in the 	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‘6+6’ proposal “made it a non-starter with the Six”, Gundersen hoped that the UK and 
Ireland would be prepared to go along with the Norwegian proposal.1302 British negotiators 
did not want to commit. When Rippon travelled to Oslo on May 25-26, he was explicitly 
instructed “not to discuss [their] negotiation position, since this is at present still in the process 
of formulation”. If asked about the Norwegian proposal on establishment, Rippon “should not 
commit himself to supporting the Norwegians, and he should say that it is being studied 
carefully by Her Majesty’s Government.”1303 
The British hoped that they could get the Norwegians to abandon their ‘special status’, 
and instead join the other applicants in multilateral talks with the Community (proposed for 
July 12). On the advice of the Norwegian negotiation delegation, the government decided to 
decline the invitation, and not be “played out on the sidelines (...) through multilateral 
negotiations”. 1304  Ambassador Halvorsen therefore briskly rejected the proposal in a 
conversation with Minister of the UK Delegation to the EC Christofas, adding, “the choice 
facing Britain was to either let Norway join the EC on our own terms, or that we remained 
outside. Not under any circumstances would British trawlers be given access between 6 and 12 
miles.”1305 In fact, in late June Norwegian officials spent an enormous amount of energy trying 
to persuade the British not to ask for too much, since “the Six might grant concessions to 
Norway as a small country which would be withheld if Britain started asking for the same 
things as well.”1306  
The Norwegian diplomats also stressed the security policy implications. If Norway 
remained outside of the EC due to a bad deal on fisheries, Arild Holland told British officials, 
“in the long term there would be a drift towards Scandinavian neutrality and thus towards a 
situation in which the whole of Scandinavia would increasingly come under Soviet influence 
and later control.”1307 “This was a real concern, which we accepted and felt ourselves”, 
O’Neill later maintained “and which had its effect on most members of the Community also, 
especially perhaps on the Germans”.1308  
The British were indeed torn, and the British embassy in Bonn urged the government to 
fall into line with Chancellor Brandt, a close ally and friend of Norway, and look at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1302 FCO 30/1024 – 21.04.1971 – N. J. P. Hutchinson – Confidential. 
1303 FCO 30/1024 – 20.05.1971 – N. Statham – The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s visit to Oslo. 
1304 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 28.06.1971. Minister Bjartmar Gjerde. 
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1308 O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 248. For Brandt and Norway see: Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009). 
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situation “from the broad political point of view of West European unity and defensive 
strength.” Britain had tried to “beat the Scandinavians back from their twelve-mile limit”: 
 
“The policy of the big stick has been tried and tried again in these fishery questions since the late 
1940’s: and it has never worked against the Scandinavians. It would be against all experience if it 
worked now. But by trying it yet again (...) we might perhaps end up by keeping Norway out of the 
EEC.”1309 
 
However, public concerns and political pressure about fisheries became so great by the spring 
of 1971 that the cabinet decided, late in May, to attempt an agreement before the continental 
holidays.1310 The time factor, combined with the knowledge of the establishment line and the 
Norwegian government government’s hardlining nudged the British towards finally settling on 
the ‘6+6’ proposal. 
The proposal was presented at the deputies meeting June 1. 1311  Significantly, it 
incorporated elements of the Norwegian establishment line (for the inner 6 miles) with the 
objective of getting access to the outer six miles of the Norwegian fishery zone.1312 As O’Neill 
would later admit, the British found the Europeans’ establishment-line “ingenious” and “quite a 
shrewd approach”, and thus “borrowed part of their concept for our own proposals of June 
1971”. British officials could report an outburst by the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The 
British proposal, he was reported to say, ‘would in effect be working directly against 
Norwegian membership in of EEC’.1313 
But the British were not the only ones concerned with Norway’s negotiation strategy: so 
were the Irish. In the spring of 1971, as fishery negotiations picked up speed, alarm bells 
sounded in Dublin: if Norway received special treatment from the Community, would Ireland 
get the same? In the words of historian Michael Geary, “Ireland’s position evolved from 
concerns over the equal access provision to include the question of equal treatment among the 
applicants. Irish negotiators decided to raise their demands even higher by adopting the main 
strand of Norway’s negotiations strategy.” Over the following months, the Irish pushed for 
similar concessions as the Norwegians. The Community was unwilling. This prompted 
Ireland to propose a new solution – the ‘status quo’ line – at a ministerial meeting with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1309 FCO 30/1026 – 02.07.1971, Bonn – Minister (Economics) D. D. Brown - Dear Tom. Norway, Fishing Limits, 
the EEC and NATO. (To Tome Brimelow and John Robinson) 
1310 O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 258. 
1311 The British informed the Norwegian, Danish and Irish Government very shortly before. 
1312 O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 263; Wise The Common Fisheries Policy (1984), p. 114; NSA–7B–34 – 11.06.1971, 
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1313 O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 261, 264. 
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Community on June 7. 1314 The proposal aimed at maintaining the status quo of the European 
fishery regime – as agreed in the London Convention of 1964 – until a Community of ten 
could agree upon a suitable fishery regime to replace it.1315 At a meeting of deputies, 
Sommerfelt had immediately responded that the Irish proposal was “totally unacceptable”.1316 
The Danish government followed a slightly different course, seeking regional 
exemptions for the Faroe Islands and Greenland, something they made clear already in 
September of 1970. In the spring of 1971, they were frustrated to find out that the 
Community would link their demands to the Norwegian fishery memorandum.1317 Danish 
negotiators, therefore, made it clear to the Community that “special arrangements regarding 
access to fishery zones given to other applicants would have to be applicable to Denmark 
too”.1318 
Thus all three applicants had edged in on the Norwegian position: Britain and Ireland 
emulated different parts of the Norwegian proposal; and Denmark opposed it, but demanded 
the same ‘special arrangements’ as Norway should it succeed. If the EC were to engage with 
these proposals it would amount to a new legal order in the fishery sector and equal access as 
the Community understood it would cease to exist.1319 
 
Abandoning the CFP 
At a deputy meeting between the EC and Norway on June 8, the Norwegian delegation was 
informed that the Commission would study proposals from the applicants in order to propose 
a common solution to the Council of Ministers.1320 The Commission’s task force, headed by 
Deniau and Mansholt, soon produced a preliminary proposal. The Commission maintained 
any compromise needed to accept the principles and objectives of the existing CFP, including 
an equal access provision. Still, the Commission proposed postponing the CFP for a ten-year 
period, which would be divided into five years of exclusive, and five years of conditional, six-
mile limits, with 12 miles for certain areas throughout all ten years. Remarkably, the 
Commission offered these terms to the enlarged Community, including the Six, thus 
completely altering its own policy.1321  	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8 June. 
1317 UM-108 B 2–23 – Memo. Status ult. May 1971 regarding EC/Denmark negotiations. 
1318 FT-50–Market Committee (DK)–7 – 16.07.1971 – Market secretariat – Memo. The preliminary results from the 
negotiations for a Danish membership in the European Community. 
1319 Dynna Fiskerisektoren (1973), p. 111. 
1320 UD 44.36/6.84–40 – 10.06.1971 – Neg. Secr. – Summary: Meeting of Deputies, EC-Norway, 08.06.1971. 
1321 O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 264. The UK delegation also urged the EC to put forward their proposals. 
	  	   304	  
With the fundamental challenge of the CFP by applicants, France, with its own 
uncompetitive inshore fleet, saw an opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the CFP after the 
Germans and Dutch – with little fish of their own and large distant water fleets – had pressed 
for the all-inclusive and liberal version of equal access. The British ‘6+6’ proposal gave an 
opportunity to reintroduce some protective measures. As we recall, this was exactly the 
intention of the Norwegian establishment line: to lure the French into abandoning the CFP. 
We cannot conclude with certainty, but the Norwegian proposal might have been too one-
sided to gain general acceptance in the Community, and Norway alone would possibly be too 
‘light’ to bring about such substantial changes in a common policy. The ‘6+6’ proposal, a 
direct reaction to the Norwegian proposal, on the other hand, opened up such a possibility. 
In June, France, as the first member state, asked for the derogations available under the 
existing CFP (exclusive 3-mile limits for 5 years) for parts of its waters. And in intra-
Community discussions, French Permanent Representatives would maintain the position that 
derogations given to applicants should apply to all member states, until the other five gave 
way at a Council of Ministers meeting on September 21. With this, for the first time, the 
Community agreed to overturn one of its own existing policies.1322 As historian Morten 
Rasmussen argues, France’s changed position created a strange alliance between Britain, 
Ireland, Norway and France “that had intense interests in abandoning the acquis”. Moreover, 
this alliance was confronted by countries that “perhaps supported the original CFP but that 
eventually gave priority to the successful conclusion of the enlargement negotiations”.1323 
Initially, the Germans and Belgians reacted strongly against the proposal. As the 
German press bitterly claimed, the French wanted to ‘cash in twice’ by accepting the British 
proposal for an enlarged Community, without reopening the issue of the lucrative support 
mechanisms of the CFP.1324 But it was equally important to maintain the CFP as part of the 
acquis so as to remove the possibility for the four applicants to find special solutions in the 
fishery sector, which in turn would open the possibility to alter the CAP. Undermining the 
acquis meant undermining Community compromises that had been largely favourable to the 
French. In protecting the acquis they shared certain interests with the Commission. Before the 
CFP was settled, Deniau rejected Norwegian consultations on the grounds that widening 
could not come at the expense of deepening. The CFP was seen as the last piece of the CAP-	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in Jan van der Harst (Ed.) Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and 
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puzzle. Confronted with internal differences of opinion, and strong resistance from the four 
applicants, the Commission radically changed the CFP in order to save the last shreds of the 
acquis and therefore the possibility of it becoming a proper community policy again after the 
transitional period.1325 Eventually the other five gave way. 
In November, therefore, a revised version of the Commission’s June proposal was 
presented, which maintained a transitional period of five plus five years with equal access as 
the finalité. In addition, the Commission proposed a ‘special exception regime’ for ‘strictly 
limited geographical zones’. These areas were: Norway, north of Trondheim; the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland (Denmark); and the Orkneys and Shetland (Britain). At the end of the 
10-year transitional period, the Commission would report to the Council of Ministers on the 
social and economic situation in the fishing regions and the state of the fish stock. If the report 
maintained that introducing equal access would produce unfavourable developments in 
certain regions, the Council would take appropriate measures. If not, equal access would be 
implemented.1326 As O’Neill notes, the Community’s proposal “was based on the United 
Kingdom’s proposal of June 1971 for 6-mile fishery limits” and would prove to be “the basis 
on which, after much amendment, agreement was eventually reached.”1327 
Before agreement was reached, however, the British and Norwegian position changed 
several times. Following the British ‘6+6’ proposal, the Norwegian government made it 
explicitly clear that a common solution for Norway and the UK was impossible. To be sure, 
the Norwegian government introduced a law that forbade all trawlers over a certain size 
access within the 12-mile limit.1328 Minister of Commerce and Shipping Per Kleppe warned 
the British of this in May as a way to force them over to the ‘establishment’ line, and the law 
came into force on July 1 effectively excluding the entire British distant water fleet from 
Norwegian waters regardless of the equal access provisions.1329 
With Norwegian waters out of reach, the British focus shifted. For a while it seemed that 
any course would either raise considerable domestic difficulties or bring Britain into direct 
conflict with the Norwegians. “In these circumstances”, Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home 
wrote, “the best course both from the point of view of our own domestic political problems 
and from the point of view of our relations with Norway seems to be to take up a position with 	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the Community which cannot be called unreasonable by anyone, namely maintenance of the 
status quo pending reconsideration”.1330 The British had now adopted the Irish position. 
As no good alternative was available, the British government tried to avoid further 
discussions on fisheries with the Community until the Parliament had voted for a ‘decision in 
principle’ at the end of October. By that time it had become abundantly clear that ‘status quo’ 
was unacceptable to the Norwegians, the French, the Commission, and the rest of the 
Community. The parliamentary vote had also revealed ‘rebel votes’ both on the Labour and 
Conservative side, which made parliamentary support less predictable. At this late stage, 
British negotiators realised that the principal interest lay in protecting inshore fishermen – 
whose votes weighed in the balance in many coastal constituencies – rather than in using the 
CFP to gain access to Norwegian waters.1331 
With this last change of strategy, British and French views aligned: the aim was to 
accept the CFP in principle, but to get a special exception regime for as much of the coast line 
as possible, and to reduce the ‘automatism’ of the reintroduction to equal access. In other 
words, de facto scrapping of the CFP, while leaving the aura of the acquis intact. The British 
now started working with the French to reach a bilateral understanding on the matter. One of 
the major challenges was to get a ‘comparable’ deal to that of the Norwegians, without driving 
them from the negotiation table.1332 
 
Pressure 
The Community’s November proposal was, therefore, a de facto hollowing out of the CFP, but 
still received uniformly hostile reactions from the applicants for not going far enough.1333 
However, the British, Irish and Danish governments were ready to accept the regime in 
principle, while getting as much of the coastline as possible accepted under the special regime. 
The Norwegian government, on the other hand, still wanted a completely different regime. It 
flatly rejected the principle of equal access, any transitional measures and solutions dividing 
the coast.1334 On what grounds they rejected it is also worth noting: the Norwegian delegation 
had replied that the establishment line put forward in May, which still, in their view, satisfied 	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the requirement for non-discrimination as expressed in the Treaty of Rome. Due to the length 
of the coastline it would be impossible to control fishing in their waters unless the fleets 
involved were established in Norway. As late as November, then, the Europeans’ interpretation 
of the acquis lived on as the fundamental rationale behind Norway’s strategy. 
The reason why the Europeans and the negotiators maintained the establishment line was 
quite peculiar. By late October, the MFA, MoCS and the MoF called for a change of strategy. 
“The negotiations with the EC would grind to a halt if one did not give new instructions to 
our negotiators”, Kleppe maintained in a government conference. The civil servants, 
including the Europeans, unanimously agreed that time was of the essence. “There will be no 
talk of changing the common fishery policy at this stage. One had to fall back on the 
declaration of September 22, 1970, giving Norway ‘special status’”. However, at this stage 
Minister of Fisheries Knut Hoem – who had initially fought the establishment line tooth and 
nail – wanted to maintain it because “tactically, both with regards to the negotiations in 
Brussels and considering domestic opinion, it would be unfortunate to make concessions from 
the Norwegian side before one could see the contours of a proposal that was acceptable”.1335 
More substantially, Hoem feared the Community’s proposal would lock Norway to a 12-mile 
zone as it seemed Iceland, and therefore possibly Norway, would expand their zones to 50 
miles. The negotiators were therefore instructed to stick to the original position, but to avoid a 
breakdown in the negotiations.1336 
Both Britain and Norway had demanded some clarification of what would follow after 
the 10-year transition period. It was unacceptable that equal access would become the 
fundamental principle of the CFP after this. The British government, backed by a ‘decision in 
principle’ from the parliament back in October, could accept that the arrangements were 
‘more than transitional’ but ‘not necessarily permanent’, thus avoiding openly defying the 
acquis, but the Norwegian government could not accept such ambiguity and needed something 
that looked unmistakeably permanent.1337 
With everyone, except the Norwegian negotiators, ready to horse-trade their way 
towards a final agreement, Britain, together with the other applicants and the Community1338 
put serious pressure on the Norwegian government to change course: first, they had to 
recognise that the exceptions granted to them could not be explicitly permanent.1339 Second, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1335 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 26.10.1971. 
1336 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 22.11.1971. 
1337 Wise The Common Fisheries Policy (1984), p. 123-124. 
1338 UD 44.36/6.84–42 –10.11.1971, Brussels – Minutes of Moro’s statement, evening meeting, 09.11.  
1339 FCO 30/1027 – Record of Meeting between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Norwegian 
Ministers. Palais Charlemagne, Brussels, 09.11.1971, 17:30 hs. 
	  	   308	  
the 12-mile limits could not be applied to the entire Norwegian coastline, as it would amount 
to a national exception and look disproportionally favourable when compared to the other 
applicants. 
Before negotiations would resume in late November, British officials used every 
opportunity to drive home the message. O’Neill warned that if Norway was unable to resolve 
its problems by the end of the year, “the United Kingdom might be obliged to sign a Treaty 
with an escape clause allowing us to return to the question of fisheries” 1340 And later in the 
month, Rippon warned that it was “no good asking for what we would never get”, it was a 
matter of making “an arrangement that was satisfactory in substance, and then leave the 
conference room looking happy and saying that we had won.”1341 On the morning of 
November 29, Heath sent a personal letter to Bratteli, letting him know that if Norway did not 
show a “limited degree of flexibility and willingness” on the issues of permanency and the 
extent of the 12-mile zone, it would be left behind. In his view, the Six would concede the 
substance of what Norway wanted – but they could not give it an explicit legal form, as this 
would openly break with the acquis communautaire. Norway would be able to protect its fishing 
interests once it was a member, he claimed – it was a matter of political trust.1342  
This was the fundamental problem, the government rightly feared that no such trust 
existed in political and electoral Norway – something visibly permanent was needed.1343 The 
Norwegian position, therefore, remained unchanged at the next ministerial meeting with the 
Community.1344 While the Norwegian delegation gave a slight opening on the issue of the 
extent of the 12-mile zone by stating that they accepted a solution that secured that “a 
sufficient area should be reserved for the fishermen of the coastal state”; they still maintained 
that “the arrangement should not be limited in time, and should apply as a general rule 
embodied in the structural regulation”. After studying the Community’s statement, the 
Norwegian delegation found that there was still “a substantial difference between your 
suggestions and what we need.” 1345  As Halvorsen reported after the meeting, Norway 
maintained its initial strategy: fishing within the national limit should be reserved for 
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fishermen residing in the member state, and should not be based on coastal divisions.1346 With 
this slight alteration, the negotiators had actually opened the door for a division of the coast 
and, following the ministerial meeting, Hoem gave way and agreed to a division of the coast 
on condition that the northern parts of Norway receive permanent exclusive fishing rights for 
the full twelve miles. Accordingly, the negotiation delegation received new instructions.1347 
Next, trying to force the Norwegian position and gain concessions from the EC, Rippon 
put a counterproposal to the Community that demanded a special 12-mile exemption 
covering 95 percent of the British coast. By demanding the same ‘maximum’ special treatment 
as the Norwegians, it aimed to hollow out Norway’s ‘special status’. The Community, 
however, rejected the British proposal, and maintained that the final objective of the CFP was 
equal access to fishing grounds, without national discrimination.1348  
The British delegation also fought for a new review clause asking that transitional 
arrangements continue unless and until the Council unanimously voted to alter them. This 
would amount to a de facto veto power for each member state. Five of the Six could go along 
with this, while the French resisted. When the UK and Community delegations met again on 
November 30, the Community – on the insistence of French Foreign Secretary M. Schumann 
– proposed the exact opposite: after 10-years the enlarged Community would have to 
unanimously agree for the continuance of transitional measures.1349 At this point, Rippon lost his 
temper. Enraged by endless legal nit picking, he tried to put the fishery negotiations in ‘the 
right perspective’. First of all, negotiations would now have to take into account the ‘real’ 
situation, and not be bogged down by communitarian principles. Furthermore, he firmly 
reminded the Six that the CFP was not  “part of the real acquis communautaire”. Everyone knew 
that it had been rushed through before the enlargement negotiations started. Its moral fibre 
was therefore weak.1350 No final agreement was reached. 
Still, some progress was made. The UK demand for a single ten-year transitional period 
was adopted and the 12-mile exception was extended to coastal areas in Ireland and certain 
regions in Britain.1351 Furthermore, as seen, the British had pressed hard for a reformulation 
of the review clause. Prior to the negotiations, Skarstein had told the British that the only 
change Norway would want to see made in the review formula was the omission of the words 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1346 UD 44.36/6.84-43 - 01.12.1971 - ND – Memo to members of the government. Negotiation situation. 
1347 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 02.12.1971. 
1348 PREM 15/563 – 09.12.1971, London - C. C. C. Tickell – PM’s message to the Norwegian PM; Wise The Common 
Fisheries Policy (1984), p. 127. 
1349 UD 44.36/6.84–43 – 01.12.1971, Oslo – ND – Memo for members of the government. 
1350 Wise The Common Fisheries Policy (1984), p. 128. 
1351 Wise The Common Fisheries Policy (1984), p. 125-126. 
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‘by qualified majority vote’. 1352  This was, in fact, what the British aimed at and the 
Commission informally agreed to omit these words. On November 30, the Community 
agreed that after December 31, 1982, the Council could by unanimity introduce ‘any 
measure’ to help inshore fishing after the transitional period.1353 This concession implied that 
national fishing zones could be maintained.1354 “I do not believe the Norwegians gave us 
much credit for all this”, Foreign Minister Douglas-Home remarked a few days later, and he 
was right, for no review clause was acceptable to the Norwegian government.1355  
The other three applicants would wait no longer. After a surge of bilateral diplomacy 
between the French and the British in early December, a final agreement was reached 
between the EC and the three other applicants on the 12th. At such a late stage in the 
negotiations, the risk of endangering the entire enlargement ensured that the negotiating 
parties took the last steps necessary to find a middle ground and an acceptable level of 
ambiguity on the contentious issues. As domestic demands to get comparable treatment with 
Norway intensified, the British and Irish requests for a 12-mile special exception increased 
and the Community accepted. One third of the British coast (estimated to include 95 percent 
of the fish stock), and 70 percent of the Irish coast became part of the special exception 
regime. More interestingly, France – the most ardent defender of the equal access principle – 
also obtained exceptions for parts of its northwest coast. Acknowledging that access to fish rich 
waters would be minimal, the French, in negotiations with the British, insisted on re-
establishing a 12-mile limit in the regions where inshore fishing was a major activity. The 
Community also softened the formulation of the applicability of equal access after the 
transition period – the enlarged Community would ‘examine’ what provisions ‘could’ be 
introduced after 10 years. Still, though modified, the equal access principle would remain a 
fundamental part of the CFP. Crucially, agreement between the ‘Nine’ was reached with the 
understanding that Norway would not obtain a substantially better agreement.1356 
 
Cas special 
The developments for the other three applicants, and the stalemate between Norway and the 
EC forced a new strategy. If a rapid solution was not found, Halvorsen wrote in mid-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1352 FCO 30/1027 – 02.12.1971 – Douglas-Home – Cypher. 
1353 UD 44.36/6.84–43 - 01.12.1971 - Neg. Secr. - Summary of ministerial meeting, EC-Norway, 29-30.11.1971. 
1354 Wise The Common Fisheries Policy (1984), p. 128;  
1355 FCO 30/1027 – 02.12.1971 – Douglas-Home – Cypher. 
1356 FCO 30/1504 – The Prime Minister’s meeting with Mr. Bratteli. EEC/Fisheries: Background. Annex A to brief 
No. 2; O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 277. According to British reports the Irish, at their final meeting and with 
obvious reference to Norway, asked if they could presume that the review clause represented the Community’s final 
position, to which Moro replied ‘yes’. Hillary also made statements to this effect afterwards. 
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December, Norway might not conclude its negotiations together with the other applicants, 
and all momentum would be lost. This might lead the EC to treat Norway with a “take it or 
leave it” attitude.1357 Moreover, the other applicants would become part of the information 
and consultation procedure, which meant that the three applicants had a legal right to be 
heard on Norwegian fishery issues, giving them “much greater” influence on the final 
agreement.1358 To deter the British from opposing a Norwegian special solution, therefore, 
they were categorically informed that if Norway did not join the Community they would 
extend their fisheries limits to 50 miles (excluding British trawlers).1359  
The idea of treating Norway as a ‘cas special’ had been discussed several times. Already 
by June of 1971, Brandt suggested – upon the British proposal for multilateral talks – that 
Norway decline the British invitation and maintain its status as ‘cas special’.1360 The idea had 
never left the negotiation delegation entirely, but was difficult to combine with a strategy of 
changing the entire CFP. Either Norway was a major European fishery power, which sought 
to shape the Community in its image, or it was a peculiar case in need of special 
arrangements. In December, Sommerfelt revitalised these thoughts after a discussion with 
Brandt. Brandt had recently tried to convince Pompidou and Schumann that Norway needed 
assurances that the 12-mile zones would remain unchanged after 1982, and had even given 
the French two alternative texts in an effort to solve the problem. Brandt’s evaluation was that 
the French would not accept a general change in the common structural policy. Sommerfelt 
wrote home that the time had come to try for a status as ‘cas special’.1361 
Informal talks with several politicians and officials of the Community revealed that the 
majority recommended a special solution.1362 Halvorsen informed the Head of the European 
Commission delegation for negotiations on enlargement of the European Communities, 
Edmund Wellenstein, that the Norwegian government would want a special protocol added to 
the accession treaty recognising the particular Norwegian conditions.1363 It was expected that 
a special protocol would be hard to obtain both because it would be a de facto circumvention of 
the acquis, and because the other applicants might resist such a settlement.1364 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1357 UD 44.36/6.84–43 – 14.12.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Norway – EC. 
1358 UD 44.36/6.84–44 – 17.12.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – EC. Fisheries. Tempo of negotiations. 
1359 O’Neill Britain’s Entry (2000), p. 273. 
1360 UD 44.36/6.84–40 – 27.07.1971, Bonn – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – Conversation with Chancellor Brandt. 
1361 UD 44.36/6.84–43 – 05.12.1971, Bonn – S. Chr. Sommerfelt – EC - Negotiations. 
1362 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 09.12.1971. 
1363 UD 44.36/6.84–43 – 13.12.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – EC – Norway. 
1364 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 09.12.1971; RA/S – 1005/D/Da/L0150 – 16.12.1971, 
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To secure support for the new approach, Kleppe suggested that the Prime Minister pay 
a visit to the most important EC countries and the UK.1365 After discussing the matter with 
Wellenstein, Halvorsen reported that the idea was received positively. Following the many 
battles between Britain and Norway, it would be ”psychologically favourable” to meet with 
Heath, as Norway’s ’cas special’ rested on the goodwill of Britain and Ireland. Speaking to the 
Six, Halvorsen said the government made it clear that it did not owe the other applicants any 
equal treatment, and that Norwegian membership depended on a special solution. “In the 
current situation”, Halvorsen warned, “we may assume that the UK is working to obstruct 
our ’cas special’.”1366  
Bratteli, Cappelen, Hoem, MoF state secretary Sven Olsen and Per Martin Ølberg left 
for Rome on January 4 for a six-day tour of the Community and Britain to impress upon the 
political leaders the need for special fisheries arrangements in Norway in an enlarged 
Common Market. The tour, with stops in Rome, Paris, Brussels, Luxembourg and The 
Hague, would end in London with talks with Heath at Chequers. The aim of the trip was to 
acquire the necessary political commitments from the Ministers of the member states, for a 
drafted special protocol based on an oral statement made by Norwegian negotiators on 
December 12, which de facto recognised Norway’s lasting, i.e. permanent, problems. Such 
commitments would secure success at what everyone hoped would be the conclusive 
ministerial meeting set for January 10.1367 
Details of the draft protocol were soon leaked. 1368  Community officials were 
unimpressed, British diplomats reported, as it was “an old text which the Norwegians had 
hawked round the Community before Christmas”. They had not been willing to accept it then 
and there was no reason to suppose that they would now.1369 Deniau and the Commission 
maintained that they could not put in writing that “coastal fishing will remain a vital interest 
for Norway” as it went against the Community’s working methods and philosophy.1370 In 
Paris, the French Foreign Minister told the Norwegian delegation that he could accept a 
protocol in which Norway was mentioned – but not with its current wording, which was 
identical to the clause presented before Christmas.1371 President Pompidou repeated that no 
permanent exception would be accepted both for principal reasons and because it could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1365 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0030 - Government Conference – 13.12.1971. 
1366 UD 44.36/6.84–43 – 14.12.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Norway - EC. 
1367 UD 44.36/6.84–44 – 30.12.1971 – J. Halvorsen – Norwegian fishery protocol and the Prime Minister’s tour. 
1368 FCO 30/1504 – 04.01.1972, Oslo – F. Brenchley – EEC: Visits of Norwegian Prime Minister. 
1369 FCO 30/1504 – 07.01.1972, Brussels – C. O’Neill – Norwegian Fisheries. 
1370 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0031 - Government Conference – 08.01.1972. 
1371 UD 44.36/6.84–45 – 06.01.1972, Paris – Prime Minister’s tour. Conversation with Schumann. 
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jeopardise the agreement that was already reached with the other three applicants.1372 The 
government had not received the political commitment it needed.1373 
The last stop was London. The British were not opposed to the Community treating 
Norway generously with regard to the 12-mile limits. The sticking point was the review clause: 
if Norway were to get a guarantee of special treatment after 1982, already strongly criticised 
in the British Parliament, the British review clause “would undoubtedly appear to have been 
devalued”. A preparatory memo for the Heath-Bratteli talks stated, “[c]onsiderable doubt will 
inevitably be thrown on the government’s case if the Norwegians clearly obtained better 
arrangements than we got”. Though the British Fisheries Department resisted, the FCO 
considered, as a last resort, “to avoid the UK being held responsible for Norwegian exclusion 
from the Community”, the government should be prepared to accept arrangements for 
Norway which gave her a special position after 1982.1374 Accordingly, Heath told Bratteli that 
Britain was prepared to go a long way, but urged the Norwegian negotiators to avoid any 
statements implying that the British deal did not give a satisfactory guarantees, for it had 30 
constituencies along the coast, mostly Conservative, ready to go against the government’s 
recommendation.1375 
 
The dying hours 
In the ECFA discussions the day before the tour, the majority had emphasised that though the 
protocol was provocatively worded, it should not come across as an ultimatum to the 
Community. In light of this, and the reactions from the Six (especially in Paris) and the 
British, the negotiation delegation formulated a new protocol. On Bratteli’s suggestion, the 
majority of the cabinet authorised the negotiation delegation to formulate the final protocol as 
long as the ’reality’ of what it obtained was the same. Hoem, however, could only accept a 
legal guarantee. The delegation, therefore, continued its preparations fully aware that the 
government might split on whatever decision was reached.1376 
At the ministerial meeting on January 10-11 between Norway and the Community, the 
Norwegians sent an extremely powerful negotiating team and were met by a somewhat feeble 
delegation, headed by land-locked Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn. “The 
imbalance between the two sides could hardly have been greater”, Wise contends, “and, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1372 UD 44.36/6.84–45 – 07.01.1972 – Conversation with President Pompidou – Summary. 
1373 FCO 30/1504 – 07.01.1972, Brussels – EEC: Visits by Norwegian Prime Minister. 
1374 FCO 30/1504 – The Prime Minister’s meeting with Mr. Bratteli. EEC/Fisheries: Background. 
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suspects, more deliberate.”1377 The Norwegian delegation continued to insist on their special 
interests being recognised in a protocol stating that the Norwegian fishing zones would 
continue after the ten-year transition period. The Community only agreed to a protocol that 
granted Norway the most positive interpretation of the existing agreement between the Nine. 
Deniau was the middleman, running between the two delegations with proposals. Though the 
parties moved closer, in the morning hours Thorn regretfully announced that no agreement 
had been found on the division of the coast or the issue of what would happen after the ten-
year transition.1378  
The following day, both Sommerfelt and Halvorsen stated that they “deplored that the 
Norwegian delegation could not go any further on the basis of the Community’s proposal”. 
Upon hearing this, Hoem argued that he had agreed to the ‘cas special’ on insufficient 
grounds and that the Norwegian Fisherman’s Organisation (Norges Fiskarlag, NFO) was against 
it. “To relinquish exclusive rights to one of Norway’s largest natural riches would mean that 
we would have to share it with all the major industrial states of Europe.” Hoem found it  
impossible to go further than the last Norwegian proposal. This was a “fateful decision which 
could not be made by a singular sector”, Bratteli warned. And Cappelen added that, in 
reality, domestic support for the negotiation result now depended on Hoem’s reaction. The 
following day, after receiving a démarche from the French saying that they would go no 
further, Sommerfelt strongly recommended, “that we now focus on formulating something 
within the framework of the Community’s proposal, which amounts to a political declaration 
of intent”. In a CIEC meeting that same day, NCTU chairman Aspengren suggested that this 
protocol be supplemented with a unilateral statement clarifying the Norwegian reading of the 
protocol. Again Hoem objected, and again the government chose to continue, not knowing 
what his reaction would be if the negotiators reached an agreement. Prior to the decisive 
deputy meeting, Sommerfelt was given the proposed unilateral Norwegian statement for 
comments. Sommerfelt thought it was too provocative. In fact, the negotiation delegation 
recommended not giving a unilateral declaration, and Bratteli agreed. However, the 
government as a collective had written the recommendation, and Bratteli clearly hoped that it 
would bind Hoem to a possible solution. Hoem, however, did not want his name attached to 
the Community’s proposed revision clause, and wanted to know how he should formulate a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1377 Wise The Common Fisheries Policy (1984), p. 137. 
1378 UD 44.36/6.84-46 - 11.01.1972 - Memo. Summary: Ministerial meeting, Norway - EC, Brussels, 10.01.1972. 
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dissent in ECFA. Solving this Gordian knot, Halvorsen drafted his own version of the 
declaration, which after minor changes was approved by the government.1379 
From the outset, therefore, it was clear that the agreement between the EC and the 
other three applicants would apply to Norway as well. What remained was settling where the 
Norwegian 12-mile special exception zone would begin. In the end, it was agreed that it would 
stretch from the Soviet border in the north to Egersund in the south, which was halfway 
between the Norwegian proposal of Lindesnes (the southern most point of Norway) and the 
Community’s proposal of Stavanger, made a few days earlier. Second, an agreement had to 
be reached regarding the wording of the special protocol. In exchange for Norway’s 
acceptance of the equal access principle, the EC recognised “the very great importance that 
fishing represents for Norway” and agreed to “take special account (...) of the problems faced 
by Norway in the fisheries field”. “[T]hese provisions could include, among other measures, a 
prolongation beyond 31 December 1982 of the exception regime to an appropriate degree 
and according to rules to be determined.”1380 To make it abundantly clear for the domestic 
audience, the Norwegian government added its unilateral declaration, based on Halvorsen’s 
proposal, stating that “[t]he Community has just given to Norway the solemn assurance that it 
will take special account of the Norwegian inshore fishing industry after 1982. My 
Government considers this to be a real guarantee.”1381 
The meeting dragged on into the early hours of January 15, with Wellenstein scurrying 
between the two delegations with new formulations. Eivinn Berg recalled the late winter 
weather, the Norwegian delegation keeping warm over a primus in the Charlemagne 
building, taking turns sleeping on folding beds. They were in direct telephone contact with 
Bratteli, Kleppe and Cappelen at Cappelen’s home. Berg called on the ministers close to 
midnight with the proposed solution.1382 After long consultations – with his state secretary, 
Bratteli, Cappelen and Kleppe – Hoem said that he “did not oppose” concluding the 
negotiations, but that he “could not accept the solution found on the fisheries question”. The 
authorisation was given to the delegation to conclude the negotiations, as no other option 
existed.1383  
The government was now ready to approve the negotiation result and sign the treaty of 
accession. Hoem, as the rest of the ministers suspected, would not go along with this. On 	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January 17, after the NFO had rejected the agreement on fisheries, Hoem decided not to 
recommend the negotiation result. At the end of the Labour Party National Delegate’s 
Meeting, which overwhelmingly approved the negotiation result, Hoem handed Bratteli a 
letter recognising the approval and the repercussions this had for his position. Sustained 
pressure from the other ministers did not change his mind, and Hoem left the government just 
days before Bratteli flew to Brussels to sign the Treaty of Accession on January 22, 1972.1384 
 
Concluding remarks 
Though in highly distributive negotiations, states may seem to act like solid billiard balls 
bumping each other into position, we can see by studying the fisheries negotiations from the 
vantage point of the Europeans, their ideas and practices, that this is not the case. The 
establishment line was born out of communitarian notions of the Europeans in the early 1960s. 
Picking up ideas from the Six and the other applicants, the Europeans believed Norway could 
change Community policies. Norway was Western Europe’s biggest fishery power, and until 
late 1971, the government and the Europeans thought an enlarged EC had much to learn from 
Norway. 
Through a strange transfer of ideas, and hard multilateral bargaining, the Europeans did 
in fact change the CFP, though not the way they had anticipated: the multilateral flip of the 
other applicants in reaction to the combined establishment line and special status of Norway 
led to the Community’s abandonment of the CFP. The British borrowed part of the concepts 
from the establishment line in their own counterproposal (6+6), which survived in modified 
form as paragraph 1 of article 100 in the treaty of accession for the other three applicants, 
which allowed each “to restrict fishing in waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction” within 
the six-mile and special 12-mile limits until December 31, 1982. 
 Two unique aspects may be discerned from the way the Europeans worked with the 
fishery issue: what we should understand from the Europeans’ interpretation; Stray’s reluctant 
acceptance; the French strategic use; the Commission’s defence; and Rippon’s heated late-
November attack on the moral fibre of the acquis communautaire, is that its legal, political and 
moral layers were performed in concrete settings and that its different meanings varied 
greatly.1385 As seen, mastering the use of the acquis was in fact crucial for the outcome of the 
fisheries negotiations. Second, the Europeans’ use of administrative power and conceptual 
ingenuity to create Norwegian European policy, interchangeably defending and shaping it in 	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domestic and international arenas, testified to how important their boundary-spanning 
capacities were, and how they were inseparable from their personal commitment and agency. 
None of this, however, would help in the public information campaign they involved 
themselves in prior to the referendum. 
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Chapter 12 
Information campaigns 
 
”I hope and believe that you are not bitter, but remain firm in your conviction  
that what you strove for was for the best of the country.  
And if you want to continue the fight, and think that I can contribute, you should know that I am prepared.”1386 
 
Personal letter from Søren Chr. Sommerfelt to Trygve Bratteli, 28.09.1972. 
 
Norway’s relationship with the EC would be decided de facto by a consultative, popular 
referendum in which the electorate would simply choose ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in regard to the 
membership issue. From the signing of the Treaty of Accession in January 1972, therefore, a 
divisive, bitter and unusually heated political struggle between the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ sides began in 
earnest. Political parties collapsed and split (the Liberal Party), governments left office 
(Bratteli’s government) and even families were divided right down the middle.1387 The events 
of ‘1972’ revealed tensions between urban and rural areas, between the centre and periphery, 
and between the ‘elite’ and ‘grassroots’. The peripheral forces coalesced with the 
countercultures represented by ‘1968’, the rise of the new left, and the generational revolt 
against the postwar order. ‘1972’ was a political and cultural earthquake with long-lasting 
aftershocks. The battle culminated in the referendum of September 25, 1972 in which 46,5 
percent voted for membership and 53,5 percent voted against membership. 
There is no comprehensive, archive-based historical study of the composition, 
coordination and actions of the different pro-European campaigns.1388 Since they failed, the 
various yes-campaigns have been written off as toothless, weak or disorganised.1389 Compared 
to the resources the ‘yes’-side had at their disposal, this is essentially true.1390 However, in 
disregarding the coordination, ideas and resources that did go into the pro-European 
campaigns, one misses important aspects of the political discourse in general. This chapter will 
therefore start by retracing the fleeting and frail, formal and informal, coalitions, organisations 	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journalist for the European Movement and her brother-in-law Ragnar Kalheim who became deputy chairman of the 
People’s Movement Against Membership in the EEC. 
1388 There are some archive-based historical studies that focus on particular parts of the pro-European campaign: 
Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990); Arve Husby JA til EF-aksjonen, Unpubl. Master thesis, Trondheim: Historisk 
Institutt, Universitet i Trondheim (1988). A comprehensive study of pro-European forces, though not the campaigns 
in particular, which includes reflections on the ’Europa-Experten’, is: Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), pp. 143-175. 
1389 See for example Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 160-161. While there are many scholarly works analysing the ‘no’-
side. The classic being: Bjørklund Mot Strømmen (1982). For a recent, very interesting, example, discussing the MoF 
and the economists’ anti-EC efforts see: Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015). 
1390 Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik Kampen om EF, Oslo: PAX forlag (1977) gives a thorough analysis of the 
unequal distribution of resources during the EC-struggle. Both social scientists and the book written in 1977, it lacks 
sources, and analyses the end result rather than the processes leading up to the referendum. 
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and networks that campaigned in favour of membership, and discuss the various roles the 
Europeans played in these pro-European efforts. It will first explore the Europeans’ role in extra-
governmental information efforts, before turning to the official information campaign of the 
government. As will become clear, distinctions between the two became blurred, and among 
the most important reasons for this erasure of borders was the many roles played by the 
Europeans, among which two were of particular importance: that of the boundary-spanning 
facilitators operating as the strings holding together different pro-European nodes, and that of 
experts and public educators who gave the public official, authoritative versions of the facts. 
The two roles were incompatible with each other, and broke established civil servant norms. 
The Europeans’ participation in the different campaigns spurred massive critiques from the ‘no’ 
side, which brought their practices, developed over a decade, to the fore. 
 
Scattered beginnings 
Following The Hague Summit, the issue of information campaigns and pro-European 
organisations reappeared on the political agenda. In January 1970, Ølberg and the NSA 
discussed the need for an organised effort. The occasion was a rather unfortunate statement to 
the press made by the Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI). Ølberg complained that 
such solo-efforts were counterproductive. As a response, the NSA started to feel out different 
business organisations with the hopes of setting up an informal working group.1391 Some 
months later, on the initiative of the FNI, five big business organisations1392 agreed to set up a 
committee and pool resources for a budget of 500.000 NOK to stimulate the creation of an 
information organisation.1393 
At about the same time, the EMN contacted the NSA to avoid “jumping into the debate 
as unprepared as we were in 1962”. They, too, felt that efforts should be coordinated. The 
EMN suggested a broad range of initiatives that they could organise. The main focus would 
be to “facilitate material for other organisations to use in their work for a Norwegian 
membership in the EEC.” Among other things, they aimed to distribute a series of booklets, 
(also the one produced by Skaug in connection with the Nordek negotiations) and arrange a 
series of correspondence courses in which, among others, Ølberg would contribute.1394 The 
EMN’s Working Committee would organise and decide on major activities. Between 1970 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1391 NSA–7B–30 – 07.01.1970, Oslo – The EEC situation. Coordination needs among the business organisations. 
1392 NEC, NSA, FNI, NBA, ANIC. 
1393 NSA–7B–31 – 08.07.1970, Oslo – Central board meeting, 17.07.1970. Norway’s connection with the Common 
Market. The question of the business organisations contribution to the information campaign. 
1394 RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0011 – Summary working committee, 04.02.1970, at parliamentarian Svenn Stray’s office; 
NSA–7B–30 – Regarding the information work about the EEC. Skaug contributed with the booklet ”Norden og 
EEC”, and Ølberg with the courses ”Norges plass i Europa” and ”Økonomiske virkninger”. 
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and 1972, Lange (until his death in May of 1970), Stray, Roem Nielsen, Haakon Lie and, 
significantly, Tim Greve were its most active members.1395 As early as April 1970, the 
Working Committee decided that Haakon Lie would act as ‘campaign manager’ and head the 
information efforts of the EMN, and that Rolf Roem Nielsen would head the financial side of 
this campaign, functioning as the contact point between the five business organisations and 
the EMN.1396 As Lie said, the EMN would prepare a campaign and “should the official course 
be in danger, the European Movement must be ready to counteract.”1397 
Apart from the fact that negotiations proper started with the Ministerial meeting 
between the EC and Norway on September 22, several other events seemed to have spurred a 
more vigorous effort among the pro-Europeans. The combination of the establishment of the 
‘People’s Movement against Membership in the EEC (People’s Movement, PM) in August, 
growing polarisation in the Norwegian public, and increasing tensions within the government 
that hindered it from coming out with authoritative statements in favour of membership 
created an unpredictable situation. In addition, the Labour Party had chosen an internal 
campaign directed against its own party members.  
The Europeans grew restless. At an Ambassador’s meeting in late August several Europeans 
warned against these developments. Ambassador Skaug complained that the Norwegian press 
and the ‘no’-side were spreading misleading and demagogic information. Ambassadors 
Halvorsen and Rogstad thought public polarisation resulted from constant discussions over 
nitty-gritty economic issues regarding tariffs, fisheries and agriculture. There was an urgent 
need for seeing the bigger political picture. Rogstad also thought that the government needed 
to provide factual information to the country’s youth organisations.1398  
The government was utterly divided. While Stray was contemplating becoming the 
chairman of the EMN, Borten and EC-sceptics within the coalition successfully cut the 
EMN’s annual financial support. Opportunity came when the PM applied for state funding 
(500 000 NOK) for a broad information campaign.1399 The Prime Minister argued that the 
government already supported extra-parliamentary organisations: the EMN received funds 
via the MFA’s budget, and the PM could claim precedence. If the government rejected the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1395 RA/PA – 0992, Europabevegelsen – A/As – L0011. 
1396 NSA–7B–31 – 19.06.1970, Oslo – J. Didriksen – Information efforts about the EEC. 
1397 RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0011 – Summary: joint meeting of the EMN’s working committee and the board of the 
EMN’s parliamentary group, 16.04.1970. The business organisations supported the idea of letting the EMN head the 
information campaign, rather than setting up a special business organisation. NSA–7B–31– 03.06.1970, Oslo – 
Memo for Director Malterud. Norwegian affiliation with the EEC. Meeting in the FNI, 04.06. 
1398 UD 44.36/6.84 A.–3 – The debate following the Minister’s account at the meeting of envoys, 24.08.1970.  
1399 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 04.091970, Oslo – A. Haugestad – Application for state funding for information efforts 
regarding the Common Market. 
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PM’s application, Borten argued, then it should also stop funding the EMN.1400 This view 
found support, and the government’s majority decided to deny the PM’s application and to 
stop funding the EMN. At the end of the meeting, MFA state secretary Colding noted that 
Stray, who was not present at the conference, would have preferred ongoing support for the 
EMN.1401 
 The MFA had strongly argued against supporting the People’s Movement financially, 
comparing it to the Campaign ‘Norway out of NATO’ of 1968.1402 Furthermore, it held, the 
European Movement worked in favour of European co-operation on democratic grounds – 
not Norwegian membership in the EC explicitly. Accordingly, the EMN could not be 
considered as the antitheses to the PM.1403 Following the government’s decision, Holland 
bitterly wrote that the European Movement, after all, was spreading information about an 
issue that the government and parliament supported: “[d]oubt will arise whether our 
negotiations are meant seriously”.1404 The growing frustration among the Europeans and within 
the MFA leadership drove them to seek co-ordinated information efforts. In November of 
1970, Greve, Holland and Ølberg met informally with Rolf Roem Nielsen (EMN, FNI) and 
Asbjørn Larsen (NSA) to discuss the matter. They were alarmed by the PM’s vigorous 
activities. The FNI, together with the Norwegian Export Council (where ambassador Gunnar 
Rogstad became director in 1971), wanted to set up a broadly based counter-organisation to 
the People’s Movement. Holland immediately supported the idea, while Greve and Ølberg 
were a bit more sceptical. They feared, quite rightly, that a ‘broad’ organisation established by 
business organisations would lose the support of the Labour Movement. Instead, they argued 
in favour of a broad campaign headed by the European Movement, to prevent a ‘big business’ 
image.1405 
However, the EMN had been without a chairman since May of 1970, when Halvard 
Lange passed away. By December, the EMN was still looking for a new chairman – preferably 
a unifying character from the Labour Party as most of the undecided voters were found 
here.1406 Rolf Roem Nielsen and Haakon Lie, the EMN’s most active members, did not have 
a broad enough appeal: the former because of his business profile, the latter because it “would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1400 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 09.09.1970. 
1401 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 17.09.1970. 
1402 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-3 –10.09.1970, Oslo – Memo to members of cabinet. Application for state funding for 
information efforts regarding the Common Market; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 17.09.1970, Oslo – A. Holland – 
Memo. Application for state funding for information efforts regarding the Common Market. 
1403 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 17.09.1970. 
1404 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 17.09.1970, Oslo – A. Holland – Memo. Application for state funding for information 
efforts regarding the Common Market. 
1405 NSA–7B–31 – 20.11.1970, Oslo – A. Larsen – Memo. Norway/EEC. 
1406 RA/PA–0992/A/As – L0011 – Summary: Board meeting, 05.11.1970. 
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seem very provocative for the younger generations”. The EMN was desperately looking for a 
uniting figure – a respected politician or a scientist – only to discover that “most of the people 
[they were] interested in [were] against the EEC”.1407 In the end, therefore, the EMN ended 
up with dark blue conservative Svenn Stray as chairman, after he stepped down as Foreign 
Minister. The triumvirate of Stray, Roem Nielsen and Lie gave the EMN the exact opposite 
profile of what it had sought, and made it difficult for the EMN to uphold an image of a 
broad, and not too polemic, organisation. For instance, the EMN enjoyed the support of 120 
out of 150 parliamentarians, through a parliamentary group (est. 1949) headed by Knut 
Frydenlund since December of 1969.1408 Heading up a tough propaganda campaign with a 
new and provocative leadership could erode such broad support. Equally, the Labour 
Movement now found it difficult to be closely affiliated with the EMN, and increasingly 
distanced itself from the organisation.  
Rather than a broad effort fronted by the EMN, therefore, a so-called ‘knife-throwing’ 
organisation (an organisation that could do targeted propaganda) had to be established 
outside the EMN. Politicians from all parties, and other respected personalities, were to head 
this organisation. This did not mean that the EMN would stop campaigning – it would 
continue with broad, objective educational campaigns, while the ‘knife-throwing 
organisation’s purpose was to challenge the PM. Much of the overall planning would continue 
to take place between the MFA, the business organisations, and the EMN.1409 
While plans for pro-European information campaigns were taking shape, they were still 
rather uncoordinated. There was a “propaganda-void”, one NSA representative complained, 
due to the government’s lacking commitment and because the EMN “for the most part have 
chosen to ‘lay low’ until the negotiation result is clear”.1410 The EMN could never, as Haakon 
Lie noted, become a nationwide campaign organisation because it would reveal itself as 
predominantly bourgeoisie.1411 The business organisations were organising and funding, but 
could not force political events. Among the few that held the different plans together were the 
Europeans. This they did with the unspoken support of the political leadership of the MFA, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1407 NSA–7B–32 – 01.12.1970, Oslo – D. Vikøren – Memo. EEC. 
1408 RA/PA-0992/A/Aa/L0008/0006 – 24.04.1969, Oslo – E. M. Bull – Appeal. Peder P. Næsheim (Labour) and 
Erling Petersen (Conservative) were appointed the chairman and vice-chairman of the parliamentary group; RA/PA-
0992/A/Aa/L0008/0006 – 02.01.1970, Oslo – T. Gabrielsen – Summary from board meeting of the EMN’s 
parliamentary group, 12.12.1919. 
1409 NSA–7B–32 – 01.12.1970, Oslo – D. Vikøren – Memo. EEC; NSA–7B–32 – B. Sverdrup – Memo to Director 
Darre Hirsch. Norwegian membership in the EEC. Information efforts in favour of membership. 
1410 NSA–7B–32 – 19.02.1971, Oslo – Memo. CY’s EEC information campaign. The CY, with the support of the 
mother party, were the only ones actively campaigning at this point. Party leader Kåre Willoch warned that the 
government’s ‘wait and see’-line was too risky, and that an active information campaign was urgently needed. 
1411 NSA–7B–33 – 19.04.1971 – Norway’s relationship with the EC. The role of the business organisations. 
	  	   324	  
though not the entire government. Before the change of government, the Europeans mostly 
worked to bring people and organisations together. They could do little else than keep the 
conversation going, as there was no agreement within the government as to how and if a 
broad pro-European campaign should be established. Meanwhile, another important 
challenge was the internal Labour Party’s opposition to membership, which intensified when 
Bratteli took office in March of 1971. Here, too, the Europeans played an important role. 
 
The family feud – the Labour Movement 
The chief designers behind the Labour Movement’s information campaigns for membership 
in the EC were Minister Per Kleppe, parliamentarian Knut Frydenlund, party secretary 
Ronald Bye, international secretary to NCTU and, from March 1971, state secretary of the 
MFA Thorvald Stoltenberg and Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen. The division of labour 
was clear: Kleppe was the ideological mastermind, Frydenlund and Stoltenberg took care of 
foreign and security policy issues and some of the strategy. Bye had much of the 
organisational, and some of the strategic, responsibility. No one had a bigger apparatus and 
more members than the NCTU and the Labour Party.1412 Their campaign was, however, 
constrained by two aspects: the Labour Movement’s long tradition of not co-operating across 
party lines and second, the crippling effect of the organised opposition to membership within 
their own rank and file. For the Labour Movement, the EC-struggle was the climax of a 
festering family feud.  
Most of the leading figures of the Labour Movement’s information campaign 
(Frydenlund, Stoltenberg, Cappelen and even Kleppe) had strong connections with the MFA. 
Frydenlund and Stoltenberg were diplomats-turned-politicians, and Frydenlund one of the 
early Europeans. By 1970, Frydenlund was one of the Labour Party’s most respected foreign 
policy experts, and was, among other things, vice chairman in the SCFA.1413 Moreover, the 
Labour Movement campaign intertwined with the government’s ‘YES to the EC’ (from 1972 
onwards) and the EMN-campaigns. Europeans worked within, and between, all of these units.  
The first challenge for the Labour Movement was to articulate a positive socialist 
argumentation in favour of membership. As we recall, from the mid-1960s, Per Kleppe, 
among others, had been instrumental in developing the idea of a ‘social democratic Europe’. 
One of the core ideas was that foreign policy was to be understood as an extension of domestic 
politics – there were no ‘objective’ national interests on the international scene, only political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1412 Trond Bergh Kollektiv Fornuft, bd. 3, LOs Historie, Oslo: Pax Forlag (2009), p. 106. 
1413 He was also delegate to the NATO parliamentary assembly (1969); delegate to CoE parliamentary assembly 
(1970-73) and member (1967) and then chairman of the Labour Party’s international committee (1967-73). 
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and ideological battles as everywhere else. Foreign politics should also be shaped by party 
ideologies, and formulated across borders to shape the international society to their liking.1414 
During the whole of 1970, in anticipation of the EC-campaigns to come, Kleppe 
researched how a ‘social democratic Europe’ would work in practice, and how it could 
possibly overcome the defensive Norwegian attitude towards the EC.1415 For his visits to 
Brussels, Ambassador Halvorsen had lined up an impressive list of people, and Kleppe 
developed and ‘tested’ his social democratic vision in conversations with socialists and social 
democrats within the Commission. 1416 Kleppe also spoke several times with John Lambert, 
editor of Agenor (a transnational socialist group based in Brussels).1417 Lambert was about to 
“set out a coherent programme for an alternative Europe to the one which is developing in 
and around the Communities”, and was, together with Frydenlund, planning to introduce 
Agenor to Norway.1418 Lambert was an old and personal friend of Knut Frydenlund, and they 
had arranged many transnational social democratic events together through the MFA and the 
EMN.1419 
In December of 1970, Kleppe launched the ‘socialist European-programme’ through 
the party press, with off-set in the Labour Party’s working programme for 1970-73 that 
explicitly stated that the Party initiate co-operation with social democratic parties in Western 
Europe to develop a European-programme. The EC of today, Kleppe claimed, was 
“bureaucratic and single-minded in its drive to transfer national authority to supranational 
organs”. What was needed was a strong European Parliament, elected by the peoples of 
Europe, and a platform from which social democratic forces could work together. To counter 
criticism from within the party that the EC was conservative and capitalist, Kleppe’s 
responded, “to realise democratic socialism in Norway alone is the most utopian thought of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1414 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0004 – 21.04.1970 – P. Kleppe – “Et sosialistisk alternativ – I Norden og Europa”. 
Lecture in Oslo Arbeidersamfunn 21.04.1970. 
1415 Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 156. 
1416 AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – 15.05.1970 – P. Kleppe – Dear John Halvorsen; AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – 
22.05.1970 – J. Halvorsen – Dear Per Kleppe; German social democrat and Energy and Internal Market 
Commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp; chef de cabinet to president Jean Rey, Raymond Rifflet; Italian socialist and 
Commissioner of Social Affairs, Personnel and Administration Lionello Levi Sandri; and vice chef de cabinet for 
vice-president Mansholt, Robert Cohen. AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – 15.06.1970 – P. Kleppe – Dear Mr. Cohen; 
AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – 08.06.1970, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Dear Per Kleppe. 
1417 AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – 28.05.1970 – P. Kleppe – Dear John (Lambert) 
1418 AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – 09.03.1970, Brussels – J. Lambert – Agenor. European Review. Agenor was first a 
transnational European magazine and then socialist political group aiming to change the EC with its roots in the 
College of Europe, Bruge, and deeply influenced “the ideas of 1968” . Agenor no. 50 (1975), p. 5. 
1419 UD 44.36/8–1 – 05.01.1965, Oslo – N. Ørvik – Report from the institute’s excursion to the Communities, 18.-
25.11.1964; UD 44.36/6.84C.-1 – 11.09.1972, London – H. Pedersen –British comments in the press. British media 
coverage of the referendum. AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 - 28.05.1970 – P. Kleppe – Dear John. 
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all.”1420 This became part of the ideological foundation of the information campaign. At the 
same time, developments on the ‘no’ side alarmed the Labour leadership. 
As noted above, the PM and its professional committee became a hotbed for trade 
unionists and the Workers’ Youth League (WYL), and legitimised resistance against the 
official line of the Labour Movement.1421 In 1970, prospects of such developments made the 
NCTU and the Labour Party to take a more active role, and a broad internal information 
campaign was planned for the autumn.1422 In October, the NCTU and Labour Party 
established a co-operation committee.1423 Its composition aggravated EC-sceptics: Ronald Bye 
(leader), Bjartmar Gjerde, Knut Frydenlund, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Per Kleppe, Olav 
Brunvand and Knut Ribu were all known as pro-Europeans. Negative reactions, especially 
from the WYL, forced the leadership to restructure to include some EC-sceptics and rename 
it in January of 1971. However, the new Working Committee on Market Issues (WCMI) – as 
it was renamed – was still dominated by Kleppe, Frydenlund, Stoltenberg and Bye.1424  
The campaign, until the Labour Party’s national convention in May of 1971, consisted 
of three phases. First, information material would be planned and prepared until January of 
1971. Leading officials would be registered across the country, creating a list of a thousand 
speakers, and potential audiences were to be targeted. The second phase involved 17 large 
regional conferences, 31 educational lectures and 68 local information courses.1425 In phase 
three, “the members shall be informed on a broad basis” stimulating meetings in “the trade 
unions the local party divisions, in the lunch rooms at the workplaces”. 1426 The message was 
that “only through planned and organised co-operation between the progressive forces of an 
enlarged European Community, will it be possible to realise a future Europe shaped by 
democratic socialist principles”.1427 Stoltenberg, Frydenlund and Kleppe wrote most of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1420 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0004 – P. Kleppe – Arbeiderbladet “Et sosialistisk Europaprogram”. 
1421 Tamnes, Oljealder (1997), p. 161-162. 
1422 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 02.02.1971 – Kristeligt Dagblad – “Der er liv i EEC-debatten”. Thorvald Stoltenberg, it 
wrote, was ”the man behind the practical development of the NCTU’s EEC-campaign”. 
1423 AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0044 – J. Sundhagen – Protocol. The executive board of the Labour Party and the 
Secretariat of the NCTU joint meeting 31.10.1970 in sekretariatssalen, Folkets Hus, Oslo. 
1424 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 147; AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – Working document from NCTU-
Labour Party’s Working Committee on Market Issues, 05.1971. Members: Ronald Bye (leader), Magnus Andersen, 
Thorbjørn Berntsen, Olav Brunvand, Liv Buck, Knut Frydenlund, Einar Førde, Valter Gabrielsen, Bjartmar Gjerde, 
Tor Halvorsen, Guttorm Hansen, Reidar Hirsti, Geirmund Ihle, Per Kleppe, Erland Mikkelsen, Knut Ribu, 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, Thorstein Treholt, Bjørn Tore Godal, Sonja Ludvigsen. 
1425 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 10.02.1971, Oslo – O. Gøthesen – EEC information. Preliminary report 
about implemented measures. (Cooperation Committee between NCTU and the Labour Party). 
1426 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 01.12.1970 – O. Gøthesen – Protocols and notes form the committee for 
information about the EEC. Memo nr. 5. 
1427 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0004 – Date Unknown (Late 1970?) – T. Stoltenberg – No title. 
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speeches, lectures, Q&A-booklets and brochures for officials.1428 One of the reasons why the 
Labour Movement did not co-operate with other pro-European organisations was this 
elaborate plan, which was aimed inwards and geared towards securing majorities within the 
Party and NCTU. Party secretary Bye would later call this “organisational self-annihilation”, 
with an “’embarrassing’ weight put on abiding by ordinary, legal, organisational forms”.1429 
They absolutely did not want to legalise participation in cross-party and extra-parliamentary 
organisations.  
The other side of this strategy, followed at least from December 1970 onwards, was to 
‘wait and see’ until the negotiation result was clear, before committing to a Norwegian 
membership in the EC.1430 Kleppe was the architect of the ‘wait and see’ strategy. Prime 
Minister Bratteli supported it because it resonated with his meticulous nature and wish for a 
correct procedure.1431 It became official policy at the May 1971 national convention of the 
Labour Party, when a proposal by Kleppe to postpone a final decision until the negotiation 
result was clear and all sides of the market issue had been discussed through a broad, 
democratic procedure in all party organs, and were adopted. Clearly, there was a genuine 
belief in the persuasive powers of the ‘Social Democratic vision’, but there were also tactical 
considerations: they hoped the ‘no’ side would run out of steam and that the negotiation result 
would convince the undecided.1432 
Things changed dramatically during the spring. The Labour Party formed a 
government in March of 1971, and in May it secured a comfortable majority in favour of 
continuing negotiations for membership at the national convention.1433 This coincided with a 
breakthrough in the negotiations between Britain and the EC. In the autumn of 1971 these 
factors were joined by polls showing a clear majority against membership in the EC – 
especially within the trade unions.1434 The information efforts grew in size and intensity. As a 
result, the ‘broad democratic procedure’ gave way for a blatantly pro-European campaign.1435 
Knut Frydenlund’s strategic memo, which Bye sent to Bratteli with the recommendation 
that it should “be the foundation of the Party and the Movement’s political and organisational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1428 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 01.12.1970 – O. Gøthesen – Protocols and notes form the committee for 
information about the EEC. Memo nr. 5. 
1429 Ronald Bye Sersjanten. Makt og miljø på Youngstoget, Oslo: Gyldendal (1987), p. 128. 
1430 AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 01.12.1970 – O. Gøthesen – Protocols and notes form the committee for 
information about the EEC. Memo nr. 5. 
1431 Bye Sersjanten (1987), p. 131-132. 
1432 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 176. 
1433 212 voted in favour of continued membership negotiations, and 71 voted in favour of negotiating for Nordic 
economic co-operation. 
1434 Bergh Kollektiv Fornuft (2009), p. 108; Gleditsch and Hellevik  Kampen om EF (1977), table 5.3, p. 156. 
1435 AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – Working document from NCTU-Labour Party’s Working Committee on 
Market Issues, 05.1971. Part 1; Bergh Kollektiv Fornuft (2009), p. 108; Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 159-160. 
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scheme”, was instrumental in this reorientation. Until the negotiation result was clear, the 
government should actively prevent people from making a decision, Frydenlund suggested, 
while also tearing down the anti-membership argumentation. The government had to use the 
‘wait and see’-period to undermine the claims made by the ‘no’ side “so thoroughly, and 
repeatedly, that people will start to distrust the material the People’s Movement have 
distributed. Members of Cabinet must play a central part in this process”.1436 From when the 
negotiation results were in until the Labour Party and NCTU congress in the spring of 1972, 
the focus would have to be to secure a majority at the two congresses in favour of 
membership.1437 The information campaign had to be aimed at those within the Labour 
Movement that opposed the EC for ideological reasons. The goal was to convince them that 
membership was not “a capitulation to capitalism”.1438  
The decisive phase, lasting until the referendum, was based on three main themes: 
Security, trust and continuity.1439 ‘Security’ was tied to the issue of employment and growth, 
particularly the NCTU’s argument that was built on the premise that membership in the EC 
would secure full employment and continued growth.1440 ‘Trust’ in this context meant loyalty 
to the Labour Party. The aim was to tip the undecided voters to the ‘yes’ side out of sheer 
devotion to the party. In the last stages of the campaign, for instance, party secretary Ronald 
Bye launched the slogan ‘A Labour-voter is a Yes-voter’ to drive this message through.1441 
Frydenlund’s third theme – continuity – was the product of the Europeans. To not join 
would be a radical break with the course Norway had followed since the Second World War. 
To join would be “a continuation of the co-operation of which we have been a part of until 
now”. The aim was to “mow down the resistance to its hard core of 10-12 percent” and to 
“break up the alliance between anti-NATO-people and (...) fishermen and farmers”.1442 
Though the campaign avoided bringing up security issues and NATO-membership explicitly, 
this was clearly what Frydenlund had in mind. This aspect of the Labour Movement’s 
campaign was a direct descendent of the strategy created by Arne Langeland and Jahn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1436 AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 23.09.1971, Oslo – K. Frydenlund – The political arrangements. 
1437 Bergh Kollektiv Fornuft (2009), p. 108. The NCTU were quick (January 25) to announce that the negotiation result 
was ‘acceptable’, and that all of its members should support it. 
1438AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – September 23, 1971, Oslo – Knut Frydenlund – Det politiske opplegg.  
1439 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0008 – 06.06.1972, Hankø – R. Bye – The EC case. Perspectives and measures. 
1440 Bergh Kollektiv Fornuft (2009), p. 110. 
1441 Bye Sersjanten (1987), p. 137; Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 187. Bye explains that the campaign was based 
on his interpretation of the Labour Party Congress decision. In hindsight, both Bye and Nyhamar thought the 
campaign was psychologically unwise. Nyhamar claims it worked against its intentions.  
1442AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 23.09.1971, Oslo – K. Frydenlund – The political arrangements. 
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Halvorsen in the early 1960s, interpreting membership as a continuation of the Atlantic 
profile of Norwegian foreign policy.1443 
This was important, as Bye warned in June 1972, because “we are also attacked from 
within. Behind the Labour Movement segment of the organised EC-resistance, Bye saw “a 
core that has, throughout the years since the war, had been in opposition to Norwegian 
security and foreign policy, those who zealously fought NATO and Norway’s connection with 
the Western world.”1444 Many of the leading figures on the right wing saw the Labour Party 
anti-membership faction as part of an organised power grab by an alliance of young and old 
left-wingers. This was why Gerhardsen’s legitimation of the party’s ‘no’ side at the extra-
ordinary national convention in April 1972 was particularly aggravating. Bye could do little 
but remind the audience that he expected that no one actively hindered the realisation of the 
government and party’s official line of membership.1445 
The political leadership had expected the negotiation results of January 1972 to bring 
about a major shift in public opinion. The shift that did occur, from 19 to 33 percent in favour 
of membership from December 1971 to January 1972, but it was not marked enough. 
Moreover, from January to March the percentage in favour actually dropped to 29 percent, 
while those against had only declined from 50 to 43 percent from December to March. The 
undecided made up 31 percent in December and 28 percent in March.1446 As most of the 
undecided voters were Labour Party voters, they would determine the outcome of the 
referendum.1447 This situation worried many within the party and government, especially the 
political leadership of the MFA, and lay at the heart of the decision to create the ‘YES to the 
EC’ campaign (YTE). 
 
The creation of the ‘Yes to the EC’-campaign 
YTE held its first press conference in late February when chairman Reidar Carlsen casually 
announced, “we were some people that had the feeling that we should come together”.1448 It 
operated from March 1972 until the referendum in September 1972 – setting up some 1450 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1443 AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 02.02.1972, Oslo – R. Bye – Plans for the discussion of the EC-case in the 
Labour Movement; Bergh Kollektiv Fornuft (2009), p. 106; Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 178-179. The last phase 
would be run like a major election campaign with an effective division of labour. The NCTU hired some 60, and the 
Labour Party 18, short-term secretaries to visit workplaces, local party offices, and unions and inform them about 
the choice ahead. This was made possible by the extraordinary funds allotted by the Parliament to information 
campaigns, where the Labour Party received 2,3 of the 12,5 million NOK. 
1444 AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0008 – 06.06.1972, Hankø – R. Bye – The EC case. Perspectives and measures.  
1445 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 164-165. 
1446 NSA–7B–39 – 05.06.1972 – Kj.H. – Memo. Gallup’s poll on the EC. 
1447 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p 187. 
1448 Morgenbladet – 22.02.1972; Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 17. 
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stands to hand out brochures and material about the EC. YTE produced LPs, movies, their 
own newspaper, 50.000 copies of the book ‘Why Yes to the EC’, 600.000 folders with 
information material for households, and 16 buses and several boats travelled all across the 
country to hand out flyers and buttons. All together, some 11.000 volunteers worked on the 
campaign.1449 Though it is difficult to measure, the YTE and Labour Movement campaigns 
must be given credit for bringing 340,000 undecided or negative voters to the ‘yes’ side during 
the year September 1971 to September 1972. In the last months of campaigning, the ‘no’ side 
lost ground quickly, but managed to stay ahead until the referendum.1450 The road to the 
YTE’s establishment was long and complex. 
Before the signing of the Treaty of Accession in January of 1972, the NSA and many 
business organisations had come to the conclusion that a broad pro-European campaign “had 
proved impossible to establish”.1451 This was closely related to the Labour Party’s internal 
situation. In 1971, the five business organisations had established a Co-ordination Committee 
to set up a campaign, but faced resistance from the Labour Party and the NCTU.1452 In a 
meeting between the two parties, Bratteli and NCTU leader Tor Aspengren made it perfectly 
clear that a new campaign should only consist of, and receive financial support from, 
individual persons. Concerned with the campaign’s profile, the Labour Movement wanted the 
business organisations to keep some distance.1453 Moreover, the Labour Party and the NCTU 
would run their own campaigns: a broad pro-European campaign would formally have to 
manage without the organisational infrastructure of the Labour Movement. Throughout the 
year, the government sent mixed signals regarding the establishment of a campaign.1454 
However, the government would not resist low-key financial support. Trying to address this, 
the business organisations set up a Policy and Finance group to raise money for the ‘yes’ 
campaign.1455 To keep the business organisations from direct contact with the campaign, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1449 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 178. 
1450 Bjørklund Mot Strømmen (1982), p. 333. 
1451 NSA–7B–34 – 01.11.1971, Oslo –K. Hansen – EEC-committee, meeting 09.11.1971. 
1452 NSA–7B–33 – No date – Norway’s relationship with the EC. The role of the business organisations. Erik Hoff 
of NEC (former secretary at the EMN), Johan C. Løchen (FNI) and Kjell Hansen (NSA) formed the unofficial 
working group of the Co-ordination Committee. NSA–7B–35 – 26.07.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo; NSA–7B–
33 - 25.05.1971, Oslo – Summary. Meeting of business organisations about the EEC, 24.05.1971. 
1453 NSA–7B–35 – 17.08.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo. EEC information. Meeting between NEC chairman 
Kaare N. Selvig, FNI president Jens-Halvard Bratz, NCTU leader Tor Aspengren and Prime Minister Trygve 
Bratteli. Aspengren was much more enthusiastic about the idea than Bratteli. 
1454 NSA–7B–36 – 16.12.1971 – D. Hirsch – Memo. EEC negotiations – Meeting by the Prime Minister’s. 
1455 NEC, FNI, NSA and NBA. NSA–7B–35– 03.09.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo for Darre Hirsch. 
Cooperation between the business organisations in the EEC case; NSA–7B–35 – 20.10.1971, Oslo – E. Hoff – 
Meeting between business organisations regarding EC information efforts, 04.10. The powerful FNI chairman Jan 
Didriksen entered the Policy and Finance group, and soon a joint budget of 2.4 million NOK for information 
campaigns was agreed. NEC: 500.000 NOK; NSA: 500.000 NOK; NBA: 500.000 NOK; FNI: 500.000 NOK; 
ANIC: 200.000 NOK; 200.000 NOK from two smaller organisations. 
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Roem Nielsen became the “special link with the European Movement and to head the work 
with the possible establishment of a new European Committee”.1456 They could not, however, 
make the political decision to establish it. 
Neither could (or would) the EMN. The EMN expanded it activities, setting up a press 
service, working very closely with the Conservative Youth and with the establishment of a 
pro-European youth movement.1457 The EMN had felt forced to act because of the passivity 
of the Borten government and the “rather ruthless” campaigning of the People’s 
Movement.1458 However, they still hoped to avoid a direct confrontation with the PM, which 
would legalise its activities. Contact between the pro-European organisations “should be kept 
informally”, the EMN maintained.1459 The initiative, therefore, had to come from somewhere 
else.  
This somewhere else was the MFA, and the process was shrouded in secrecy. According 
to Andreas Cappelen – in an interview he gave in 1988 – ‘YES to the EC’ came about when 
state secretary Stoltenberg – together with head of the Minister’s secretariat Arne Arnesen – 
urged young diplomat and Labour Party member Sverre Jervell to enter Foreign Minister 
Cappelen’s political secretariat to help them set up a pro-European campaign 
organisation.1460 Cappelen could only name journalist Gidske Anderson, but recalled that 
several people had asked him to do something to strengthen the pro-European forces. Arild 
Holland was surely one of those people. When Cappelen took over as Foreign Minister, 
Holland immediately told him that an information campaign was needed. He also 
remembered bringing up the question with Bratteli on the airplane to Brussels for the signing 
ceremony in January of 1972.1461 However, the specific ‘YES to the EC’ plan was only 
discussed within a very limited circle. Stoltenberg had deliberately chosen an unknown 
diplomat straight out of the Diplomatic Academy and placed him in the political secretariat. 
This way Jervell would not be a civil servant while setting up YTE, and therefore free of civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1456 NSA–7B–35 – 03.091971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo for Darre Hirsch. Cooperation between the business 
organisations in the EEC case. 
1457 NSA–7B–35 – 25.08.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo; NSA–7B–36 – 08.11.1971 – K. Hansen – Memo. Youth 
Movement for the EEC; Interview – Gro Dragland – 25.07.2013; RA/PA–0992/A/As – L0011 – Protocol working 
committee, 30.11.1970; Lahlum Haakon Lie (2010), p. 530. In August 1971, the Co-ordination Committee contacted 
journalists from the daily press to have them be formally affiliated with the European Movement. Soon thereafter 
Haakon Lie established an EMN press service. Alf Seeland (Conservative journalist), Vesla Vetlesen (Labour 
politician and writer), and Bjarte Botnen (Moderate Christian, Vårt Land journalist) started working at the EMN. Lie 
employed his daughter Gro Dragland to help out with the daily operations. 
1458 RA/PA–0992/A/As – L0011 – Protocol annual meeting 31.03.1971. 
1459 RA/PA–0992/A/As – L0011 – Protocol working committee 10.09.1971. 
1460 Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 18, Interview Cappelen 13.03.1988. Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 
24.02.2014. Stoltenberg, however, claims he was not a part of it. 
1461 Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014. 
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servant norms.1462 Jervell tried to keep a low profile, but was called out by the EC-critical 
daily newspaper Dagbladet already in late 1971.1463 Echoing Magne Reed’s journey in 1962, it 
was then decided that Jervell should take a leave of absence and work as a political consultant 
to YTE, while de facto continuing to work for Cappelen.1464  
It was Cappelen that made the final decision after conferring with Labour Party 
secretary Ronald Bye and Prime Minister Bratteli. With Cappelen, Bratteli, Bye, Stoltenberg, 
Arnesen and Jervell involved, a social democratic project designed to win over the undecided 
within their own ranks was put in place.1465 The choice of chairman confirmed this profile: 
Einar Gerhardsen unsurprisingly declined to head the campaign, so Trygve Bratteli chose 
Reidar Carlsen, who was Minister of Commerce and Shipping in Gerhardsen’s first 
government (1945-46) and Minister of Fisheries in the second (1946-1951).1466 However, 
Cappelen’s decision to establish YTE was part of a much broader process that had been going 
on for over a year. The Co-ordination Committee, for example, claimed that YTE was 
created “partly as a direct result of initiatives from [their] side”.1467 Haakon Lie had also been 
active.1468   
Nonetheless, YTE was quite deliberately kept from both the business organisations and 
the EMN. The reason to keep away from the EMN was its conservative slant and the 
provocative figure of Haakon Lie. Stoltenberg later recalled that they feared the EMN would 
struggle to attract new supporters of membership in the EC.1469 The reason to keep the 
campaign away from the business organisations was the same as in 1962-63: it would smell 
too much of narrow self-interest and high finance. If this was to be a ‘people’s movement’ on 
par with the anti-membership organisation, close links with shipping or industry would be 
detrimental to its image.1470 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1462 Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.2015; Interview – Sverre Jervell –12.06.2015. 
1463 Dagbladet – Gudleiv Forr – 1971 (unable to find date). Referred by: Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.2015. 
1464 Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.2015. 
1465 Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 18, Interview Cappelen 13.03.1988. 
1466 NSA–7B–35 – 17.08.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo. EEC information; Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 
18-19; Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 178; Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 160. It was Selvig and Bratz, in discussions 
with Bratteli and Aspengren, who first suggested Gerhardsen as chairman. While Cappelen recalls that he was the 
first to suggest Gerhardsen as chairman. It is likely that many had this idea around the same time, and also that they 
discussed it with each other. Bratteli did not think Gerhardsen would accept, but did indeed contact him. It was 
Cappelen and Stoltenberg that approached Reidar Carlsen. Carlsen came from the north of Norway, was director of 
the Regional Development Fund and chairman of the Nordic Association. He represented the periphery and the 
primary sector, and was a strong supporter of Norden. It is not unlikely that Bratteli thought Carlsen’s name in some 
small way could make up for the fact that Minister of Fisheries Knut Hoem had resigned in January 1972. 
1467 NSA–7B–38 – 20.04.1972, Oslo – Memo for Director Jens Halvard Bratz. 
1468 Interview – Gro Dragland – 25.07.2013. However, Haakon Lie, as many of the EMN members, was annoyed by 
the way the ’Yes to the EC’-campaign came about. Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 25, 105. 
1469 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014. 
1470 NSA–7B–33 – 21.05.1971, Oslo – Memo. Meeting between business org. about the EEC, 24.05. 
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However, its most striking feature, in our context, was the almost complete lack of 
official involvement from the Europeans. In fact, the only European signing the ‘YES to the EC’ 
petition in January 1972 was elder Ambassador Arne Skaug. Their absence is even more 
noticeable given the very strong involvement of the political leadership of the MFA. This was, 
of course, deliberate: it would go against all established norms for high-profile diplomats to 
take part in such a campaign. Moreover, as we shall see, the MFA was already under 
increasing fire for its information efforts, and it was important to keep it separated from YTE’s 
campaign and they were seen as two different things.1471  
Though YTE was officially detached from the Europeans and the MFA, the EMN, the 
business organisations, and even the Labour Party, co-operated closely. For one, Jervell 
continued to be the MFA’s watchdog and link to YTE. Historian Arve Husby goes as far as to 
claim that, “all the power was gathered in the hands of Carlsen, Metliaas [former chairman of 
the Liberals in Oslo and the Liberal Youth, and vice-chairman in YTE] and Jervell”.1472 
Moreover, Jervell gathered information and analytical material from the Europeans and 
developed arguments for ‘YES to the EC’. They needed professional expertise, which they got 
from the MFA. The Europeans had been told not to get directly involved, but could contribute 
with expert advise and interpretations.1473 The YTE campaign’s focus seems to confirm that 
the content was shaped between the Labour Party government on the one hand and the 
Europeans and the MFA on the other. First, the EC and European integration was a vehicle for 
peace in Europe, something Bratteli fundamentally believed in, and it was strongly supported 
within the EMN and among the Europeans. Second, membership would be a natural and safe 
continuation of Norway’s political course.1474 Both arguments were a shift away from the 
technical and economic discussions that had dominated the Norwegian debate for so long – 
this was also something the Europeans had argued for earlier.  
Jervell also functioned as the contact point between the YTE and the business 
organisations. In April 1972, for example, he visited the NSA to warn them that the 
organisation would soon run out of money for their ambitious campaigns. The costs were high 
because YTE suffered from “an almost total lack of organisational sub-structure” – the local 
contact groups, supposedly in every commune, were “pure paper tigers”, one NSA official 
noted. Since the government had made it clear that YTE should not receive appropriations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1471 Interview – Arild Holland – 18.07.2015. 
1472 Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988), p. 106. NSA–7B–38 – 05.04.1972, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo for Director 
Malterud. Financing the YTE campaign. 
1473 Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.2015, 12.06.2015; Interview – Arild Holland – 18.07.2015. 
1474 Husby JA til EF-aksjonen (1988). 
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from companies or institutions, Jervell suggested setting up multi-stage operations, funneling 
money to the EMN, which in turn could give money to the YTE campaigns locally.1475 From 
the spring of 1972, therefore, Roem Nielsen entered the Policy and Finance group due to “his 
close connection with the European Movement and the ‘Yes’ campaign”. The business 
organisations would continue to “trigger as much activity organised by others as possible” 
through practical assistance, material support, lecturers and financial support, “with a 
minimum of formal structures and fixed organisational patterns”. Soon, however, the Co-
ordination Committee warned that YTE had “an almost unimpaired need for practical 
assistance”1476, and in June 1972, NSA Director Malterud wrote to all his members that YTE 
was ‘a special problem’ that needed to be solved: “today it operates with a deficit of major 
proportions. For it to be able to do a [proper] job, funds must come from persons/businesses. 
There will soon come a request for support from our members, and I can warmly recommend 
that we all see to this.”1477 The business organisations and the Co-ordination Committee had 
long known that they had to “pay most of the party (...) whichever way it is organised and 
whoever runs it”.1478 Now they did.  
It is only part of the story therefore when historian Rolf Tamnes, building on Husby’s 
unpublished master thesis, highlights the antagonism between the business organisations’ Co-
ordination Committee and YTE, and the fact that they did not receive any direct economic 
support from them.1479 It was a much more complex relationship: in silent understanding, one 
depended on the other, and – importantly – this was known and accepted by the Labour 
Party government. The main contributors were found within the NSA and FNI, with some of 
the contributions going via the EMN. It seems much of the financial co-ordination was 
supervised by the MFA, through junior diplomat on leave Sverre Jervell.1480  
As Party Secretary Ronald Bye wrote in his biography, “there was never any organised 
and legalised connection between ‘Yes to the EC’ and the Labour Party leadership”. 
However, the informal co-ordination was close, and Bye was the contact point. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1475 NSA–7B–38 – 05.04.1972, Oslo – K. Hansen – Memo for Director Malterud. Financing the YTE campaign; 
NSA–7B–41 –29.08.1972, Oslo – Kj.H. – Memo. Overview of important measures in the shipping sectors EC 
information. Director Roem Nielsen had also found another loophole, giving a 1 million NOK credit, under the tacit 
agreement that ‘someone else’ would officially cover it. The NSA was more reluctant, but gave financial support to 
the regional offices of YTE through local businesses. 
1476 NSA–7B–38 – 20.04.1972, Oslo – Kj.H. – Memo for Director Jens Halvard Bratz. 
1477 NSA–7B–39 – 13.06.1972 – O. Malterud – Board meeting 15.6.1972. Elements for account about the EC. 
1478 NSA–7B–33 – 19.04.1971 – Norway’s relationship with the EC. The role of the business organisations. 
1479 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 160. Jervell remembered that YTE avoided contact with the Committee, as they were 
’political amateurs’, but at the same time needed their economic support. Interview – Sverre Jervell – 12.06.15. 
1480 Gleditsch and Hellevik  Kampen om EF (1977), p. 189. The informal financing procedures makes it difficult 
estimate how much the business sector contributed, and the books of YTE remain unavailable. However, in an 
interview from 1977, Carlsen said that YTE spent around 20 million NOK.  
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Knut Frydenlund, Labour official Arne M. Olsen and Bye met in secrecy with YTE-leaders 
Magne Lerheim and Ola Metliaas in a cabin in the outskirts of Oslo to plan co-ordinated 
events in the autumn of 1972.1481 It was here that the idea of inviting Willy Brandt to Norway 
for a large pro-European rally materialised. The massive mid-September YTE-rally at 
Youngstorget was the biggest pro-European event organised during the campaign by far.1482 
Another major issue the Labour Movement and YTE most likely co-ordinated was 
Trygve Bratteli’s decision to make the referendum a vote of confidence for the Labour 
government. On August 23, Bratteli announced to the press and public that the government 
had “asked the people for its support in an important question, should the answer be ‘no’, the 
government will have to take the consequence of this”.1483 Bratteli had been in doubt. The 
government was divided right down the middle, and the decisive pressure in favour of a vote 
of confidence came from Aspengren, Bye and Cappelen, who met late in the summer of 1972. 
Bye recalls the rationale: “time was of the essence (...) and ‘yes’ was still way behind ‘no’ in the 
polls. All ammunition had to be used, and the vote of confidence was a joker.”1484 According 
to journalist and author Jostein Nyhamar, the original plan was to shock the electorate by 
announcing the vote of confidence the same week as the referendum. Nyhamar refers to a 
strategic memo from ‘Yes to the EC’ and mentions LMIC chairman Bernt H. Lund’s 
statements in August – given a week before Bratteli’s announcement – and insisting that 
Bratteli indeed had to go should a majority against membership botch these plans.1485  
What was the role of the Europeans in all these pro-European campaigns? Before the 
change of government the Europeans acted, as they had done since the mid-1960s, as 
boundary-spanners for the European cause. They were instrumental in managing the 
relationship between the government and MFA, and the extra-parliamentary information 
efforts. T 
Their involvement happened with the consent of MFA leadership, not with that of 
Prime Minister Borten, which gave it a clear streak of personal conviction. However, they did 
not act in a private capacity, they acted as diplomats bound by civil servant norms. This was 
defendable in the sense that it was official government policy to obtain membership. In any 
case it was an ambivalent role: that they continuously considered their position and level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1481 Bye Sersjanten (1987), p. 128-129. “We hid in a cabin in the forest when we thought we were close to breaking the 
rules (...) the EC-struggle was an organisational cultural revolution for the Labour Movement.” 
1482 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 186-187. 
1483 Lahlum, Haakon Lie (2010), p. 538. 
1484 Bye Sersjanten (1987), p. 139. See also: Lahlum, Haakon Lie (2010), p. 539, 540, Lahlum bases this on interviews 
with Bye and Aspengren. 
1485 Nyhamar Nye utfordringer (1990), p. 186-187; Interview – Sverre Jervell – 11.06.15. Jervell concurs. 
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involvement is clear from their official ‘absence’ from YTE. This was a deliberate choice, 
which reflected that the Europeans and the MFA were very aware of the grey areas of civil 
servant norms. Whether they facilitated contacts, or delivered policy advice as with the 
Labour Party, NCTU and YTE campaigns, the Europeans kept in the background. It was the 
Labour government’s official information campaign, administered by the MFA’s Press 
Department that, for the first time, brought them into direct and persistent contact with the 
Norwegian public. It was this meeting that called the many new roles the Europeans had taken 
on since the early 1960s into question. It was an institutional shock for the MFA, where the 
diplomat’s status, expertise and norms were fundamentally challenged. 
 
Europeans into Battle 
In the early stages of the third EC-round, the MFA was mostly concerned with information 
about Norway aimed at the Community. Norwegian journalists demanding more information 
were simply referred to the existing parliamentary white papers and the Market Committee’s 
yearly reports.1486 The government, the MFA and the Europeans, at this point, had few 
elaborate plans to involve the Press Department in an information effort directed at the 
Norwegian public. However, after the establishment of the People’s Movement and increasing 
tensions within the government, such plans surfaced. In November 1970, for example, Tim 
Greve contacted the daily press and instructed the editors to take on pro-European pieces and 
answers to the EC-sceptics as soon as possible.1487 Soon, the Labour Party in opposition 
pushed for the MFA as a whole to take a more active role in the information efforts. At a 
meeting in the ECFA, Labour leader Bratteli raised concerns about the “low information level 
of the Norwegian debate”. There were “myriads of misleading information” and Bratteli 
suggested that the MFA set up a list of 15-20 important themes that it could inform the public 
about. Not surprisingly, Foreign Minister Stray jumped on this invitation, and admitted that 
the MFA had contemplated such information efforts for a while. In fact, Stray had wanted an 
expanded press service headed by Greve’s Press Department, to give ‘correct information’ and 
‘responsible assessments’ regarding membership. Chairman of the committee, Helge Seip 
(Liberal) concluded that the MFA should be “more active in the day-to-day information” of 
the public.1488 The negotiation secretariat and the Press Department were instructed to come 
up with suggestions for how the MFA should organise its information efforts in early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1486 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 25.06.1970 – Aftenposten – Publication about Norwegian economy in French; UD 
44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 07.06.1970 – A. Skarstein – Memo. Information material about the EC. 
1487 NSA–7B–31 – 20.11.1970, Oslo – A. Larsen – Memo. Norway/EEC. 
1488 SA, UUKK – Minutes: ECFA, meeting December 9, 1970, 9.45AM. 
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January.1489 Efforts by the Market Secretariat were also added to take care of the long-term 
organisational planning.1490 
However, in February, Greve wrote to the state secretary that the Press Department was 
already planning a series of booklets, but before it could continue it was “necessary for the 
government to establish a budgetary framework for the information efforts”.1491 As the 
Centre-Right government was falling apart, Greve wrote to Bratteli in opposition that he did 
not have the impression that the coalition had made any decision on the matter. Greve’s clear 
advice to Bratteli, whom he assumed would be in power soon, was to “get funding for the 
thematic booklets”.1492 The Labour Party, in fact, anticipated a major information effort from 
the government’s side. Their internal information strategy presupposed that the government 
would initiate a “new and more powerful information scheme”, so that the two campaigns 
“comprises a whole (...) our internal campaign is complemented by the government’s external 
information”.1493 It seems that this was the reason why Bratteli pushed the coalition to let the 
MFA start up an information campaign. 
The new Labour government proposed, and parliament approved, an additional 
1.500.000 NOK to the MFA’s EC-information budget, now totalling 2.000.000 NOK, to do 
something about the ”strong need for public information” and provide a ”broad range of 
educational material (...) as soon as possible.” But as the negotiations dragged out until early 
1972, and domestic debates became increasingly heated, more resources were needed. 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Accession, parliament decided to allot 12.500.000 
NOK to information efforts related to the EC-case. Five million went to the political parties, 
divided according to the number of representatives in the parliament. The PM and the new 
YTE-campaign got 1.250.000 NOK each. Finally, the MFA received 5.000.000 NOK for the 
government’s information campaign, of which 3.737.158 NOK was spent.1494 
Between June 1971 and June 1972, the MFA published a series of thematic booklets. In 
total, 21 were produced, many of them printed in several hundred thousand copies.1495 Greve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1489 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 17.12.1970, MFA – K. Colding – Memo to the NS. Information from the MFA. 
1490 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-3 – 29.12.1970 – P. M. Ølberg, NS – Memo. EEC. Information material for the public; UD 
44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 08.01.1971 – Memo. Preparation of necessary background and information material. 
1491 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 12.02.1971 – T. Greve – Memo. The Press Department’s booklets about the EC. 
1492 AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0045 – 10.03.1971, Oslo – T. Greve – Memo to Trygve Bratteli. Information efforts 
about the EC. My italics.  
1493 AA/D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 02.02.1972, Oslo – R. Bye – Plans for the discussion of the EC-case in the 
Labour Movement. 
1494 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-7 – 29.05.1973 – T. Greve – Reseracher Nils Petter Gleditsch, PRIO; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 
– 14.04.1972 – St.prp.nr. (1971-72) Om tilleggsbevilgning på statsbudsjettet for 1972 under kap. 108, Forhandlinger 
med De Europeiske Fellesskap, post 26, Informasjonstjeneste. 
1495 Distributed through Statens Informasjonstjeneste (The State’s Information Service). Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen 
om EF (1977), p. 132. 
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drew on expertise he trusted, and commissioned work from, for example, the NSA. The 
material handed in would be anonymous and edited by the Press Department with the help of 
journalists.1496 The Market Secretariat authored and sent out targeted information packets to 
opinion makers. The MFA also informed the public of negotiation results through ads in the 
national daily press. Moreover, the MFA aimed to produce leaflets explaining the negotiation 
results in a straightforward language for mass proliferation.1497 
This written information brought the Europeans into direct contact with the public and 
created many negative reactions. Greve and the Press Department had their hands full 
correcting so-called factual errors made by critics of the MFA’s information, or what they 
considered misinterpretations of the MFA’s intentions. The Europeans were clearly frustrated: 
they felt restricted by civil servant norms of thoroughness, objectivity and reliability, while the 
extra-parliamentary ‘no’ organisation agitated freely. Greve was therefore continuously 
engaged in disputes in the press, trying to counter what he called “prophecies (...) not based in 
reality”, and “fantasies”.1498 Shortly before the referendum in 1972, parliamentary leader for 
the Liberal Party Gunnar Garbo claimed the parliament’s appropriations to the MFA’s 
information campaign had been squandered away on “spreading shallow, unreliable and 
unfounded information”, referring specifically the booklet 100 questions and answers, he claimed 
that “the Ministry’s statements [were] clearly misleading”.1499 This developed to a longer 
exchange of views in the press between Garbo and Greve.1500  
There were many such accusations that the Europeans together with the government 
manipulated or construed information, or made decisions detrimental to the real interests of 
‘Norway’ and ‘the people’.1501 One of the most dramatic accusations against the Europeans 
came when parliamentarian Erling Engan (Centre Party) in the Storting claimed that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1496 NSA–7B–33 – 30.04.1971, Oslo – Memo. The MFA’s information booklets about the EEC. 
1497 NSA–7B–35 – 23.09.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Plans for EEC information; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–7 – 29.05.1973 
–T. Greve – Researcher Nils Petter Gleditsch, PRIO. 1.9 million NOK was spent on this. 
1498 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 28.09.1971, Oslo – T. Greve – The Treaty of Rome and us; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 
19.07.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – The MFA’s booklet ‘100 spørsmål og svar’. 
1499 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – Arbeiderbladet 31.07.1972, “Spørsmål og svar”. 
1500 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 19.08.1972 – Arbeiderbladet, Gunnar Garbo – “Usakligheter fra UD”; UD 44.36/6.84 
Inf.–6 – 22.08.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – Editor Arbeiderbladet. 
1501 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 17.08.1971 – Finnmarksposten – “EF og utviklingslanda. Mangelfull statsinformasjon”, by 
Ottar Grepstad; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–4 – 28.09.1971, Oslo – T. Greve – The Treaty of Rome and us; UD 44.36/6.84 
Inf.–5 – 09.11.1971 – Rogalands Avis – “Gale opplysninger fra UD i Fellesmarkedet-debatten”; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-5 
– 15.11.1971, Oslo – T. Greve – Editor of Rogalands Avis; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 18.05.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – 
Tromsø; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – May 18, 1972, Oslo – T. Greve – Tønsberg Blad; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 
24.05.1972, Notodden – Olaus Høydal; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 19.07.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – The MFA’s booklet 
‘100 spørsmål og svar’; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 27.07.1972 – Nordlandsposten, Julius Evjen – “Rett politisk 
vurdering”; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 01.08.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – Tromsø (For tilhengere er alle midler tillat); UD 
44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 02.08.1972, Paris – E. Winsnes – Dear Stoltenberg; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 18.08.1972 – 
Nordlandsposten, Paul M. Steiro – “EF og UD”. MFA – Press Dept, Greve; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 11.09.1972 – T. 
Greve –Editor, Orientering; Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF, p. 135. 
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negotiators had deliberately mistranslated Article 9 of Norway’s Agriculture Protocol. Engan’s 
argument, which he based on accusations made by the PM and Dagbladet, was that the 
Norwegian language text of Article 9 opened up the possibility of continued milk subsidies 
once Norway joined the EC, while all the other texts said the contrary.1502 “Some of the 
Norwegian negotiators were aware of this inconsistency well before the agreement was signed 
in Brussels”, Engan claimed.1503 Engan’s accusations were thoroughly dismissed by Foreign 
Minister Cappelen who rightly pointed out that each text was an independent and authentic 
legal document with the same validity as the others. Cappelen also warned against libellous 
accusations against Norwegian negotiators and other civil servants. Still, Engan proposed that 
the government should re-examine the real interpretation of Agriculture Protocol with all the 
different negotiation partners. After a very heated debate Engan withdrew his proposal.1504 
This was not the end: Arild Holland, together with Head of Office Bjarne Solheim, waited for 
Engan to exit the plenary chamber, and dared him to repeat his accusations outside of 
parliament and therefore not covered by parliamentary immunity, so that they could take him 
to court for defamatory statements. Engan refused, referring instead to Dagbladet.1505  
Even if the Europeans did not intend it, engaging in polemics in the press or outside 
parliament with EC-sceptics framed the MFA as their counterpart.1506 Thus, information 
became conflated with pro-European propaganda. The MFA would never escape this.1507  
 
 
Institutional battles 
Through the EC-issue, foreign policy intertwined with domestic policy. At the height of the 
information campaigns, this became evident when the coordinative ministries on the domestic 
and foreign scene, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the MFA and MoCS, respectively, 
locked horns over issues of growth and economic instruments.  
The viewpoints of the Norwegian economists inhabiting and governing the main 
institutions of political economy, the so-called iron triangle1508, were largely incompatible with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1502 The accusations first came in Dagbladet 29.2.72, Torstein Eckhoff in Arbeiderbladet 9.3.1972; St.t. (1971-72) p. 
2541. It concerned the translation of “sans préjudice de” to “uten hensyn til” (which would translate ‘without 
consideration for’, while British text read “without prejudice to”). An analysis of this became part of the People’s 
Movements Counter-Report: Folkebevegelsen Motmelding (1972), p. 114-116. 
1503 Arbeiderbladet 17.03.1972. 
1504 St.t. 1971/72, pp. 2540-2560. 
1505 Arbeiderbladet 17.03.1972; Nationen 17.03.1972. UD 44.36/6.84–48 – 15.03.1972, Brussels – B. Solheim – Memo 
to the Foreign Minister. 
1506 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-6 – 01.08.1972, Oslo – T. Greve – Tromsø (For tilhengere er alle midler tillat). 
1507 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf. – File 4-6. 
1508 ‘Iron Triangle’ of economic competence: the Social Economic Institute (SEI) at the University of Oslo (UoO), 
under Ragnar Frisch, the MoF and Statistics Norway (SN). These economists formed, compared to most other 
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those prevailing in the EEC at the beginning of the 1970s. The Werner Plan – with its 
ambitious three-stage plan for an Economic and Monetary Union – proposed strong 
economic and financial integration.1509 Moreover, a raft of political measures that hindered 
competition – what the MoF would call economic instruments – were to be abolished, so that 
commercial activity could unfold within the entire Common Market.1510 In the Community’s 
view, “[i]t was the market, rather than economic policies and instruments, that created wealth 
and prosperity”, economic historian Einar Lie contends.1511 It is safe to say that this was not a 
legitimate part of the Norwegian ‘prosperity discourse’ and it was met with almost unison 
resistance from postwar Norway’s technocratic elite par excellence: the economists.  
These economists fundamentally disagreed with the Europeans on the membership issue. 
Already during the first round (1960-63), the MoF economists were angered by what they 
conceived as propaganda from the Europeans. Norwegian membership in the EC was not the 
best solution, as they felt the Europeans argued, as it would obstruct the realisation of a wider 
transatlantic free trade area. When the Europeans tried to sell what they saw as the best 
available option, the economists of the MoF defended the ideal postwar solution.1512 The 
government had therefore bypassed the MoF in the early 1960s and given the task of 
evaluating the economic effects of membership to the MoCS. In the 1970s, the MoF 
economists would become a major resource on the ‘no’ side. They reacted strongly, for 
instance, when the MoCS used ‘an example’ in Parliamentary White Paper no. 50 (1971-72), 
which estimated a 1 percent decrease in growth should Norway decline full membership in 
the EC. Director of Statistics Norway dismissed the numbers, and claimed that the decrease 
would be as little as one-tenth of a percent, and economists at the MoF wrote in formal protest 
to their minister.1513  
Another dispute erupted when the Negotiation Delegation charged Hermod 
Skånland 1514  to head a commission that would evaluate the long-term implications of 
membership in the EC for Norwegian monetary policy. This was meant to be an attachment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European countries, a particularly homogeneous community, as they were all educated at SEI under Frisch. Shaped 
by the economic collapse of the interwar era, they came to favour economic interventionism over laissez-faire or free 
market economy. The new generation of economists were the states ‘social entrepreneurs’, uniting science and 
society in a higher order – the modern mixed-economy welfare state. Einar Lie “Masters and Servants. Economists 
and bureaucrats in the dispute over Norwegian EEC Membership in 1972.” in Contemporary European History, 
(forthcoming 2015), p. 4 (of draft); Bjerkholt Kunnskapens Krav (2000), p. 15, 27-31, 63. 
1509 Mourlon-Druol A Europe Made of Money (2012). 
1510 Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015), p. 13; Bo Stråth and Peter Burgess “Money and Political 
Economy. From the Werner Plan to the Delors Report and Beyond” in Lars Magnusson and Bo Stråth In Search of a 
Political Economy for Europe, Brussels: Peter Lang (2001). 
1511 Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015), p. 15 
1512 Lie and Venneslan Over Evne (2010), p. 136.  
1513 Gleditsch and Hellevik (1977), p. 134; Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015), p. 20. 
1514 Director general of the MoF, and from 1971 deputy governor of The Central Bank of Norway. 
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to the White Paper. However, the conclusions were highly critical and contended that 
membership in the EC, and the implications of the Werner Plan, would challenge Norwegian 
credit and interest rate policies. As Lie explains: “[t]his meant, the commission concluded, 
that the Norwegian system of channelling large volumes of inexpensive loans to certain long-
term industrial investments and housing through a number of State Banks would by and large 
have to be abandoned. These instruments were all at the core of the Norwegian system of 
economic management.”1515 The Market Committee recommended, and the government 
decided, not to attach the Skånland-report to the White Paper.1516  Instead the study ended 
up as an appendix in a Counter-White Paper by the People’s Movement. The MoF 
economists also provided drafts and suggestions for the rest of the Counter-White Paper.1517 
“The decisive factor”, Lie argues, “was the threat to Norway’s power to shape its own 
economic policy”. The free-market ideology of the EC would remove economic instruments 
from the MoF, and thus endanger the state intervention needed to secure full employment 
and economic growth, so the argument went.1518 
The Europeans’ dense network of pro-European forces, on the other hand, held opposing 
views to that of the ‘iron triangle’ economists. These ranged from hoping that membership in 
the EC would somehow dismantle the postwar state and pull Norway in a liberal direction, to 
visions of an active, international social-democratic economic policy. The NSA was part of the 
first category, which already in 1961 saw membership as a way to get rid of the economic 
‘instruments’ of the government and harmonise tax regimes so that Norway would appear 
more like others on the continent, and open up capital markets – a general return to liberal 
policies.1519 At the other end of the scale were people like Arne Lie, who was in the same 
generation as the Europeans, an economist by training, and a civil servant and politician for the 
Labour Party.1520 On the recommendation of Halvorsen and Langeland, who knew Lie from 
his days in the OEEC, Lie would be part of the influential negotiation secretariat during the 
first round of negotiations, and also a close economic advisor of Bratteli.1521 As opposed to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1515 Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015), p. 14. 
1516 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0031 - Government Conference – 17.02.1972. 
1517 Folkebevegelsen mot medlemskap i Fellesmarkedet Folkebevegelsens melding om Norges forhold til De Europeiske 
Fellesskap (EF) Oslo (1972), p. 31-47; Lie and Venneslan Over Evne (2010); Einar Lie Ambisjon og Tradisjon - 
Finansdepartementet 1945-1965, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (1995). 
1518 Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015), p. 8, 12 (of draft). 
1519 NSA–7B–13 – 08.09.1961 – Memo. Nordic meeting of Directors, 15.09.1961; NSA–7B–13 – 21.08.1961 – 
Central Board item 1. Norway and the Treaty of Rome. 
1520 http://runeberg.org/hvemerhvem/1973/0340.html (27.09.2015). In the late 1950s he had a stint at the OEEC 
Embassy as secretary (1956-1959), before serving as assistant secretary at the MoCS, office manager in the Bank of 
Norway (1960), Head of Department in the OECD (1968), and state secretary to Prime Minister Bratteli (1970-71). 
1521 UD 44.36/6.84 B.-1 – 09..07.1962 – A. Skarstein and H. Engen – Memo. Composition of the negotiation 
machinery; Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. 
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NSA, Lie, in a 1962 article, argued for a process of adaptation to, and influence on, European 
economic policy. In an assault on the reigning economists he concluded, “I believe that the 
Norwegian organs engaged in social-economic research have been so absorbed by their own 
excellence, that they often have not taken the time to try to understand other countries 
economic research and policies.” He also said, “[e]conomic welfare policy is not solely a 
Norwegian invention”. On the other hand, he thought membership in the Community could 
lead to “a European welfare policy in the Norwegian image”. 1522 This was the economic 
rationale of the Social Democratic vision of Europe.  
Like the Europeans, the NSA and Arne Lie were heavily involved in the EMN. Lie, also 
part of the polito-administrative Labour elite, was a board member and took part in the 
information efforts, among other things, by writing a booklet (“The Europeans that created 
the Common Market”), which was printed and distributed to EMN members and the Labour 
Movement via Frydenlund.1523 The NSA was the most consistent contributor to the European 
Movement, covering roughly 20-30 percent of the yearly budget. As they did for the MFA, 
the shipowners arranged and held the yearly dinner of the EMN.1524 In this way, the EMN 
represented an arena of strange alliances. 
The Europeans embodied and represented these different views. Already in the early 
1960s, Langeland, for instance, argued that since international economic cooperation would 
restrict the use of national economic instruments, it was “illusory to discuss trying to stand on 
the outside of a long-term development pushed through by strong forces.”1525 Also in the early 
1960s, Halvorsen criticised professor Frisch at the University of Oslo, father of the dominant 
economic school who had described the EEC as ‘an unenlightened plutocracy’1526, for 
advocating state-subsidised isolationism in violation of GATT, because he could not accept 
the market developments in Europe. “For a country with the economic structure such as 
Norway’s it is difficult to believe that such a system of trade [as suggested by Frisch] is best 
equipped to obtain the economic goals we have had so far: full employment, rising standards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1522 Arne Lie “Norge i Europa – de økonomiske problemer”, Internasjonal Politikk 20(1) (1962), pp. 37–77, p. 69-76. 
1523 RA/PA–0992 A/As/L0010 - 03.05.1967 – Minutes: Board Meeting; S-1275–Db/Box 277/Folder 2. 
1524 RA/PA/0992/A/Aa/L0010 – 20.12.1965 – Board Meeting; RA/PA/0992/A/Aa/L0010 – 19.01.1966 – 
Minutes: Working Committee; RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0010 – 15.12.1966 – Minutes: Board Meeting in the Storting; 
PA-0992/D/L0015 – 05.06.1968 – H. Lange – Mr. Fred Olsen; RA/PA/0992/D/L0015 – 11.03.1968 – T. 
Gabrielsen – To shipowner Fred Olsen; RA/PA/0992/A/As/L0011 - – 16.01.1969 – Minutes: Working Committee. 
Starting in1965-66, the board of the NCEM would be treated to a dinner on the England boat (M/S Braemer or 
M/S Blenheim) by shipowner Fred Olsen.  
1525 UD 44.36/6.84–1 – 12.05.1961 – A. Langeland – Memo. The relationship to the new economic and political 
cooperation in Western Europe. 
1526 Dagbladet – 09.11.1961 – “Det uopplyste pengevelde”, by Ragnar Frisch. 
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of living and economic growth”. 1527  Though the goals were the same, the Europeans 
represented an alternative concept of ‘prosperity’ shaped by the networks in which they took 
part. 
Accordingly, the Europeans, the MoCS, the NSA and others, did not necessarily analyse 
the Werner report or the economic consequences of membership in the 1970s, in light of the 
state’s ability to govern economic politics. The MoCS, for instance, criticised the Skånland 
report for not assessing viable policy options, given the plans laid out by the Community for 
the years ahead. And even more fundamentally, the commission had failed to consider the 
fact that Norway’s “economic policy in many areas is dependant on economic interaction 
with the western European countries”.1528  
The Europeans argued that the plans for an Economic and Monetary Union would affect 
Norway no matter what. This was, they contended, an argument in favour of membership. In 
a consultative committee meeting in January 1971, Sommerfelt acknowledged that the 
government’s formal freedom of movement would be limited by an Economic and Monetary 
Union. However, referring to how Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Pierre Werner thought his 
country had increased its sovereignty – also in economic matters – through membership in the 
Community, Sommerfelt argued that the applicants should hurry to get on the inside and that 
close coordination of national economic policies was a necessity. “This did not entail that the 
national economic policy would be of any less interest. On the contrary, it was important that 
every country continued to be able to master their own peculiar national problems”.1529 Jahn 
Halvorsen was even more direct. Coordination of economic policies was a prerequisite for a 
functional monetary union. Harmonising taxation policies, for example, was a consequence of 
the wish to establish an effective, functioning common market.1530 
In the end, few of the government’s white papers or official statements emphasised free-
market arguments – instead they downplayed the four freedoms of the EC. This conceals the 
tensions. The first draft of the opening declaration in Luxembourg on June 30 1970, for 
instance, stated the government “look[ed] forward to taking part in the cooperation and [was] 
in agreement with the principle guidelines and the planned stages stipulated for the future in 
area of economic and monetary policies”.1531 However, the government revised the draft and 
believed the diplomats had gone too far in embracing the Community’s economic and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1527 Aftenposten – 05.12.1961 – “Universitetsøkonomene får nytt svar på tiltale”, by Jahn Halvorsen. 
1528 UD 44.36/6.84 E.–6 – 15.12.1971 – MoCS, Department of foreign trade – Meeting of the Market Committee, 
13.12.1971, item 1: discussing the Skånland commission’s report on the EC’s plans for EMU. 
1529 NSA–7B–32 – 26.01.1971, Oslo – Negotiation Secretariat – Minutes. The consultative committee, 25.01.1971. 
1530 NSA–7B–32 – 19.02.1971, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – The economic and monetary union. 
1531 UD 44.36/6.84–33 – Draft of Norwegian opening declaration, Luxembourg, 30.06.1970. 
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monetary plans.1532 The official line was to silently accept the economic policies of the EC, 
and speak instead of export markets and sustained growth.  
The conflict outlined above, however, reflected a deeper socio-political struggle: what 
was to be the role of the state and planning in the economy? The answer to this question also 
reflected a battle for the soul of the Labour Party: was EC-membership a natural continuation 
of the social democratic ideas of ‘prosperity’, as developed since the 1940s, or was it the 
ultimate capitalist sell-out of the Labour Party elite, as argued by the ‘no’-side?1533  
 
Tour of Norway 
One of the most peculiar involvements of the Europeans up until the referendum was their 
travelling across the country to inform people about the EC and the negotiation result. The 
Europeans were not prepared for this physical and direct meeting with the public, and it 
triggered a more substantial discussion about the norms of civil servants in general. 
Already in September 1971, MFA officials had informed the NSA that “a team of civil 
servants” would “present the negotiation results at meetings for local officials within the 
labour and business organisations all across the country”.1534 Some, like Arild Holland, 
wanted to start touring the country before the negotiation results were in.1535 Meanwhile 
others, like Sigurd Ekeland, thought lecture tours would be more effective after the results 
were clear, and suggested the first two weeks of 1972 as a good time to start.1536 It was, 
however, state secretary Stoltenberg that made the decision with the approval of Cappelen. 
He recalled the MFA getting piles of requests from all over the country, from people who 
wanted to be informed about the negotiation result or other aspects of the EC: “we had to 
answer this, so we had to move out.”1537 Following the signing of the Treaty of Accession, 
Greve systematised these efforts, requesting all offices to list “people that can be used as 
lecturers” on EC-matters and “able to travel to different parts of the country to give such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1532 RA/ S-1005/A/Aa/L0028 – Government Conference – 18.06.1970. 
1533 The pro-European liberal forces and their economic ideology are understudied in the context of the failed 
Norwegian bid for membership. The topic deserves thorough research. 
1534 NSA–7B–35 – 23.09.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Plans for EEC information. 
1535 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. 
1536 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 05.10.1971 – S. Ekeland – EC/Norway. Information efforts in Norway. 
1537 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014; Interview – Sverre Jervell – 12.06.2015; Interview – Arild 
Holland – 09.01.2014. Arild Holland claims it was due to his ‘constant badgering’ of the MFA’s political leadership, 
though it is clear that many of the Europeans supported the idea. 
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lectures”.1538 The use of travelling lecturers increased greatly in the last months before the 
referendum.1539 
As Cappelen told parliament, what people wanted was sober information about the 
negotiation result and the implications of membership: “we have in Norway over time 
developed a group of civil servants with special expertise regarding Nordic and European 
integration issues. Common for all of them is that they have worked with EC-questions daily 
for years”. These were primarlily the Europeans.1540 Many of the requests for lecturers went to 
Greve, whose Press Department had coordinative responsibility. 1541 The most common 
procedure would be that when Greve received a letter from an organisation or group of 
people, he would ask Holland to find a suitable diplomat or civil servant to send.1542 Holland 
recalled often asking the young diplomat Haakon Skaarer or Per Martin Ølberg. Ølberg, with 
his broad knowledge of the agreement on fisheries, was often sent to the north of Norway.1543 
The delegation in Brussels also took part. While in Norway, press attaché Freihow, 
Ambassador Halvorsen and counsellor Ekeland, were often invited to provide information 
about the negotiation results.1544 
A delicate balancing act was clear from the beginning: the diplomats and civil servants 
were asked to provide information about the negotiation result in a neutral way, and avoid 
recommending an outcome or making normative statements about aspects of the Treaty of 
Accession.1545 One of the first comprehensive complaints regarding this practice came from 
the board of WYL to Prime Minister Bratteli. The WYL had noted that civil servants in the 
central administration had often made “forceful and enthusiastic statements in favour of 
Norwegian membership”. These “direct, outward political activities to promote a point of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1538 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 08.02.1972 – T. Greve, Press Department – Departmental circular. Information work 
regarding the EC. 
1539 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 14.04.1972 – St.prp.nr. (1971-72) Om tilleggsbevilgning på statsbudsjettet for 1972 
under kap. 108, Forhandlinger med De Europeiske Fellesskap, post 26, Informasjonstjeneste. Of 7.000.000 NOK 
the MFA received in April 1972, 275.000 NOK was set aside for a so-called ‘ambulatory information secretariat’ 
travelling to cities and towns across the country to answer questions from the public ‘on site’, and distributing 
official publications. 
1540 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 19.04.1972 – A. Cappelen – 19.4.1972: Foreign Minister Cappelen’s answer 
to interpellation by representative Gunnar Garbo; Interview – Sverre Jervell – 12.06.15. 
1541 AA – D/A/079/3/5/L0045 – 02.02.1972, Oslo – P. Kleppe – The continued work with market issues. 
1542 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014. For example: UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.-5 – 13.03.1972, Sofiemyr – G. 
Granne – Application for lecturer for meeting about the EC.. 
1543 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. For example: UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 16.03.1972 – B. Braathen – 
Director General Tim Greve; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 28.03.1972, Oslo – K. Breunig – Lecturers for information 
meetings about the EC for Buskerud Conservatives. 
1544 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 18.12.2012. For example: UD 44.36/6.84–48 – 12.06.1972, Trondheim – 
“Norge foran EF”. Lecture in Trondheims Industriforening by Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen; UD 44.36/6.84–48 –
15.03.1972, Ålesund – S. Ekeland – “Norge og det europeiske fellesskap. En redegjørelse om Brüssel-
forhandlingene”; Interview – Sverre Jervell – 12.06.15. 
1545 Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014; AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – April 19, 1972 – Andreas Cappelen – 
19.4.1972: Foreign Minister Cappelen’s answer to interpellation by representative Gunnar Garbo. 
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view which there is strong disagreement about in our country” created an image of the entire 
administration being in favour of membership, they complained. In their view, the only 
solution would be to allow civil servants to participate in campaigns against membership.1546 
In April, the issue was raised again, this time in Parliament by Liberal representative Gunnar 
Garbo. Garbo asked if the Foreign Minister believed “that it is in accordance with Norwegian 
administrative practice that MFA officials are engaged to participate in the political debate on 
whether Norway should join the EC or not?” 1547 
The critical reactions prompted Bratteli to ask his staff to look into the matter. They 
were in their right to use the administration to inform the public, they said, referring to a 1968  
article by the Governor of the central bank of Norway Knut Getz Wold, and added, “there 
are no determined rules and the view put forward by Getz Wold is by and large what the civil 
service tries to follow”.1548 Getz Wold’s article stated that civil servants were free to participate 
in political activities and placed Norwegian norms somewhere between those of the very strict 
British, and the more relaxed Swedes. He was, for instance, quite clear that “the individual 
civil servant is assumed to implement the policy-decisions made by parliament, government 
and department loyally and with interest”. This was a classic Weberian norm. His overall 
view was: “great caution regarding public expressions of ones own opinion on issues one is directly 
involved with. Great freedom expressing ones own opinion on other areas in politics and 
society.”1549 Both the answer to WYL and the answer to parliamentarian Garbo were based 
on Getz Wold’s article.1550 
However, the Prime Minister was genuinely surprised by, and quickly dismissed, the 
WYL’s request that civil servants opposed to membership could express themselves freely. 
Equally, Cappelen reminded the press that the government had, in fact, been encouraged to 
inform the public. “If civil servants in the MFA are asked to give lectures regarding this issue, 
they are permitted to do so.” The Foreign Minister had made it clear, however, that ”civil 
servants working with the EC-case could not openly argue against the governments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1546 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 21.03.1972, Oslo – B. T. Godal – Statement to the government by WYL’s 
central board about the involvement of civil servants in the EC case. 
1547 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 19.04.1972 – Andreas Cappelen – 19.4.1972: Foreign Minister Cappelen’s 
answer to interpellation by representative Gunnar Garbo. 
1548 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 24.03.1972, Oslo – F. Midtskaug – Memo. To the Prime Minister. Political 
engagement of civil servants; AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 07.04.1972, Oslo – E. Himle – Memo. To the 
Prime Minister. Political engagement of civil servants. 
1549 Knut Get Wold “Administrasjon og politikk” in Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift (1968), pp. 68-100, p. 72, 87. 
1550 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 07.04.1972, Oslo – E. Himle – Memo. To the Prime Minister. Political 
engagement of civil servants. 
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position”.1551 In parliament, Cappelen’s answer to Garbo was that administrative norms 
required a civil servant to be loyal to the sitting government and to be cautious with public 
statements on issues of a purely political character within his own area of responsibility. 
Beyond these limitations, civil servants were free to participate in public debate and in 
political organisations, just like any other Norwegian citizen. The Foreign Minister saw no 
problem in civil servants presenting the government’s view. 
However, Cappelen admitted that there had been some problems regarding the lecture 
tours. For one, those who requested lectures had created events in which “the civil servants 
were meant to play the role as someone who argued in favour of membership, while someone 
else [was invited] to argue against, so as to create a clear duel.” Another complicating factor 
was that civil servants and diplomats also took part in public debates as private citizens: “some 
civil servants have participated in the debate in favour of Norwegian membership. This has 
happened in more internal forums, like internal meetings of different parties”, Cappelen 
maintained. A last problem, that Cappelen did not mention, was that the PM often followed 
civil servants on tour, and deliberately turned their lectures into pro-con debates. 1552 
Cappelen concluded that if the government should chose not to use its administration to 
inform the public for fear of its civil servants making normative statements, “we will have lost 
a source of enlightenment and information, which we in this case cannot afford to do 
without”.1553 
Essentially, the government’s position was that official and factual information could be 
distinguished from personal and normative opinions. The problem was that with the 
boundary spanning efforts of the Europeans since the early 1960s, the lines between personal 
and professional, between information and propaganda, and between official and informal, 
had become completely blurred. It was difficult to expect sober, factual information from 
Arne Skaug, when he stated in the newspaper Bergens Tidende, “the EC goes further than the 
UN” with regards to securing peace in the world, for example.1554 Or to expect objective 
lectures from Sigurd Ekeland, who answered Verdens Gang’s question of whether Ekeland 
believed Norway would become a member of the EC, with, “yes, because in reality we have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1551 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0031 - Government Conference – 23.03.1972. This was in line with ealier statements made 
by Trygve Bratteli and Halvard Lange. Wold “Administrasjon og politikk” (1968). 
1552 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
1553 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 19.04.1972 – Andreas Cappelen – 19.4.1972: Foreign Minister Cappelen’s 
answer to interpellation by representative Gunnar Garbo. 
1554 UD 44.36/6.84–49 – Bergens Tidende Si JA nr. 1/1972 – Arne Skaug: “EF går lenger enn FN”. 
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no alternative”.1555 Such statements framed the Europeans in a certain way, regardless of how 
thorough, objective and reliable their lectures were. 
Equally, it must have been hard for the MFA to uphold the view that they were only 
concerned with factual information when their representatives held regular informal meetings 
with the business organisation’s Coordination Committee to ensure that their work did not 
overlap.1556 Many of the Europeans had several overlapping, and in this context contradictory, 
roles. Accordingly, head of the Labour Party’s pro-European press efforts Ole David Koht 
Norbye1557 wrote in an official letter to the MFA and Asbjørn Skarstein: “I write to you partly 
in your capacity as board member of the European Movement. As you may well know, I’m 
writing a third brochure for Haakon Lie (...) It would be great if I got the opportunity to read 
the government’s new white paper before I put the finishing touches to it.”1558  
Ideas for campaigns were also shaped in these fuzzy borders. Early in 1970, when the 
Europeans were combatting the Nordek plans, Arne Skaug – at an EMN meeting – warned that 
people seemed to forget that EFTA as they knew it would disappear the moment Britain 
entered the EC.1559 This was something he repeated in private letters to Haakon Lie.1560 And 
something Ølberg and Lie discussed with the NSA.1561 In June of 1972, the European 
Movement conducted a poll questioning how people would vote in September if both Britain 
and Denmark would become members: 42 percent answered that they would vote ‘yes’, while 
40 percent said ‘no’.1562 By posing the question differently, the EMN had polled a rare ‘yes’ 
majority. State secretary of the MFA, in turn, recommended that this aspect of the choice 
ahead be communicated to the public.1563 These thoughts ended up in a 20x32 cm ad in 
several major newspapers only days before the referendum. In it, the MFA reminded the 
electorate that the referendum was about whether Norway wanted to join Denmark, Ireland and 
Britain into the Community.1564 
The general public must also have found it hard to see any clear distinction when Sverre 
Jervell (‘YES to the EC’), Haakon Skaarer and Arild Holland were sent to the same event co-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1555 Verdens Gang – 07.04.1972 – “Intet alternativ til medlemskap”. 
1556 NSA–7B–35 – 23.09.1971, Oslo – K. Hansen – Plans for EEC information. 
1557 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0005 – 02.02.1972, Oslo – R. Bye – Plans for the discussion of the EC-case in the 
Labour Movement. 
1558 UD 44.36/6.84–39 – 27.05.1971, Velleches – O. D. Koht Norbye – Dear Skarstein. 
1559 RA/PA – 0992/A/As – L0011 – 25.02.1970 – Summary: The EMN’s Annual meeting. 
1560 Arb.Ark - Skaug, Arne – Box 40 – 08..06.1970, Copenhagen – A. Skaug – Dear Haakon Lie. 
1561 NSA–7B–30 – 23.01.1970, Oslo –Memo. Norden/EEC situation; AA – Haakon Lie Dd/A/053/3/3/L0012. 
1562 NSA – 7B – File XXXIX – June 5, 1972 – Kj.H. – Notat. Gallups meningsmåling om EF. 
1563 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg - 24.02.2014. 
1564 Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF (1977), p. 136.	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ordinated by the MFA.1565 The other pro-European actors did not make the distinction either: 
Arild Holland recalled how Haakon Lie once called Tim Greve and instructed him to send 
Holland to Odda in Western Norway to hit some ‘goddamn communist bastards’ in the 
head.1566 
All this made for an almost impossible balancing act and many unpleasant encounters. 
Terje Johannessen remembered constantly censoring himself, trying not to overstep any 
boundaries while giving lectures, but that he found it nearly impossible not to give his personal 
opinion when people asked him questions after the lecture.1567 Arild Holland recalled how he 
could not resist talking about the broader political implications of membership and how the 
EC secured peace in Europe when speaking about the negotiation results. 1568 One of 
Ambassador Sommerfelt’s punch lines to a lecture was, “not being a member is not only 
wrong but stupid”.1569 Other scripts indicate a dry and factual tone.1570 Haakon W. Freihow 
had agreed to give a lecture in Vinje (Central Norway) to a small pro-European group in an 
area known as a ‘no’ bastion. Prior to the lecture, a local police officer had warned him not to 
go alone, and offered to escort him to the venue.1571 In the last stages of the campaign, the 
MFA also chose to set up a telephone service. This was modelled on a similar Danish solution, 
in operation since December 1971, and was explicitly recommended by MFA officials as a 
way of avoiding constant accusations of false propaganda.1572  
 
Beyond diplomatic norms? 
Ambassador Halvorsen probably summed up what many of the Europeans thought in a 
personal letter to Prime Minister Bratteli right after the negative referendum: 
 
Dear Trygve! (...) The room for manoeuvre that the government has bestowed on its civil 
servants is in reality a necessity for our entire system and our political debate. With Norway 
having such a small milieu, we would lose something essential if the civil servants could not 
present and explain the government’s policies. We now run the risk of civil servants not daring to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1565 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 28.03.1972, Oslo – K. Breunig – Lecturers for information meetings about the EC for 
Buskerud Conservatives. 
1566 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. There was a sharp increase in meetings between Haakon Lie and Tim 
Greve from 1972 onwards. AA/Df/A/053/4/1/L0004. 
1567 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
1568 Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014. 
1569 Lie “Masters and Servants” (2015), p. 8. 
1570 For example: NSA–7B–37 – A. Holland – Lecture in Oslo Skibsmeglerforening 08.02.1972. Norway-EC. 
1571 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 18.12.2012. 
1572 RA/S-1005/A/Aa/L0031 - Government Conference – 07.08.1972; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 24.08.1972, Oslo – 
O. Graham; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 11.09.1972 – T. Greve –Editor, Orientering; UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 18.09.1972, 
Oslo – A. Holland – EC. Preparedness measures 18.-22.09.1972. Arild Holland organised the telephone service, and 
Eivinn Berg and Håkon W. Freihow (together with two others) took several shifts. 
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give their opinion, not even internally, if it should run counter to the opinion of shifting 
governments. Partly because they may feel that they become unpopular, partly because leaks and 
other channels to the press might be used. Then we’re truly in danger.1573 
 
The problem was that many of those opposed to membership no longer trusted the expertise 
of the civil service. As the People’s Movement wrote to Bratteli, “even if the administration 
commits itself to giving factual orientations, there is an evident danger that their information 
campaign will be affected by the fact that the same administration is intensely engaged in 
reaching an agreement about Norwegian membership in the EEC”.1574 The Europeans’ and 
other civil servants’ personal motives were called into question, also by academics. Social 
scientists Gleditsch and Hellevik highlighted that civil servants were socialised through 
international contacts and tempted by splendid international careers.1575  
Political scientist Knut Dahl Jacobsen’s article from 1960 highlights the two oft-
conflicting role expectations of civil servants: loyalty and professional independence. Knut 
Getz Wold dived into another aspect: neutrality in politically sensitive matters. Interpreting 
Getz Wold, the government chose to make a very strict division between ‘information’ and 
‘personal opinion’, thus allowing civil servants to inform the government’s position on the 
politically sensitive EC-matter. Moreover, it emphasised loyalty to the government as being 
more important than professional independence. 
Tim Greve’s answer to an angry complainant at the height of the information 
campaign, for example, followed this view: “you mention that employees of the state are 
servants of the people, and I can without reservation agree with this point of view. As an 
expression of this, the parliament has requested the government to inform the public about 
the EC.”1576 However, the boundary spanning efforts of the Europeans made it questionable 
whether loyalty was with the membership cause or the government. Sommerfelt’s reaction to 
the hypothetical scenario of an EC-sceptic coalition following the Bratteli government is 
telling: “it would have to have a twisted sense of humour if it instructed me to negotiate a 
trade agreement with Brussels”.1577  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1573 AA/D/Da/A/044/6/2/L0012 – 27.09.1972, Brussels – J. Halvorsen – Dear Trygve. 
1574 AA – D/De/A/044/6/7/L0006 – 01.1972 – Referendum about Norwegian membership in the EEC. The 
People’s Movement against Norwegian membership in the Common Market. 
1575 Gleditsch and Hellevik Kampen om EF (1977), p. 142. Making a point about Norwegian civil servants, they rather 
misleadingly refer to an op-ed in The Times (09.01.74) by Labour Party politician Richard Crossman about British 
Parliamentarians. 
1576 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 21.08.1972 – T. Greve – Mr. Sylfest Rosseland. The Press Department thanks you for 
your letter dated 15.08. 
1577 Quote from Lie “Masters and Servants” (forthcoming 2015), p. 23. 
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The Europeans were overwhelmed by the negative reactions. This development can be 
traced through Greve. In January of 1971, he confidently answered a complaint that Europeans 
gave biased information by saying that civil servants could not be completely nondescript, and 
that it was natural that they emphasised what they thought to be important.1578 In November 
of 1971, he admitted that the “critical surveillance” of the MFA’s information booklets, forced 
them to either be incredibly precise or to be deliberately vague.1579 By August of 1972, a 
clearly strained Greve wrote: “[t]his assignment is both very demanding and ungrateful. (...) 
Not everyone is equally content with the information they get. Some claim that it is 
incomplete; others that it is misleading.”1580 
In 1967, political scientists could – without much dispute – claim that the MFA had 
seen few instances of diplomats politically engaged through the press. But that had changed. 
In the past, the Press Department secured a unified and coherent flow of information.1581 
Following the negative referendum – in the publication, ‘The Unfaithful Servants – The Civil 
Service in the EC-struggle’, three young political scientists and EC-sceptics argued that the 
Europeans working with the EC-case had disrupted the Weberian norms of  civil service 
through public political engagement, and had undermined democratic values of Norwegian 
society: “central parts of the foreign policy oriented civil service (...) can be said to have 
entered the EEC already in the early 1960s.”1582 The fierce resistance against the involvement 
of civil servants in the referendum campaign and the negative referendum had shocked the 
Europeans and ultimately resulted in a loss of prestige.1583 
Following the negative referendum, the Bratteli government was replaced by a 
parliamentary weak government consisting of the EC-sceptic Centre Party, the EC-
ambivalent Christian People’s Party and the EC-sceptic remains of the divided Liberal Party, 
which was headed by Lars Korvald (Christian People’s Party). Its only mandate was to 
negotiate a trade agreement with the EC, a job it completed in the spring of 1973. The 
Korvald government deliberately avoided placing the most enthusiastic pro-Europeans in 
leading positions in the trade negotiations. The relationship was particularly strained between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1578 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–3 – 12.01.1971 - Dictated by phone from Bergens Arbeiderblad. Accusations by Arne 
Haugestad against the Embassy in Brussels. 
1579 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–5 – 26.11.1971, Oslo – T. Greve – The language in the MFA’s booklets about the EC. 
1580 UD 44.36/6.84 Inf.–6 – 21.08.1972 – T. Greve – Mr. Sylfest Rosseland. The Press Department thanks you for 
your letter dated 15.08. 
1581 Hallenstvedt Utenriksdepartementets handelspolitiske avdeling (1968), p. 88. 
1582 Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (Eds.) De Utro Tjenere (1974), p. 79. 
1583 Neumann ”Norway. The Foreign Ministry” (1999), p. 158; Allers Besondere Beziehungen (2009), p. 171. 
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the new negotiation leader, Director General of the MFA’s Legal Department Jens Evensen, 
and Ambassador Jahn Halvorsen.1584 
The criticism, the negative referendum and the trade negotiations deeply affected the 
Europeans. In fact, a remarkable number of Europeans changed their career paths following the 
referendum. Eivinn Berg left the service for many years, and worked as a director in the NSA. 
Arild Holland was asked to stay on for a while, to negotiate the trade agreement, but left the 
service in 1974 to become head of the Association of Pulp and Paper Industries. Asbjørn 
Skarstein was transferred to Ottawa, and Tim Greve became director of the Norwegian Nobel 
Institute in 1974. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The boundary-spanning efforts of the Europeans were new and challenged traditional 
diplomatic norms. Operating and mediating the boundaries of several different domestic and 
international arenas seems to have been part of a broader development that was particularly 
noticeable among multilateral economic diplomats. However, the Europeans were doing this 
for the European cause – under a government that was not able to speak with one voice. The 
distinction between private convictions and professional practices were blurred. As seen in 
previous chapters, it sparked many reactions from EC-sceptics within the government and 
parliament. However, it happened largely out of the public’s eye. 
With their involvement in the Labour government’s official information campaign, the 
Europeans were brought into direct and persistent contact with the Norwegian public. Due to 
their conviction, expertise and boundary spanning efforts, and because of the impossible 
balance between unbiased information and pro-membership propaganda, many of the 
changes in their diplomatic norms that had been implicit now became explicit. Their ‘policy 
shaping’ capacities, their expertise and, not least, their participation in public political debates 
were called into question. There is no authoritative judge of whether the Europeans went 
beyond civil servant norms, except to say that they had changed and that many reacted to 
these changes. However, the defeat of established elites at the hands of the electorate followed 
a deep discrediting of the Europeans. This defeat and discrediting at the hands of the public was 
experienced as an institutional shock for the MFA, and a personal defeat for many Europeans. 
1585 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1584 Tamnes Oljealder (1997), p. 179-180. 
1585 https://nbl.snl.no/Eivinn_Berg (01.02.2015); Interview - Håkon W. Freihow – 18.12.2012; Holland 
Utenrikstjenestens historie (1997), pp. 24-28. 
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More fundamentally, the Europeans lost the diplomatic hegemony to voice ‘Norway’s 
interests’ on the international scene. The constant polemics between the Europeans and the 
public burst the image of the diplomat (and one could argue the state) somehow being above 
the people in such matters. Suddenly everyone felt allowed to define and question foreign 
policy, as it had become domestic policy too. The power to define the facts was dispersed. 
When the MFA booklets wrote of growth, the organised ‘no’ side would respond with, “What 
kind of growth?” and “Do we even want it”? This was the real impact of ‘1968’ and the 
referendum. The Europeans’ comparison of the ‘People’s Movement’ and ‘Norway out of 
NATO’ was not by chance. Neither was Frydenlund’s slogan of security, trust and continuity in a 
situation where the Labour Party leadership saw the social fabric of their postwar hegemony 
eroding in front of their eyes. In an essential way, the postwar concepts of ‘prosperity’ and 
‘security’ were opened up and redefined in the hectic years leading up to the referendum of 
1972. 
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Epilogue 
How the Europeans narrate(d) themselves 
 
“The end of the story is what equates the present with the past,  
the actual with the potential. The hero is who he was.”1586 
 
Paul Ricoeur on remembering. 
 
The Norwegian electorate’s ‘no’ to entry into the EC was a kick in the teeth for the established 
political, economic and administrative elites of Norway. And few felt it more acutely than the 
Europeans – it meant professional and personal defeat. Indeed, many of them left the service 
following the referendum. How did the Europeans create a meaningful narrative from the 
professional and personal failure of the negative referendum?  
As will be argued, the Europeans have reconciled the ingrained and institutionalised 
understanding of ‘the diplomat’ as a heroic character with the traumatic experience of the 
Norwegian ‘no’ by recasting and narrating themselves as martyrs, professionally sacrificed for 
a just cause: continued peace in Europe. Memories of the Second World War, their role as 
diplomats, the membership issue, and the failed referendum, all form part of the same 
narration. This narrative was profoundly shaped by the historically loaded discourses of the 
victorious ‘no’ side. In fact, as we shall see, the Europeans’ particular rationale in favour of 
membership could be labelled a fourth discourse in relation to the EC-case, which never 
captured the public’s imagination, and therefore became marginalised. 
 
Making sense of memory 
The epilogue analyses the interviews with the Europeans through a two-pronged approach. 
First, it builds on French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of meaning and 
narratives, and combines it with new insights on memory and interviews from the field of oral 
history.1587 Ricoeur viewed self-understanding as constantly interpreted and defined through a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1586 Paul Ricoeur ”Narrative and time”, Critical Inquiry 7(1), (1980), pp. 169-190, p. 186. 
1587 Ricoeur’s conceptual framework offers two benefits in relation to collective memory studies and oral history. 
Maurice Halbwachs, upon which much collective memory studies build, saw memory as inherently social and 
collective, as something that moved beyond memories of lived experiences (historical memory), and as a process 
through which social cohesion was achieved. Ricoeur, on the other hand, bids a crisp analytical tool to understand 
narration as it creates meaning for the individual, but does not exclude the collective cohesion that could come from 
sharing such narratives. Oral history does give heed to individual memory. Some adhere to the postmodernist or 
poststructuralist notion that language and discourse do not reflect the social and material world, they construct it, 
while others are more concerned with given voice to the voiceless. In this landscape, Ricoeur offers a hermeneutical 
middle way: for while there is certainly a ‘fictionalizing’ or creative element to remembering, there is a bond to the 
social reality of lived experiences of the past. Maurice Halbwachs On Collective Memory, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press ([1925] 1992); Anna Green “Can Memory be Collective?” in Donald A. Richie (Ed.): The Oxford 
Handbook of Oral History, Oxford: OUP (2011), pp. 96-111; Kathleen Canning “Feminist History after the Linguistic 
Turn: Historicizing Discourse and Experience”, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 19:2 (1994). 
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hermeneutical narration of the self.1588 Things that happen to us, Ricoeur argues, are given 
meaning through a narrative ‘emplotment’ in which events are ordered to uphold the plot. 
Thus, narratives do not necessarily operate with a linear understanding of time – instead 
events are connected to create a meaningful ‘self’ in the present.1589 This ‘emplotment’ twirls 
together important life events, such as experiences of war or death, and major victories or 
defeats.1590 Accordingly, the epilogue understands the Europeans’ narratives from the point of 
view of the conclusion, and the ‘chain of meaningful events’ as being narrated and pushed 
‘back in time’.1591 At the same time, it tries to incorporate the fact that this creation of 
meaning has happened continuously throughout their lives. Memories of the Second World 
War were structured, and structuring, for the Europeans in the 1960s, as well as today. Their 
thoughts on war, peace and integration are ‘put into play’ in different ways depending on time 
and context. 
Second, the epilogue builds on Neumann’s notion of diplomats adhering to three 
ingrained, professional ‘stories’: the bureaucratic, heroic and mediator story. Neumann argues 
that when young and promising aspirants enter the Norwegian Foreign Service, they are 
“exposed to a diplomatic discourse that offers various stories of how to be a diplomat”.1592 
These stories of what makes a good (and bad) diplomat, are embedded in the discourses and 
practices of the diplomatic field and the MFA as an institution. Diplomats acquire, adhere to, 
and interpret these stories through diplomatic practice – this way they subscribe to the stories 
‘to which they are supposed to subscribe’.1593 As opposed to roles, which are context specific, 
Neumann argues that stories are relevant and meaningful in several contexts, and make up 
truly ingrained and internalised understandings of self. Thus, stories can be understood as 
collectively accessible, and institutionalised, diplomatic narratives. Or, put differently, stories are 
‘templates’ of the core of what it means to be a good diplomat. Using Neumann’s stories as 
ideal types, we may explore the Europeans’ understanding of what made a good (and bad) 
diplomat, and how they redefined their professional self post-referendum.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1588 Mads Hermansen and Jacob D. Rendtorff (Eds.) En hermeneutisk brobygger, tekster av Paul Ricæur, Århus: Klim 
(2002). 
1589 Michael Andersen A Question of Location – Life with Fatigue after Stroke, Unpublished PhD thesis, Copenhagen: 
University of Copenhagen (2013), p. 11. 
1590 Thomson “Memory and remembering in oral history” (2011), pp. 83-85; See also: Daniel Schacter The Seven Sins 
of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers, Boston: Houghton Mifflin (2001), pp. 15-16. 
1591 Ricoeur: ”Narrative and time” (1980), p. 174. 
1592 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 99. 
1593 Boudon The Logic of Social Action (1979), p. 40. This is a twist of Boudon’s definition of what a role is. 
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The Europeans and the ‘no’-side’s discourse 
The ‘no’ side, with their effective grassroots movements, won the referendum. As seen above, 
one reason for the win had to do with their ability to successfully ‘tap into’ historically and 
culturally loaded discourses of ‘Europe’, being something different than ‘Norway’. 
Membership would entail a loss of Norway’s hard-won sovereignty, they argued, and was 
therefore a threat to Norway’s future existence. This was captured in the slogan, ‘self-
determination’. The referendum was cast as this generation’s opportunity to protect the right 
to self-determination. The choice was effectively portrayed as a struggle between binary 
oppositions: ‘State’ vs. ‘People’, ‘Bureaucracy’ vs. ‘Parliament’, ‘Constitution’ vs. ‘Treaty of 
Rome’, ‘Sovereignty’ vs. ‘Union’, ‘Norway’ vs. ‘Europe’.1594 It was a linear and rhetorically 
powerful interpretation of history, already well developed in the first no-campaign in 1961: 
 
“When big decisions were taken in our country's history – in 1814, 1905 and 1940 - a united 
people stood behind the choices. These decisions form the basis for our country's social, 
economic and cultural progress in recent times and obliges our generation to lead in the same 
direction.”1595 
 
The Europeans could not escape this discourse. As a bureaucratic elite with historical ties to the 
unions with Denmark and Sweden, they were constrained by how they were perceived. For 
example, CPP parliamentarian Asbjørn Haugstvedt argued, “as far as I can tell, full 
membership in the EC represents an open break with traditional Norwegian democracy 
(folkestyre). Ever since 1814, we have fought for the people’s right to govern the country, often 
against the civil servant regime”.1596 And Bjørn Unneberg of the Centre Party maintained:  
 
“If we look at our history, we see that pro-union parties existed both in 1814 and 1905, which 
argued that Norway was best served by joining bigger [political] entities. Those days it was the 
right side in Norwegian politics and the civil servants. Today it is the Federation of Norwegian 
Industries, Norwegian Bankers’ Association, civil servants and party officials.”1597  
 
In this discourse, the diplomat – the quintessential civil servant – was a foreign element in 
cahoots with continental capitalists and great powers. Leftist writer, political activist and EC-
sceptic Sigbjørn Hølmebakk eloquently captured this sentiment when he spoke about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1594 Neumann Norge – en kritikk (2001). 
1595 The ‘no’-side’s first parole against membership in 1961 quoted from Hans Fredrik Dahl: “Norge på en ny måte”, 
in Neumann: Norge – en kritikk (2001), p. 11. 
1596 Asbjørn Haugstvedt, St.t. (1972), p. 3286-3287. 
1597 Bjørn Unneberg, St.t. (1972), p. 3291. 
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MFA’s information campaign at a PM rally in 1972:  
 
“I thought it would be best to begin with the MFA’s brochures. I don’t know if I did this because 
I had helped to pay for them, or because I still held on to the childish, innocent belief that the 
MFA wouldn’t lie. So, I sat down and read, as the lilies of the valley blossomed and the mackerel 
started to seep into the Lista fjord. It was the stupidest thing I could have done. Because slowly I 
realised that this was not information. It was propaganda. It was not clarifying, it was concealing. 
There was no attempt to shed light on dark and unknown places. The lighting was muted and 
soft, so as to make it intimate and pleasant, in order to create sweet music about cooperation and 
community in our hearts. This was the elegant rape in morning dress and pin stripes. So, I put 
the brochures down and went on the fjord.”1598 
 
The elegant, smooth-talking and well-dressed MFA-men were contrasted with the pure, 
unspoiled and innocent fjord: civilised Europe versus natural Norway. In this dichotomy, ‘the 
diplomat’ was an agent of civilised Europe. 
Throughout the EC-debacle, those opposed to membership continuously accused the 
Europeans of propagating for membership. Already during the first round, the EC sceptic 
newspaper Dagbladet claimed that full membership would mean “the gradual dismantlement of 
the Norwegian nation state”, and that the MFA tried to conceal this.1599 This distrust was 
embedded in the discourse of the ‘no’ side, and given validity through historical imagery. With 
the end of the EC-struggle, then, the Europeans had challenged the traditional norms of 
diplomacy, through political agitation fuelled by personal conviction. The ‘no’ side, in turn, 
effectively condemned them to an existence outside of Norwegian political discourse as a 
foreign (European) element. It was this challenge to their professional lives combined with the 
shock of the negative referendum that would lead to a reinterpretation of the ingrained 
understanding of themselves as heroic diplomats. 
 
The heroic diplomat 
In his study of Norwegian diplomats, Neumann distinguishes a bureaucratic, a heroic and a 
mediator story, and argues that juggling them successfully is what constitutes a good 
diplomat.1600 The three stories, Neumann argues, resemble Western society’s stories of what it 
means to be a good human in general. Philosopher Charles Taylor identified (at least) two 
such scripts or stories. One concerns the decency of everyday life. Neumann explains it as 
“doing all the little things that are expected of you in a wide range of different contexts (...) this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1598 Hølmebakk: “Varmen fra et gammelt halmbål” (1982), pp. 205-218. 
1599 Dagbladet 04.04.1962, 28.10.1962. 
1600 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 125. 
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story celebrates low-key, monotonous labouring life. It has no place for heroics in the sense of 
exceptionalism”.1601 Rather, it is heroism in the shape of endurance. The image is the silent 
and admirable suffering of Christ, and makes up the bureaucratic story of the diplomat.1602 
The other story Taylor unveils concerns the good deed. “This is a hero story”, Neumann 
assesses, involving exceptional individual feats and spurs of creative genius. Here we are 
dealing with warrior ethics and turning water into wine. Such imagery underlies the heroic 
career diplomat. The face of the hero diplomat when at home is that of an adviser, “as close 
to the action as possible”, thriving in pulsating secretariats and mixing strictly diplomatic work 
with political actions. The face of the hero diplomat when stationed abroad is that of the 
masterminding field diplomat.1603 The last story, which Neumann educes from his studies of 
the Norwegian MFA, is the self-effacing mediator. This story is specific for diplomacy, he 
argues, and is central to their understanding of what constitutes a good diplomat. One of the 
most important tasks of a diplomat is to successfully prepare sites (of negotiation) for others. 
When the negotiations are concluded, politicians – not diplomats – will put their name to the 
papers.1604 Diplomacy, Neumann points out, “is about easing communication by turning 
yourself into an optimally functioning medium between other actors”.1605 In a sense, all three 
stories are heroic, albeit in different ways.  
The Europeans’ understanding of what made a good diplomat was narrated along the lines of 
these three stories. Håkon W. Freihow captured the bureaucratic story of the enduring character that 
does what is expected of him, no matter what, for instance, in his story of how Jahn Halvorsen reacted 
to the negative referendum in September 1972: 
 
“I remember right before the referendum, I had bought a lot of champagne to the Embassy. We 
were supposed to give toasts. And then it happened – we did not become members – we were all 
very surprised. (...) We were, of course, very disappointed. But I remember Jahn Halvorsen, he 
was a passionate pro-European, had worked for it with his information back home, and through 
his broad network in the Commission (...) So, when the results were in, he disappeared up to his 
office, and then he called a meeting, and stated: ‘The decision has been made, and our task, in 
these circumstances, is to work to obtain the best terms possible. The decision is made, and we 
must adhere, as we always do, to the instruction from ‘home’.’ He was an exceptional civil 
servant. The ambassador, and I’ve had many good ones, but I rank him the highest.”1606 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1601 Iver B. Neumann “To be a Diplomat” in International Studies Perspectives 6, 2005, p. 73. 
1602 Charles W. Taylor Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: CUP (1989). 
1603 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 98. 
1604 Neumann Diplomatic Sites (2013). 
1605 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 121. 
1606 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 18.12.2012. 
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Freihow, when referring to Halvorsen’s enduring and loyal characteristics, explicitly labelled him ‘an 
exceptional civil servant’, thus highlighting the bureaucratic traits of a diplomat. 
The heroic story was also part of the Europeans’ self-perception. The belief that as diplomats, they 
were practitioners, out in the real world, as opposed to many other experts and civil servants, was 
fundamental. The heroic story entailed being ‘a man of action’, as captured in this reflection by Arne 
Langeland: “I just did what I thought to be right. No, I didn’t have any philosophical reflections.”1607 
The diplomat was not trapped behind a desk, but someone who engaged with people. Arild Holland 
clearly made a distinction between being ‘book-smart’ and being a heroic diplomat: “everything 
concerning diplomacy, all negotiations, is about personal chemistry, the ability to socialise with people 
– it’s everything. You can be dumb as a bag of hammers – but if you’re able to win the hearts of those 
you negotiate with, you can go very far.”1608 Arne Langeland also juxtaposed the two when he 
reflected on how the proto-European Einar Løchen differed from career diplomats: “one thing is to have 
read and written about it. You know when you are in negotiations, when you negotiate, all that, that’s 
what we know. (...) You don’t get that through reading.”1609 
Last, the Europeans also adhered to the mediating story. The notion of being able to build 
bridges between people, institutions, or negotiating standpoints was an essential part of their 
professional identities. As Neumann notes, it is the “negotiating itself, the doing that is seen to 
be of key importance”, where the diplomat becomes an “optimally functioning medium” to 
the point of being self-effacing.1610 Terje Johannessen used the same imagery of a medium or 
channel: “You get, either consciously or subconsciously, a sense of what the receiver 
wants.”1611 Similarly we may recall, from chapter 10, how Sommerfelt facilitated a meeting 
between Norwegian nature and Commission President Malfatti.1612 
All of these deeply ingrained stories of what it meant to be a good diplomat were 
templates that the Europeans drew upon when they remembered and narrated themselves in 
the interviews. Moreover, they were present in their diplomatic practice – how they worked 
with the EC-case – in the 1960s and early 1970s. Following the negative referendum, the 
juggling diplomat hero had to be reinvented for the Europeans to remember the EC-debacle in 
a meaningful way. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1607 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. 
1608 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012.  
1609 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. 
1610 Neumann At home with the Diplomats (2012), p. 120-121. 
1611 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012.  
1612 Sommerfelt Sendemann (1997), p. 149. My translation. 
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Memories of War 
To understand how the diplomat hero was reinvented following the negative referendum, we 
need to explore how memories of the Second World War play(ed) an important part in their 
work with the EC-case, their interpretation of the negative referendum, and personal 
narratives of who they are today. 
The Second World War is omnipresent in the Europeans’ memories, works, and 
publications. Being kids or young adults during the war, most of them have unadorned and 
childish memories of life during the occupation, often free of intricate political analysis.1613 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, 12 years old in 1943, experienced the war from a cottage north of 
Oslo. He kept track of the progress of the allied forces through two sisters living nearby who 
delivered illegal news – and drew the frontlines with needles and threads on a giant map of 
Europe in his room.1614 Arne Langeland described the German occupation of a small, 
unnamed town in Norway, in his semi-fictional novel, My little town (1988), based partly on his 
memories from the war: 
 
“The 11th April the Germans marched into the town. They had stayed in the outskirts for 
twenty-four hours or so – the boys had seen them. A small detachment of Norwegian soldiers was 
sent towards them but was quickly withdrawn. People fled from the city, they got away in cars, 
busses and lorries. The farms in the area took them in, all kinds of rumours spread. Young boys 
and men poured into the police station and the district sheriff’s office to be mobilised – to no 
avail. Nobody knew anything; nobody knew what he or she was supposed to do, or where to 
enquire. Men cried overtly, they felt debased.”1615  
 
Langeland vividly describes how the adults around him reacted to the occupation, seen from a 
young boy’s perspective (Langeland was 12 years old in 1940). Even though they did not take 
active part in the war, their experiences of it were often dramatic. Many of the Europeans 
remember, for example, how their fathers were taken as prisoners by German troops.1616 
Those a bit older had more concrete confrontations with, and memories of, war, and 
perhaps more articulated resentments. Arild Holland, for example, voiced such resentments: 
 
“I have experienced war: my mother’s home town, Kristiansund, was bombed to the ground in 
April 1940; my father was severely injured in 1943; two, slightly older, school-mates of mine were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1613 The average age of the Europeans was just shy of 17 years in 1940. Attachment 1 – Statistics. 
1614 Salvesen Thorvalds Verden (1994), p. 17. 
1615 Arne Langeland Min lille by, Oslo: Grøndahl & Søn Forlag (1988), p. 43; Interview – Arne Langeland – 
01.05.2012. 
1616 Salvesen: Thorvalds Verden (1994), p. 15. His father was sent to the concentration camp Luckenwalde, outside of 
Berlin, in 1943. Similarly, Ibsen Jr., Skarstein, Holland and Freihow’s fathers were imprisoned by the Germans. 
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tortured to death; my closest friend and neighbour was imprisoned for nearly a year (17 years 
old) and suffered from it afterwards; and I was on Gestapo’s list, but got away by sheer luck”1617 
 
At the age of fourteen when the war came to Norway, Holland remembered hiding on the 
rooftop of a building until night came – afraid to go home – while the Gestapo arrested many 
of his friends. Many years later, he thought he was dreaming away the war while he was 
hiding up there.1618 Asbjørn Skarstein, 21-years-old in 1943, had just started his degree in 
economics in Bergen when he was tipped off that German troops would be arresting students. 
Skarstein, with friends, fled Bergen on bikes, crossing the mountains from Western Norway to 
Eastern Norway. Afraid that Gestapo would find him in his hometown at Oslo, Skarstein 
sought refuge at his grandfather’s cabin in Southern Norway.1619 
The youngest Europeans, like Terje Johannessen (five-years-old in 1940), had vague 
memories of wartime Norway. Growing up during the war he recognised that war “was a bad 
thing”. Johannessen, on the other hand, had clear memories of the immediate postwar years, 
and came to link the years of occupation with Soviet annexations in the early cold war: 
 
“Our generation, we will never be entirely free from what we grew up with. First you had the 
war itself and the occupation of a small, peaceful country, as we were; then, even more 
significantly, what happened in Eastern Europe, with those countries, especially with 
Czechoslovakia. It has left a mark that is always a part of our mind-set.”1620 
 
Only the oldest Europeans had direct experience with the war: Jahn Halvorsen, 24-years-old in 
1940, participated in the battle of Narvik, where allied forces first pushed back the Germans 
and then capitulated.1621 Working in London during the war, Søren Chr. Sommerfelt (24-
years-old in 1940) recalled, “sometimes, when the bombs were raining down, I volunteered as 
a fireguard”. Even during the worst times of German bombing, he goes on, small bottles of 
milk would be delivered to his doorstep in London every day. “As long as the milk was 
delivered”, he said, “I knew victory would be ours, sooner or later.”1622  
Thousands and thousands of contemporary Norwegians and millions of contemporary 
Europeans shared such experiences. Memories like those of the Europeans were common to a 
whole generation who had felt the horrors of war first hand. The point here is not the veracity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1617 Interview – Arild Holland – 20.02.2013. 
1618 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. 
1619 Interview – Tove Skarstein – 08.04.2014. 
1620 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012.  
1621 Aftenposten 15.05.1976: ”Ambassadør Jahn Halvorsen”, by Helge Seip. 
1622 Sommerfelt Sendemann (1997), p. 37-38, 49. 
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of these experiences and memories, but rather how the Europeans came to explicitly link them 
with European integration. Through their work with the EC-case, the Europeans’ memories of 
The Second World War were given a new meaning. The concept of peace was practiced and 
narrated into the integration project – and eventually came to serve as an enduring and 
emotionally charged rationale for why membership was necessary. 
 
Peace and Integration 
It is unsurprising that the Second World War and notions of European integration as a peace 
project were prominent in the minds of the Europeans in the 1960s, following the negative 
referendum, and even today. After all, the devastating experiences of the Second World War 
was at the heart of why the six original member states of the ECSC chose to pool 
sovereignty.1623 What is interesting, however, is how memories, events and professional stories 
were reconfigured – or re-emplotted – at different times.  
The Europeans’ linkage between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ can be traced back to their 
work with multilateral diplomacy in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. With the EC-case – ‘integration 
as a vehicle of peace’ became a strong political discourse among the many pro-European 
forces. In these environments, the Europeans’ memories of war were given new significance. 
Since then, the relationship between ‘war’, ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ has been an important 
aspect of the Europeans’ narrative. Today the Europeans inextricably conjoin experiences of war, 
the quest for peace, and their support of Norway joining the EC. So much so, that all three 
aspects often appear in the same sentence. Håkon W. Freihow, for example, explains that the 
arrest of his father during the war and his own need to go into hiding “contributed 
significantly in shaping my view of Europe in the future. I became a warm supporter of the 
EC”. 1624  Similarly, Thorvald Stoltenberg links the three: “what preoccupied me, what 
preoccupied many of us, was ‘never again war’, and how to build peace. In the 1950s I didn’t 
know of, and still today I don’t know of, a better way to do it than by making people mutually 
dependent on each other (...) and the necessity of supranationalism, it’s deeply rooted within 
me, and has been with me since my days as a student.”1625 These are clear examples of what 
Ricoeur called the threefold mimesis, in which the narrative created to order one’s 
experiences in turn becomes an integrated part of one’s identity.1626  	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1624 Interview – Håkon W. Freihow – 16.05.2013: “Håkon W. Freihow”. 
1625 Interview – Thorvald Stoltenberg – 24.02.2014. 
1626 Andersen A Question of Location (2013), p. 91; Paul Ricoeur Time and Narrative (Temps et Récit), Vol. 1, trans. 
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This mantra of ‘never again war’ is something all of the Europeans uttered during 
interviews. It makes clear the important link created between peace and integration, but also 
evidences how many times this link must have been retold as a story. Consider, for example, 
Arild Holland’s memories of how he, immediately after de Gaulle’s first veto, understood the 
significance of the EC: 
 
“And then I remember that I, one weekend, took all the papers we [the MFA] had on the 
Communities with me home and sat a Saturday and Sunday late in January 1963 and read and 
studied, studied and read, and then I understood the whole thing. This wasn’t bloody economy – 
that was just a means to an end. It was about abolishing war in Europe, just like I had dreamt 
when I was sitting on the kerb during the war. That’s when I became Norway’s biggest EC 
advocate.”1627 
 
Arild Holland’s defining moment is described with literary features (‘read and studied, studied 
and read’) often found in Norwegian fairy tales.1628 The linearity of his memories is also 
striking: The dreams from his childhood were about to become a reality. Two major life 
events have been narrated together. Arne Langeland also draws a direct line between war, 
peace and integration: “yes, because it was after the war (...) and when we spoke with each 
other, it was about keeping Europe together. It was something fundamental within us.”1629 
Equally, Terje Johannessen instinctively link the two: “I saw it as an instrument to create 
peace, keep in mind it was only 10-12 years since the war, and I had grown up with the 
war.”1630 
The conjoining of ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ was something that slowly developed 
through their work with the EC-case in the 1960s and early 1970s. In a Norwegian setting, it 
came to be their unique ‘take’ on the membership issue. Large parts of the political and 
administrative elite involved with the EC, and earlier in OEEC and other organisations, were 
convinced of the benefits of peaceful multilateral cooperation. This conviction was shared by 
anyone from hard-boiled federalists to cautious intergovernmentalists.1631 The Europeans took 
part in the discourse of integration as an instrument of peace in Paris of the 1950s, or Brussels 
of the 1960s, as evidenced by Asbjørn Skarstein’s dispatch in February 1962, in which he 
reminded the politicians back home that the EEC was not only about economics: “the Treaty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1627 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. 
1628 It is a ‘way of speaking’, that clearly draws on the genre qualities of the fairy tales of Per Chr. Asbjørnsen and 
Jørgen Moe Norske Folkeeventyr I-III, Oslo: Aschehough (2012). 
1629 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. 
1630 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
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of Rome is therefore – in its consequence – a peace movement that, with its effective 
measures, could possibly be compared with the League of Nations or the United Nations. 
This, at least seems to be true if one looks at the movement in a historical perspective.”1632  
Moreover, the Europeans became increasingly involved with the EMN in the 1960s. The 
EMN had, since its creation, explicitly linked peace and integration, and the Europeans came to 
adhere to this language and rationale. For instance, soon after de Gaulle’s first veto, when 
Magne Reed discussed the EMN’s future with European Jahn Halvorsen, Reed proclaimed: 
“the basic idea of European cooperation is to clean out the last vestiges of historical conflicts, 
power struggles and economic troubles in Europe, thus making a new war unthinkable and 
impossible."1633 Peace, war and the EC were also the major elements in the newspaper ads of 
the EMN leading up to the referendum: 
 
“’Mind your own business’, they said in the Europe of the 1930s. ‘We do not want any meddling in 
internal affairs’. Each country had enough with their own, without community and cooperation. 
One by one, they fell at the hands of an aggressive dictatorship. During the war two things became 
clear to the Norwegians: first, that Norway had to become free again. Second, that countries now 
had to cooperate, if freedom was to prove lasting. (...) This was why the EC was created.”1634 
 
Furthermore, as seen above, in negotiating with the Community, the Europeans came to 
develop and articulate an explicitly political rationale for membership in the EC. Thus, the 
tactical considerations of the Europeans linked Atlantic security, and therefore the avoidance of 
war, with membership in the EC in a Cold War setting. “It was foresight that lay behind the 
Norwegian London-Government’s Atlantic policy, while country and people lay ridden by the 
German occupants”, Sommerfelt wrote in his 1997 memoirs, continuing, “for me 
membership in the EC was a continuation of the economic and political line followed for 25 
years since the victory and the peace.”1635 Last, the Europeans helped facilitate the Labour 
Party’s social democratic vision of Europe in the mid to late 1960s. This vision explicitly 
linked ideas of ‘solidarity’ and ‘world peace’, with the political project of a more socialist 
Europe. The Labour Party leadership developed this vision together with a dense pro-
European social democratic network that spanned across Europe. Bratteli, for example, 
consistently understood and articulated the membership issue as a matter of perpetuating 
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1633 UD 44.36/6.84 P.-1 – 02.04.1963, Oslo – M. Reed - Memo. The uropean Committee. Goals and tasks. 
1634 NSA–7B–41 –24.08.1972, Oslo – The European Movement. 
1635 Sommerfelt: Sendemann (1997), p. 156. 
	  	   366	  
peace.1636 Terje Johannessen recalled how Bratteli, echoing the lessons of the interwar period, 
often said: ‘the day commodities stop crossing the borders, the armies will come instead’.1637  
Already in the 1960s, then, the Europeans drew a rather direct line between their 
memories of war, European integration, and the prospect of peace. The combination of the 
Europeans’ generational understanding, education and work with the EC-case, and with it, 
their connections abroad and at home, created a specific link between peace and integration. 
It was within this context that the Europeans tried to convey a particular understanding to the 
electorate up until the referendum. 
 
The inaugurated few 
During their work with the EC-case, the Europeans contrasted their unique understanding of 
why membership was necessary with what they understood as the lack of knowledge among 
the Norwegian electorate. The fundamental task was to make the voters understand what 
they, the Europeans, already knew. Successive governments chose to discuss the membership 
issue almost exclusively in economic terms, and there was no official information campaign 
until the last months before the referendum. The Europeans, therefore, often displayed a 
tension, between their wish to bridge the gap between ‘Norway’ and ‘Europe’, and feelings of 
resignation over what they saw as a misguided debate, and the general ignorance and the 
inward-looking nature of Norwegians. 
During the first round (1960-1963), Langeland stressed that membership of the EEC 
had to be presented as a continuation of the Labour Government’s foreign and security policy 
throughout the post-war era. We recall how he thought it impossible to create “a kind of 
‘European enthusiasm”, but instead hoped to convince the electorate that membership was a 
political necessity. 1638 His comments on ‘European enthusiasm’, taking part ‘as a loyal 
member’ and ‘joining a Community’, are riddled with tension. Langeland placed himself on 
the outside of what he understood as a Norwegian mentality, and simultaneously revealed that 
he, as opposed to others, had adopted a Community-thinking. He thus extracted himself from 
the Norwegian discourse of ‘Europe as the Other’, and spoke of himself instead as a European. 
But he did not only distance himself from the Norwegian mentality, he juxtaposed it to ‘trust’ 
in the outside world – the Norwegian mentality was therefore portrayed as myopic.  
Similarly, when Otto Kildal retired in 1967 after serving as ambassador to Brussels and 
The Hague, he felt the need to comment upon what he thought was a derailed and parochial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1636 Roy Jacobsen Trygve Bratteli – En Fortelling, Oslo: J.W. Cappelens Forlag (1995). 
1637 Interview – Terje Johannessen – 24.04.2012. 
1638 UD 44.36/6.84 – 18.04.1962, Oslo – A. Langeland – Norway’s relationship with the EEC. Certain remarks. 
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membership debate in the Norwegian Parliament: “the Community is both a common market 
and a political idea of peace and cooperation, and we have to strive towards membership even 
though there will be obstacles along the way.” Asked by the journalist what he thought of the 
membership-sceptics’ argument that Norway would loose its sovereignty, he answered: “are 
there no limits to the small-town mentality and inferiority complexes? Shouldn’t Norway be 
able to raise its independent voice just as well as the Dutch within the Community, or the 
Belgians?”1639 Likewise, Egil Winsnes, at the Norwegian embassy in Paris, received complaints 
about his lectures on Norway and the EC to visiting Norwegians, and wrote back to MFA 
State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg: 
 
“I usually touch upon what I jestingly call the “long live Toten [a part of the agricultural inland in 
Norway], to hell with Norway”-mentality. A mentality in which the feeling of solidarity stops a 
few meters past the living room door, and which is the biggest obstacle to building a 
communitarian solidary Europe.”1640 
 
Though it is abundantly clear that the Europeans thought Norwegian attitudes towards the 
Community was a problem, the aim was to overcome this hurdle. Still, feelings of being 
outside, or above, are easy to detect. In 1962, Asbjørn Skarstein, for example, complained – 
after underlining that the EEC was “a peace movement” – that “it’s difficult to understand the 
Norwegian opposition to the European Communities – seen from the outside. It’s almost as if 
it’s from another time.”1641 
We are only able to appreciate the significance of these feelings of frustration and 
resignation in light of the role they played in memories of the Europeans after the negative 
referendum. For it was these feelings of being among the inaugurated few that became 
cemented after the ‘no’. “In Norway”, 50 years after the referendum, Langeland reflected, 
“there was a fundamental distrust of Germany; and of France, and the Italians, all these 
southern Europeans. The level of distrust was immense. (...) Here we touch upon something 
fundamental: Norwegians didn’t understand the first thing about this. Even the most educated 
people didn’t understand it. There was a fundamental scepticism, which exists to this day.” 
When I tried to press him on why they didn’t understand, Langeland replied: “the country is 
far to the north, middle of nowhere.”1642 He, on the other hand, saw it differently: “I reacted 	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the way I did because I didn’t have any objections. It was perfectly fine with me that the world 
turned out like this. I had no preconceived notions. And I thought it was exciting.”1643  
Arild Holland, too, gives a tangible example of the differences between being among 
those who understood, and those who didn’t. Holland’s old teacher at the University, famous 
economist Ragnar Frisch, who he respected deeply, called the EEC the ‘unenlightened 
plutocracy’. “Everybody wrote and spoke of economy”, Holland remembers, “no one – 
absolutely no one – understood that this was about permanently ending war in Europe”.1644 
Equally, Arild Holland’s obituary of Asbjørn Skarstein is illuminating: 
 
“In Brussels too [1962-63], Asbjørn Skarstein was the right man in the right place. He was one of 
the first in Norway that understood the background for the EEC-cooperation. Even though it 
was about economic cooperation, it was also a comprehensive peace initiative – making a new 
war in Western Europe impossible. EEC’s peace aspect was decisive in Skarstein’s positive 
attitude towards Norwegian membership.”1645 
 
The inextricable link between ‘peace’ and ‘integration’ defined what it meant to be among the 
inaugurated few.  
Holland, as Langeland, portrays Norway as myopic and provincial, when explaining the 
enthusiasm for the Danish Nordek proposal: “it fit the Norwegian parliamentarians like a 
glove, most of them do not know any languages, but they loved ‘Norden’, because then they 
could speak their mother tongue [said in a broad dialect] you know”.1646 Tancred Ibsen Jr. makes 
the same distinction, contrasting himself to the Norwegian mentality, when explaining why he 
became so invested in the membership issue: “you could say I’m a European. I come from a 
segment of the people that has had just as many contacts abroad as at home. So, I’m a 
Norwegian European (...) And I thought that Norway should find its place in Europe...” He 
remembered talking to Jahn Halvorsen after the negative referendum: “Jahn was distraught 
and angered. Absolutely. We were distraught. (...) But there was nothing you could do. The 
Norwegian people didn’t want to. We are... Norwegians are isolationists and difficult.”1647 
Illustratively, he corrects himself in the last sentence, and places himself outside the discourse. 
After the negative referendum, the need to bridge the gap disappeared, and the bitter 
EC-struggle cemented the elements of conflict. The negative referendum thus led to a subtle, 
but important, shift in the Europeans’ narrative. They were among the inaugurated few who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1643 Interview – Arne Langeland – 01.05.2012. 
1644 Interview – Arild Holland – 09.01.2014. 
1645 Aftenposten 28.10.1999: ”Asbjørn Skarstein”, by Arild Holland.  
1646 Interview – Arild Holland – 27.04.2012. 
1647 Interview – Tancred Ibsen Jr. – 23.11.2013. 
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understood what the EC really was – namely a political project to prevent war. To their mind, 
neither the organised ‘no’ side, nor the broad majority of the people, understood this. More 
fundamentally, Norway was, and is, fundamentally detached and different from Europe. One 
may note, therefore, that both the Europeans and EC-sceptics placed ‘the diplomat’ outside of 
Norwegian political discourse. Moreover, the political discourse of Europe, as a vehicle of 
peace, which failed to capture the electorate’s imagination, is transmuted into a private 
narrative among the Europeans. 
Reading the quotes above one gets an image of a few heroic diplomats fighting against a 
dominant force – their memories highlight how they were a discursive minority. Nowhere is 
this imagery more clear than in Arild Holland’s retelling of the day they travelled to the 
ratification ceremony: 
 
“Saturday January 22, 1972 I was, together with some other civil servants, supposed to travel 
together with [Prime Minister] Bratteli and [Foreign Minister] Cappelen, both with spouses, to 
Brussels to take part in the ratification ceremony. Already at Fornebu [Airport] the drama started 
(...) When I arrived in a taxi at Fornebu, a crowd had gathered outside the entry. To my 
stupefaction I saw Bratteli and his wife surrounded by protesters, preventing them from the 
entry. I was able to get Randi Bratteli under the arm, and together we forced our way through 
the crowd. At the entry I met a SAS-employee and I asked him to take care of Mrs Bratteli who 
exclaimed: ‘Take care of my husband’! I ran back. Bratteli was still surrounded by squawking 
protesters, which he tried to keep away by swirling a couple of travelling bags around. I was able 
to guide Bratteli out, as his driver came to help as well. Luckily, it didn’t come to violence. When 
we had broken out of the circle, the protesters began to sing ‘Ja, vi elsker’ [the Norwegian national 
anthem]. It struck me as rather grotesque, when I thought about what Bratteli had been trough 
as a prisoner in Germany”.1648 
 
Rather than the diplomat heroically building bridges across landmasses almost impossibly far 
apart, the story became one of the Europeans being among the few who fought for a morally 
just cause, but were defeated at the hands of the unknowing and unwilling masses. 
Widespread misconceived nationalism prevailed over righteous, peace-seeking 
cosmopolitanism. The personal and professional defeat of losing the referendum, being 
discredited by the ‘no’ side and, in some instances, leaving the service, was thus squared with 
the story of the heroic diplomat in order to create meaning. In this imagery, it is clear that 
both the warrior-like, and the self-effacing mediator hero, faded to the background, leaving a 
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suffering and enduring hero. Thus, a new character rose from the ashes of the EC-struggle: 
the martyr. 
 
Retelling Stories 
Tamnes rightly noted that, “no two scenarios are alike, but some are more alike than others. 
The EC/EU-cases, as they developed up until to the critical decisions of 1972 and 1994 have 
many noticeable similarities.”1649 In both instances, Norway was forced by external events to 
apply for membership negotiations before it was politically prepared, and the government was 
dragging its feet, negotiating a difficult dossier and demanding special treatment. And both 
times, the primary sector and loss of sovereignty were the two major stumbling blocks in the 
negotiations, and the whole endeavour ended with the Norwegian electorate voting against 
membership.1650 However, while 1972 was a defining generational experience, a landmark for 
an entire people, 1994 will first and foremost be remembered for the Winter Olympics in 
Lillehammer.1651 There is no doubt the Europeans today feel the same way: 1994 was a pale 
repetition of 1972, which confirmed that Norway would continue to be referred to “the 
sidelines and marginalised from the economic and political integration in Europe” as Eivinn 
Berg puts it. Berg returned to the MFA as chief negotiator at the deputy level both in the 
European Economic Area and the enlargement negotiations with the EU in the 1990s.1652  
The second negative referendum also strengthened the Europeans’ feeling of belonging to 
the inaugurated few. Although retired from the MFA, Arild Holland engaged in the 
membership debate in the 1990s, giving interviews and lectures, but explained that he ‘gave 
up’ when he understood that the government once again focussed exclusively on economic 
matters.1653 Terje Johannessen agreed: “Trade policy is security policy, and that is the politics 
of peace. And that dimension was completely missing – wasn’t even on the horizon in the 
Norwegian debate, neither in 72’ nor in 94’”.1654  
“Now, finally, the peace perspective is starting to come to the fore with the handing out 
of the Nobel Peace Prize”, Holland mused in 2013, a year after the European Union had 
received it, as if to say that the mistakes repeated since the 1960s might still be rectified.1655 
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1650 53,5 % and 52,2 % voted against entry in 1972 and 1994 respectively. 
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1652Minervanett 15.12.2009 “Norges nei til EU – 15 år etter”, by Eivinn Berg. http://www.minervanett.no/norges-nei-
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“He’s been very preoccupied with the political aspects lately” Eivinn Berg noted about 
Holland, “he never brings something up in our group – the European Movement’s senior 
group – without giving a flaming lecture on the Coal and Steel Community and Schuman and 
all that. Like hearing a new Peace Prize speech. And I fully agree with him, it was 
neglected.”1656 The argument that the EC/EU has contributed to peace and stability has 
never gained popular appeal, or even significantly coloured, the Norwegian debate, former 
editor of the bourgeois newspaper Aftenposten Per Egil Hegge reflected in 2013. Hegge adds: 
“for the ‘yes-people’ the Peace Prize (...) was a just and well-founded appreciation”.1657 
In later life, the process of ‘life review’ – involving the time and desire to remember 
one’s life – strengthens the importance, and sometimes the accuracy, of long-term memory. 
Such a tendency helps to structure temporally ‘long’ plots, and gives a cohesive meaning to 
one’s life.1658 It is clear today that the Europeans make little distinction between the EC and the 
EU, or 72’ and 94’ – they are all part of the same narrative. When they meet and share these 
experiences, they retell and remodel the story of themselves and Europe, and it seems that 
they strengthen the causal link between war, peace and Europe. By ‘reliving’ the experience of 
1972, in 1994 they have confirmed their belief that they are rather alone in understanding 
what European integration is really about. “Looking back from the conclusion to the episodes 
leading up to it”, Ricoeur wrote, “we have to be able to say that this ending required these 
sorts of events and this chain of actions”.1659 It is this fictionalising process that has created a 
meaningful experience out of the professional and personal failure of the negative referendum. 
Today, the remaining Europeans are retired, and live in the wealthy and esteemed 
western outskirts of Oslo. In fact, most of them live within walking distance of each other – a 
village, so to speak, of former diplomats. With few exceptions, they remain very close friends: 
they are ‘best friends’, or at least ‘close friends’, they are godfathers to each other’s children 
and served as ‘best man’ in each other’s weddings.1660 Many of them meet regularly in the 
EMN offices. Alone in sharing this unique experience of working with the EC-case so closely, 
they retell and uphold the narrative of the diplomatic martyr. To this day they refer to 
themselves as Europeans. 
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Conclusions – Caught in the Middle 
_________________________________________ 
 
Norway, in the end, did not join the Community – the journey the Europeans helped navigate 
was incomplete. Jahn Halvorsen, for instance, – recognised as the most influential, 
knowledgeable, and ardently pro-membership European in a Norwegian context – would 
remain in a European context, as a Danish official teased, “the everlasting student”.1661 As we 
have learned throughout this thesis, being a European meant being caught in the middle. Who 
the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case, therefore, is best understood by 
unpacking the criss-cross of norms, diplomatic space, discourses and practices that made up 
their layered in-betweenness. 
 
Between Europe and Norway 
As this thesis has argued, it makes good sense to study foreign policy as both transnational and 
national, and as shaped in-between (political) entities through transfers and translations of 
ideas, strategies and concepts. Norwegian European policy was shaped in the middle, through 
the Europeans’ practice. In formulating policy, they adopted a communitarian language and 
logic: the radical, trust-based, negotiation strategy created in late-1962, the establishment line 
in the fisheries negotiations, and the emphasis on embracing the political finalité and the 
adoption and performance of the acquis, were all products of this. The enlargement process, 
therefore, disciplined Norwegian politics via the Europeans (and others) – an embryo of the pre-
accession logic that the EU operates with today. However, the flow went the other way too: 
the communitarian fishery policy developed by the Europeans would, in the end, contribute to 
the downfall of the EC’s own Common Fisheries Policy. Moving past the ‘road to 
membership’-narratives, then, this thesis has uncovered an important instance of the ‘outside’ 
shaping the ‘inside’, and showed that the non-membership of Norway should be understood 
and studied as an integral part of the first enlargement. 
The Europeans were between Europe and Norway in another way, too. The combination 
of the role of the diplomat, and the connotations attached to him in Norwegian society, the 
‘no’ side’s historically loaded rhetoric of ‘Europe as the Other’, and the personal conviction of 
the Europeans and their norm-breaking participation in the information campaigns, led to ‘the 
diplomat’ being discursively pushed outside the concept of ‘Norway’, which was synonymous 	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with ‘the People’. The Europeans contributed to this by juxtaposing their trust in the outside 
world (the EC) with what they conceived as the myopic distrust displayed by ‘the People’ – 
they were among the few who understood why membership was a good thing. However, EC 
officials, representatives and politicians of the member states, Monnet’s Action Committee, 
and others, continuously questioned Norway’s ‘Europeanness’, and placed ‘Norway’ outside 
‘Europe’.  
At the heart of the Europeans work with the EC-case, therefore, was a continuous effort 
to bridge the gap between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’. One way of doing this was through an 
elaborate and unique form of public diplomacy, which entailed flying Norwegians to 
Community sites and the Embassy in Brussels, and Community and member state officials to 
Norway to encounter its unique nature. The public diplomacy of physical connectivity was as 
much about changing the Norwegian outlook as it was about changing the position of the EC, 
and sought to communicate that Norway was at once a distinct and a natural part of Europe. 
It aimed at reproducing the Europeans’ experience of the two entities – from in-between – 
within a position of trust and understanding. Equally, the creation of a communitarian fishery 
policy intended to shape Europe in the Norwegian image displayed their in-betweenness. It 
was at once an acceptance of the communitarian logic and the superiority of the Norwegian 
model. The efforts at bridging the gap, we have seen, were driven by both personal and 
professional convictions. 
 
Between personal and professional 
The Europeans were a community of likeminded MEDs: a highly autonomous, emotionally 
tight-knit, elite of multilateral economic diplomats with a recognised expertise on European 
integration, and who defined themselves through their passion for, and belief in, a Norwegian 
EC-membership. This community coalesced and defined itself through the first round of 
negotiations (1960-63). Within three years, the Europeans and the foreign policy leadership 
fundamentally changed their attitudes to European integration: from distrust, via 
acquiescence, to eagerness. The membership line was their policy and starting point, in the 
sense that the Europeans had been fundamental in shaping it, and defending it became their 
modus operandi. It underpinned why the Europeans defended a certain kind of application in all 
three rounds, why they entered the EMN in the mid-1960s, opposed Nordek in the late 1960s, 
and engaged in public information campaigns in the early 1970s. By the time of the 
referendum, the Europeans were engaged in several different pro-European networks, most 
importantly the EMN, and operated between these entities as boundary-spanners for the 
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European cause. There was a deep sense of intimacy and trust among the Europeans, and their 
pro-European surroundings, precisely because they shared the cause. 
The reasoning behind the membership line, produced by the community of Europeans, 
circled around the discourses of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’. They were produced in the middle, 
and were shaped by ideas from the Community and other applicants, and from the 
experiences and expertise of the Europeans themselves. The core argument was that EC-
membership lay in continuation of NATO-membership – it was another layer in the Atlantic 
Community. This argument, the Europeans thought, would be appealing both in a European 
and domestic context. In the European context, it was used as a warning of the consequences 
if Norway remained on the outside, together with the neutrals and within the reach of the 
Soviets. But also as a way of signalling that Norway, indeed, was a natural part of Western 
Europe. In the domestic context it failed to gain prominence. Gerhardsen feared it would split 
the Labour Party and Borten would have no talk of political implications of membership. 
Only from 1971 onwards, when Bratteli took over and carried with him elements of the social 
democratic vision of Europe, did this reasoning become part of the government’s rhetorical 
arsenal, but by that time it was too late – the question of sovereignty and economic arguments 
dominated the domestic debate.  
However, the Europeans belief in, and ownership of, a particular membership line had 
deeper roots. At the time, and even more so after the referendum, the Europeans developed a 
normative and emotional rationale, seeing European integration as a vehicle of peace. This 
view was formed by their generational experiences and memories of war, their multilateral 
diplomatic environment, their participation in the European Movement and their connections 
with the transnational Social Democratic networks. In the dying days of the information 
campaigns, ‘peace’ was pushed to the fore as the ‘yes’ side’s last emotional plea. These 
convictions were instrumental in their work. Between the personal and the professional, the 
Europeans helped to create and uphold a certain discourse of Europe, which after the 
referendum remained central in keeping them together as a community. But the ability to 
create policy, to such a degree, was also determined by developments within their particular 
diplomatic field. 
 
Between diplomacy and politics 
Most international history gives character, memories and agency to great statesmen while 
leaving diplomats as the silent facilitators: their job is to prepare the ground for others, one 
assumes, without predispositions or influence. Not so. Centring the diplomats, their norms, 
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backgrounds, spaces, discourses and practices, this thesis has uncovered plenty of agency: the 
Europeans belonged to a young war generation of multilateral economic diplomats who gained 
new capacities, more room for policy formation, and entered new international and national 
spaces. They were experts and boundary-spanners, and their practices and field of diplomacy 
blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic politics. The EC-case is an extreme 
example: multilateral negotiations concerning the very social fabric of Norwegian society were 
directly tied to a consultative referendum. 
The Europeans held key positions in-between the various arenas, and through their 
expertise they created politics and articulated a political foundation to Norway’s application 
for membership negotiations in the early 1960s, which profoundly shaped the outlook, policies 
and arguments of the pro-European political and economic elites up until the referendum. 
They created a communitarian fishery policy, which the Bratteli government defended in 
negotiations until late 1971, and were instrumental in the organisation of the information 
campaigns and the formulation of its argumentation. 
Administrative and diplomatic power is different from political power. This thesis has 
disentangled the diplomats as the silent extension of politicians and analysed their practice 
through the lens of their norms, institutions and knowledge production. This has, ironically, 
made it possible to understand the political potential of the Europeans. The way Langeland 
adopted elements of the Danish and British negotiation strategies, to make Norway “work 
through the Community machinery” in the first round; the way Halvorsen and Skaug publicly 
denounced their own government’s indecisiveness in the second round; how Greve instructed 
newspaper editors to counter those opposed to membership and how Holland and Ølberg 
reversed the decision of the WG on fishery questions thus profoundly changing what would 
have been Norway’s future fishery regime; all were ways in which the Europeans entered the 
realm of politics by way of their diplomatic capabilities. 
In the end, the Europeans’ political engagement in 1971-72 exploded established 
diplomatic norms – they were not the silent mediators, the loyal servants, or the ‘objective’ 
experts anymore. As this thesis has shown, this was the product of a glacial shift in diplomatic 
practices on-going since the Second World War, the demise of the Labour Party hegemony in 
the mid-1960s, the distrust of Borten and the EC-sceptics, and the Europeans’ personal and 
professional engagement in pro-European networks. In this context, the breakdown of the 
Labour Party hegemony was a turning point, for this led the Europeans to become explicitly 
engaged with the EMN, which in turn cemented their new role as boundary-spanners for the 
European cause. The new role was exposed during the information campaigns, through the 
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fundamental criticism of the victorious ‘no’ side – a distinct manifestation of the 1968 ‘system’ 
criticism. The Europeans were discredited, and, at least at the time, the MFA lost its legitimacy 
in voicing ‘national interests’. The fate of the Europeans was an aborted trajectory towards 
careers as part of the technocratic elites of the Community. Nonetheless, their practices 
capture the many ways in which such an elite wielded its power upon entry. 
 
Between continuity and change 
The 1960s and early 1970s were times of rapid transition – placed between the postwar order 
and the tumultuous globalising 1970s – and the Europeans embodied both change and 
continuity. On the one hand, their arguments, negotiation strategies and advice with regards 
to membership in the EC were anchored in the well-established postwar concepts of 
‘prosperity’ and ‘security’. In fact, the Europeans work with the EC-case was in many ways an 
unremitting attempt at placing membership as a continuation of the course followed up to that 
point. It was with this argumentation that Halvorsen and Langeland won over Lange and 
Skaug in the early 1960s, and it was with this argumentation Frydenlund hoped to win over 
the electorate in 1971-72. In terms of ‘security’, membership was interpreted as being the next 
logical step anchoring Norway to the Atlantic alliance. And, perhaps more importantly, that 
active exclusion from the EC would be a step towards neutrality, and therefore an open break 
with Norwegian post 1949 foreign policy. Here the Europeans and the MFA found common 
ground with the Conservatives and the right wing of the Labour Party, and they all helped to 
produce this rhetoric through the hub of the EMN. In terms of ‘prosperity’, membership 
meant maintaining access to vital export markets. Every sitting government, and the Europeans 
too, realised that this access had to be balanced with special arrangements for the agricultural 
and fishery sector. The strategy chosen aimed at maintaining the socio-economic postwar 
balance between access and protection. 
However, as we have seen, this conceals the fundamental, and known, changes that 
membership entailed. In the early 1960s, the Europeans and the government first left its 
strategy of a wider transatlantic free trade area behind, then the aim of bloc negotiations 
between EFTA and the EEC, and was left with the option of applying for membership or 
negotiating a trade agreement with the Community. Faced with this choice, the influential 
‘iron triangle’ economists argued that the free-market ideology of the EC would strip Norway 
of its economic instruments, and thus endanger the balanced state intervention needed to 
secure full employment and economic growth. Opposite, the dense network of pro-European 
forces that the Europeans were a part of, were not opposed to change. They held views that 
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ranged from hoping that membership in the EC would somehow dismantle the postwar state 
and pull Norway in a liberal direction (NSA), to visions of an active, international social 
democratic economic policy (Labour Party right wing). The Europeans represented these views. 
They saw international economic change as inevitable, the maintenance of past economic 
instruments as futile, and coordination of economic policies, tax harmonisation and eventually 
a monetary union, as natural consequences of a functioning common market. The Europeans 
represented an alternative node of economic competence within the administration – closer to 
the view that markets, not economic policies and instruments, created prosperity. 
On another level, however, this was still continuity. Frydenlund’s campaign of security, 
trust and continuity is emblematic for the way the Europeans emphasised that change was 
potentially dangerous, and that membership meant sticking to the winning recipe of the past. 
In meeting with a radical extra-parliamentary alliance of right and left, and their peculiar mix 
of ‘1968’, and ‘Norwegian’ arguments captured in the slogan of self-determination, the 
Europeans and the established political elite’s concepts of continued ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ 
became stale remnants of a postwar order, which, in 1972, seemed to be eroding in front of 
their eyes.  
 
The legacy of the Europeans 
As much as Norwegian European policy was formed by the ‘no’ side, EC-sceptics, the 
People’s Movement, the primary sectors and the Norwegian ‘no’, it was shaped by the pro-
European alliance between parts of the administrative, political and economic elite. The 
Europeans were the glue and the brain trust of this alliance. A historiography of Norway and 
Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, without a study of the Europeans, therefore, is incomplete. It 
leaves a blind spot to processes through which Norwegian domestic and foreign policy was 
shaped by Europe and vice versa – something which is all the more relevant given the 
Norwegian participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) from 1994 onwards.1662 
Today, with Norway excluded from the EU’s decision-making processes, the Norwegian EU 
delegation in Brussels is among the government’s most important sources of expertise, analysis 
and information – a policy shaping, semi-autonomous actor in the midst of Europe.1663 
The Europeans helped institutionalise a way of speaking about and dealing with Europe 
in official Norway. This did not disappear with the electorate’s ‘no’ in 1972, and would 
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continue in a low-key version with Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund’s1664 ‘active European-
policy’. In the 1980s and early 1990s, moreover, the Europeans returned: Langeland became 
director of the Norwegian Export Council between 1982 and 1988, and served as 
Ambassador to Paris (until 1993) and The Hague (until 1996). Ølberg was Ambassador to 
Bonn between 1987 and 1993, and then served as Ambassador to the Norwegian OECD 
delegation in Paris. Eivinn Berg returned as Ambassador to Brussels and Norway’s permanent 
representative to the EC in 1988, and was appointed head of the EEA (1989-1993) and EU 
membership (1993-94) negotiations. Thorvald Stoltenberg was Foreign Minister in the crucial 
years (1987-89 and 1990-93). The Europeans therefore represent an elite, with deep historical 
roots, broad networks, and the ability and will to create foreign policy, which would continue 
to hold important positions in-between ‘Europe’ and ‘Norway’.  
Mapping the community of Europeans and how they worked with the EC-case in the 
1960s and early 1970s, therefore, should prove important for historians engaging with 
Norway’s second attempt to join the EU in the 1990s – as an integral part of the enlargement 
problématique, process and policy – and who try to understand Norway’s depoliticised semi-
membership in the EU of today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1664 Frydenlund was Foreign Minister from 1973 to 1981, followed by Svenn Stray between 1981 and 1986, and 
returned as Foreign Minister from 1986 until his death in 1987, when he was replaced by Stoltenberg. 
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